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Part 1 RATIONAL FREEDOM

1 The Dialectic of Enlightenment

Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude!  Have courage to use your own understanding!
Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large proportion of men, even when nature has long emancipated them from alien guidance (naturaliter maiorennes), nevertheless gladly remain immature for life. For the same reasons, it is all too easy for others to set themselves up as their guardians. It is so convenient to be immature! If I have a book to have understanding in place of me, a spiritual adviser to have a conscience for me, a doctor to judge my diet for me, and so on, I need not make any efforts at all. I need not think, so long as I can pay; others will soon enough take the tiresome job over for me. The guardians who have kindly taken upon themselves the work of supervision will soon see to it that by far the largest part of mankind (including the entire fair sex) should consider the step forward to maturity not only as difficult but also as highly dangerous. Having first infatuated their domesticated animals, and carefully prevented the docile creatures from daring to take a single step without the leading-strings to which they are tied, they next show them the danger which threatens them if they try to walk unaided. Now this danger is not in fact so very great, for they would certainly learn to walk eventually after a few falls. But an example of this kind is intimidating, and usually frightens them off from further attempts.

Kant WE Reiss ed 1996: 54

I shall open with Kant, the Motto of Enlightenment and Steven Pinker’s recent book Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress and attendant article Reason is Non-Negotiable. In my critical examination of the connection between reason and freedom, I am concerned to develop some of the key issues that Pinker raises in these places. Pinker gets us to ask Kant’s old question: What is Enlightenment? In answering that question, I develop a conception of rational freedom out of Marx’s work that takes Enlightenment in a direction other than Pinker’s. I’m interested in reason, freedom, and the connection between them in terms of the arts and sciences, culture, politics and social institutions. I am also concerned to identify the precise ways in which that connection has come to be severed so that the emancipatory potentials of reason come to take the form of a repressive rationalization. Pinker thinks that such a dialectic of enlightenment is the product of disgruntled leftist intellectuals working in the humanities and social sciences, ignoring the hard facts that things have actually got better and that the Enlightenment project is succeeding. The key word, however, is ‘dialectic.’ Marx insists that we live in a world in which everything is pregnant with its opposite. It can very well be, in Dickens’ words, that we live in the best of times and the worst of times. If we place the accent on one side to the neglect of the other, then we fail to see the nature of the predicament as well as its potentials for something better. Marx was not a cultural pessimist in this respect, but took the high road of modernity, appreciating the developmental achievements and potentials of capitalist modernity whilst noting the downside. I’m interested in the social forms implicated in the disconnection between reason and freedom. This, I shall argue, is Marx’s theme, something which defines Marx as a critical post-Enlightenment thinker.

Pinker highlights the idea of a ‘science of man’ as a key concern of Enlightenment thinkers:

The need for a “science of man” was a theme that tied together Enlightenment thinkers who disagreed about much else, including Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Kant, Nicolas de Condorcet, Denis Diderot, Jean-Baptiste d’Alembert, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Giambattista Vico. Their belief that there was such a thing as universal human nature, and that it could be studied scientifically, made them precocious practitioners of sciences that would be named only centuries later.

‘Reason is non-negotiable’: Steven Pinker on the Enlightenment, 2018

Many have issues with Pinker and his critical comments against humanist scholars of leftist persuasion. I'll happily defend critical theory, the Frankfurt School, Bauman et al against scientistic reductions of reason. The greatest threat to science comes not from these leftist and humanist sources, those (such as I) who are interested in the ‘dialectic of enlightenment,’ which are attempts to make us think reasonably and critically about reason, but from right-wing conservative forces allied to money who are concerned to entrench and extend their power within prevailing asymmetrical power relations. On that, Pinker is silent. He is strong on abstract reason, weak on its institutional expression. He takes the existing forms of capitalist modernisation to be rational.

The rights and wrongs of Pinker’s view of the humanist left, however, is not my specific concern here. I have developed a dialectical view of the Enlightenment throughout, something which highlights the extent to which alienation for Hegel and Marx is not a destructive process but progressive, an agent of development. Pinker is right enough to cite the evidence for progress, his blind spot comes with respect to capitalist modernity as a predicament. My interest lies in Pinker’s defence of Enlightenment, reason and the need he expresses for a conception of human nature. Over the years I have written extensively on Immanuel Kant and his rational community of co-legislators, and consider Kant’s philosophy to be infinitely superior to most of what passes for philosophy today. And I think that Pinker misses Kant’s true significance as an Enlightenment thinker by a very wide mark. As for this ‘science of man,’ I can only be my usual bore for Aristotle here. Aristotle's Politics and Ethics are premised on this very thing, Aristotle drawing out the implications of his pioneer biological studies for human beings and society in this regard. I develop this further with reference to Marx’s notion of a ‘unified science of man’ expressing a normative concern with human development grounded in an essentialist anthropology. 

I’d place Marx in line of descent from the tradition Pinker is concerned to defend, defining him as a post-Enlightenment critical thinker who was also ‘the Aristotle of the modern age’ (to quote Terry Eagleton in After Theory (2004: 144). Which is to say that Marx is a peculiar kind of Enlightenment thinker, not easily placed within that tradition. His ‘science of man’ is not a scientism, and nor is it the materialism of the eighteenth century, but has incorporated the ‘active side,’ the subjective factor, developed by German idealism. At the same time, Marx is against all philosophical abstraction, idealist and materialist, and seeks the abolition/realization of human disciplines of thought to overcome their idealistic character. I spend a whole chapter establishing what Marx means by this challenging notion, which overcomes all separations and dualisms with respect to natural and human sciences. If Rousseau was a figure who was both in and against the Enlightenment, then Marx is part of the development that highlights the lines of development that lead out. But he is still part of that Enlightenment tradition in that he demonstrated a practical concern in seeing what form an enlightened world would take. 

Scott Meikle argues that the common judgement that Marx is to be considered an Enlightenment thinker stands in need of ‘considerable qualification.’ Marx shares many Enlightenment values, certainly, and in his work ‘appears as the enemy of superstition, obscurantism, dogmatism, religion, and authority.’ So far, so Enlightenment. But, crucially, Meikle points out that ‘he did not suppose all those things to be summed up in the word “Aristotelianism,” as many of his followers, especially the early ones, did.’ Marx thus possessed an ‘ambiguous’ relation to the Enlightenment, and ‘analytically he was far removed from the Enlightenment ideal of science associated with the name of La Mettrie, and much closer to Aristotle.’ (Scott Meikle, ‘Marx and the Stalinist History Textbook,’ Critique, 27 (1995); (Meikle 1985: 184). How removed, I shall make clear in what follows. In the process, I shall show that Marx’s assault upon superstition, obscurantism, dogmatism, religion, and authority was quite distinct from a rationalist humanist rejection and scientistic reduction, but was concerned to identify and uproot the social foundations of these things through practical transformation. 

Marx certainly lived up to Kant’s ‘motto of Enlightenment,’ displaying the courage to know (sapere aude) in abundance and asking some very pertinent questions about the nature of reason in relation to modern social forms and institutions in the process. In fact, Marx developed this courage to the fullest, taking shape as a commitment to a realized society that embodies human self-knowledge and self-understanding. Jacob Bronowski defined the essence of science in these terms: ‘ask an impertinent question, and you are on the way to a pertinent answer.’ (Bronowski, The Ascent of Man). Marx was a man of impertinent questions. He noted the progressive aspects of the constant revolutionising of the mode of production but was concerned to know about the nature of a progress in which things could get worse as they got better: What kind of society turns the emancipatory potential of reason into a repressive rationalization? In what kind of society could reason take rational form? Answering those questions involved Marx in a search for that kind of society that enabled all human beings to express without fear what Aristotle in the Metaphysics considered to be the natural and universal ‘desire to know.’ Marx sought to realize the kind of society that would support that Enlightenment courage to know with the creation of the appropriate social forms and practices of the common life, thus putting character formation (the social identity supporting the intellectual and moral virtues) and social formation together, thus forming the inner motive that Habermas identifies as the key to all true learning. (Habermas 1981: 28). That’s the spring to action, without which the emancipatory potential contained in the accumulation of scientific knowledge and technological know-how will remain unactualised, merely canalized within prevailing social forms and power relations.

This begs some troubling questions about the international commerce and prosperity celebrated by Enlightenment liberals and rationalists like Pinker, and identifies some serious issues with respect to the rationalization arising from within the capital system. As much as those who celebrate the free markets and free trade unifying the world, Marx understood the capital system to be ‘the universal mode of production,’ ‘world-historic’ in scope. It’s just that he was much less hopeful that the result would be a universal peace and prosperity. Marx didn’t see the progress as free competition as necessarily benign.

Pinker’s Enlightenment Now also begs some questions about this science of human nature, and about what we mean by science. The essentialist tradition to which Marx belongs is keenly concerned with this ‘science of man,’ it’s just that this science comes with a core normative component that sees human beings as certain kinds of social beings requiring certain kinds of social forms if they are to come to fully realize their natures. That’s a contentious view, containing notions of purpose, meaning and design that are considered erroneous and ideological (religious) mystifications in these post-Darwinian times. I shall make the case for teleology in Marx, distinguish it from notions of an extraneous force, and yet, ultimately, indicate why adherents of a scientific rationalism may well be right to suspect a ‘religious’ character to such thinking. At which point, the argument becomes very interesting – maybe, after all, there is a ‘hidden God’ in Marx, God as an anarchic surplus left over after reason has done its work, always evading rational enclosure: as there must be in all normative concerns beyond biological imperatives. I return to this unsettling question in the third volume, A Home and a Resting Place: Homo Religiosus.

If the Enlightenment project is faltering, falling into disrepute, even, then we should look for the social causes of this degeneration, not intellectual, and investigate how the ‘is’ of capitalist rationalization is coming to diverge so markedly from the ‘ought to be’ of rational freedom. Of course, for those who see the cause of decay in the unreasoning fear, ignorance and prejudice of those unenlightened by science, to ask such a question is to risk becoming complicit in the humanist left’s demonization of reason (a reason, significantly enough, that is equated with science, and has having naught to do with ethics). Note also the remoteness from and fear of ‘ordinary’ folk on the part of the defenders of this very liberal conception of the Enlightenment. If liberal democracy and Enlightenment are under threat, then its defenders need to look closely at their distance from the real individuals composing the demos, and ask why they consider them to be so unenlightened. (I refer people to the often fractious argument with which I ended Culturalism, Naturalism and Social Metabolism here – there is a split here between elites and masses, dividing the public between elitism and populism, that is utterly disabling and counterproductive, and which will ensure the demise of the Enlightenment project as an arid and arrogant rationalism with no roots in hearts, minds, concerns and communities of the ‘ordinary’ folk. Education works both ways, and any educator must also be educated).

There are other and better ways of defending reason and advancing enlightenment than Pinker’s way. Go too far down Pinker’s route, and we risk becoming shameless apologists for a status quo that is very far from being rational and enlightened, both in the way that it is constituted and in its effects. And not just apologists, either, but activists engaged in a reactionary defence of an unenlightened modernity that is imploding within, for want of having the courage to keep thinking - and acting - beyond ossified institutions and false fixities. 

Jeremy Lent is author of The Patterning Instinct: A Cultural History of Humanity’s Search for Meaning, which investigates how different cultures have made sense of the universe and how their underlying values have changed the course of history.

In The Patterning Instinct: A Cultural History of Humanity’s Search for Meaning (2017), Lent argues that culture shapes values and values shape history. What are our values, what is their origin, how do we articulate them and how can they shape history for the better? These are key questions with respect to the formation and activation of the inner motives. Lent’s view on this is therefore pertinent. Lent subjects the specific factual claims made by Pinker and finds them wanting:

I agree with much of what Pinker has to say. His book is stocked with seventy-five charts and graphs that provide incontrovertible evidence for centuries of progress on many fronts that should matter to all of us: an inexorable decline in violence of all sorts along with equally impressive increases in health, longevity, education, and human rights. It’s precisely because of the validity of much of Pinker’s narrative that the flaws in his argument are so dangerous. They’re concealed under such a smooth layer of data and eloquence that they need to be carefully unraveled. That’s why my response to Pinker is to meet him on his own turf: in each section, like him, I rest my case on hard data exemplified in a graph.

Lent 2018 Steven Pinker’s Ideas About Progress Are Fatally Flawed. These Eight Graphs Show Why.

It’s time to reclaim the mantle of “Progress” for progressives, states Lent. By falsely tethering the concept of progress to free market economics and liberal institutions, Pinker is effectively attempting to appropriate a great idea for which he has no rightful claim. He is appropriating reason for the very irrational forms of the capital system. 

‘When Pinker does get serious on the topic, he promotes Ecomodernism as the solution: a neoliberal, technocratic belief that a combination of market-based solutions and technological fixes will magically resolve all ecological problems. This approach fails, however, to take into account the structural drivers of overshoot: a growth-based global economy reliant on ever-increasing monetization of natural resources and human activity. Without changing this structure, overshoot is inevitable. Transnational corporations, which currently constitute sixty-nine of the world’s hundred largest economies, are driven only by increasing short-term financial value for their shareholders, regardless of the long-term impact on humanity.’ (Lent 2018).

Pinker’s work offers an intellectual rationale for the dominant class to continue practices that imperil humanity, in the name of raising standards in health and welfare for the greater numbers. Lent makes a significant point here. ‘Progress’ has become a word that has been appropriated by the worst aspects of capitalist modernity, meeting with a predictable reaction. For Lent, the right approach is not to reject ‘progress’ but to understand its true nature and causes, reclaim the term from apologists and ideologists, and establish its true intellectual, social and political conditions: ‘Progress is what I, and others I’m close to, care about passionately. Rather than ceding this idea to the coterie of neoliberal technocrats who constitute Pinker’s primary audience, I believe we should hold it in our steady gaze, celebrate it where it exists, understand its true causes, and most importantly, ensure that it continues in a form that future generations on this earth can enjoy.’

Pinker’s approach is scientistic rather than scientific. He lambasts the humanities for the very critical questioning that would identify them as heirs of the Enlightenment, and yet his scientific reductionism on these issues flies in the face of solid scientific research. Lent thus details the issues on which Pinker, despite taking his stand on science, blithely ignores scientists’ desperate and impeccably researched warnings to humanity. Pinker has a very selective view of progress, propagating the key neo-liberal myths of recent times. Lent shows how this plays out:

There is no doubt that the world has experienced a transformation in material wellbeing in the past two hundred years, and Pinker documents this in detail, from the increased availability of clothing, food, and transportation, to the seemingly mundane yet enormously important decrease in the cost of artificial light. However, there is a point where the rise in economic activity begins to decouple from wellbeing. In fact, GDP merely measures the rate at which a society is transforming nature and human activities into the monetary economy, regardless of the ensuing quality of life. Anything that causes economic activity of any kind, whether good or bad, adds to GDP. An oil spill, for example, increases GDP because of the cost of cleaning it up: the bigger the spill, the better it is for GDP.
This divergence is played out, tragically, across the world every day, and is cruelly hidden in global statistics of rising GDP when powerful corporate and political interests destroy the lives of the vulnerable in the name of economic “progress.”
Pinker is aware of the crudeness of GDP as a measure, but uses it repeatedly throughout his book because, he claims, “it correlates with every indicator of human flourishing.” This is not, however, what has been discovered when economists have adjusted GDP to incorporate other major factors that affect human flourishing.

Supplying the facts and figures to support his critical refutation of Pinker’s thesis every step of the way, Lent nails the question with a reference to false equivalences and false dichotomies. Lent shows how many of Pinker’s missteps arise from conflating two different dynamics of the past few centuries: improvements in many aspects of the human experience, and the rise of neoliberal, free market capitalism. Whether we consider this the result of faulty reasoning or a deliberate strategy to obfuscate on Pinker’s part, the result is the same, leading readers to conclude that free market capitalism is an underlying driver of human progress. That conclusion runs directly against Marx’s view, so Marx must be plain wrong, an ideologist, a deluded romantic who continues to seduce, fool and mislead those who continue to let their hearts rule their heads … Actually, Marx was not a romantic and was very hard-headed. And he operated with a dialectical view of progress, analysing a world in which everything seems to contain its opposite, and being concerned to separate the good from the bad. Pinker himself seems to advocate some such view: ‘Progress,’ he writes, ‘consists not in accepting every change as part of an indivisible package… Progress consists of unbundling the features of a social process as much as we can to maximize the human benefits while minimizing the harms.’ Marx, as a thinker who is truly in the Enlightenment tradition, does some such think. Pinker’s work, in contrast, has all the hallmarks of apologetics. And an apologetics that cannot be argued with or over – reason is non-negotiable, after all. That sounds less like Enlightenment and using your own reason than dogmatism.

Pinker closes down the critical faculty rather than enlarges it, and this non-negotiability of reason has monocratic political implications too. Pinker ‘laces his book with an unending stream of false equivalencies and false dichotomies that lead a reader inexorably to the conclusion that progress and capitalism are part of the same package.’ (Lent 2018). Lent shows how this serves to narrow options down to a one-dimensional politics. ‘One of his favorite tropes is to create a false equivalency between right-wing extremism and the progressive movement on the left,’ so that it is progressives on the left who are effectively to blame for extremist reaction on the right. Both sides are in error in rejecting the success of a centrist liberalism and the largesse of liberal economic institutions. Thus Pinker tells us that the regressive factions that undergirded Donald Trump’s presidency were ‘abetted by a narrative shared by many of their fiercest opponents, in which the institutions of modernity have failed and every aspect of life is in deepening crisis—the two sides in macabre agreement that wrecking those institutions will make the world a better place.’ And here he implicates Bernie Sanders in the rise to power of Donald Trump: ‘The left and right ends of the political spectrum,’ he argues, ‘incensed by economic inequality for their different reasons, curled around to meet each other, and their shared cynicism about the modern economy helped elect the most radical American president in recent times.’

Here, Pinker merely resurrects an old, outmoded trope of liberal critiques of totalitarianism, that in going to extremes, both left and right converge, so that Communists are just the same as, and just as bad as, Fascists and Nazis, and all right thinking people are those moderate sorts in the middle. Such claims are wrong, fail to engage in serious analysis of the forces and institutions driving politics and social divisions. They have liberalism’s trademark hypocrisy written on them, too, with this neutral reason in the middle concealing a very particular view of the good society, one that correlates in all essentials with liberal institutions and values. The problem is not with this view of a substantive good, it is with the claim that liberal institutions are neutral with respect to the good, leaving individuals free to pursue the good as they see fit, imposing a moral as well as economic marketplace, declaring these institutions to be rational in some eternal and natural sense, rendering them permanent, and delegitimising any alternate goods. As Lent points out, ‘implicit in Pinker’s political model is the belief that progress can only arise from the brand of centrist politics espoused by many in the mainstream Democratic Party.’ Or Republican, or Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Labour. In the last volume, I come to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, who critically analyses the view that ‘we are all liberals now,’ regardless of our political colours:





As for ‘centrism,’ the centre does not exist – the capital system has removed the ground from under our feet and sent the world to extremes. The extremists are governing over us, it’s just that Pinker presents them as centrists. Pinker reproduces the tired, old and very false dichotomy of liberal thought and politics, that of right versus left as a choice between equally false and equally illegitimate extremes. His target, as it was for Cold War liberals, is not the extremes of the right, but the left, which they see poised on the horizon as capitalism is at bay. ‘The left has missed the boat in its contempt for the market and its romance with Marxism,’ Pinker alleges. I’ll just say here that in my thesis I argued that Marx’s critical concern was not with the market at all but the commodity form, and that there is no intrinsic reason why a socialist society shouldn’t possess markets as means of exchange. Marx is against alienated social forms, such as markets in wage labour. Pinker proceeds to the broad brush claim that whilst ‘industrial capitalism’ has rescued humanity from universal poverty, communism has ‘brought the world terror-famines, purges, gulags, genocides, Chernobyl, megadeath revolutionary wars, and North Korea–style poverty before collapsing everywhere else of its own internal contradictions.’ Millions of people the world over can see what capitalism has brought, and that is why they are turning again to Marx and socialism.





Jeremy Lent is correct here. 

My argument advances a concept of ecological virtue as a condition for constituting the flourishing earthly commonwealth. Conceiving the virtues as qualities for successful living, I seek to put character formation and social formation together within right social relationships to define a rational common control of collective forces that is achieved through (co)responsibility. In conceiving these qualities along ecological lines, then ‘successful living’ takes shape as sustainable living in the ecological society. 

Central to this vision is the ancient eudaimonistic conception of flourishing well. My argument can be compared to that of Owen Flanagan who, in The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World (2007), writes of ‘eudaimonistic scientia’, or ‘eudaimonics’ for short. Flanagan describes this eudaimonics as the ‘empirical-normative inquiry into the nature, causes, and conditions of human flourishing.’ That is precisely the nature of my enquiry. Rational freedom involves establishing these conditions in terms of the institutions, structures, practices and relations in which human and planetary flourishing go hand in hand.

My work on Marx draws on a wide range of sources and thinkers, including conservatives and liberals, from Plato and Aristotle to Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. I organize themes concerning a viable social order around the concept of rational freedom. I offer this not as a rebuttal to apologists to a liberalism that is in implosion but as an attempt to get those who are serious about constituting a new social order to get it right. Criticisms of capitalism are easy – putting together new forms of social mediation to ensure viable forms of government and economic systems that command the assent of the governed and satisfy popular needs is the difficult part. It is not a project to be undertaken lightly – the economy could easily go down the tubes, with chaos and political repression an inevitable corollary. So I am more concerned, in recommending Marx, that people engage in some hard analysis of social forms, institutions and systems so that revolutionary claims have some viable practical content. Without that, communism remains a gamble that experience cautions against. That said, if the pull of the idea isn’t persuasive, the push of a capital system in implosion may well be compelling. I just don’t think necessity is ever a good argument, and would prefer if people could supply the terms of which they are to govern their lives rationally and with consent.

In the first instance, though, it is necessary to recover reason from its ossification within liberal forms. The problem lies in coming to see the Enlightenment as a project that completes itself in the form of liberal institutions, rather than as an unfinished, contradictory, dialectical project that is still in the process of completion. Marx consistently notes the ‘bourgeois’ tendency to see history as having ended with the institutions and relations of the prevailing capitalist society. It is significant that Pinker and people of his ilk consistently target romanticism as the enemy of Enlightenment, drawing leftist critics of capitalist modernity into that designation. 

Lent notes the great irony of Pinker’s Enlightenment Now. Pinker writes a paean to historical progress only to take a staunchly conservative stance to those who want to continue that progress. ‘It’s as though he sees himself at the mountain’s peak, holding up a placard saying “All progress stops here, unless it’s on my terms.”’ And that precisely encapsulates the bourgeois liberal viewpoint which sees history as having ended with liberal institutions. For Marx, the split between liberals identifying the ‘end of history’ with capitalist relations and romantics yearning for the primal unity of a lost premodern world expresses the bourgeois mentality to the core:

It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this complete emptiness history has come to a standstill. The bourgeois viewpoint has never advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and this romantic viewpoint, and therefore the latter will accompany it as legitimate antithesis up to its blessed end.

Marx Gr 1973: 162

Marx’s critical view has naught to do with romanticism and nostalgic yearnings and lamentations for a world we have lost. He sees the future as more than the present enlarged. The bourgeois mind sees no such future. History, for Marx, has not ended with the liberal market, free trade, capitalist institutions. And he is clear, too, that the problems of capitalist relations will not be resolved by a return to premodern social forms, still less by going ‘back to nature.’ Even if such things were possible (and they are not), they are not desirable, for the simple reason that Pinker has an important part of the truth – there has been progress, there is potential for so much better. It’s just that Pinker uses these achievements not as examples to inspire further efforts to continue the emancipatory project of enlightenment, but as a form of apologetics to resist change. In truth, many of the great advances in securing the moral and material progress that Pinker celebrates ‘came from brave individuals who had to resist the opprobrium of the Steven Pinkers of their time while they devoted their lives to reducing the suffering of others.’ 

Progress in the quality of life, for both humans and nonhumans, is something that we should be looking to secure for all, and is central to my conception of rational freedom. Such progress ‘did not come about through capitalism, and in many cases, it has been achieved despite the “free market” that Pinker espouses,’ writes Lent. Marx’s view is more nuanced in that he most certainly does highlight the progressive aspects of capitalist development. He highlights the destructive aspects too, to call for a human appropriation of the productive forces to ensure a humane development. In these volumes I present Marx’s vision of a ‘rational’ human-nature interchange through the ‘collective control’ of ‘united individuals’ as the alternative to the capital system, whilst making it clear that the precise social forms and institutions regulating this interchange have remained so elusive as to lead many to doubt whether they exist. That’s a question of practice, design and transition strategy, as well as one of embedding politics in the material organisations of the people. It’s a question of taking institution building seriously. Here, I recall Kenneth Clark’s slightly patronising tone as he drew his Civilisation to a close with the clash between capitalism, what he called ‘heroic materialism,’ and Marxism:





Clark was right. He doesn’t seem to say much here, but actually he says a lot. Fail to answer the question of viable institutions, and all your ideals in the world will count for nothing but missed opportunities and backfiring promises. But if we come to develop those elusive forms of rational social control, and we realize reason in rational form, and we do actually get an ‘Enlightenment Now,’ then ‘it won’t be thanks to Steven Pinker and his specious arguments.’ (Lent 2018). 

I go back to Rousseau on this, who saw the fractures and tensions within the Enlightenment from the inside, and split with the philosophes on this issue, seeing liberal rationalism as a ‘philosophy of the comfortable’ and suspecting the emergence of a new elite from within its ranks. (Critchley 2017 Reason, Natural Law and Rational Freedom http://pcritchley2.wixsite.com/beingandplace/single-post/2017/05/16/Rousseau-Natural-Law-and-Rational-Freedom (​http:​/​​/​pcritchley2.wixsite.com​/​beingandplace​/​single-post​/​2017​/​05​/​16​/​Rousseau-Natural-Law-and-Rational-Freedom​)). 
The numbers of the comfortable will decrease as capital reaches its absolute limits, and it will take more than assertions of an intellectual reason for enlightenment to survive in the uncomfortable times to come. (Critchley 2018 An Introduction to the Thought of István Mészáros). Instead of defending a liberal Enlightenment as a finished form, now in decline along with its social roots, how about completing the liberatory process with a radical Enlightenment? Or would that mean too much by way of engagement with the uneducated herd? The truth cannot just be given, it must be willed, if it is to be known and lived as a realized truth.

With Marx, I argue for the democratisation of power, politics and philosophy. That doesn’t necessarily relativize knowledge, as the scientistic critics of culturalism allege, although it does take a ‘pragmatic’ stance with respect to notions of objective truth and reality. I, too, argue against culturalism. (see the Appendix to vol 1 Culturalism, Naturalism and Social Metabolism). My view is captured by Rousseau's seemingly paradoxical notion of ‘the general will.’ Surely, critics point out, the will can only be particular. Rousseau knew this very well. His formulation, however, is precise in that it expresses his key point that truth cannot just be given by an active elite to a passive mass but must be willed by the people themselves, if it is to be truly known and lived as truth. Truth is thus both cognitive and affective. Marx, I shall show, stands very much in this tradition when calling for the abolition/realization of philosophy, and much else besides. His early formulation of philosophy as the head of emancipation and the proletariat as the heart, putting together both ‘intellectual weapons’ and ‘material weapons’ (Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 256-257) is Marx’s earliest, and inadequately expressed, attempt to integrate theory and practice at the level of material relations. He soon sharpened the view in more sophisticated form. Marx is concerned with bringing theory and practice into dynamic, interactive relation:

And by the same token the whole principle of socialism is concerned only with one side, namely the reality of the true existence of man. We have also to concern ourselves with the other side, i.e. with man’s theoretical existence, and make his religion and science, etc., into the object of our criticism.

Marx EW Letters 1975: 209

Marx gives us no abstract theoretical or philosophical rationalism as truth, but is concerned with the critique of such truths in connection with social forms, institutions and relations so as to realize their essence in the ‘true existence’ of individuals. Marx was profoundly influenced by Rousseau in this – what David Lay Williams calls Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment (2007) - and Marx’s words on ‘true democracy’ cannot be properly understood unless the importance of Rousseau here is understood. As Williams argues, Rousseau stood for transcendent truths, values and norms against the conventionalism and sophism of Hobbes and the materialism he inspired, and argued for the democratisation of those standards.

The crucial point to understand is that Marx did not write philosophy, he engaged in critique. And it is important to understand that in this Marx is located within the Enlightenment tradition. For all of the references to Kant in the liberal defence of enlightenment reason against assorted enemies on the left – pomos and relativists of various kinds (not to mention the obscurantists and fundamentalists on the religious right) – Kant’s real significance is missed. One of the greatest thinkers of the Enlightenment, Kant wrote three great … critiques: the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, the Critique of Judgment. And he was stimulated to write these works in response to David Hume’s great challenge to rationalism in declaring reason to be the slave of the passion. Hume’s work, Kant claims, awoke him from his ‘dogmatic slumbers.’ To know what reason can do, it is first of all necessary to know the limits of reason, circumscribe its boundaries. This is what Kant did. And in this, Kant was profoundly influenced by Rousseau, calling him ‘the Newton of the modern world.’ Hume appreciated Rousseau too, writing to him: ‘you are the person whom I most revere both for the Force of your Genius and the Greatness of your mind. . . .’ 

Somewhere out of this combination of Hume, Rousseau, and Kant, we would develop an incredibly nuanced view of Enlightenment reason from the inside. Pinker’s scientistic predilections render him blind to this critical dimension. There’s nary a mention of Hume, Rousseau and Kant on this key aspect of the Enlightenment, and that neglect is not an oversight but plainly ideological and begs questions as to the nature of Pinker’s project.

Marx himself engaged in critique. As against abstract theorising over some ahistorical 'Reason,' 'Man,' 'History,' 'Nature,' or ‘God,’ Marx engaged in the critique of social forms and the theories about them. He didn’t write his own economic theory to replace those he objected to; instead, he engaged in the 'critique of political economy.' And he did so in order to make the world reasonable, reason worldly, and all things more reasonable. Such a concern is miles away from an arid, abstract rationalism that holds the world, and the people in it, at a distance. 

Are we defending the Enlightenment as an already accomplished fact? Or are we demanding its realization as an uncompleted project? These are key questions. I’d strongly argue that we are involved in the latter, but so would others who see the forces of superstition, ignorance and reaction all around, standing in the way of reason. Which begs the further question as to what precisely is involved in this realization of reason and what is the precise nature of the forces standing in its way. Many would see the completion of the Enlightenment as entailing the overcoming forces of superstition, ignorance and reaction in order to secure the foundations of liberal institutions. And many would read this as a demand for a thoroughgoing secularisation, seeing, as does Michel Onfray, Kant as wimping out when it came to religion, making room for faith as he did. Many could also see Marx as wimping out too, for a related, if not quite for the same, reason. In volume 3: Homo Religiosus I address Nietzsche’s criticism that many of those who overtly reject a belief in God have nevertheless retain a moral language that presupposes standards of good and bad, right and wrong, that no longer exist. In Nietzsche’s view, they fail to see how everything changes with the ‘death of God.’ There are two options from here, the thoroughgoing secularisation that Onfray advocates or a return to God. That’s if we want to be consistent and coherent. Natural rights presuppose natural law. I deal extensively with the question in volume 3.

And Marx? Marx saw both these positions as a young man, and demanded a realization that was much more radical and thoroughgoing than either the atheism of his young Hegelian friends and associations or the political emancipation sought by liberals. That gives the communism that Marx describes a peculiar flavour, and I shall be concerned with drawing out its peculiarity in this volume with respect to the concept of rational freedom, Marx’s pursuit of a unified science of man, and his essentialist metaphysics. Whilst that may strike many as an unusual approach to Marx – and many Marxists criticised the view I took from the first – it is warranted, not so much in terms of another exercise in ‘what Marx really said’ as in highlighting certain things that Marx seemed to take for granted, or buried, as background assumptions, but which are absolutely key to the realisation of his emancipatory claims. ‘Are you sure this is what Marx said?’ asked my Director of Studies Jules Townshend as he read my work in the 1990s, ‘or is this you saying this is what Marx should have said?’ I am saying that Marx, for all of his historicist emphasis on a creative unfolding within specific social relations, does indeed require certain transcendent standards in order to advance and support his emancipatory commitment. History has a purpose for Marx, and truth and meaning is something more than an arbitrary human projection on an objectively valueless world. David Lay Williams has established the case for Rousseau as advancing a Platonic Enlightenment, affirming transcendent truths, norms and values against Hobbes, conventionalism and sophism. Marx’s position, following Hegel, is more ambiguous, involving a position that sees such transcendent standards as located in history and not some eternal realm. And if there is a part of me that does indeed say that this is what Marx should have said, then it is here that I say it – a praxis-based imposure of truth is inadequate and needs to be supported by a greater recognition of disclosure. It’s that age old question, with sages going back to Plato, which recognizes that true wisdom comes in contemplation, not action. Marx was an action man. I’m interested in restoring the missing dimension, bridging contemplation and action, overcoming a theoretico-elitist model of enlightenment for the democratisation of philosophy, politics and power, and attaining a position that sees disclosure and imposure as integral. That’s work underway elsewhere. Here, my focus is on Marx, by far and away the most ambitious of modern thinkers. 

Are we prepared to be as radical and as bold in our thinking as the Enlightenment thinkers were? Can we avoid their compromises and complicities and overcome their contradictions (read on them, and how they challenged constituted power and authority, only to curry favour with it, as well as reconstitute it in new undemocratic forms)? Or are we supinely going to try to cling on to what we have, thinking that the Enlightenment has been realized in liberal institutions and values, issuing endless laments as it fades away with the social ground supporting it, deriding the ignorant masses for turning to ‘populism’? Have we the courage not merely to use our own understanding but act on it and engage in the rational and practical reconstruction of the institutions and forms of the rational society? Are we prepared not merely to inform and educate the people from the outside, but engage them, involve them, incite their reason and be educated by it?

I take Marx to be someone working critically in that Enlightenment tradition (and how could an Enlightenment thinker be anything but critical?), identifying and analysing the social forms that stood in the way of the true realization of the rational, and truly human, society, and demanding their transformation:

Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form. Hence the critic can take his cue from every existing form of theoretical and practical consciousness and from this ideal and final goal implicit in the actual forms of existing reality he can deduce a true reality. Now as far as real life is concerned, it is precisely the political state which contains the postulates of reason in all its modern forms, even where it has not been the conscious repository of socialist requirements. But it does not stop there. It consistently assumes that reason has been realized and just as consistently it becomes embroiled at every point in a conflict between its ideal vocation and its actually existing premises.

Marx, Early Writings, Letters 1975: 208

This begs the question of the precise social forms of the rational society, forms which enable human beings to live in accordance with their own reason (and, since the entire rational concern is premised upon a normative ‘science of man,’ in accordance with their nature). That this was Marx’s concern is clear from the way he expresses himself time and again, as I demonstrate at length in volume 1. What rational social form could the realization of Reason take? Marx’s answer to that question is based upon a normative anthropology which saw human beings as creatures of a certain type, whose conscious practical activity mediating between humanity and nature was key to their realization. That realization took Marx beyond the alienated forms of the capital system. Liberal defenders of Enlightenment rationalism argue as though the rational society has already been realized within the capital system, or at least would be realized once we have dispensed with the malcontents like Rousseau and Marx as well as the pomos, the cultural relativists, the religious fundamentalists and the reactionaries being the targets of their criticism. That this target covers quite a large group of people indicates the extent to which the liberal Enlightenment is somewhat … elite, minority, detached from the demos, and getting smaller by the year. Liberalism is at bay, for reasons Marx identified from the first. And that Kant could rate Rousseau so highly indicates that the malcontents are not so easily answered.

Marx is both in and against the Enlightenment, seeking to liberate the rational potential he sees immanent in the forces of the modern world but as repressed within existing social institutions, structures and relations, by going beyond these arrangements. That takes Marx beyond the liberal social order that many are concerned to identify with the realization of the Enlightenment project. Marx is not alone in his criticism of liberalism. His great bourgeois critic Max Weber also saw reason as coming to be ossified in the form of a pervasive rationalization, imprisoning the human subject within sterile forms, hence his references to a ‘mechanized petrification’ within the ‘iron cage’ of modernity. (Weber 1985: 181). 

My key point here is that Marx is a post-Enlightenment thinker who engaged in the critique of existing theories relating to the world, as opposed to writing theories of the world conceived as an external objective datum. There is a key switch there, and I explore the significance of the difference between theory and critique throughout. My Director of Studies, Jules Townshend, argued for Marx not as a prophet, a dogmatist and authority to be followed to the letter but as a critical thinker who wrote in light of the Enlightenment tradition, and urged us to think critically in analysing the world of which we are a part:

how valuable is the attempt to maintain a theoretical and practical fidelity with Marx? Should not Marx be viewed as a major pioneer within the socialist tradition, rather than its prophet? Is it not better to follow the example, rather than the letter, of Marx? As a child of the Enlightenment he had an intense passion for freedom and knowledge in equal measure. He pursued knowledge in the name of freedom. This involved the destruction of any form of mystifying consciousness that sustained humanity's self-oppression, and the development of ideas that would be of practical use to the struggles of the oppressed and exploited. He would not have enjoyed the prospect of future generations looking to him not for inspiration, but for legitimation. Marx and the movement he created offer all those struggling for freedom and equality a treasure house of practical and theoretical wisdom - negative as well as positive. This movement is a constant reminder that the theory and practice of human freedom are always unfinished business. As long as capitalism remains in business, Marxism as a movement and doctrine, in whatever form, is likely to remain obstinately relevant.

Townshend 1996 ch 15

I was with Jules when his book was published. He was right on this then and he is right with respect to that critical emphasis now. The defects that critics find in Marxism in practice can have many aspects, but the common fault will always to be found in a slavish adherence to texts and the complete suspension of the critical faculty. You can attach Marx’s name and words to it all you like, but that isn’t Marx. Anyone who thinks otherwise needs to avail themselves of Marx’s very sharp criticisms of the early socialist parties and their statements of principle. 

In the years since 2001, I have developed a greater awareness of the importance of the bits that are left over from reason, the 'anarchic excess,' the 'surplus', the core that evaded enclosure by a totalizing Reason/Kantian self-legislation/Hegelian-Marxist self-creation. It turns out that ‘rational freedom’ is bounded by a greater truth, one that encourages a more contemplative and more humble approach to the world. I know well that in Marxist terms, such reasoning opens the door to myriad irrationalisms and mysticisms. I don’t disagree, hence the strong case I have made for Marx’s ethics of immanence. But that greater world beyond reason exists all the same, and if, as the motto of Enlightenment says, it takes courage to dare to use your own reason, then it takes even more courage to have faith in an age when everything must meet the requirements of reason – but it is the right way in the end. Religion is our bedrock truth and reality, the world of an eternal and experiential truth that is lived beyond reason. Marx proposes a self-contained development in which all the forces for change come from within. I say that his view, like Rousseau’s, presupposes the continued existence of transcendent standards, and is empty without them. Are those forces of transformation purposeless or purposeful? I develop the answer throughout.

As the Appendix to volume 1 makes clear, I am concerned to avoid a social monism. I am not enamoured of the vision of a world enclosed in a totalizing reason or labour. By setting human productive activity within the universal metabolism of nature, Marx does set human self-creation within an extra-human form. But the point goes further than the recognition of nature as the eternal foundation of human action and refers to the aspects of life that Wittgenstein sought silence on, to Kant's 'scandal of reason,' and the way that the mind raises questions of meaning that it cannot, itself, answer rationally. Rousseau was the first to get wind of this, and broke with the philosophes on this very point. He objected to the prevailing materialism and sophism of the eighteenth century as the ‘philosophy of the comfortable.’ And Rousseau, too, to his eternal credit, saw that truth and goodness - the transcendent Reason that Marx saw as having ‘always existed,’ and which, we might add, will always exist - could not just be given, passively, but had to be willed, actively, if the democratic revolution implicit in the motto of Enlightenment was to be completed. David Lay Williams thus considers Rousseau to be the greatest of the modern Platonists, for giving us transcendent norms in the democratic age, as against the conventionalism of Hobbes and all those – the many – who follow in his wake. (Williams 2007).

Are the individuals composing the demos capable of living up to those norms? Will they develop the courage to live in accordance with their own reason? More to the point, Marx would ask, can they develop the social forms of the common life enabling the rational realization of reason, that is, as a human emancipation in general, rather than a capitalist rationalization?

With respect to the affirmation of transcendent standards, the young Marx makes an explicit statement against ethical and cultural relativism. He asks rhetorically: 

Must philosophy adopt different principles for every country in accordance with the saying “different countries, different customs” so as not to contradict the ground truths of dogma? Must it believe that in one country 3 × 1 = 1, in another that women have no souls, in a third that beer is drunk in heaven? Is there no universal human nature just as there is a universal nature of plants and heavenly bodies? Philosophy asks what is true not what is accepted as such, what is true for all men not what is true for individuals: its metaphysical truths do not recognize the boundaries of political geography; its political truths know too well where the “boundaries” begin, to confuse the illusory horizon of particular world and natural outlooks of the human mind.

Marx from Rheinische Zeitung in Easton and Guddat 1967: 118

That is an emphatic statement on Marx’s part in favour of transcendent standards that are independent of the relativism of time and place, universal standards that serve to evaluate, criticize and orient the institutions, laws and practices of the social and political world. The later Marx does not express himself the same way, of course, but I would suggest that Marx’s commitment to what he identifies as ‘metaphysical truths’ here runs as a consistent thread throughout his work. As, indeed, does the commitment to a ‘universal human nature.’ Marx affirms the existence of a ‘universal human nature,’ in the same way that the ‘universal nature of plants and heavenly bodies’ exists. But not quite the same way. Marx affirms that humanity possesses an essence, proceeding to identify reason as the quality that differentiates human beings from plants and planetary bodies. That quality enables human beings to act on more than animal impulse in coming to choose their fate, to be free in the sense of a Kantian self-determination, an autonomy as against an heteronomy. (It’s an idea that goes back to Aristotle and runs throughout the Western theological tradition. I leave to the question till later as to whether Marx, asserting Darwin’s non-teleological naturalist explanation, is entitled to make the argument. In making such an argument, Marx is asserting a purpose in existence that may well not exist – which means that either Marx has to return to the God and religion he has rejected or he has to reject his normative standards as having no basis in a naturalist explanation).

To realize this freedom as a rational moral autonomy is the object of each individual’s will and striving, Marx reasons, realizing the potential that exists within each and all. The liberation of individuals from external control, whether this be conceived in terms of God, Nature or the domination of others in society, is the moral goal of human history. ‘Freedom,’ Marx declares, ‘is surely the species-essence [Gattungswesen] of all thinking beings;’ it is ‘the natural gift of the universal sunlight of reason,’ each obeying ‘the natural laws of his own reason, of human reason’ in association with all others in a true democratic state. ‘Freedom is so much the essence of man that even its opponents make it real as they struggle against its realization … No man fights freedom; at most, he fights against the freedom of others.’ (Marx, ‘Debatten uber die Pressfreiheit,’ Werke, 1: 54, 47, 51; Kamenka 1962: 26-31; Hunt 1974: 36).

Marx’s articles in the Rheinische Zeitung of Cologne are very Kantian and very Hegelian, arguing for freedom as a human self-determination conceived in terms of the universal human essence as rational and as embodied in and articulated through the state as the agency of rational freedom. Marx thus describes the state as ‘the great organism, in which legal, moral, and political freedom must be realised, and in which the individual citizen in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, of human reason.’ (Marx “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung.” Rheinische Zeitung, 10-14 July 1842).

Those were the views of Marx as a young man. He sharpened and deepened that understanding over the years. But that commitment to freedom in connection with reason remained Marx’s central concern. Marx’s rationalism was a thoroughly democratic and democratising one, one grounded in a normative essentialist anthropology. In following Rousseau, Marx saw what was missing in the Enlightenment project defended by liberals, saw the danger of an Enlightenment that descended into an apologetics with respect to capitalist rationalization, and saw what was required socially and institutionally if Reason was indeed to be able to take rational form in time and place. And he saw what was required if Enlightenment was to take democratic form, too. Like Rousseau before him, Marx saw that the character of the people matters a great deal indeed, if the rational society is to be achieved. In an older idiom, from before the age of the democratic revolution, the intellectual virtues matter as well as the moral virtues. There is an implicit concern in Marx with the forming of character within communities of practice, not merely the informing of minds undertake on the part of an educating elite. In the third part of this volume, I shall show Marx’s immanent, embodied ethics to entail a particular view on the virtues and the practices by which they are fostered.

2 The Principle of Rational Freedom

Before analysing precisely what Marx meant by the state and its abolition, there is a need to define clearly and concisely the conception of ‘rational freedom.’ The principle of ‘rational freedom’ can be summed up thus:

1. rationality is predicated not only of individuals but of the institutional, communal and cultural context which makes individual agency possible; 
2. rationality is more than a means to ends but is an end in itself; 
3. the good life for human beings is more than the pursuit and satisfaction of private pleasures but is inextricably connected to the good of all; 
4. the political community as a mode of life is more than an aggregate of individuals but is constitutive of what it is to be a human being.

The concept of 'rational freedom' is defined against individualist liberal conceptions of freedom. Going back to Aristotle, human beings are seen in this conception as social beings who stand in need of a genuine public life in order to individuate themselves. Individuation thus occurs within reciprocal relations, the development of each proceeding in mutually supportive relation to the development of others. Rational freedom is therefore a relational freedom in seeing freedom as something that is possible only within a collective framework, be that institutional, ethical or social. The only freedom that is possible outside of such a framework is abstract. Rational freedom thus embodies a principle of community and of a political authority that is legitimate in the sense of being democratically constituted, self-assumed and self-imposed. 

Marx’s ‘abolition of the state,’ I shall argue, transcends the institution of the state in order to realize the principle of the state as the embodiment of rational freedom. That is, Marx overcomes the existence of the state as an external regulatory framework designed to constrain behaviours within a competitive capitalist economy, something that preserves the parameters of the capital system intact, so as to realize a conception of communism that embodies the normative aspects of the state’s principle of rational freedom. 

To demonstrate commonalities and differences within the principle of rational freedom, in which the freedom of each individual and all individuals coincides in a political community, Kant’s ideal republican constitution as the institutional incarnation of the principle as a lawful freedom is to be compared to the definition that Marx gives of the political community in communist society. Kant writes in favour of:





This is rational freedom as a lawful freedom constraining behaviours institutionally with a view to the good. I argue that Marx turned this principle into a socialized freedom beyond ‘the abstraction of the political state.’ Thus Marx writes:

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

Marx MCP Rev1848 1973: 87

The basic principle of rational freedom holds that the freedom of each individual is coexistent with and conditional upon the freedom of all individuals, and that such freedom is attainable only within a community of right relations defined in terms of embodying and articulating the unity of each and all in the realization of healthy potentials. Marx, as I shall argue at length, is in key respects an Aristotelian. He certainly adheres to Aristotle’s notion of human beings as social beings. As Clark argued, the lesson of Aristotle’s philosophy is that ‘Man's being lies in community, in the unity of man with man’ (Clark 1975: 107/8). Marx argues this at length and, more than this, establishes the conditions of such unity in order to realize the society of free individuals. (Forbes 1991).

There is also a principle of solidarity at the core of rational freedom, affirming that the state is concerned with something more than the security of individuals. Aristotle thus criticizes the view of the state as a mutual insurance pact on the part of self-interested individuals. Aristotle’s point here needs to be set in the context of his conception of politics. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle describes his subject matter as ‘political science’, which he characterizes as the most authoritative science. Politics, he writes, is the ‘master science of the good,’ the architectonic science concerned with the human good, or happiness, understood as human flourishing, ‘the most authoritative art’ and ‘truly the master art.’ 

And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

Aristotle Ethics Bk 1 The Good for Man

Politics is the practical science par excellence, the science that orders all other sciences. Such a politics is the ‘science of man,’ ‘the science of the good for man,’ and as such presupposes a conception of human nature.

For Aristotle, then, the state could not be neutral on the question of the good for human beings and must therefore provide something more than ‘a military pact of protection against injustice’ in a society concerned with the ‘exchange of goods.’ The ‘state’s purpose is not merely to provide a living but to make a life that is good,’ something which gives the state an intimate concern with ‘the virtue and vice of the citizens.’ Without the conception of the good ‘the association is a mere military alliance .. and law .. a mere agreement,’ the state becoming merely ‘a mutual guarantor of justice’ which is 'unable to make citizens good and just' (Aristotle Ill.ix 1981:196). The ‘rational’ idea of the state, then, involves a developmental conception of human nature rather than a protective one with respect to the freedom of private individuals. 

Marx is plainly Aristotelian on this point, openly criticizing the protective conception of the liberal order in favour of the developmental conception:

Security is the supreme social concept of civil society, the concept of the police, the concept that the whole of society is there only to guarantee each of its members the conservation of his person, his rights and his property...
The concept of security does net enable civil society to rise above its egoism. On the contrary, security is the guarantee of its egoism.

Marx OJQ SW 1975: 230

Marx sought the socialization of politics, something which enabled the recovery of the sphere of fellowship, reciprocity and sensuality as against the rationalised, externalised regulations of an abstracted institutional world, something which restores a concern with the personal aspects of life (Marx EPM 1975: 365). Again, the view can be traced to Aristotle and his idea of friendship. Marx’s view is plainly Aristotelian in key respects, but also deepens and enriches Aristotle’s. This is apparent here in Marx’s view of human intercourse as fellowship. 
There are important differences between Aristotle and Marx.

‘Man is no Aristotelian god contemplating all of existence at one glance.’ (Walter Lippman).

But doesn’t virtue ethics require some such god?

In the eighth section of the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle develops his view that a life of pleasant, vigorous philosophical contemplation is one of superior eudaimonia and therefore the best sort of life for human beings. Only in contemplation, he argues, are the rational needs and desires of human beings properly fulfilled. Aristotle praises other virtues, such as justice, courage, practical wisdom, and such like, of course. The virtuous person engaged in a number of virtuous acts has a variety of eudaimonia. But philosophical contemplation is something above all of this, and its practice isn’t conditional on the provision of the right opportunities like these other virtues. You just need a little breathing space.

Aristotle makes an additional as to why the life of philosophical contemplation must be the most perfect Eudaimonia. He asks us to imagine the gods, blessed and happy in ways beyond anything that mortals find possible. Unlike us, the gods are not concerned with virtues like justice, courage, liberality, or temperance. Whilst these virtues are crucial to us in ensuring that we come to acquire the right character, engage in right conduct, and live well, such things would accomplish nothing for the gods, since there is nothing in their world that needs to be set right. But since the gods are not inert, the question is what kind of activity do they deem worthy of their interest? Contemplation, replies Aristotle, from which it follows that it is the practice of philosophical contemplation on the part of people that the gods most appreciate. The fact that eudaimonia is not available to non-human animals gives the clue that it is closely tied to reason. Eudaimonia ‘extends… just so far as contemplation does’ and is some form of contemplation. 

For Aristotle, the priorities that human beings set in life, the things that human beings must do in order to live a virtuous life and flourish well, need to be set in the context of the contemplative life. None of these things should be taken to excess. It is sufficient to have the necessities, the luxuries are not required. It is sufficient to be noble, no one needs to be Lord High Noble. Secure the basics and achieve sufficiency so that you can look after yourself, behave honourably, and engage in the practice of philosophical contemplation as the most eudaimon life it is possible to live.

Eagleton writes on what separates Aristotle from Marx:





As Alasdair Maclntyre puts it: 'For the love of the person, as against the goodness, pleasantness, or usefulness of the person, Aristotle can have no place.’ The opposite of self-sufficiency is dependency: human beings are socially and naturally dependent creatures, and there is a need to recognize that fact.

MacIntyre reminds us of the deficiencies of Aristotle’s thought. Aristotle is complacent respect to the iniquities of existing social arrangements, and when he argues that some men are slaves by nature he is certainly guilty of naturalizing those socially specific arrangements. By contrast, Aristotle appears to advantage in his inclusion of friendship as among the necessities of the man who achieves or is to achieve the good. He distinguishes the varieties of friendship —those between equals and unequals; those based on shared pleasure, .mutual usefulness, or common virtue—and, being Aristotle, produces a typical catalogue, the details of which, MacIntyre writes, matter less than the fact that the discussion is there at all. 





Marx argues against such self-sufficiency on the part of the individual and recognizes that freedom exists only in relation to others, in a condition of conscious social interdependency beyond capital’s ‘objective dependency relations.’ (Marx Gr 1973: 162-165). For Marx, the individual experiences ‘his greatest wealth - the other man - as need’ (Marx JM 1975: 267). Under communism as the truly human society, the inner need of the individual is to realise himself and recognise other individuals as the ‘source’ of their own life (Marx JM 1975: 267). In such a society, individuals no longer confront others as mere means to personal ends, and no longer experience social relationships as an external imposition obstructing the satisfaction of individual needs. Instead, individuals relate to others as fellow human beings, as Kantian ends in themselves, not as constraints upon the freedom of individuals but as the constituent elements of freedom as the common goal and good of each and all. In these circumstances, when the individual is ‘in his most individual existence, he is at the same time a communal being’ (Marx EPM 1975: 347), recognising other individuals as human, rather than just as an objects, having overcome the estrangement inflicted by the rule of private property.

Marx’s developmental conception is clear. Arguing in Aristotelian fashion that human beings are social beings, creatures that individuate themselves only in relation to others, Marx’s qualities for human flourishing involves a view of which human powers a community should develop:





As I argue in Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, chapter four ‘Labour, Need and Production,’ there is an ineliminable normative dimension contained within Marx’s philosophical anthropology. Marx is committed to the free and full development of the healthy potentials of each and all in unison. Terry Eagleton is thus right to argue that: ‘Marx does indeed possess an “absolute” moral criterion: the unquestionable virtue of the rich, all-round expansion of capacities for each individual. It is from this standpoint that any social formation is to be assessed.’ (Eagleton 1990: 223 226).

And Eagleton makes it clear why this normative dimension is central to an emancipatory politics. He states that ‘the political left .. cannot define the political in [a] purely technical way, since its brand of emancipatory politics inescapably involves questions of value.’ 





Eagleton thus draws attention to the necessary intertwining of politics and ethics, something that would make complete sense to Aristotle and the ancients, but which may cause liberals reared on Enlightenment rationality, scepticism with respect to the good life, and disenchantment in all things some disquiet. Marx may incorporate the achievements of political emancipation into his concern to realize human emancipation in general, but he is not a liberal. (But not illiberal on that account. For reasons I developed in Social Restitution, it is better to characterize Marx as post-liberal rather than illiberal, given the way that he challenges liberalism to realize its key values by rejecting key liberal institutions within the capitalist order.)

The key point to establish is that the rational conception holds that no one person is truly and completely free unless all persons are free, and that all persons can only be free in a truly human community. The conception of ‘Rational Freedom’ therefore maintains that the freedom of each is conditional upon and co-existent with the freedom of all individuals. And that view is critical of the separation of individual and society in the liberal ontology, severing individuals from each other and from collective forces and purposes, and is critical of certain liberal institutions, but is not thereby illiberal. 

Jurgen Habermas gives a concise definition of the principle of rational freedom in this respect. He recognizes the ‘honourable history’ of the liberal idea of a minimal state that allows individuals to realize their own conceptions of the good life, whilst entering into agreement with each other. ‘That degree of legal equality should be achieved which will allow at the same time the greatest possible measure of individualism, and this means space for individuals to shape their own lives.’ That is the liberal idea of rational freedom as a lawful freedom, involving a public sphere that is neutral on the good, asserting the priority of right over good, and leaving individuals free to pursue the good as they see fit, ensuring no harm is done to others. The problem is that since human beings are social beings, the good can never be merely a matter of subjective value and preference and will always be more than an aggregate of individual choices; the good implies a socio-relational and institutional context. (In which case, the neutral state in which right prevails over the good (Rawls) is itself the non-neutral liberal version of the good life, without being consciously and explicitly presented as such). 

Habermas thus states the principle of rational freedom as a social freedom:

However, one cannot simply forget the kinds of criticism of these individualistic constructions of law which have been brought forward ever since Hegel. Freedom, even personal freedom, freedom of choice in the last instance, can only be thought in internal connection with a network of interpersonal relationships, and this means in the context of the communicative structures of a community, which ensures that the freedom of some is not achieved at the cost of the freedom of others. Interestingly, abstract right is not sufficient for this purpose. One must make the effort to analyse the conditions of collective freedom, which remove the dangers of individual freedom, its potential for social-Darwinist menace.




Affirming the unity of freedom of each and all within community, Habermas presents a ‘rational’ ideal which anticipates and justifies a post-capitalist ‘good’ society characterised by the greatest possible happiness, peace, and community for all:





This ethico-rational society is thus defined in terms of the satisfaction of the human needs of all, in contradistinction to the subjection of all to the deprecations of arbitrary power. This precisely is Marx’s conception of the realization of rational freedom. And that condition is a state that counts as true and good. 

Marx thus expresses the principle of rational freedom as the unity of the freedom of each individual and all individuals. It is the institutional framework and social infrastructure embodying and articulating that principle that stands in need of establishment. The upshot of this analysis is that ethics, politics and economics are intertwined for Marx, with rational freedom involving a multi-layered, socially mediated freedom based upon a complex interimbrication of institutions. This brings us to the institution of the state within capitalist society.

3 The Influence of Hegel’s Rational Freedom on Marx





Those ‘dangers,’ of course, are the strengths of philosophy, demonstrating its pertinence in the practical world of human affairs, particularly with respect to the gap between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought.’ What was it about Hegel’s philosophy that Marx could find so captivating? Marx didn’t care for Hegel’s ‘system’ at first, the way in which is built upon layer after layer of negations and contradictions. Then he came to see its strengths. In time, materializing Hegel’s concepts and categories, Marx could stand idealism on its head and develop a new, active, affirmative materialism. Barker writes:

Marx found that the late-18th-century idealisms of Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte that so dominated philosophical thinking in the early 19th century prioritized thinking itself — so much so that reality could be inferred through intellectual reasoning. But Marx refused to endorse their reality. In an ironic Hegelian twist, it was the complete opposite: It was the material world that determined all thinking.

That simplifies what Marx did greatly, given that Marx openly praised idealism for developing the ‘active side,’ incorporating it into his own materialism to go beyond the passive environmentalism of Enlightenment materialism. 

In a letter to his father, Marx comments: ‘If previously the gods had dwelt above the earth, now they became its center.’ The idea that God or divinity was ‘in’ or ‘among’ the people was not a new idea, of course. Marx’s innovation, Barker writes, was to ‘stand idealistic deference — not just to God but to any divine authority — on its head. Whereas Hegel had stopped at advocating a rational liberal state, Marx would go one stage further: Since the gods were no longer divine, there was no need for a state at all.’ There was also no need for God, either. I shall argue that a certain intoxication with human power and heady visions as to its possibilities here took Marx away from the transcendent truths that alone serve to ground such power, and bind it within a covenant of love, keeping it sane and truly rational, giving us an emancipation as a salvation in its deepest sense. That will become apparent in final volume.

The argument I develop in the first two volumes of this book presents Marx as an ethical immanentist who pursues a vision of socialism ‘from within.’ The gods are no longer above the word, they are at its centre. In the historic divide between a socialism ‘from above’ and a socialism ‘from below,’ Marx is frequently cast by his critics as belonging to the former tradition and by his adherents as belonging to the latter. The idea that Marx was a ‘state socialist’ is plain wrong, but there is a reason for the misunderstanding. Marx does retain a principle of authority and does seek to realize ‘the political’ in the form of conscious human governance of their collective forces. To the non-obscurantists and non-dialecticians of the world, that would strongly imply the continued existence of the state. There is certainly a sense in which setting up the debate in terms of an antithesis between ‘above’ and ‘below’ misses what is of real significance in Marx. There is no doubt that Marx argued for the abolition of the institution of the state (there are numerous direct statements to this effect from Marx, for example the Critique of the Gotha Programme FI 1974: 354) and no doubt either that he emphasized a principle of self-emancipation through the self-activity and self-organisation of the working class. (reaffirmed by Marx in the Circular Letter to Bebel, Liebknecht, Bracke, et al. FI CL 1974: 375). This was all part of Marx’s concern to realize freedom as self-determination, as autonomy over against heteronomy in Kant’s sense. But to understand precisely what Marx meant by these things, it is necessary to understand clearly the dialectical meaning of the term ‘abolition’ that he uses. Marx was concerned not merely with the physical destruction of the state or the repudiation of the state in the name of an individual liberty that is asserted ‘from below’ in civil society. Such a view serves only to make Marx an (individualist) anarchist or a liberal, once more setting up an abstract opposition between individuality and collectivity. That’s precisely what Marx is not doing. Marx shows that there is nothing particularly emancipatory about the ‘below’ of an untransformed civil society within the alien forms of capital system; individuals are not free in such a society but subject to an external constraint that is every bit as totalizing as the abstract state. Marx rejects that state every bit as much as liberals, in fact more so, given that Marx shows that such a state is itself the product of the liberal social order. Marx thus shows that ‘the abstraction of the political state’ was a product of the capital system, the state and capital arising together and existing in symbiotic relation. (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 90). 

This view of abstraction offers us a key to understanding Marx’s real insight on this question. Marx did not offer a theory of socialism ‘from below’ as against socialism ‘from above,’ he was not concerned to write theories of this kind but was engaged in an immanent critique. Marx related the concepts and categories of political and social thought to their social forms and relations, subjecting both to an immanent critique so as to reveal their inner truths, their laws of motion, their lines of development, seeking to liberate their potentialities beyond the constraints of the prevailing social system in order to usher in the new truly human society of truly human, and free, individuals. Time and again, when arguing for communism, Marx repeatedly emphasizes that the communists have not made-up their ideals in accordance with some theoretical understanding of reality, but are seeking to realize what already exists as a potential repressed within prevailing relations. The communists, he says, ‘have no ideals to realise,’ they are merely seeking ‘to set free the elements of the new society’ immanent within the present society, elements of the future socialist society which already exists as a repressed potential within capitalist society (Marx CWF FI 1974: 213). 

I shall, therefore, present Marx as a proponent of a ‘socialism from within’ in contradistinction to a ‘socialism from without.’ This socialism from within sees the future socialist society as an ‘ought to be’ that in some way is already in existence within the ‘is’ of capitalist society. Marx consistently writes of socialism as emerging from within capitalist society. He frequently employs organic metaphors to describe the transition from capitalist society to socialist society (something which also underlines the metabolic character of Marx’s thinking), referring to socialism as already existent in embryonic form.

In fine, it makes more sense to approach Marx as offering a vision of ‘socialism from within’ than it does to get involved in a debate which sets the ‘below’ and the ‘above’ against each other. With appropriate scaling in accordance with a true ordering principle, the above and the below are integrated. Such an approach emphasizes the extent to which Marx conceived socialism as grounded in real developments and practices, guarding against an idealism and utopianism that sees socialism as a theoretical and political construction that is imposed upon a recalcitrant reality (and people) ‘from the outside’ (to employ Lenin’s phrase from What is to be Done?, which he, in turn, took from Karl Kautsky, a view which conceives socialism to be the product of intellectuals, theoreticians and scientists, who proceed to bring socialism to the merely economistic workers’ movement ‘from the outside’).

The conception of ‘socialism from within’ derives from the principle of active materialism that Marx developed in transcending the old philosophical materialism and idealism and the opposition between them. I developed that view at length in volume 1, Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration. Here in volume 2, I shall show that this ‘socialism from within’ is developed out of an immanent critique that is thoroughly grounded in an essentialist metaphysics that emphasizes internal lines of development and their realization (or frustration, as the case may be, agency is involved all the time, there is no inevitability to the developmental process). And I shall also argue that the immanence of Marx’s critical-practical vision of socialism derives from his grounding in Hegel’s philosophy and in Hegel’s understanding that realization proceeds from forces lying inside rather than outside. As Hegel expresses the point:





This location of the ideal within the real that Marx adopted from Hegel emphasizes the extent to which Marx develops a ‘socialism from within’ as distinct from a ‘socialism from without.’ This offers a much more sophisticated view of the historical conflict between what Hal Draper defined as the two socialisms, ‘socialism from above’ and ‘socialism from below.’ In truth, that division between above and below is too crude to make true sense of Marx’s holistic concern to establish a ‘unity of the diverse’ within ‘a rich totality of many determinations and relations’ (Marx Gr 1973: 100 101). 

Marx, it should be remembered, emphasized the holistic transformation of the (abstract) state, wage labour and capital as a singular process. This cannot be simply characterised as advancing the ‘below’ against the ‘above’, but begs the deeper question of the ‘below’ and ‘above’ of what. Pursuing this line of thought, Marx can be shown as integrating the above and the below within a self-subsistent whole. Libertarians can be found in many guises advancing the claims of free markets, self-choosing individuals and ‘civil society’ against ‘the state.’ To emphasize distance from the Labour Party and its ‘authoritarian’ politics, the co-leader of the Green Party recently emphasized that the Greens seek to free the individual from the state. The Greens, he claimed, are ‘a party of freedom which believes in liberation from the shackles of state authority and the critical balance between people and planet.’ (Bartley 2018). 

Marx, as one who argued for the abolition of the state and for the freedom of the individual would surely agree? Actually, no, not in such abstract terms. That statement demands clarity as to what precisely is meant by the terms ‘shackles,’ ‘state,’ and ‘authority.’ Is all collective constraint to be considered a shackle that infringes individual liberty? Even constraints that individuals have agreed to be bound by? Consider here the well-known quote from Rousseau in The Social Contract that ‘man is born free but is everywhere in chains.’ Rousseau is frequently misunderstood as arguing for all chains to be thrown off in order to realize a natural, libertarian, freedom. Rousseau actually argues for the very opposite. Rousseau’s concern is to replace the illegitimate external constraint of current forms with the legitimate, internal, self-constraint of a public community governed by laws that citizens have agreed to be bound by and have had an active role in making. Such ‘chains’ or ‘shackles’ are legitimate, mutually obligating and liberating, recognising that human beings are social beings requiring collective forms of common control if they are to realize their purposes. This is the sense of Rousseau’s argument that law forces individuals to be free. Libertarians, no doubt, will protest and reject such a notion as authoritarian and repressive. What they miss in their reaction is the emphasis on the (self-)educative and moral character of law, law as something internal to human self-realization, not as an external imposition. And what is clear is the extent to which, in falsely separating and abstracting individuality and sociality, the liberal ontology renders each, any and every form of common control abstract.

To clarify the point further, liberation from the shackles of state authority is a meaningful notion only in the terms of the widespread social embodiment of rational freedom so that any external constraint upon individuals – whether through the institutional force of the abstract state or the systemic force of the capitalist economy - is supplanted by an internal constraint voluntarily agreed upon by those individuals. Marx’s restitution of alienated social power to the social body establishes the structural grounds of this liberation. This would be to rise to Plato’s old challenge when he asked whether democracy was capable of supplying itself with a self-limiting principle. 

That merely leaves us deciding whether the end result is a state or not. 
The same ‘ambiguity’ crops up in Rousseau, who himself has been criticized as a proponent of ‘totalitarian democracy’ (Talmon 1960 1986) and an authoritarian who was ‘no social ecologist.’ (Marshall 1992 ch ch 18). Marshall’s view is typical of a shallow understanding of Rousseau from a libertarian perspective:

Rousseau was a paradoxical man and thinker. Just as he thought woman should be educated to be the plaything of man, so his ideal state is totalitarian. Starting out with the isolated individual in a state of nature, he ends up submerging him in a coercive community.

Marshall 1992 ch 18

I have a rule of thumb that has served me well with Rousseau criticism. As soon as I read a critic referring to the ‘paradoxical’ and ‘ambiguous’ nature of Rousseau’s thought, I know that said critic has failed to understand the man’s work and that his judgements will be suspect. Marshall, like many, paints with a broad but shallow brush, and the criticisms he makes here of Rousseau could also apply to Marx, for the same reason. There is a complete failure to understand the democratic constitution of authority and the moral and educative force of law in the rational tradition. The truth is that such critics proceed from an explicitly liberal ontology and so denounce any morality, community, law and authority as abstract, as potentially repressive of individual liberty and actually totalitarian in its attainment. The fault is not that of Rousseau or of Marx, but expresses the inability of the liberal ontology, false abstracting individuality and sociality, to conceive common form/s of life in anything but abstract, and therefore totalitarian, terms. 

When is a state not a state? Rousseau did not theorize for the modern centralized state, but envisaged something like the Genevan city-republic as the site for genuine moral and political activity. Likewise Marx, as indicated in the contours of commune democracy he drew in outline. Neither Rousseau nor Marx theorised a large, centralised state, and Marx explicitly advocated the abolition of such a state, with abolition here understood in the dialectical sense of a realisation/preservation/transcendence. Marx’s abolition of the state, in other words, was the realisation of the rational principle of the state so that ‘the political’ became co-extensive with everyday practical affairs. Likewise Rousseau. Both envisaged what may be called a modern polis democracy. That points to an overarching political architectonic sustained by on extensive public spaces for citizen interaction, discourse, and deliberation. 

Is it a state or not? It doesn’t really matter what we call it, so long as it isn’t the abstraction of the modern centralized nation-state grounded in alienated social power and so long as it is a political authority constituted by and subject to the conscious control of the individuals establishing their sovereign power in and through democratic forms of social control. And if that isn’t clear enough, maybe we have no option but to be ambiguous ourselves and paraphrase Star Trek's eminently logical Mr Spock and agree that it’s the state, but not as we have ever known it. At which point we begin to understand that the apparent paradoxes in the political thought of Rousseau and Marx are not paradoxes at all, but attempts to outline genuinely new political forms that transcend previous categories. Once we see clearly that both thinkers thoroughly repudiated the liberal ontology that lies behind so many false antitheses with respect to individual and society, separating the things which belong together, then we come to appreciate that Rousseau’s and Marx’s supposed totalitarianism actually amounts to the realisation of the true state as the embodiment of a rational freedom that makes it possible to transcend the state as an abstract institution in the form of an anarchist society. Any paradoxes and ambiguities that critics find in Rousseau and Marx lie in the failure of these critics to understand the anarchistic imperatives of both thinkers in seeking the realization of rational freedom. What Ellenburg writes of Rousseau in this respect applies also to Marx:

Questions about the shape and circumstances of personal liberty dominate Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political thought, as they do that of the traditional liberal philosophers with whom Rousseau is often but mistakenly lumped. Moreover, Rousseau advocated absolute liberty or literal self-government so insistently that he equated all instances of external rule, whether governmental or not, with slavery. Ignorance of this anarchistic imperative animating his thought makes his ideas a tangle of arbitrary assertions and robs them of their moral urgency.
Rousseau's understanding of individual liberty and the circumstances of its realization is also grounded in a philosophical orientation radically different from that upon which classical liberal thought is based, different in premises and in structure.

Ellenburg 1976 ch 2

The key to understanding notions of law, the constitution of authority, the nature of ‘the political,’ democracy as the ‘true state’ in Rousseau and Marx lies in grasping how thorough the rejection of the liberal ontology and mode of thought is in both thinkers.

Liberalism posits the existence of a discrete individual with private interests and in possession of rights that are independent of common life, ‘rights of separation’ as Marx calls them:

But the right of man to freedom is not based on the association of man with man but rather on the separation of man from man. It is the right of this separation, the right of the restricted individual, restricted to himself. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 229

But note Marx distinction of these rights of the individual, as rights of separation based upon the atomising liberal ontology, from the rights of citizenship as pertaining to the association of individuals as social beings:

The first point we should note is that the so-called rights of man, as distinct from the rights of the citizen, are quite simply the rights of the member of civil society, i.e. of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community.

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 229

Note also, too, Marx’s reference to the bourgeois individual as ‘egoistic man,’ something that identifies the character of alienation as an individual self-alienation that requires personal moral effort as well as social transformation for its overcoming, 

This discrete individual is either naturally endowed with rights and interests or acquires them unaided, again independently of cohesive social involvement and mutual recognition of shared experience. Such a view is ‘the expression of the separation of man from his community, from himself and from other men.’ (Marx EW OJQ 1975: 221). The liberal individual is essentially the self-made man, in possession of himself, owing no debts to others and involved in no dependency upon others. In classical liberalism, individuals agree to exchange a portion of their self-exclusiveness – natural liberty – to create a political community that secures and protects their private interests – civil liberty. But even with the creation of civil government there is still a separation between discrete private individuals and community which does not exist in the Aristotelian conception of human beings as social beings. In the liberal conception, individuals make, but are not made by, political society; in the Aristotelian conception, individuality and sociality exist in mutual relation. (I’m generalising hugely here, given the specific concern to identify the principal features of the liberal ontology that Rousseau, in large part, but not completely, and Marx, thoroughly, repudiated). Other than gaining personal security through the institution of government, individuals in the liberal conception remain unchanged in their aggregation. Public community is thus merely a numerical aggregation, no greater than the sum of its individual wills and desires. Subject to the same authority and positive law, individuals still share nothing other than the official recognition of and respect for their private interests. The liberal conception is thus premised on individuals in their separation from each other and from society, and it retains that emphasis on the parts as distinct from, and at the expense of, the whole. That latter point points to the crucial flaw in the liberal view from the standpoint of rational freedom. Because once we see individuality and sociality as two aspects of the same human nature, the one as crucial to the other in a condition of mutual interdependence and shaping, then any deficiency in the whole cannot but come to be detrimental to the individual and to the parts too. Public community in the liberal conception is deficient in solidary ties and connections. Liberty is neither social nor relational in this conception but a sphere of exclusiveness that each individual retains when surrendering a portion of natural liberty for the protection of private interests by the civil liberty of government. Liberty remains private and non-political, outside of the realm of government. The scope of the political is strictly delimited to governmental action, with politics being merely the relationship between private individuals and their representatives. All other relationships that lie outside of the realm of politics are therefore ‘free’: religion, economics, family life. Liberty is thus expressed as an aggregation of private solitudes and narcissisms.

Marx counters this liberal ontology at every point, so that familiar criticisms of Marx’s thought as ‘totalitarian’ and inimical to liberty is just another way of saying that Marx is not a liberal and offers an alternative conception of freedom to the liberal conception. Freedom may be a contested concept, but liberals seek to foreclose debate in order to protect their monopoly claim. I return to liberalism’s false claims to neutrality in the final chapter of volume 3.

In chapter 9 of volume 1, I showed how Marx demonstrated the liberal inability to conceive of morality and community as anything but an abstract imposition upon ‘free’ individuals, rejecting each, any and every attempt to supply a conscious self-constraint through public community whilst nevertheless remaining silent on, and complicit in, the external constraint imposed upon all as a result of capital’s ‘objective dependency relations.’ (Marx Gr 1973: 164-165). With liberal criticisms of totalitarianism we are dealing with the self-contradictions, abstractions, fictions and fears generated by a liberal ontology that falsely separates individual and society, unleashes the violence and tyranny of abstraction, denies human beings the capacity to constitute collective force self-consciously as an internal constraint, and thus leaves discrete individuals powerless before the collective forces that their uncoordinated social action generates. Such individuals are indeed ‘free’ from the ‘shackles’ of state authority, it’s just that at the same time their lives are shackled first and last to the ‘irresistible force’ of the capital economy. That phrase comes from Max Weber, Marx’s great critic, who also points to the way that the processes of capitalist rationalization, proceeding ‘without regard to persons,’ determines the lives of each and all. The whole point of Marx’s socialism is to liberate the individual from such systemic ‘shackles.’

Marx is critically concerned with the way that the capital system disrupts the ‘metabolic interaction’ between the ‘social metabolism’ and the ‘universal metabolism of nature’, seeking to establish a healthy, harmonious relation between humanity and nature. He would, therefore, certainly agree with the need to establish a ‘critical balance’ between people and planet. Effecting that balance requires the development of appropriate institutions, embodying a principle of legitimate, democratic authority constituted by a self-assumed obligation and self-constituted constraint. 

And that, I argue, is how Marx conceived socialism as a form of social self-mediation embodying the principle of rational freedom. I covered this question of mediation in chapter eight of Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration. I also emphasized in chapters six and seven there that Marx established the appropriate metabolic relation in terms of the humanity-labour/production-nature relation. To see this simply in terms of ‘people and planet’ misses out the crucial social mediation via labour/production – the very thing that is responsible for disturbance in the ‘metabolic interaction’ between society and nature and which is key for the restoration of harmonious interaction - and hence leaves any ecological project idealistic, utopian and structurally and politically impotent. The assertion of libertarianism in these terms is empty at best, ideological and complicit in the shackles of capital’s unfreedom at worst. 

Marx utterly rejected the liberal ontology which separates individuality and sociality and reduces both sides to abstraction as a result. That separation and abstraction also entails the rejection of each, any and every common force or constraint as a repressive ‘shackle’ upon individual liberty. (In volume 1, chapter 9, I showed how Marx considered libertarians whose views are premised upon this false ontology to be ‘simply uncomprehending’ of how community could be anything but abstract and oppressive). Liberalism thus comes to be paralyzed in an endless struggle between an abstract individual and an abstract community, presiding over a society in which real individuals are subject to a series of alien and surrogate collectivities. Marx’s critical focus was upon identifying and uprooting the systemic, external ‘shackles’ of the capital system, against which he sought to develop an internal self-constraint through the association of individuals. That self-constraint constitutes a legitimate, internal, democratically constituted authority, collective force and community.

Which brings me to the principle of rational freedom. The case for rational freedom is timely in the context of the scarcely-reasoned nihilisms and relativisms of recent decades. As Rubel comments on Marx’s importance as a rational, critical and emancipatory thinker:





Establishing the concept of ‘rational freedom’ serves to highlight themes of universality, commonality, truth, authority and the normative that serve to distinguish Marx’s critical and emancipatory project from the myriad libertarianisms of the (post)modern age. Marx is a rational and an essentialist thinker who, in adhering to concepts of truth and freedom, argues a position that is quite contrary to postmodernism and poststructuralism. The concept of rational freedom may be clarified by way of contrast with ‘postmodernism.’ ‘Postmodernism’ here refers to

the contemporary movement of thought which rejects totalities, universal values, grand historical narratives, solid foundations to human existence and the possibility of objective knowledge. Postmodernism is sceptical of truth, unity and progress, opposes what it sees as elitism in culture, tends towards cultural relativism, and celebrates pluralism, discontinuity and heterogeneity.

Eagleton 2003 ch 1

Much of this may sound emancipatory. The problem, however, is that in eliding the implications of what it is for human beings as social beings to live in common, indeed, in implying that all collective forms of common living are inimical to individual liberty, such thinking effectively serves to block the creation of the conditions of a socially embedded and articulated freedom. Indeed, from such a perspective, socialism can only be what its liberal and conservative critics in the past said it was, ‘the road to serfdom,’ in the words of Hayek, the ‘housing for the new serfdom,’ in the words of Max Weber. (Weber 1994: 68). 

Eagleton points out what is involved in the attack on universality, commonality and the normative in postmodern libertarianism:

What is under assault here is the normative. Majority social life on this view is a matter of norms and conventions, and therefore inherently oppressive. Only the marginal, perverse and aberrant can escape this dreary regimenting. Norms are oppressive because they mould uniquely different individuals to the same shape.

Eagleton 2003 ch 1

Universality, commonality and the normative are core themes in the concept and tradition of rational freedom, and reappear in Marx as they come to transfigured. I have no objection to liberals committed to methodological individualism making such claims, which are perfectly consistent with the liberal ontology. There are two conceptions of freedom in collision here, and these can be clearly distinguished. The real confusion occurs when these libertarians come to identify themselves with the Left in politics. Their impact upon socialism and its universal commitments and values is acidic. It is in this respect that Eagleton notes that the ‘postmodern prejudice against norms, unities and consensuses is a politically catastrophic one’ as well as being ‘remarkably dim-witted.’ (Eagleton 2003: ch 1). It undermines any claim to emancipation and is certainly corrosive of the emancipatory project of the Left. 

Eagleton notes the extent to which some modes of postmodern thought reject consensus as tyrannical and reject solidarity on account of being a soulless uniformity. This rejection is quite distinct from the liberal defence of the individual against conformity, with some postmodernists explicitly rejecting the autonomous subject to even doubt the very reality of the individual. To consensus and solidarity, such postmodernists oppose margins and minorities, seeing what stands askew to society - the marginal, mad, deviant, perverse, transgressive - as the most politically fertile. Such postmodernism sees little of value in mainstream social life. (Eagleton 2003 ch 1). Whilst good work has been done here to give voice to those whom dominant forces have pushed to the margins, the point, surely, is to overcome marginalisation rather than celebrate it as a necessary principle.

Derridean deconstruction and kindred sophistries won’t do much for the working class or for women or for African-Americans or for gays and lesbians or for Dalits (untouchables) or for any other oppressed group.’ (Sokal 2008: 94). 





‘Meanwhile, those white males who, unfortunately for themselves, are not quite dead have been metaphorically strung upside down from the lamp-posts, while the ill-gotten coins cascading from their pockets have been used to finance community arts projects.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 1). Not that I’m feeling threatened in any way.

Eagleton locates the social roots of such thinking in the disintegration of the old bourgeois society into a host of sub-cultures. Here, he identifies the decline of the traditional middle class as one of the key social changes of the age. With appropriate disdain, Perry Anderson notes the way in which the solid, civilized, morally upright bourgeoisie has been supplanted by ‘starlet princesses and sleazeball presidents, beds for rent in the official residence and bribes for killer ads, disneyfication of protocols and tarantinization of practices.’ The ‘solid (bourgeois) amphitheatre’ has given way to 'an aquarium of floating, evanescent forms - the projectors and managers, auditors and janitors, administrators and speculators of contemporary capital: functions of a monetary universe that knows no social fixities and stable identities.’ (Anderson 1998: 86 and 85). For all of Anderson’s socialist contempt here, it is precisely this lack of stable identities which some celebrate as the very definition of radicalism. It isn’t radical at all, though, in that it offers no way of allowing individuals to embed and assert their power as social beings. The idea that instability of identity is ‘subversive’ is a claim that would be contested by the socially dumped and disregarded themselves. (Eagleton 2003 ch 1). Again, it is intellectuals, from pretty well off and comfortable positions within established society, who seem most prone to indulge in fantasies of instability as liberatory.

Such libertarianism that cannot realize any emancipatory claims it makes, because it is lacking in any kind of normative philosophical anthropology that alone can make any emancipatory claims meaningful. The rejection of such views comes not on account of their radical nature, but on account of their utterly reactionary implications, their complete inability to constitute anything like an effective political challenge to constituted power and authority.

In a world of ‘global’ forces, thought and action need to scale up to the challenges we face. Small scale reasoning, local practice and libertarian self-assertion and self-identity cannot hope to withstand the institutional and systemic force ranged against them. This, Eagleton notes, presents theory with a fresh challenge:

If it is to engage with an ambitious global history, it must have answerable resources of its own, equal in depth and scope to the situation it confronts. It cannot afford simply to keep recounting the same narratives of class, race and gender, indispensable as these topics are. It needs to chance its arm, break out of a rather stifling orthodoxy and explore new topics, not least those of which it has so far been unreasonably shy.

Eagleton 2003 ch 8

Eagleton offers his book After Theory as an opening move in that inquiry. What is striking about this book is the extent to which the ‘new topics’ upon which (post)modern thought has been ‘unreasonably shy’ that Eagleton identifies are actually very old ‘traditional’ themes of political and social order – morality, truth, law, norms, community, essentialism. I have developed these themes at length in a rational reconstruction of the socio-institutional, moral and anthropological requirements of the embodiment and articulation of the principle of rational freedom in and through the form/s of the common life. I develop these themes, too, to establish the requirements of a genuine public community, involving notions of a political architectonic, authority, citizenship and sovereignty. 

In the process, I attempt to show that Marx’s view combines authority, autonomy and authenticity, the free and full development of each and all individuals realizing their human essence in community with others. Not for no reason have I referred to the various occasions certain people have suggested that I have made Marx into a conservative and into an anarchist. Those people may have been baffled by my presentation, but they have glimpsed, without quite identifying, the peculiar character of Marx’s argument when read in terms of the principle of ‘rational freedom’ and its radical transfiguration. I shall show that, within this theme, Marx establishes morality and community, a legitimate, democratic, form of authority, and a sense of the sacred through the critique of alienation at the heart of the emancipatory project, thus achieving harmony in a world ordered to true ends. All of which presuppose the existence of transcendent truths, norms and values. At which point I have to admit that that is not exactly how Marx establishes his argument for communism at all and, with respect to Marx’s historicism, quite the contrary to the way Marx presented his argument. To which I say two things, 1) the views on community, the normative, and authority are at least implicit in Marx’s argument and, more often than not, explicit, it’s just that Marx was against their abstract and ideal presentation and 2) Marx needs the architectonic of transcendent truth to make good his emancipatory claims. The unfolding of the human essence in the historical process was not some blind, accidental occurrence for Marx, but purposeful and normative. It isn’t difficult to highlight this aspect of Marx’s argument and turn him into, if not a conservative, then someone who takes fundamental conservative themes, critically appropriates them from their ideological functions in the service of asymmetrical relations of power and domination, and establishes them as socio-institutional realities in a functional community of ends. 

Which takes me to the second aspect of this ‘unusual’ reading of Marx – anarchism. I’ll state Marx’s ‘anarchism’ simply: in internalizing the key themes of rational freedom, Marx sees associating individuals as becoming capable of living in accordance with an internal moral-social constraint, supplanting the external institutional-systemic constraint of capital and the abstract state. Uprooting all alienated forms of mediation, Marx’s communism takes shape as the anarchist society. I shall show that the main causes of Marx’s arguments with prominent anarchists was not that they were anarchists – if that was the case, then Marx would never have been as close as he was to Bakunin or Proudhon as he was at certain times – but that their prescriptions failed to transcend bourgeois values and the capital relation, leaving their prescriptions confined within the capital system and thus far short of the anarchist society they desired. 

There is no possibility of returning to older solidarities and forms of collectivity that belong to a world that is unravelling under our feet. This fact is something that puts a question mark against Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of modernity – the remnants of older communities and ethical commitments are barely holding on in present society, and hardly constitute a promising base for the recovery of the common life. But if there is no going back, it isn’t clear at all how to move forward. Human history, Eagleton comments, is now for the most part ‘both post-collectivist and post-individualist.’ Whilst MacIntyre may see this as a void, Eagleton thinks it may present an opportunity for reconstituting forms of community:

We need to imagine new forms of belonging, which in our kind of world are bound to be multiple rather than monolithic. Some of those forms will have something of the intimacy of tribal or community relations, while others will be more abstract, mediated and indirect. There is no single ideal size of society to belong to, no Cinderella's slipper of a space. The ideal size of community used to be known as the nation-state, but even some nationalists no longer see this as the only desirable terrain.

Eagleton 2003 ch 1

Marx argued for the abolition of the state. Having established Marx’s precise meaning here – which entails the realization of a genuine public community, not the end of politics but its realization – I come in the final chapter of volume 3 to examine the thought of Alasdair MacIntyre, whose rejection of the modern nation-state is almost total, seeing it as singularly incapable of constituting the community of the public good. I argue that MacIntyre is deficient in this respect and is incapable of constituting political order. The local communities of virtue that MacIntyre prescribes can survive, thrive and multiply only by scaling up to the large-scale social embodiment of the good under the auspices of an effective political community ordering the parts to their true end. Traditionally, we have known some such thing by the name of the state.

To sum so far, I have identified themes of universality, commonality, the normative, genuine political activity, authority, freedom and public good as lying at the heart of the concept of rational freedom. Marx sought the realisation of these things beyond the prevailing institutional expression of social and political order.

The title of my thesis Marx and Rational Freedom (2001) was taken from this quote from the young and very Hegelian Marx. It was this Hegelian Marx that incited my own philosophical interest and set me on the ‘dangerous’ philosophical road that I took, with occasional delirious dancing (and a lot of singing – I write with the sound of music in my ears):

A state which is not the realization of rational freedom is a bad state.
Marx and Engels Historische Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt, Berlin and Moscow 1927, vol. I, i (i), p. 247

I found the quote in Raymond Plant’s fine book on Hegel, and took that concept of ‘rational freedom’ as the organizing principle of my own work. (Plant 1973: 195). I wanted to know what this ‘rational freedom’ was and why it was so important to Marx that he demanded its realization. I learned that Marx at this stage of his career was an Hegelian, and that this concept of ‘rational freedom’ related to Hegel’s conception of the state as an ethico-rational agency transcending particular interests to embody and articulate the universal interest, canalising particular interests to the common end, fully realising their particular ends in the process. Such a political order promised a win-win positive sum society in which the particular and the general were integrated through a multi-layered, multi-scaled interimbrication of institutions. I found the view congenial, and set out to investigate further.

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel elaborates on this notion of rational freedom:

As for the conspicuously good will for the general welfare which the Estates are supposed to possess, it has been pointed out already (in the Remark to § 272) that to regard the will of the executive as bad, or as less good [than that of the ruled] is a presupposition characteristic of the rabble or of the negative outlook generally. This presupposition might at once be answered on its own ground by the counter-charge that the Estates start from isolated individuals, from a private point of view, from particular interests, and so are inclined to devote their activities to these at the expense of the general interests, while per contra the other moments in the power of the state explicitly take up the standpoint of the state from the start and devote themselves to the universal end.
As for the general guarantee which is supposed to lie peculiarly in the Estates, each of the other political institutions shares with the Estates in being a guarantee of public welfare and rational freedom, and some of these institutions, as for instance the sovereignty of the monarch, hereditary succession to the throne, the judicial system, &c., guarantee these things far more effectively than the Estates can.
Hence the specific function which the concept assigns to the Estates is to be sought in the fact that in them the subjective moment in universal freedom — the private judgement and private will of the sphere called civil society' in this book — comes into existence integrally related to the state. This moment is a determination of the Idea once the Idea has developed to totality, a moment arising as a result of an inner necessity not to be confused with external necessities and expediencies. The proof of this follows, like all the rest of our account of the state, from adopting the philosophical point of view.
Addition: The attitude of the executive to the Estates should not be essentially hostile, and a belief in the necessity of such hostility is a sad mistake. The executive is not a party standing over against another party in such a way that each has continually to steal a march on the other and wrest something from the other. If such a situation arises in the state, that is a misfortune, but it cannot be called health. The taxes voted by the Estates, moreover, are not to be regarded as a present given to the state. On the contrary, they are voted in the best interests of the voters themselves. The real significance of the Estates lies in the fact that it is through them that the state enters the subjective consciousness of the people and that the people begins to participate in the state.

Hegel, Philosophy of Right § 301

Hegel traces the idea back to Plato:

But as justice, according to Plato, is really the entire being, which presents itself to the individual in such a way that each man learns to do the work he is born to do as well as it can be done, and does it, it is only as determined individuality that man reaches what is law for him; only thus does he belong to the universal spirit of the state, coming in it to the universal of himself as a “this.” While law is a universal with a definite content, and thus a formal universal only, the content in this case is the whole determined individuality, not this or that thing which is mine by the accident of possession; what I properly hold as my own is the perfected possession and use of my nature. To each particular determination justice gives its rights, and thus leads it back into the whole; in this way it is by the particularity of an individual being of necessity developed and brought into actuality, that each man is in his place and fulfils his vocation. Justice, therefore, according to its true conception, is in our eyes freedom in the subjective sense, because it is the attainment of actuality by the reason, and seeing that this right on the part of liberty to attain to actuality is universal, Plato sets up justice as the determination of the whole, indicating that rational freedom comes into existence through the organism of the state, — an existence which is then, as necessary, a mode of nature.

Hegel's History of Philosophy: Greek Philosophy, Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Part One: Greek Philosophy

In summing up Hegel’s notion of rational freedom, Paul Franco emphasizes the extent to which the conception of freedom in this concept realizes the key claims of liberalism but much more besides, delivering a self-determination that represents the ‘highest fulfilment’ of Enlightenment aspirations, a much richer freedom:

What exactly is the relationship between Hegel's political philosophy of freedom and liberalism? Two broad conclusions have emerged from our analysis in the foregoing chapters. First, in its incorporation of subjective freedom, the Hegelian state is able to account for almost all the rights and freedoms we ordinarily associate with the liberal state. Second, though Hegel is able to provide for these liberal rights and freedoms in his state, his ultimate justification for them is not the typical liberal one. Subjective or particular freedom is not the end or purpose of the Hegelian state, as it is of the liberal state. The end or purpose of the Hegelian state is rational freedom, the willing of the universal that corresponds to the universality of the human essence, or, less metaphysically, the willing of a content that corresponds to the self-determining nature of the human will. It is only through its connection to this rational freedom that subjective freedom receives its ultimate justification as the activating and self-conscious element. The rational freedom that is realized in the Hegelian state is not inimical to subjective freedom—indeed, it derives its greatest strength and depth from being conjoined to subjective freedom—but neither is it simply identical or reducible to subjective freedom. It is in this notion of the state as the realization of rational freedom that Hegel most radically departs from the instrumentalist conception of the state that predominates in liberal theory.
Whereas communitarians have tended to emphasize Hegel's break with Enlightenment rationalism and his affinity with such romantic themes as belonging, personal wholeness, and communal solidarity, I have stressed Hegel's doctrine of rational freedom and self-determination—a doctrine that descends from the Kantian doctrine of rational autonomy and that, far from being antithetical to Enlightenment aspirations, in some ways represents their highest fulfilment.

Franco 1999: ch 9 Epilogue 344ff

Franco was emphasising Hegel’s rational freedom at exactly the same time I was earning my spurs on Marx’s reworking of that concept. That idea sounded as good to me in the 1990s as it had once done to Marx. It still sounds good. I could rewrite the claims that Franco makes on Hegel’s rational freedom with respect to Marx’s communism as an ethico-rational society beyond the abstraction of the modern state. Isn’t this rational freedom and self-determination incorporating a sense of belonging, personal wholeness and communal solidarity what we all demand with respect to balancing individual freedom within a commitment to the common good? Isn’t that precisely what the world stands in need of? 

But this begs an obvious question: if Hegel’s rational freedom was so good, then why did Marx come to criticize Hegel’s political philosophy at length? 

Marx’s work for the Rheinische Zeitung of Cologne led him to fight for freedom of the press in Prussia in the name of a liberty, which he conceived to be the very essence of human beings. His emancipatory commitment was also undertaken in the name of a State which Marx defined in terms of the embodiment of rational freedom. This principle informs the articles that Marx wrote in the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx affirming freedom as human self-realization and self-determinism through the state as ethical agency. So far, so Hegelian. Marx thus describes the state as ‘the great organism, in which legal, moral, and political freedom must be realised, and in which the individual citizen in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, of human reason.’ (“The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung.” Rheinische Zeitung, 10-14 July 1842).

Marx is concerned to distinguish the natural laws of reason he affirms from any religious connotations of transcendence as a supernatural authority these laws may have. He thus writes that ‘the numerous champions of the Christian-knightly, modern feudal principle … want to regard freedom not as the natural gift of the universal sunlight of reason, but as the supernatural gift of a specially favourable constellation of the stars, because they regard freedom as merely an individual property of certain persons and social estates, [and] are in consequence compelled to include universal reason and universal freedom among the bad ideas and phantoms of ‘logically constructed systems.’ (Marx, ‘Debates on the Freedom of the Press.’ p.151).

Marx’s target here is neither the lingering form of corporatist organicism left over from feudalism nor Christian supernaturalism as such but the ‘bastard form of Christian individualism’ that he saw taking shape within modern liberal society, politics and thought. The passage seems clearly to repudiate transcendent standards, but the phrasing is too bound up with a particular target to warrant a clear statement. Marx contrasts the ‘natural gift’ with the the ‘supernatural gift,’ and so explicitly rejects any religious conception of the transcendent. But that natural gift as ‘the universal sunlight of reason’ certainly remains a transcendent standard, albeit an earthly rather than an heavenly one. But supernaturalism is not Marx’s specific target here, but the way that the proclamation of eternal principles and transcendent standards can be used to rationalize their very opposite in practice. The important feature of the Prussian society that was the specific context of Marx’s critical comments here was not its corporatist structure but ‘its adoption of atomism as a principle of social or, more accurately, anti-social organization.’ (Breckman 1999: 275). In making this charge, Marx moves seamlessly along the continuum that connects religion, politics and social practices. Marx criticizes the ‘needy, egoistic interest’ that dominates modern society, from the pious ‘self-seeking which puts personal salvation above the salvation of all’ to the ‘pressing need of private interests [which] is the architect of the political system based on estates.’ (Marx ‘On the Commissions of the Estates in Prussia,’ p. 303). 

Marx thus came to understand that the ‘natural gift’ of freedom was socially mediated, not necessarily realized through social forms, and often contradicted. His discovery of the extent to which private interests, centred on the institution of private property, dominated Prussian society caused Marx to ask: ‘Are not most of your court cases and most of your civil laws concerned with property?’ (‘Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kolnische Zeitung, CW vol 1 p.199). Marx’s immediate concern in the Prussian context was inherited landed property, but he treated this as paradigmatic of all forms of private property, meaning that his question was directed to all as citizens in the modern world. Marx considered heritable landed property to express, albeit through the mystified form of primogeniture, the essence of private property as something that lies in its abstraction from the community as the presocial right of individuals. (‘On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia.’ P. 305). 

Whilst Marx’s specific criticisms here were directed against the aristocracy, the large property owners who dominated the estate system, he nevertheless considered that the same egoistic, individualistic concerns were in the process of pervading modern society in general. An atomized society, he argued, is founded on the incarnation of particular rights in individuals as the rights of ‘private persons’ to the exclusion of the rights of humankind in general, with the result that people are reduced to a ‘rabble of private individuals.’ (Marx, ‘Debates on Freedom of the Press,’ p.168). Marx’s concern is with the fracturing of society into a sphere of egoism and antagonism, a social atomism below proceeding hand in hand with a political centralism above, with the people forming a ‘crude, inorganic mass’ as the ‘non-state spheres of life’ came to be ‘unreal, mechanical, subordinated.’ (Marx, ‘On the Commissions of the Estates in Prussia, pp 296-297). Marx thus notes that the ‘urban estate’ acts as ‘bourgeois,’ and not as ‘citoyen.’ (Marx, ‘Debates on Freedom of the Press,’ p.169).

Hegel had constantly invoked this Rousseauian distinction between bourgeois and citoyen in his analysis of civil society, and it became a critical element in Marx’s transformatory project oriented towards the realization of rational freedom. It is important to note, Warren Breckman argues, that Marx’s concern with the conflict between ‘bourgeois’ and ‘citizen,’ between the self-interested individual of atomistic society and social individual of a public community, ‘emerged against a background in which the secular tension between private interest and public-spiritedness overlapped with the conflict between Christian atomism and immanent collective spirit. Marx’s idealist republicanism, like Feuerbach’s and Ruge’s, synthesized Rousseauian and Hegelian elements by identifying the general will with philosophical comprehension of this rational, collective spirit. Moreover, his republicanism had in common with theirs the fact that it was not exclusively or narrowly political. This was true even before Marx turned explicitly to the social question. His rigorous defense of immanence against transcendence and his monistic philosophy of spirit made the sharp distinction between politics and economics unintelligible.’ (Breckman 1999: 276).

Working as a young economics journalist, Marx thus came to find that the ideal of the state as the agency of rational freedom was contradicted in practice by the reality of the state serving as the surrogate of private economic interests. In his investigations of the prosecutions for thefts of timber – through the institution of private property, what had once been a customary right had come to be considered a criminal offence – Marx came quickly and clearly to understand the extent to which the Hegelian ideal of the ethical (rational) state had been subverted by the realities of capitalist society; instead of being the embodiment of the universal interest, the state served as the surrogate of private interests. 

Marx proceeded to take the principle of ‘rational freedom’ and seek its realization beyond its limited institutional incarnation as a lawful freedom within a rational liberal state bound to the alienated mediations of the capital system. This state, Marx saw clearly, exists as one of capital’s alienated second order mediations, integral to the reproduction of the capital system. It is futile to seek redress at this level for any injustices inflicted in the capitalist economy, since the state is formed as capital’s political command centre (I cover this point at length in An Introduction to the Thought of István Mészáros 2018). Marx’s critique of Hegel’s doctrine of the state thus required also a critique of the material determinations, class divisions, and contradictory dynamics of capitalist reality. 

4 Marx and Hegel 
Hegel or Marx? Or Marx beyond Hegel? Or Hegel and Marx? In a very philosophical conversation over a pint or four of Guinness in a pub in Manchester city centre, March 2001, the very fine Kantian philosopher Gary Banham looked at me smiling and slightly nodding and said: ‘You are very Hegelian.’ ‘Very Hegelian’ as in a hopeless case. Gary was concerned to challenge the common view that Hegel had answered and superseded Kant. Had this been so, he said, then Marx would not have found it necessary to criticize Hegel to the extent he did, recommending Harry Van Der Linden’s Kantian Ethics and Socialism to me (1988). A fine book it is too. There is a division on ethics between Kant and Hegel, and between Marxist socialists who favour one over the other, and I shall examine the difference in Part 3. Here, I want to remain with Hegel, since the relation of Hegel and Marx will run throughout this book, with a long section on essentialist metaphysics and organic dialectics tracing the origins of Marx’s thought in Hegel back to Aristotle.

For MacGregor, ‘Marx did not go far enough in his Hegelian exploration of a rational society. Marx's ideal of communism offers only a ghostly outline of a system that Hegel had already constructed in detail’ (MacGregor 1998: xiv). There is a case for arguing that the enthusiasm many, such as myself, show for Marx’s idealised presentation of the Paris Commune is a result of the need to satisfy curiosity, achieve clarity and even establish certainty with respect to the institutional features of the future communist society. There are many occasions when I look at Marx’s sketchy outlines of the future communist society and regret that he did not write a socialist equivalent of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Except that had he have done so, he would have ceased to have been Marx. And since we already have the Philosophy of Right, the question arises as to why it doesn’t suffice as the constructive model many demand from Marx. We could read it and apply it in new social relations. But isn’t that what Marx was doing?

Controversies over the Commune as a model of future society indicate why Marx was wise to refuse to write detailed blueprints – such things are idealist, and do not adequately depict society as it is, as a field of materialist immanence in the process of continuous movement. Instead, they always look backward even as they attempt to project forward. That is the inherent limitation of such a project. Marx’s real innovation was to have eschewed writing theory or philosophy but to have broken through to reality to engage in a practical sociological critique focused upon a society in its process of self-transcendence. 

And herein lies the real and enduring significance of Hegel to Marx. In his conception of Sittlichkeit, the system of the ethical life, Hegel synthesises the ‘is’ and the ‘ought to be,’ grasping existence in terms of the becoming of that existence. The key thing is to identify the course of development through which what ‘ought to be’ is in the process of becoming what ‘is,’ the way that society is always in the process of transcending itself. As Charles Taylor writes:

The crucial character of Sittlichkeit is that it enjoins us to bring about what already is. This is a paradoxical way of putting it, but in fact the common life which is the basis of my Sittlichkeit obligation is already there in existence. It is in virtue of its being an ongoing affair that I have these obligations; and my fulfilment of these obligations is what sustains it and keeps it in being. Hence, in Sittlichkeit there is no gap between what ought to be and what is, between Sollen and Sein.




That’s a view of a self-transcending ethical immanence that Marx took over and incorporated into his own critique. Materialising Hegel’s concepts and categories, Marx came to look upon reality as a field of materialist immanence, containing inherent lines of development, hidden inner connections and potentialities in the process of becoming actualities. (Marx CI 1976: 733-734; Marx C3 1981: 956). In this sense, Marx developed a ‘socialism from within,’ his immanent critique being focused on showing how the contradictory dynamics of the capital system contained within the potential to actualize the socialized system of the future.

Hegel is important to Marx in other key respects. In the tradition of rational freedom, institutions are evaluated according to their capacity to develop and sustain the desire of each individual for mutual respect and freedom. Hegel’s conception of Sittlichkeit explains how the actuality of concrete freedom is possible, being a ‘rational reconstruction of what institutions must exist if rational freedom is to be possible’ (Smith 1991: 130/1). Marx took issue with the precise forms of Hegel’s institutional mediation, showing how these were bound to the capital system, and therefore blocking freedom rather than realizing it. But he retained that concern with rational reconstruction in accordance with the principle of rational freedom, and took the question of mediation very seriously. 

Marx was profoundly influenced by the way that Hegel sought to ground ethics in a mode of life that was appropriate to human nature in a specific context. As against the thin, abstract nature of Kantian and utilitarian ethical theories, Hegel affirms a complex self-actualising conception of human nature which is culturally and historically specific (Wood 1990: 17 53). On this basis, Hegel sought to identify the institutions that are required for rational freedom to be realized and how they are to be arranged in order to enable self-actualisation (Wood 1990: 237). The differentiated system proposed by Hegel rests upon ethical relations connecting individuals within an institutional framework in which all citizens participate. The principle of Hegel’s state, therefore, is subjective freedom (Wood 1992 PR para 273A; PR paras 185R 206R 260 262A 299R 316A; PH trans Sibree 1956 540/456). Hegel is thus a liberal to this extent, but, as against individualist notions, he is a corporate liberal for whom individual freedom is actualized within an ethico-institutional and social matrix. His subjectivity is an intersubjectivity.

Marx criticizes the way that the state comes to acquire an existential significance whereas, in truth, it is the people who create the state. He makes this criticism with respect to Hegel:

Just as if the people were not the real state. The state is an abstraction. Only the people is a concrete reality. And it is noteworthy that Hegel, who does not scruple to ascribe living qualities to the abstraction, should concede the right of the concrete reality to a living entity such as sovereignty only with reluctance and with many reservations.

Marx CHDS EW 1975: 85/6

I think Marx is right in principle here, but wrong about Hegel, for reasons given above with respect to Hegel’s corporate liberalism. He is restating Hegel’s principle against Hegel. Hegel is well aware of the conditions of concrete freedom and is concerned to develop the socio-institutional and ethical framework and infrastructure of rational freedom to establish those conditions. Indeed, the framework and infrastructure of Sittlichkeit is not merely as the condition of that freedom, but a dimension of it. It is ironic to note Marx making the same criticisms of Hegel as hypostatising conceptions, reality and individuals that liberal critics make of Marx. The truth is that Marx’s real target is the actual state that denies the principle of subjective freedom.

The real point is that Marx was also concerned to establish the real conditions rational freedom, something which took him beyond Hegel and beyond capital. And this is where the real controversy lies. Because that commitment to a new social order runs the risk not merely of going beyond the rational liberal state, but of losing positive liberal achievements which are crucial to individual liberty. For Errol E Harris, ‘had Marx understood Hegel aright he would have found in him much that he (Marx) was seeking, including a basis for socialism that would not have led his followers astray into totalitarian repression of human liberty’ (Harris 1993: 51). In which case, there is every need to keep emphasizing that Marx’s abolition of the state entails the transcendence of the liberal state as a realization that preserves, enhances and raises up positive liberal achievements. Marx did not set political emancipation and human emancipation in general in antithetical relation but established them on a continuum. He thus engaged in an immanent critique of the liberal order in order to universalize its positive achievements with respect to individual rights and liberties in a concrete freedom. To argue against Marx that Hegel, and the liberal institutional order of political emancipation, supplies the basis for the socialist order that Marx sought ignores the extent to which Marx subjected Hegel and the liberal order to a close immanent critique for precisely that reason – to extract its potentials and separate them from their institutional constraints. Ultimately, as the point about what differentiated Marx from Proudhon made clear, the question was about much more than realizing the truths contained in liberal or bourgeois principles, it was about establishing a new morality and practice entirely, one based upon new social forms.

McCarney acknowledges that the experience of Communism reinforces Hegel's insight 'that freedom has to be embodied as justice, and, hence, as a constitutional system incorporating explicit and effective guarantees of rights.’ That lesson needs to be learned, lest the gates be opened again to Communism as a moral and political wasteland. Yet McCarney proceeds to note the extent to which these rights and liberties are violated by Hegel's support of private property and wage labour (McCarney 1991: 33 35). Which, precisely, is Marx’s critical point in coming to show the extent to which the rational liberal state is structurally wedded to capital’s alienated forms of mediation. Marx’s point is that these forms are inimical to human freedom, a fact which poses the question of what social institutions, relations and structures are required if rational freedom is to be realized. 

What is interesting about this view of ‘Hegelian unfreedom’ is the extent to which it makes clear that no legal apparatus safeguarding constitutional rights can be effective in protecting freedom in conditions of substantive unfreedom. Hegel himself is aware of the extent to which the system of needs turns upon individuals as an external force through the mediations of labour, tools, machinery and money (Fraser 1998: 62). And that makes the case for substantive democracy and equality as a condition of rational freedom, implying new socialized forms of mediation. In other words … Marx’s case for communism, and the case for Marx’s communism.

That Marx subjected Hegel’s doctrine of the state to a close and extensive critique may make it appear that Marx was thoroughly rejecting Hegel and his system. What he was actually doing, however, was engaging in an immanent critique, turning Hegel against himself in order to liberate the truth his philosophy contained, identifying key principles and demanding their realization apart from, and ultimately against, the precise forms of institutional mediation proposed by Hegel. Hegel, Marx shows, cannot transcend alienation. Instead, his rational liberal state remains firmly within the capital system. Marx identifies the key principles of rational freedom and develops them beyond Hegel’s liberal state in the direction of a social self-mediation as against capital's social metabolic order of alien control. 

In Capital, Marx thus writes of human beings coming to manage their common affairs in a 'rational way,' something which requires a ‘collective control’ as against the fundamental irrationality and uncontrollability of the capital system. Such comments scattered throughout Marx’s critique do not amount to a Philosophy of Right on his part. Marx had no time for such theoretical presentations and blueprints, seeing them as necessarily limited and passive in being conceived in abstraction from a living reality that evades such rational capture. Marx was loathe to attach living principle to precise institutions and structures, inviting its ossification in practice. But the ‘rational control’ he adumbrates is undoubtedly conceived in line of Hegelian descent. Marx wanted the creative human agents themselves to write their own Philosophy of Right in their ‘revolutionary,’ ‘practical-critical activity.’ (Marx, Thesis I on Feuerbach).

I say Marx is Hegelian. I say he is essentialist. And I say that he is Aristotelian too. And I say that without key aspects drawn from all of these traditions, the emancipatory project is up a creek without a paddle, without meaning, direction and destination. To argue for the emancipated society is to have some idea what emancipation entails, and that involves a view of nature and human nature that can only be in some way essentialist. At the same time I make clear that Marx is an Hegelian beyond Hegel and the rational liberal state; that he is an Aristotelian beyond Aristotle, in that he argues for more than the social individual to give us the social conditions of the free individual; and that he is an essentialist far removed from any notion of essentialism as connoting a timeless, fixed essence. 

Marx sought to realise ‘the essence of socialised man’ in what he called a 'true democracy.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 88-89). Marx goes further, beyond capital's alienated second order mediations, (in a way that Hegel did not) to transform social relations so as to realize rational freedom. For Jacques d'Hondt, Hegel's political project was soon superseded through the birth of the proletariat and Marx's social and political theory. The contradictions of bourgeois society were transposed and concealed in Hegel's thought. It was left to Marx to show that rather than civil society being ‘dependent on the state, as Hegel proposed .. the state rested on civil society’ (D'Hondt 1988: 191 192 195). Marx shows that the state and law are not determinant, they are determined: they are part of capital’s second order mediations, integral to the circular linkages protecting the capital system. (Mészáros 1995: 109 933). From that, it follows that attempts to resolve social problems and divisions through the agency of the state as a form of alienated mediation are doomed to fail, unless political action here is set within the context of a commitment to widespread social transformation. Hence I return to Marx as one who absorbed Hegel and incorporated the principle of rational freedom into a practical immanent critique of social forms.

5 The Abolition of the State
There is a principle of the state in Marx. Many anarchists have long suspected this very thing, and condemned Marx for his authoritarian and governmental socialism as a result. I argue that this as a strength of Marx rather than a weakness, so long as that commitment to political order is made explicit and the constitution of public community and authority is established on a democratic basis. There is a principle of political authority in Marx, integrating the ‘true state,’ ‘the democratic state,’ within a 'true democracy.' These were key elements in Marx’s ‘state,’ as they were in Rousseau. Remove those things, and you no longer have Marx’s ‘true state,’ the ‘democratic state,’ you have the continuation of the abstraction of the alien state that he sought to abolish. But remember, properly understood, Rousseau is also an anarchist, and his ethical imperatives were understood as such by William Godwin. As with Marx, Rousseau made no abstract and abstracting distinction between nature, individual and society:

The fundamental alternative remains liberty or slavery, not natural isolation or society, not private man or public society, not man or citizen, not the individual or the group, not spontaneity or opinion. Man cannot choose between liberty and society because both are essential to him once the state of nature has ended. Similarly, both nonindividualism and anarchism are fundamental to Rousseau's thought. They are the warp and woof of his political philosophy. To ignore or slight either, or to interpret society and liberty as competitive principles, is to miss the integrity and meaning of Rousseau's philosophy. 

Ellenburg 1976 ch 6

Ellenburg thus writes of ‘the anarchist imperative’ that is central to Rousseau’s thought, emphasizing the extent to which ‘nonindividualism and anarchism converge within Rousseau's political thought,’ pointing to ‘a united and disciplined common life alone assures literal self-government for all artificial individuals.’ (Ellenburg 1976 ch 6).

Rousseau advocated absolute liberty or literal self-government so insistently that he equated all instances of external rule, whether governmental or not, with slavery. Ignorance of this anarchistic imperative animating his thought makes his ideas a tangle of arbitrary assertions and robs them of their moral urgency.

Ellenburg 1976 ch 2

Likewise, Maximilien Rubel refers to Marx as the ‘theoretician of anarchism.’ (Rubel, L'Europe en formation, no 163-164, octobre-novembre 1973 trans Adam Buick). 
Rubel reasons his argument thus: 





Rubel proceeds to argue that, ‘under the name communism, Marx developed a theory of anarchism,’ and that, further, Marx ‘was the first to provide a rational basis for the anarchist utopia and to put forward a project for achieving it.’ These views would appear to reverse the familiar view, which sees both Rousseau and Marx as authoritarians whose views of freedom are utterly inimical to individual freedom. The key lies in repudiating the false separations of nature, individuality and sociality in the liberal ontology and seeing individuals as social beings requiring a public life as a dimension of freedom as self-realisation and self-determination. That would point to the need for establishing reciprocal relations on a legitimate, democratic, basis, involving collective notions of mutual constraint. Rubel explains with respect to a comparison between Marx and Proudhon. Whilst Proudhon, with his federalist aspirations, would appear to be closer to the anarchist position than Marx, ‘the picture changes when we consider Proudhon’s overall conception of the reforms which should lead to the abolition of capital and the State.’ 





Marx proceeded beyond the instruments and institutions of capitalism to apply the critical method against the capital system as such, including the capital relation and the very logic of capital, developing a holistic assault against the abstract state, wage labour and capital together.





I haven’t been concerned to describe Marx’s ethico-rational society as anarchist, not least because to make such a claim would involve me in myriad debates within and between Marxism, socialism and anarchism that I can well do without. I remember Prof Lawrence Wilde in my Viva Voce claiming that my view of Marx is so libertarian that at some points I ‘make Marx out to be almost anarchist.’ Which I took to be something plain wrong and hence to be frowned upon. Lawrence advised me to be ‘more realistic’ in presenting my view of Marx and possibilities for the rational society. That begs the question of ‘realistic’ in terms of what? If realism pertains to what is possible within existing arrangements, then my view is not very realistic at all. But neither was Plato’s. The rational conception becomes much more realistic once we examine prevailing institutions and structures in order to identify potentialities for their transformation leading to an alternate society. I wanted to see how far the principle of rational freedom could go, and whether reason could come ever to rule, with society coming to be self-governed through the rational agency of each and all. The end in view is not so much Plato’s Philosopher-Ruler but the Rule of Philosophy – reason is in control. Read back to Kant’s Motto of Enlightenment with which this part opened. Kant defined Enlightenment in terms of the emergence of human beings from their ‘self-incurred immaturity,’ calling upon the individual to use his or her own understanding without the guidance of another. The courage and resolution is required to use understanding without the guidance of another. ‘It is so convenient to be immature!’ writes Kant, scorning the reliance of individuals upon guardians to avoid making any efforts at thinking on their own part. He argues for individuals to cease being ‘domesticated animals’ and ‘step forward to maturity’ by throwing off ‘the leading-strings to which they are tied’ and ‘try to walk unaided.’ (Kant WE Reiss ed 1996: 54).

Rational freedom! And that, many could argue, is precisely what anarchism is about. It may be significant in this respect that I have written on William Godwin, whose philosophical anarchism comes so very close to the core principles of rational freedom I am elaborating here that I called Godwin’s view ‘the libertarian conception of rational freedom.’ And I found Godwin’s thinking congenial. For Godwin’s parishes, read Marx’s communes. ‘The form was simple, like all great things,’ Marx wrote on the Commune (Marx FD-CWF FI 1974: 251; Peter Critchley, William Godwin and Political Simplicity: The Libertarian Conception of Rational Freedom 2004 

In my research work, I cited arguments of anarchists who were looking for ways of constituting social order beyond individualistic assertions of liberty, arguing that their attempts to radicalize the principle of self-assumed obligation to generate a democratically constituted authority bring them very close to the way I develop the concept of rational freedom. Then again, I was also considered to have risked turning Marx into a conservative, with the emphasis on organic change, community, belonging, and warm, affective ties and bonds. I discovered the possibility of some such thing in the work of Robert Nisbet, who argued that the founders of sociology were very much motivated by conservative concerns, the loss of order, stability, personal ties, the sense of the sacred, organic community as a result of the rationalistic atomisation of capitalist society. Nisbet showed how Marx’s key themes could easily be re-read in conservative terms, as the quest for community and as the recovery of the sacred against alienation. (Nisbet 1970; Nisbet 1990). If you want to be a conservative, you have no option but to become revolutionary against capital’s constant disturbance of natural and social order; if you want to be a Marxist and establish the harmonious order, you will have to become a conservative. Nisbet expressed a preference for Emile Durkheim, a figure I have scandalously neglected over the years, but who reads like sociology’s very own Hegel. (Nisbet 1975).

On the whole, I am happy that this concept of rational freedom gives us a rich and rounded, whole and wholesome sense of the human experience, no matter the name by which we choose to call it. And it does give us a conception of ‘the political’ that is independent of the abstract state, but which may well be the realization of what Marx called the ‘true state.’ It’s just that the realization of the true state, in Marx’s dialectical understanding, is also the abolition of the state. To put the point paradoxically, anarchism is the true state and the true state is anarchism. I shall come later to examine the idea that Marx’s emancipatory commitment, like Rousseau’s, is driven by anarchistic imperatives. These may well be ethical imperatives that Marx derives from the philosophy of rational freedom, expressing them in the form of a left-Kantianism or left-Hegelianism, seeking social conditions that conform to the categorical imperative and a Sittlichkeit that is embedded in everyday relations. But Marx’s democratic community of ends is, to all intents and purposes, an anarchist society. When Marx wrote of communism, he wrote of an entirely new form, quite distinct from past and present forms of communism, describing an anarchist society. The key point to understand here with respect to Marx’s well-known differences with anarchists is that Marx’s principal concern is 

a) to counter the liberal ontology as outlined above at every point, overcoming its abstraction and atomism to enable a socially rich and embedded account of freedom; and 
b) to uproot the key features of the capital system as such, not merely capitalism and its institutions, but the capital relation itself and the forms associated with it, the logic of capital and capital’s alienated mediations. 

Those two requirements are the test I apply to any socialistic theory, scheme or programme, whatever name they go by, even, and maybe most especially, Marx’s. Marx’s contention was that the likes of Stirner, Proudhon and Bakunin did not meet these requirements, and hence their prescriptions were destined to reproduce the capital system. The same point applies to socialists who rest content with physical abolition/expropriation with respect to the means of production, focusing on changing the title deeds to property whilst leaving the fundamental capital relation intact. In other words, the issue is not one of socialism versus anarchism, and insofar as this does become the issue we can be sure that something essential has gone missing in the analysis. I’ll put the point slightly differently, this time to expose the evasions and limitations of ‘third way’ thinking. In recent years, Henry George and his land tax have come to excite people who claim to be neither left nor right but ahead, and who condemn capitalism and socialism as variants of the same thing. George’s land tax was one of the ten proposals that Marx advanced in the Communist Manifesto. But Marx made it abundantly clear that unless such a tax is set within the wider transformation of social relations, it would leave the capital relation unchanged. George was no anti-capitalist. Any ‘third way’ sought in this direction becomes part of the process of capitalising the world rather than offering a coherent alternative to it. A moral or verbal commitment to an alternative society is worthless without the structural and institutional transformation to back it up.

The upshot of this is that whilst Marx’s rational freedom is contrary to liberalism and seeks to transcend liberal society and its institutions, it is contrary to anarchism only insofar as anarchism shares the liberal ontology, or fails to transcend the capital system. I’m not saying Marx is an anarchist. I’m not concerned to claim him as any kind of ‘ist,’ I see naming as something much less important than knowing. I am saying that in making Marx to be ‘almost anarchist,’ I did demonstrate the extent to which the conception of rational freedom is able to integrate autonomy and authority to provide a very distinctive conception of communist society, a society based on the democratic constitution of self-government that certainly qualifies as anarchistic. 

I shall return to Marx’s ‘anarchism’ later, having developed the concept of rational freedom further in order to emphasize the way it integrates autonomy and authority within a socio-relational setting.

Marx identifies the rational component of freedom and employs it as a critical and normative standard of political action and organisation. ‘We must’, the young Marx wrote, ‘take the essence of the inner idea as the measure to evaluate the existence of things’ (Marx in Marx and Engels CW 1:154). And the ‘essence of the inner idea’ of humanity is freedom with a rational component, ‘the natural gift of the universal sunlight of reason’ (Marx CW 1:151). Marx goes on to refer to the ‘rational, moral essence of freedom’ with regard to a free press (Marx CW 1:158), arguing that ‘laws are .. the positive, clear, universal norms in which freedom has acquired an impersonal, theoretical existence independent of the arbitrariness of the individual.’ Marx proceeds to identify the principle of rational freedom at the heart of the state:

the state [is] .. the great organism, in which legal, moral and political freedom must be realised, and in which the individual citizen in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, of human reason.

Marx in Marx and Engels CW 1:162, 202; (“The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung.” Rheinische Zeitung, 10-14 July 1842).

In quick time, Marx came to see the extent to which this idea of the state was contradicted by the reality of the institution of the state within capitalist society. 

With Prussian censorship putting an end to his career as a journalist, Marx proceeded to examine the real nature of the State philosophically. Quickly, he came to doubt the rational and ethical validity of Hegel’s political philosophy. He set out his critique in The Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the State (1843), Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and On the Jewish Question (Paris, 1844). In these writings, Marx identifies the social forces standing in the way of the realisation of rational freedom, the state and money as alienated social power, demanding a transformation of the social institutions governing the social life of individuals. He identified the proletariat as the ‘universal class,’ the class in ‘radical chains,’ the class most exploited by the forces of state and money whose self-emancipation would put an end not merely to their existence as an exploited class but to all other forms of domination and exploitation, political and economic. (Marx EW CHPR: I 1975). The self-emancipation of the proletariat would thus be the emancipation of humanity in general, something entailing the social embodiment of rational freedom.

Marx thus sought to detach the ethical and rational inner essence of freedom from the abstraction of the modern state and law, which he saw as serving as integral parts of capital’s second order mediations, and establish it instead within a system of social self-mediation as a genuine public life. He took the principle of self-assumed obligation and radicalised it so as to conceive individuals associating together to subject themselves to a conscious, accountable and revocable self-constraint. He thus argued for the democratic constitution of political authority and legitimate public community:

In all forms of the state other than democracy the state, the law, the constitution is dominant, but without really being dominant, i.e. without materially penetrating the content of all the non-political spheres. In a democracy the constitution, the law, i.e. the political state, is itself only a self-determination of the people and a determinate content of the people.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 88-9

Marx thus proceeds to demonstrate that 'all forms of state have democracy for their truth' (Marx CPHDS 1975: 89). In embodying and articulating rational freedom concretely, such a state would quality as a true and good state. But it would no longer be the rational liberal state of Kant and Hegel. It would be the classless and stateless communist society. Barker sees irony here:





That may sound odd, but there is no irony, however, and no paradox and no contradiction, once we understand clearly what Marx’s ‘abolition of the state’ entailed with respect to the realization of rational freedom, and how far socialist practice over the century parted company from the anarchism of Marx.

As Rubel argues, Marx’s fight was undertaken ‘in the name of a State understood as the realisation of rational freedom.’ (Rubel 1973). Herein lies the explanation of a point that has mystified critics and colleagues with respect to my view on Marx and rational freedom as making Marx to be ‘almost anarchist.’ There is no paradox here. Marx is against the individualism and abstraction inherent in the liberal and libertarian ontology. But in locating the principle of rational freedom in a normative essentialist anthropology he can envisage its social embodiment as an anarchism of the ‘true state.’

But what is the ‘true state’? ‘When is a state not a state?’ my Director of Studies, Jules Townshend asked me, in response to my enthusiastic presentation of Marx’s view of the state as an alienated social power that needs to be abolished if freedom is to be achieved. The implication of Jules’ question was that Marx’s ‘abolition’ is a far more complicated process than the physical rejection and destruction of the state, and that Marx’s vision of communist society retained a conception of government, authority and control and absorbed it into a self-governing society. And that is, indeed, the case. Marx envisaged the political investment of a transformed civil society, a society of extensive public spaces invested with governmental significance. With this question, I was being encouraged to develop Marx’s position in all of its sophistication, beyond simplistic libertarian notions of the overthrow or destruction of state power to see how the state is positively transcended in Marx. ‘Abolition’ as Aufhebung refers to a process of realization that preserves and raises up as it abolishes. In this way, Marx retains a principle of the state and of authority and seeks to establish legitimate governmental functions on a social basis. As Shlomo Avineri argues, we can only make sense of Marx’s meaning within the specific Hegelian usage of the term Aufhebung:





Marx, it is clear, adhered to the principle of the state as an ethical agency embodying the universal interest. That principle contains notions of legitimate rule and authority as well as of citizenship and sovereign power, a view of freedom as a common, relational, endeavour on the part of social beings, and a commitment to reason and the governance of common affairs in accordance with reason, expressed in law. Most importantly, Marx’s awareness of the extent to which the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ have come to diverge in the institutional form of the state in capitalist society contains a radical demand that the ideal come to be actualized in the real. It also yields a critical standard by which to evaluate existing states in time and place, demanding their conformity to an ideal (transcendent) standard that is nevertheless immanent in the real. The realization of this principle would constitute the ‘true state’ as the ‘democratic state.’

It follows that what Marx describes as ‘the abstraction of the political state’ is not a good state but a ‘bad state.’ The abstract state of the modern world is not an ethical agency serving the universal interest, but the political command centre of the capital system, cloaking the particular interests that arise in the private economy within claims to the general interest. This is the state as the ‘illusory community,’ the state as an alienation and centralisation of social power and a force of class coercion and domination. This is not a true state, but the state as an ideological project. In his early works Marx does indeed refer to the ‘true state’:

What is crucial in the true state is not the fact that every citizen has the chance to devote himself to the universal interest in the shape of a particular class, but the capacity of the universal class to be really universal, i.e. to be the class of every citizen.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 113

This ‘true state’ as ‘the democratic state’ is the realization, embodiment and articulation of rational freedom. (Marx EW OJQ 1975: 225). And the state that Marx adheres to as ‘true’ and ‘democratic’ is not the state that forms an integral part of capital’s series of second order mediations. Marx’s work as an economics journalist told him that the state, far from being the embodiment of rational freedom, was, within the capitalist social order, the surrogate for private economic interests, its claimed universality being a rationalization of particular interests and asymmetrical relations of class power. And that is where we are today, leaving us with Marx’s own ‘ought to be’ in the form of the principle of the state as the embodiment of rational freedom, seeking the means of its realization in relation to material forces constituted in the realm of the ‘is.’

Marx argued for the abolition of the abstract state in terms of the realization of rational freedom, seeking a form of social self-mediation in which human beings, realizing themselves as free, rational, social beings, no longer stood in need of an overarching institutional apparatus above them, regulating them and constraining their self-interested behaviour for the common good. For Marx, that overarching good is to be embedded within mediated social relationships, the associative unity of social individuals being able to dispense with the need for an external apparatus of control and constraint exercised over ‘free’ isolated individuals. That state as an external apparatus was required in the context of an atomised civil society as a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism. It is the Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’ that generates the need for the abstraction of the state as an external form of regulation. Marx sought to embody universality, commonality and solidary exchange within the ties, bonds and loyalties of a transformed civil society, putting an end to atomised bourgeois society as a universal antagonism, and putting an end to the state as abstraction. His system of social self-mediation incorporated the principle of the state as a rational and ethical agency. And that, I argue, is a ‘true state’ as a dimension of the good society of free social individuals.

The principle of ‘rational freedom’ denotes Marx’s own ‘ideal’ of the ‘good state,’ what he also called the ‘true state.’ But this true state is not, for reasons given above, a republic. As Avineri points out, Republicanism is just an imperfect, formal way of overcoming alienation, abolishing a particular political alienation within the sphere of alienation. It is for this reason that Marx criticized political emancipation and sought to push on to human emancipation in general:





At this point, it becomes important to establish precisely the dialectical quality of Marx’s concept of ‘abolition,’ from the German Aufhebung or Aufgehoben, indicating something that preserves and raises up at the same time as it abolishes. The term thus describes realization as a dialectical transcendence. Marx makes this meaning clear in describing the relationship between philosophy and the proletariat:





Neither Aufhebung (transcendence) nor Verwirklichung (realisation) mean anything like abolition as a mere physical destruction, overthrow or extirpation. Hence the suspicion on the part of liberal and anarchist critics that, far from getting rid of the state, Marx smuggles it back into the revolutionary movement in such an underhand way as to ensure that it takes an even worse authoritarian form, a form that is all the more irresistible in being presented as the people’s own power. I therefore clarify Marx’s view here to make the commitment to a principle of legitimate public community, political order and government explicit in Marx, emphasizing that his key point is not to extinguish these forms with the abolition of the abstract political state but to democratize and socialize them in the concern to overcome abstraction. This has the merit of guarding against the dangers of the re-alienation of political power. (Thomas 1994).

Marx’s abolition of the state is therefore its transcendence as a realization of its rational principle. Marx’s Aufhebung des Staates entails abolition as a transcendence of contradictory dynamics and realization of immanent potentials, the supersession of existing society which is simultaneously the realisation of the positive, emancipatory potentials and tendencies contained within that society, including the principle of reason contained in the state and law. 

The location of the ‘ought to be’ within the ‘is’ thus leads us to consider the interpenetration of ideal and real so as to achieve their coincidence in a society of social harmony. As I shall proceed to argue with respect to Marx’s essentialist metaphysics, this is the aim of Marx’s ‘unified science,’ a vision of a society in which appearance and reality no longer diverge. That ‘unified science’ is realized through the abolition of idealism and abstraction in religion, ethics, philosophy and natural science. It’s a heady vision of a world of universal self-knowledge and self-understanding, implying that essence and appearance no longer diverge.

The present state, Marx went on to argue, is not the realization of the principle of rational freedom, but has instead become the surrogate of private interests, offering these interests the cloak of the universal interest as they pursue their own self- and sectional interest. Marx nevertheless locates the principle of rational freedom within the institutional framework of the state, seeking its realization as the transcendence of the abstraction of the state. As the institutional form of the self-estrangement of the capitalist economy, the state is also a positive expression of the human social and rational character, a demand for a universality and commonality that does not exist in current society, but which ought to, if human beings are to realize themselves as social beings. Marx thus located an ideal of ethicality and a rationality within the state, an ideal which he sought to locate in a transformed reality:

as regards actual life, the political state, even where it is not yet consciously impregnated with socialist principles, contains in all its modern forms the demands of reason .. Inside its republican form the political state expresses all social struggles, needs and truths.

Marx thus retained the idea of the state as ethical agency whilst criticising the ability of the abstract state as a second order mediation within the capital system to be this agency. Marx thus identifies the principle of the state as an ethical agency serving the universal interest and sought its realization so that community could come to exist at social level. Such an ideal could be actualised only through the abolition of the institution of the abstract state. Marx thus sought the socialisation and democratisation of politics that enables the associating individuals composing the demos to constitute and control their own social forms of governance and thereby mediate the relation between power, agency and their expression. 

In fine, Marx rejects the constitutional and institutional structure of Hegel’s state whilst retaining and realizing its moral structure as ethical agency. As R.N. Berki argues, Marx's ideal of communism incorporates Hegel's principle of the state as a source of unity and ‘concrete moral identity.’ 





Marx thus proceeds to demonstrate that ‘all forms of state have democracy for their truth’ (Marx CPHDS 1975: 89). In tracing political and social forms back to the concrete reality of individuals in society, Marx seeks to root any institutional order created by human beings in the actual needs and reasons of these creators. As I show in chapter 3 on The Human Essence in Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, Marx has a concept of radical needs which drives human development in history. Marx can therefore be understood as seeking to trace the state back to its origins in human needs, overcoming its abstraction with respect to an alien power that subordinates these needs to external purposes. Marx thus seeks to overcome a situation in which the state has come to acquire an independent significance from human need and its expression, alienated from the individuals composing it. Instead of serving the universal interest, the state comes to function as the political command centre of the capital system.

The task is to overcome the separation of the state and civil society, overcome abstraction in these spheres, and thus abolish political alienation:

Hitherto, the political constitution has always functioned as the religious sphere, the religion of the life of the people, the heaven of its universality as opposed to the earthly existence of its actual' reality. The sphere of politics has been the only [real] state-sphere in the state, the only sphere in which both form and content was that of the species, i.e., truly universal. At the same time, however, because politics was opposed to all other spheres, its content too became formal and particular. Political life in the modern sense is the scholasticism of the life of the people.... It is self-evident that the political constitution as such is only developed when the private spheres have achieved an independent existence...
The abstraction of the modern state as such was not born until the modern world because the abstraction of private life was not created until modern times. The abstraction of the political state is a modern product.

Marx CHDS EW 1975: 69/90

‘True democracy’ for Marx involves the supersession of the state-civil dualism through the abolition/transformation of both. In the Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State, Marx stated plainly that true democracy implies the end of the political state:

In democracy the state as particular is only particular, and as universal it is really universal; i.e. it is not something determinate set off against other contents. In modern times the French have understood this to mean that the political state disappears in a true democracy. This is correct in the sense that the political state, the constitution, is no longer equivalent to the whole. In all forms of the state other than democracy the state, the law, the constitution is dominant, but without really dominating, i.e. without materially penetrating the content of all the non-political spheres. In a democracy the constitution, the law, i.e. the political state, is itself only a self-determination of the people and a determinate content of the people.
Moreover, it goes without saying that all forms of the state have democracy for their truth and that they are untrue to the extent that they are not democracy.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 89

The clear influence of Rousseau in this reasoning makes it clear that Marx’s notion of democratisation embraces both political and economic spheres. Marx is as interested in the political forms of the state as he is in the social forms of the capital economy. Democracy thus serves Marx as a critical tool by which to evaluate the forms of human governance and activity, criticizing forms of the state in which ‘man has only a legal existence,’ as the bearer of individual rights, in order to ‘transform society into a community of men to —a democratic state.’ (Marx to Arnold Ruge, May 1843, MECW, vol. iii, p. 137). Marx thus argues with respect to the suffrage:

The vote expresses the real relation of real civil society to the civil society of the legislature, to the representative body. Or, in other words, the vote is the immediate, direct, not merely representative but actually existing relation of civil society to the political state. It is therefore self-evident that the vote must constitute the chief political interest of real civil society. Only when civil society has achieved unrestricted active and passive suffrage has it really raised itself to the point of abstraction from itself, to the political existence which constitutes its true, universal, essential existence. But the perfection of this abstraction is also its transcendence [Aufhebung = abolition]. By really establishing its political existence as its authentic existence, civil society ensures that its civil existence, in so far as it is distinct from its political existence, is inessential. And with the demise of the one, the other, its opposite collapses also. Therefore, electoral reform in the abstract political state is the equivalent to a demand for its dissolution and this in turn implies the dissolution of civil society.

Marx CHDS EW 1975: 191

The overcoming of the separation between the state and civil society entails the transformation and dissolution of them both in one and the same process. Marx, then, was not advocating the abolition of the state in some simple physical sense, nor was he rejecting the state as such as something necessarily repressive or authoritarian. Marx did not make the libertarian mistake of rejecting the state in favour of the freedom of individuals in an untransformed civil society. Rather, he sought to effect a unity between the two spheres so that civil society made its political existence actual and so that the state ceased to exist as a political abstraction, something he criticizes as a state-formalism without content. Marx’s end is the realization of ethicality and rationality in society as a whole, a public community of self-determining social individuals. This is what Marx means by civil society rising to the abstraction of itself, to political existence, commenting that the ‘realisation of this abstraction is also the transcendence of the abstraction’ (Marx EW 1975: 191).

The passage above shows the extent to which Marx radicalizes the principle of self-assumed obligation to give us the democratic constitution of (‘true state’) authority. Importantly, this obligation is not reified so that comes to be owed to an institution, ideal or law abstracted from human need, reason and relation. Each individual associates with others freely for the purpose of collective decision making, creating horizontal ties of political obligation with each other as opposed to vertical ties with some separate body raised above them, i.e. the state. It is worth spending some time elaborating upon the meaning of ‘the political’ in this conception. Here I return to those anarchists who, in seeking to constitute the terms of a viable social order, come very close indeed to the idea of rational freedom as I develop it out of Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx:

Some notion of self-assumed obligation is necessary to ensure that self-managing democracy constitutes a form of political organisation from which domination has really been excluded. It is based on the idea that democratic voting should be analogous to the social practice of promising. A vote is a public act of commitment by which one binds one's future conduct...
That each person should be able to decide whether to consent to a majority decision will raise charges of arbitrariness. Such charges are unfounded. In a society of richly articulated and complex social relationships in which the individual is constantly being educated into moral probity, self-awareness and social commitment, such that each person acquires the competence to manage social affairs directly, that social competence will include the ability to make moral and political decisions, including the decision to withhold consent to a policy with which one profoundly disagrees.

Baugh in Clark ed. 1990:104/5

It’s along these lines that I would seek to overcome the historic division and mutual antagonism between Marxism and anarchism. In the way that Rousseau, properly understood, is an anarchist, in a properly understood sense of anarchism. I am currently working on Rousseau and his search for the legitimate constraint of a democratically constituted public community beyond the abstract, centralizing states of the modern world. I argue that Marx realizes some such ‘state.’ Avineri describes this as a ‘trans-political’ conception, associating the abolition of the state with the realization of universal suffrage as an active suffrage, overcoming the limitations of representative institutions conceived as purely legislative and regulative bodies within class society to realize a functional representation. As Marx wrote with respect to the implications of universal suffrage in The Civil War in France:

Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business. And it is well known that companies, like individuals, in matters of real business, generally know how to put the right man in the right place, and, if they for once make a mistake, to redress it promptly. On the other hand, nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchical investiture.

Marx CWF FI 1974: 210-211

I would argue that this is less a ‘trans-political’ conception than an expansive conception of ‘the political’ beyond the restrictive and protective institutions of the abstract state. Marx's revolution is a process of ‘Aufhebung', a gradual process of dissolution and supersession, transcendence through realization, in which society comes to be invested with the capacity to govern itself and individuals come to develop the ability to mediate their own activities in relation to each other. Marx was keenly aware of the danger that the mere physical destruction, overthrow or rejection of the state, in breaking up production between different groups, would merely serve to reproduce the competition of capitals in its most ‘anarchic’ form, creating a situation which demanded the reconstruction of a state that would be all the more authoritarian in order to deal with the ensuing chaos. Marx understood the need to reabsorb and reorganise social power, and not simply destroy it in its institutional and organised manifestations. Society needs appropriate forms of mediation in order to be able to reappropriate this power and prevent its being reconstituted in terms of class and coercion.

The anarchism of Marx
Rubel draws attention to the anarchism of Marx. Whilst it is well known that ‘Marx had very little sympathy for certain anarchists, it is not so generally known that … he still shared the anarchist ideal and objectives: the disappearance of the State.’ Rubel goes on to state that in ‘embracing the cause of working class emancipation, Marx started off in the anarchist tradition rather than in that of socialism or communism.’ He continues that when Marx chose to describe himself as a ‘communist,’ he distinguished himself from the communist currents then in existence to refer to ‘a movement of thought and mode of action which had yet to be founded.’ Rubel proceeds to demonstrate that Marx, ‘under the name communism,’ ‘developed a theory of anarchism’ and, indeed, that he ‘was the first to provide a rational basis for the anarchist utopia and to put forward a project for achieving it.’ He thus presents Marx as the ‘theoretician of anarchism.’ (Rubel 1973).

Marx and the state and anarchism
Marx described the research he intended to undertake as the ‘anatomy of bourgeois society.’ He established the plan of the ‘Economy’ under six ‘headings’ or ‘books’: Capital, Landed Property, Wage Labour; The State, Foreign Trade, World Market (see Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, 1859). Marx was thus concerned to develop a critique of both political economy and politics, undertaking the Book on the State once he had finished Capital. (See “plan et méthode de l'Economie” in M. Rubel, Marx, Critique du Marxisme, Payot, Paris, 1974: 369-401). 

It is worth noting at this point that such a critique of the state does not entail the ‘end of politics,’ as liberal critics routinely allege (Polan 1984; Schwartz 1996), no more than the critique of capital entails the end of the economic. Politics and economics are essential, universal features of human social existence. (I’m more concerned that Marx missed this about religion and the spiritual dimension). Marx’s critical concern is with their precise institutional expression. The end of the state, in this sense, is the realisation of the political. That, for Rubel, points to Marx as the theoretician of anarchism. It could also be argued, as I shall argue later, that the realisation of the political implies a rational justifiable political order which, some would say, could be better expressed as the realisation of what Marx called the ‘true state’ as against the alien state of the capital system.

Rubel claims that the theory of anarchism finds ‘its first recognised exponent’ in Marx. ‘The misunderstanding of the century of Marxism as an ideology of the State was the result of the fact that Marx never wrote this book.’ The absence of this Book on the State allowed both adherents and opponents of socialism to cite Marx as a proponent of State socialism or communism, as the author of an ‘authoritarian’ socialism from above. And that is a complete misreading of Marx that makes a travesty of his emancipatory project.

Marx’s anarchism – beyond the capital system – Marx’s proletarian ethics
Rubel concludes that this unwritten Book on the State ‘could only have contained the theory of society freed from the State, anarchist society.’ (Rubel 1973). We can deduce the nature and structure of the book from its triad of headings. The book would have been a critique of the State. 

There seems to be a paradox in arguing for Marx as an anarchist thinker when he had some very dramatic spats with key anarchist thinkers. I have addressed Marx’s differences with Stirner and Bakunin elsewhere. Here, I deal with Proudhon. Rubel points out that whilst Proudhon, on account of his federalist principles, seems to be much closer to the anarchist position than Marx, ‘the picture changes when we consider Proudhon’s overall conception of the reforms which should lead to the abolition of capital and the State.’ (Rubel 1973). Rubel identifies the deep theoretical differences that separated Marx and Proudhon. In particular, Proudhon’s critique of property remained confined within bourgeois economics and left the social relations of the capitalist system it criticised unquestioned and unaltered. In Proudhon’s doctrine, ‘the economic categories, which were theoretical expressions of the institutions of capital, were all systematically preserved.’ Whilst Proudhon revealed the inherent contradictions of bourgeois economic science, his acceptance of the categories and institutions of the capitalist economy ensured that his criticism remained firmly within the relations and logic of the capital system. Marx thus shows that the reforms and solutions that Proudhon proposes retains and reproduces all the instruments of the capitalist class and its political power: wages, credit, banks, exchange, price, value, profit, interest, taxes, competition, monopoly. Approaching the question this way makes it clear that Marx criticised anarchists like Proudhon, Stirner and Bakunin not because they were anarchists but because they were not anarchist enough: that is, in their mode of thought and action they remained confined within the capital system, within the capital relation and its expansionary logic and its principal institutions and economic tools and value form. (I have developed the distinction between ‘capitalism’ and ‘the capital system’ to which this critical comment pertains at length in An Introduction to the Thought of István Mészáros 2018). 

Proudhon failed to extend the critical method from the law and legal system to the capitalist economy, with the result that he remained confined within the power and logic of capital and within the capital relation. Marx’s achievement was to have fashioned this method as a weapon in the emancipatory struggle of labour against capital and the State. Further, whereas Proudhon undertook his critique of bourgeois economics and law in the name of bourgeois morality, Marx made his criticism ‘in the name of proletarian ethics, whose standards of judgement were taken from quite a different vision of human society.’ (Rubel 1973). To accomplish this, Marx followed Hegel’s principle of negation to its logical conclusion: in the same way that philosophy could only be realized through the negation of philosophy, so the Justice that Proudhon desired could only be established by the negation of justice, that is, by a social revolution which would enable humanity to become truly social and society to become truly human. (Smith 1996: 64-65; 68-69). No human being is an isolated, autonomous entity, which first exists apart from everybody else and is subsequently influenced and moulded by the social environment. Each human is being is potentially a ‘social individual’ and a ‘universal individual.’ The creative powers which make the individual human, the conscious productive activity to which Marx refers, are at once totally social and totally individual. Thus, the realised human society is the society of realised human beings. (Meikle 1985: ch 2). This is communism, the end of the pre-history of humanity and the beginning of individual life, the appearance of fully-developed human being with all-round faculties. To Proudhon’s morality, which sought to preserve the ‘good side’ of bourgeois institutions, ‘Marx opposed an anarchism’ which rejected social classes and the hierarchical division of labour, and whose demands would be measured by the possibilities offered by a science and technology sufficiently developed to provide for the needs of all humankind: 

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

Marx MCP Rev1848 1973: 87-88

From the proletarian standpoint, the state and capital exist as instruments of class domination and exploitation within relations of capitalist production. 

Rubel identifies the anarchist roots of Marx’s critique in his original critique of Hegel’s doctrine of the state and in the way that he extended this critique to political economy. ‘The negation of the State and capitalism by the most numerous and most poor class appears in Marx as an ethical imperative before he demonstrated dialectically that it was a historical necessity.’ (Rubel 1973). In its first form, it was based on the objective for which humanity should strive, a human emancipation in general that transcends political emancipation. Rubel summarizes Marx’s initial thesis as an anarchism: ‘The freest political State – of which the Unites States of America provided the only example – made Man a slave because it intervened as mediator between Man and his freedom, just like the Christ in whom the religious person vests his own divinity. Man when politically emancipated still only had an imaginary sovereignty. As a sovereign being enjoying the Rights of Man he led a double existence: that of a citizen of the political community and that of an individual member of society; that of a heavenly and that of an earthly being. As a citizen he was free and sovereign in the skies of politics, that universal kingdom of equality. As an individual he was degraded in his real life, bourgeois life, and reduced to the level of a means for his neighbour; he was the plaything of alien forces, material and moral, such as the institutions of private property, culture, religion, etc. Bourgeois society separated from the political State was the realm of egoism, of the war of each against all, of the separation of man from man. Political democracy had not freed Man from religion by ensuring his religious liberty, any more than it freed him from property in guaranteeing him the right to property. Similarly when it granted everyone the freedom to choose his occupation political democracy maintained occupational slavery and egoism. Bourgeois society was the world of trafficking and profiting, the reign of money, the universal power which had subjected politics and hence the State.’ (Rubel 1973). 

This, Rubel states, is a critique of the State and capital that ‘belonged to anarchist thought rather than to any socialism or communism.’ And the truth is that Marx was careful to distinguish his view from the socialisms and communisms that had hitherto prevailed in history. ‘There was not yet anything scientific about it, but it implicitly appealed to and based itself on an ethical conception of the destiny of humanity in that it insisted on the need of doing something within the framework of historical time. This is why he did not just make a critique of political emancipation – that it reduced man to being an egoistic monad and an abstract citizen – but put forward both the end to be achieved and the means of achieving it.’ (Rubel 1973).

In time, what had hitherto been only a visionary intuition and an ethical choice detached from the social and historical conditions of its realisation was developed by Marx as a theory of necessary social and economic development. But Marx’s notion of historical necessity here does not entail inevitability, since the realisation of the future society was to be achieved through creative human agency: ‘it was also to be active participation in the social movement whose task was to put into practice the ethical demands which derived from the conditions of existence of the modern proletariat.’ (Rubel 1973).

Rubel emphasises the extent to which Marx’s practical vision involves successive steps developing the ‘forms of anarchist and communist society,’ reaching its fruition in a society without the State, without class division, without monetary exchange, and without religious and intellectual fears and the processes leading to it. Marx’s critique of the capital system, as distinct from merely capitalism and its institutions, is concerned precisely with the realisation of nothing less than the stateless, classless society. 

Marx explicitly identified himself as an anarchist when writing:

All socialists see anarchy as the following program: Once the aim of the proletarian movement – i.e., abolition of classes – is attained, the power of the state, which serves to keep the great majority of producers in bondage to a very small exploiter minority, disappears, and the functions of government become simple administrative functions.

Marx, Fictitious Splits in the International, 1872 

A classless, stateless society describes anarchism: ‘Along with them [i.e., classes] the State will inevitably fall. The society ... will put the whole of the machinery of State where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe.’ (The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, chapter IX). In a letter to Edward Bernstein of 28 January 1884, Engels quotes some passages from the Poverty of Philosophy (1847) and the Communist Manifesto (1848) to prove ‘that we proclaimed the end ["Aufhören"] of the State before there were really any anarchists.’ As for who was first and who is more real, I’d rather not get involved. I need to keep the point simple and avoid all manner of controversies breaking out – for Marx, the abolition of the capital system, involving a holistic assault upon wage labour, capital and the state, was the condition of the realisation of the stateless, classless society: anything less than that will remain within the capital relation and hence reproduce the logical and power of capital, including the authoritarianism of the state as a crucial second order mediation. Understand what that all means, and you will understand the nature of Marx’s anarchism and the nature of his arguments with prominent anarchists.

Marx’s targets were both capital and the state as alienated social power. The physical abolition and expropriation of capital through the accumulation of power of the state is diametrically opposed to the socialism that Marx advocated, serving to reproduce the power and logic through the untransformed capital relation. For Marx, economic slavery and political servitude proceeded hand in hand, with capital and the state existing in symbiotic relation. For Marx, political emancipation, that is, the recognition of the Rights of Man on the part of the modern State, had the same significance as the recognition of slavery by the State of antiquity: ‘In the modern world, everybody is at the same time a slave and a member of the community, although the servitude of bourgeois society takes the form of the maximum of freedom.’ (Marx, The Holy Family, 1845).

Marx, Rubel argues, ‘did not modify his initial anarchist vision.’ (Rubel 1973). At the same time that he was developing the fundamental principles of the materialist conception of history, Rubel notes, Marx formulated a ‘conception of the State which places him amongst the most radical anarchism.’ At the same time, there is a need to give the quote that Rubel cites in full in order to make it clear that Marx’s critical target is not just the state and not mainly the state, but the state set in its true relation to the capital relation. The state is not all powerful and is not the architect of alienation and exploitation, it is the product of alienative and exploitative relations:

Indeed, when we consider the consequences arising from the asocial nature of civil life, of private property, of trade, of industry, of the mutual plundering that goes on between the various groups in civil life, it becomes clear that the law of nature governing the administration is impotence. For, the fragmentation, the depravity and the slavery of civil society is the natural foundation of the modern state, just as the civil society of slavery was the natural foundation of the state in antiquity. The existence of the state is inseparable from the existence of slavery…. The more powerful a state and hence the more political a nation, the less inclined it is to explain the general principle governing social ills and to seek out their causes by looking at the principle of the state, i.e. at the actual organization of society of which the state is the active, self-conscious and official expression. Political understanding is just political understanding because its thought does not transcend the limits of politics. The sharper and livelier it is, the more incapable is it of comprehending social problems.

Marx EW CN 1975: 413-414

The problem lies not in the abstraction of the modern political state as such, but in the alienative social relations which generate fetish systems of power, production and politics. For Marx, it is not an either/or in deciding whether the state or capital is the primary power, he challenges alienated labour, the abstraction of the state and capital at the same time to emphasise the necessity of uprooting the capital relation.

Marx nevertheless identified the illusions of politics in a way that can certainly be described as anarchist. And it is this overrating of political understanding and political will that lay behind the vehemence of Marx’s criticism of Arnold Ruge:

Political understanding is just political understanding because its thought does not transcend the limits of politics. The sharper and livelier it is, the more incapable is it of comprehending social problems. The classical period of political understanding is the French Revolution. Far from identifying the principle of the state as the source of social ills, the heroes of the French Revolution held social ills to be the source of political problems. Thus Robespierre regarded great wealth and great poverty as an obstacle to pure democracy. He therefore wished to establish a universal system of Spartan frugality. The principle of politics is the will. The more one-sided, i.e., the more perfect, political understanding is, the more completely it puts its faith in the omnipotence of the will; the blinder it is towards the natural and spiritual limitations of the will, the more incapable it becomes of discovering the real source of the evils of society. No further arguments are needed to prove that when the 'Prussian' claims that 'the political understanding' is destined ' to uncover the roots of social want in Germany' he is indulging in vain illusions.

Marx EW CN 1975: 413

Marx’s anarchistic criticism traced the historical connections between the old monarchy, the centralisation that proceeded under the French Revolution, and the political absolutism of the Bonapartist state:

The centralized State machinery which, with its ubiquitous and complicated military, bureaucratic, clerical and judiciary organs, entoils (enmeshes) the living civil society like a boa constrictor, was first forged in the days of absolute monarchy as a weapon of nascent modern society in its struggle of emancipation from feudalism ... The first French Revolution with its task to found national unity (to create a nation) had to break down all local, territorial, townish and provincial independence. It was, therefore, forced to develop, what absolute monarchy had commenced, the centralization and organization of State power, and to expand the circumference and the attributes of the State power, the number of its tools, its independence, and its supernaturalist sway of real society which in fact took the place of the medieval supernaturalist heaven, with its saints. Every minor solitary interest engendered by the relations of social groups was separated from society itself, fixed and made independent of it and opposed to it in the form of State interest, administered by State priests with exactly determined hierarchical functions.

Marx FD-CWF FI 1974: 247-48

This emphatic denunciation of the modern centralised state power can be traced back to Marx’s initial critical engagement with Hegel’s moral and political philosophy, expressing Marx’s concern to establish the social conditions for the embodiment and articulation of the principle of rational freedom. To state the point paradoxically, Marx showed that the realization of the rational principle of the state entailed the transcendence of the institution of the state as a modern abstraction. Marx used the historical example to outline the contours of the future political society under communism:

This was, therefore, a revolution not against this or that, legitimate, constitutional, republican or imperialist form of State power. It was a revolution against the State itself, of this supernaturalist abortion of society, a resumption by the people for the people of its own social life. It was not a revolution to transfer it from one fraction of the ruling classes to the other, but a revolution to break down this horrid machinery of class domination itself. It was not one of those dwarfish struggles between the executive and the parliamentary forms of class domination, but a revolt against both these forms, integrating each other, and of which the parliamentary form was only the deceitful by-work of the executive. The Second Empire was the final form of this state usurpation. The Commune was its definite negation, and, therefore, the initiation of the social revolution of the nineteenth century.

Marx FD-CWF FI 1974: 250-251

Marx proceeds to define the Commune as ‘the reabsorption of the state power by society as its own living forces instead of as forces controlling and subduing it, by the popular masses themselves, forming their own force instead of the organized force of their suppression.’ Importantly, the end of the state is not the end of the political but the realization of the possibility of genuine political activity through a political order worthy of the name: the Commune was ‘the political form of their social emancipation.’ (Marx FD-CWF FI 1974: 250-251).

Marx argues that the end of the class designation entails the end of the state power. His argument is certainly anarchistic, with Marx affirming that the proletariat, in putting an end to wage labour, the social conditions involved in their exploitation as a class, put an end also to the state, thus realizing themselves as individuals:

Thus they [the proletarians] find themselves directly opposed to the form in which, hitherto, the individuals, of which society consists, have given themselves collective expression, that is, the State. In order, therefore, to assert themselves as individuals, they must overthrow the State.

Marx and Engels 1999: 85

Rubel points out that this view was not uttered in the heat of the moment but ‘was the logical conclusion, expressed as a revolutionary demand, of the whole development of a theory whose purpose was to demonstrate the “historical necessity” of the anarchist commune.’ 

In this way, Rubel argues that the revolution will ‘not be a political adventure’ but a ‘universal act, carried out consciously by the immense majority of the members of society after they had become conscious of the necessity and the possibility of the total regeneration of humanity.’ (Rubel 1973). 


6 Marx’s Unified Science of Man

I began these philosophical essays with a reference to Steven Pinker’s Enlightenment Now. In this book, Pinker praises the Enlightenment thinkers’ concern to identify a conception of human nature within a commitment to a ‘science of man.’ Pinker places himself firmly within that tradition. The problem is that Pinker’s own version of that ‘science of man’ is narrow and scientistic, and pays scant attention to what may broadly be called the humanities. His ‘science of man’ is a natural science rather than a ‘human science.’ In Marx’s sense of these terms, Pinker’s ‘science of man’ is idealistic. In this concluding chapter to Part I, I shall explain what Marx understands by a ‘science of man’ and what he shows its attainment to entail.

In his early writings, Marx identifies the common philosophical framework of the old idealist and materialist metaphysics as lying in the concern with ontological questions of objective truth and reality, and proceeds to criticize both for their speculative approach as a consequence of conceiving nature abstractly. (Marx EW EPM 1975: 389). I cover this extensively in chapter 4 of Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration and so shall be brief here and refer people to that work.

In The Holy Family, Marx comments on the extent to which the Enlightenment is arguing with itself, highlighting Hegel’s comment on the identity between philosophical idealism and materialism:

On the question of Absolute Being, the Enlightenment argues with itself and is divided between two points of view .. The one calls Absolute Being 'that predicateless object’ .. the other calls it matter .. Both are entirely the same notion.

The old philosophical idealism and old philosophical materialism are ‘entirely the same notion’ and, for Marx, both are equally false for the same reason. Here, Marx’s status as a post-Enlightenment critical thinker comes out clearly. To realize its ambitions for a true ‘science of man,’ Enlightenment thinkers would need to cast off the idealistic and abstract approach to the world. We can debate the relative merits of Absolute Being and matter, ‘God’ and ‘Nature,’ endlessly, in terms of evidence and logic. We can debate science and the methods of investigation, and choose a different method to yield a different conclusion, should we have need of one. We can debate ‘Reason,’ ‘Humanity,’ and ‘Man’ for all eternity. And there is indeed value in asking unanswerable questions. For Marx, all these terms are mere abstractions apart from the praxis that actually knows the world from being involved in its transformation from within. Marx is not merely distinguishing his materialism from the mechanistic materialism of natural science, he is explicitly repudiating any kind of abstract, metaphysical materialism Whilst many are engaged in idealistic battles for and against Enlightenment abstracted from the practical struggles in which reason takes form, Marx is pushing Enlightenment on into the world and the practical struggles through which we actually come to know the world in the process of changing it,

Marx thus places the emphasis upon human practical-critical activity as the mediating term between humanity and nature. It is this conscious practical activity on the part of human beings that produces ‘matter’ or material reality as a social matter. Such a view implies a cultural relativism on Marx’s part, to the extent that his position is understood as a denial of objective reality and of the objective truth about that reality. But this would be a mistake. 

In drawing attention to how many times Marx defended his views by reference to truth and the true democratic state and constitution, it was pointed out to me that such notions are now treated with great scepticism. It was not merely Marx’s claims that socialism would constitute the truly human society that were considered suspect, but the whole notion of ‘truth’ itself. Eagleton notes that ‘no idea is more unpopular with contemporary cultural theory than that of absolute truth. The phrase smacks of dogmatism, authoritarianism, a belief in the timeless and universal.’ He proceeds to defend this ‘remarkably modest, eminently reasonable notion.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 5). I don’t know what he would make of the notion of transcendent standards, though.

It is a mistake to think of absolute truth as a special kind of truth. On this view, there are truths which are changing and relative, and there is a higher kind of truth which is neither. Instead, it is fixed for all eternity. The idea is that some people, usually those of a dogmatic or authoritarian turn of mind, believe in this higher kind of truth, while others, such as historicists and postmodernists, do not. In fact, some postmodernists claim not to believe in truth at all - but this is just because they have identified truth with dogmatism, and in rejecting dogmatism have thrown out truth along with it. This is a peculiarly pointless manoeuvre. In less sophisticated postmodern circles, holding a position with conviction is seen as unpleasantly authoritarian, whereas to be fuzzy, sceptical and ambiguous is somehow democratic.

Eagleton 2003 ch 5

There is nothing of any world-shaking significance at stake here, and nothing authoritarian underway: ‘That truth is absolute simply means that if something is established as true - a taxing, messy business, often enough, and one which is always open to revision - then there are no two ways about it.’ (Eagleton 2003: ch 5). That doesn’t mean that truth can only be discovered from some disinterested viewpoint. Indeed, recognition of absolute truth says nothing about how this truth is attained. It simply says something about the nature of truth itself. ‘All truths are established from specific viewpoints; but it does not make sense to say that there is a tiger in the bathroom from my point of view but not from yours. You and I may contend fiercely about whether there is a tiger in the bathroom or not. To call truth absolute here is just to say that one of us has to be wrong.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 5). 

Here we see the errors of perspectivism and the idea that truth – if indeed we can say it exists – is merely a matter of opinion or power:

If it is true that racism is an evil, then it is not just true for those who happen to be its victims. They are not just expressing how they feel; they are making a statement about the way things are. 'Racism is an evil' is not the same kind of proposition as 'I always find the smell of fresh newsprint blissful.' It is more like the statement ‘There is a tiger in the bathroom.’

There is, then, such a thing as objective truth, as those sharing a bathroom with a tiger would come to see very clearly and very quickly. Reclaiming the notion of absolute truth matters, not least because it ‘belongs to our dignity as moderately rational creatures to know the truth. And that includes knowing the truth about truth. It is best not to be deceived if we can possibly help it.’ (Eagleton 2003: ch 5). A commitment to truth expresses the desire to know that Aristotle wrote of in the Metaphysics, to which Kant gave renewed form in the motto of Enlightenment, affirming the dignity of human beings as lying in the capacity to live by our own understanding. Marx places himself firmly in that tradition by arguing for human beings to come to live by the sunlight of their own reason. 

Eagleton writes that a ‘ludicrous bugbear’ has been made of the word ‘absolute’ in recent times. But the issue is serious enough since truth is emptied of much of its value if the relativist is right. Whom would such a situation benefit the most? The rich and powerful have no need of truth and reason, of course, except in order to rationalization their actions and their dominant position as being for the common good. It seems that an obsession with subverting such rationalizations has caused many to discard reason as such as implicated in domination. That’s remarkably short-sighted since exposing the ideological claims of the dominant class requires the existence of standards of truth and reason with respect to the way things really are and the way they ought to be. As Bernard Williams points out, relativism is really a way of explaining away conflict. (See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the limits of Philosophy 1985: 156). ‘If you maintain that democracy means everyone being allowed to vote, while I maintain it means that only those people may vote who have passed a set of fiendishly complicated intelligence tests, there will always be a liberal on hand to claim that we are both right from our different points of view.’ (Eagleton 2003: ch 5). But if everyone is right from their own points of view, how are the rich and powerful, the exploitative, the iniquitous and the tyrannical, to be held to account? If the notion of truth is abandoned or loses its force, ‘then political radicals can stop talking as though it is unequivocally true that women are oppressed or that the planet is being gradually poisoned by corporate greed.’ The argument is self-contradictory and politically and socially self-defeating and destructive: ‘They may still want to insist that logic is a ruling-class conspiracy, but they cannot logically expect anyone to believe them.’ ‘The champions of Enlightenment are right: truth indeed exists. But so are their counter-Enlightenment critics: there is indeed truth, but it is monstrous.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 5).

Marx’s position does not deny truth in this sense, and doesn’t deny natural science nor the existence of nature as a referent either. As we shall see with respect to Marx’s comments on religion, the state and philosophy (and ethics in Part 3), Marx’s emancipatory project is a positive affirmation of the human relation to the world, seeking a creative expression of the human essence; it is not a mere negation. Marx is seeking to close the alienating dualisms and separations that remove the world from human comprehension, preventing a positive expression of the human essence, and invite endless speculation as to the nature of reality and the truth about it. He does not deny the existence of objective reality, only the possibility of yielding definitive objective knowledge that ends all speculation as to the nature of that reality. He is against an abstract metaphysical materialism that, part from the transformation of the world, can only be idealistic.

Marx thus criticises Feuerbach’s materialism on account of its ‘contemplative’ and ‘inconsistent’ character:

In reality and for the practical materialist, i.e. the communist, it is a question of revolutionising the existing world, of practically attacking and changing existing things… Feuerbach's ‘conception’ of the sensuous world is confined on the one hand to mere contemplation of it, and on the other to mere feeling; he says ‘Man’ instead of ‘real historical man’. ‘Man’ is really ‘the German’. In the first case, the contemplation of the sensuous world, he necessarily lights on things which contradict his consciousness and feeling, which disturb the harmony he presupposes, the harmony of all parts of the sensuous world and especially of man and nature. To remove this disturbance, he must take refuge in a double perception, a profane one which only perceives the ‘flatly obvious’ and a higher, philosophical, one which perceives the ‘true essence’ of things. He does not see how the sensuous world around him is, not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social system according to the changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest ‘sensuous certainty’ are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse. The cherry-tree, like almost all fruit-trees, was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by commerce into our zone, and therefore only by this action of a definite society in a definite age it has become ‘sensuous certainty’ for Feuerbach.

Marx and Engels GI 1999: 62-63

Marx’s criticism of naturalism, then, is part of his larger concern to move beyond speculative philosophy with respect to abstract questions concerning the ontological status of objective reality and the truth about it. For Marx, matter is not an inert objective datum external to human beings but is sensuously real, produced by industry and society in conjunction with given nature, the comprehension of which must be integrated with practical activity. Objective reality is thus humanly objective:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

Marx Thesis II in EW 1975: 422

All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

Marx Thesis VIII in EW 1975: 423

Here is the basis of a true ‘science of man’ as a ‘human science.’ The ‘sensuous objects’ to which Marx refers pertain to ‘objects of sense’ or ‘objects known through the senses.’ In describing human activity as ‘an objective activity,’ Marx means ‘an activity directed towards objects.’ Marx criticizes Feuerbach for understanding the human ‘sensuous’ perception of objects as a passive or contemplative process rather than as an active one. It makes no sense, Marx contends, to conceive 'sense objects' as if they were simply given in reality, since these become sense objects only by human beings coming to actively appropriate them as part of their purposive life. 

In the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx takes the opportunity to sum up his approach. For Marx, the question of ‘objective truth’ is a ‘practical question,’ to be answered within a ‘social life’ that he describes as ‘essentially practical.’ Marx therefore argues that questions of ‘truth’ and ‘objective reality’ can only be meaningfully asked and resolved through practical human activity. 

In doing this, Marx is not simply opposing the 'practical’ to the 'theoretical’ in some simple and crude sense. Marx’s point is aimed against all speculative philosophy which seeks objective knowledge of the world by abstracting thought from other human social activities, only to pose the question as to how such ‘thought,’ conceived abstractly, is able to comprehend the world. That’s the question that Marx dismisses as ‘scholastic,’ as a question that is idle in being incapable of resolution in its own terms. Such speculation about ‘thought’ in abstraction from activity generates the irresolvable problems of philosophy. Against such speculative theorising, Marx holds that ‘thought’ and 'reality' are inextricably connected through being mediated by human activity. He thus writes in Thesis XI: ‘Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point however is to change it.’

Developing the standpoint of socialised humanity on this basis, Marx could envisage the emancipatory-revolutionary incursion of human beings as creative agents and knowledgeable subjects into the fetishized and alienated 'matter' of the capital system, erected as a second nature through the modification of first nature (Bonefeld et al vol I 1992: 38/9). 

The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity.

Marx, Thesis X on Feuerbach

Mediation matters. It is not enough to point to ‘Man’ or ‘Nature,’ or to ‘God’ or ‘Reason’ for that matter. It is the nature of the specific mediation between humanity and nature, and the forms that mediation takes within specific social relations, that reveals the truth or otherwise about our conceptions about reality.

It is in this sense that Gramsci argued that ‘objective means humanly objective.’ Those four words pack a wealth of meaning that needs to be teased out and rendered explicit, lest it invite misunderstanding. Indeed, a brief examination of Gramsci’s views on this is instructive in shedding light on Marx’s praxis as an active materialism capable of integrating knowledge about the world as a self-knowledge, highlighting possible pitfalls with respect to relativism and being concerned to re-instate the reality-check that comes with a certain objectivism. Gramsci writes:

A great deal of research and study on the historical significance of different philosophies is utterly sterile and fanciful because it fails to take account of the fact that many philosophical systems are exclusively, or almost exclusively, individual expressions and that that part of them which can be called historical is often minimal and swamped in a complex of abstractions whose origins are purely and abstractly ratiocinative. One could say that the historical value of a philosophy can be calculated from the ‘practical’ efficacy it has acquired for itself, understanding ‘practical’ in the widest sense. If it is true that every philosophy is the expression of a society, it should react back on that society and produce certain effects, both positive and negative. The extent to which precisely it reacts back is the measure of its historical importance, of its not being individual "elucubration" but "historical fact.”

Gramsci PN 1971: 346

The first point to establish here goes back to Marx’s Theses II and VIII, to the effect that human beings can only test and prove the accuracy of their analyses of the material world through the process of trying to change it from a socially mediated position within that world:

If the problem of the identification of theory and practice is to be raised it is to be done in this sense, that one can construct, on a specific practice, a theory which, by coinciding and identifying itself with the decisive elements of the practice itself, can accelerate the historical process that is going on, rendering practice more homogeneous, more coherent, more efficient in all its elements…or alternatively, given a certain theoretical position one can organise the practical element which is essential for the theory to be realised. The identification of theory and practice is a critical act, through which practice is demonstrated rational and necessary, and theory realistic and rational. This is why the problem of the identity of theory and practice is raised especially in the so-called transitional moments of history, that is, those moments in which the movement of transformation is at its most rapid. For it is then that the practical forces unleashed really demand justification in order to become more efficient and expansive; and that theoretical programmes multiply in number, and demand in their turn to be realistically justified, to the extent that they prove themselves assimilable into practical movements, thereby making the latter yet more practical and real.

Gramsci PN 1971: 365

At this point we need to ask whether, if the test of the truth or otherwise of ideas is merely ‘practical,’ it makes sense to write of the existence of an objective reality, a material world, or nature at all. Hence my references above to Marx’s position pointing in the direction of pragmatism and relativism. Thus, John Passmore, in A Hundred Years of Philosophy, comments on Marx’s Theses: ‘This side of Marxism leads it into close relations with pragmatism.’ (Passmore 1968: 46).

Close, but not quite. And pragmatism doesn’t have to be the visionless, valueless ‘philosophy’ fitting the status quo as it is often portrayed as being, in the hands of the likes of Dewey, is more than capable of incorporating principles and ideals to orient a visionary action from within. This understanding of pragmatism leads it into closer relations with Marx’s praxis.

The problem lies with a narrow conception which pursues the verification of ideas through a crudely conceived practical activity. Without qualification, this view could open the doors to many things that Marx would have considered wrong, false and, dare I say it, immoral. To refer back to Marx’s comments on Feuerbach above, Marx argues that ‘the sensuous world’ ‘is not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society.’ It follows from this that objective reality is ‘an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations … developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social system according to the changed needs.’ That seems like a clear statement on Marx’s part for the social production of the material world. But that’s not quite what Marx says, and understanding the difference is important. 

In referring to the world as a product of industry, Marx is concerned to check passive ideas of a reality that is given for all eternity, a Nature that is as timeless and as fixed as God. He is arguing against a passive and abstract naturalism, pointing out that the human relation to the natural world and our knowledge of it is socially mediated. Thus, in that same passage he points out that ‘Even the objects of the simplest “sensuous certainty” are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse.’ Marx does not labour the point, and so his comments can easily be misinterpreted, but nowhere does he deny the existence of Nature as independent of human beings, whilst he does explicitly recognize the irreducibility of what he calls ‘the universal metabolism of nature’ as the natural foundation of human activity. (Critchley 2018 chapter 7 Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration). There is a reality-check in the mediated human development that Marx proposes.

It is easy to see why, in the way that Gramsci, following Marx, formulates this question, we could see both as casting doubt on a reality that exists independently of the human conceptualisation of it, taking Marxism in the direction of postmodernism and social constructivism in some of their forms. Marx declares the question of objective reality and the truth about it to be a ‘scholastic’ question. In the same vein, Gramsci writes:

The idea of “objective” in metaphysical materialism would appear to mean an objectivity that exists even apart from man; but when one affirms that a reality would exist even if man did not, one is either speaking metaphorically or one is falling into a form of mysticism.

Gramsci PN 1971: 446

In criticising scholasticism and mysticism, however, Marx and Gramsci are concerned to reject idealistic, abstract and speculative approaches to ‘objective reality,’ rather than deny the existence of such a reality. The concern of both Marx and Gramsci is with the mediated character of the human relation to the world. Gramsci thus continues in this passage: 

We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity, etc.

Gramsci PN 1971: 446

Gramsci’s emphasis, in line with Marx, is upon the triadic structure of humanity-labour/production-nature, with the conscious practical activity of social humanity as the mediating term. The issue, in fine, is not the existence or otherwise of a reality outside of the human species, a proposition which Marx considers trivially true. As he continues in this same passage, Gramsci makes it clear that there is a real world with which human knowledge is concerned, discussing the terms ‘north’ and ‘south,’ ‘east’ and ‘west.’ ‘What would North-South or East-West mean without man?’ Gramsci asks. ‘They are real relationships and yet they would not exist without man and without the development of civilisation.’ These relationships are objectively real, yet are humanly known only through human conceptualisation. Gramsci proceeds to point out that references to places through geographical terms are ‘arbitrary and conventional, that is historical, constructions, since outside of real history every point on the earth is East and West at the same time,’ and yet nevertheless ‘are real,’ in an objective sense, in that ‘they correspond to real facts, they allow one to travel by land and by sea, to arrive where one has decided to arrive, to “foresee” the future, to objectivise reality, to understand the objectivity of the external world. Rational and real become one.’ (Gramsci PN 1971: 447-48). At this point, Gramsci challenges Georg Lukács in a Note for confining the dialectic to human history and excluding it from nature. This is not Marx’s dialectic, and opens the door to the very idealism that Marx sought to overcome:

One must study the position of Professor Lukács towards the philosophy of praxis. It would appear that Lukács maintains that one can speak of the dialectic only for the history of men and not for nature. He might be right and he might be wrong. If his assertion presupposes a dualism between nature and man he is wrong because he is falling into a conception of nature proper to religion and to Graeco-Christian philosophy and also to idealism which does not in reality succeed in unifying and relating man and nature to each other except verbally. But if human history should be conceived also as the history of nature (also by means of the history of science) how can the dialectic be separated from nature? Perhaps Lukács, in reaction to the baroque theories of the Popular Manual, has fallen into the opposite error, into a form of idealism.

Gramsci PN 1971: 449

I examine this question of dualism in Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, chapter 5, The Dialectics of Nature, seeking to reinstate Marx’s unified materialist (social and natural) ontology. This ontology is crucial to Marx’s ‘unified science.’

To return to Gramsci’s view that objective always means ‘humanly objective,’ Gramsci continues by arguing that this can be ‘held to correspond exactly to "historically subjective": in other words, objective would mean "universal subjective."’ In asking how ‘subjective’ human development in history is, the key term here is ‘universal.’ Any subjectivism is an intersubjectivism based on a universal rationality in the Kantian sense, related to the ‘universal metabolism of nature.’ Establishing these points makes clear that there are no grounds for arguing that Marx’s praxis entails a crude ‘whatever works’ pragmatism. Many things that Marx criticizes have a ‘pragmatic’ value but that doesn’t make them true. Religion as an expression of human suffering and longing for meaning is an obvious example. As I shall show below, Marx doesn’t consider religion ‘false’ in any simple rationalistic sense. There is a truth in religion, in the same way that there is a truth in the state, in philosophy and in natural science, for all of the abstract character of its expression. All such practices are social practices, their character is thus always in some way relative to the social relations and state of society and industry in which they are set. Marx is well aware that truth, success, and adequacy cannot just be determined by the test of ‘what works’ within asymmetrical relations of power and resources that predisposes reality one way rather than another. As the young Marx wrote, ‘philosophy asks what is true not what is accepted as such, what is true for all men not what is true for individuals: its metaphysical truths do not recognize the boundaries of political geography.’ (Marx in Easton and Guddat 1967: 118). 

Marx does not pose validation in the narrow terms of social practice against theory. His practice is principled in that it contains an immanent normative dimension with respect to truth that orients activity. For Marx, the orienting principle is the free and full development of humanity as a whole through history. This is Marx’s ‘science of man.’

Again, I see Marx here as building on Rousseau’s great insights. Rousseau wrote of dedicating himself to the ‘truths that pertain to the happiness of mankind,’ truths that were once immediately apparent to human beings in the natural state but which have long since become opaque in civil society. Jason Neidleman, in the aptly titled Rousseau's Ethics of Truth: A Sublime Science of Simple Souls, thus writes of Rousseau’s normative philosophy and ethics of truthseeking, concerned with what human beings must do if they are to (re)discover the truths of human happiness. (Neidleman 2017). The first section of the book lays out Rousseau’s general philosophy of truth and truthseeking. 

Gramsci elaborates on this point: ‘Philosophical innovations…will demonstrate themselves to be “historically true” to the extent that they become concretely—i.e. historically and socially—universal.’ (Gramsci PN 1971: 348). Truth is this historical sense thus refers to all humanity in the course of its historical development, affirming the rational unity of each and all beyond the class division of individuals within asymmetrical social relations. 

Gramsci expresses the idea thus:

Man knows objectively in so far as knowledge is real for the whole human race historically unified in a single unitary cultural system. But this process of historical unification takes place through the disappearance of the internal contradictions which tear apart human society, while these contradictions themselves are the condition for the formation of groups and for the birth of ideologies which are not concretely universal but are immediately rendered transient by the practical origin of their substance. There exists therefore a struggle for objectivity (to free oneself from partial and fallacious ideologies) and this struggle is the same as the struggle for the cultural unification of the human race.

Gramsci PN 1971: 445

This ‘cultural unification of the human race’ is the social context for what Marx calls a ‘unified science,’ the one presupposing the other. The meaning of Gramsci’s ‘humanly objective’ as ‘universal subjective’ (which could also be translated as ‘subjective universal’) is thus clear: the unity of knowledge and being demanded by the subjectivists can only avoid the pitfalls of arbitrary relativism when there is a single knowing subject and an undivided human race so that knowledge becomes the same for all. (Gramsci PN 1971: 445). 

We are now in a position to properly understand what Gramsci meant by understanding the ‘historical value of a philosophy’ in accordance with its ‘practical efficacy,’ ‘understanding ‘practical’ in the widest sense.’ (Gramsci PN 1971: 446). References to ‘practical efficacy’ – when separated from the qualifications Gramsci makes here - take the position close to pragmatism, whilst references to truth and knowledge as the ‘expression of a society’ take the position close to relativism. But Gramsci is saying more than this, pointing to a historical truth that is more than relative to a particular society. (This is precisely what Rousseau’s ethic of truthseeking does, as both Neidleman and Williams establish, and which is how I read Marx’s praxis). Gramsci’s standard – and Marx’s – as to the measure of historical importance is the free and full development of humanity as a whole. And that is a critical and normative standard that holds class-divided society to account and demands their practical transformation in order to achieve a genuine universality. That view is not a cultural relativism nor a sophism that sees justice as the interests of the dominant classes, but its very antithesis. It seeks the unification of humanity on the basis of a universal self-realization.





What the idealists call "spirit" is not a point of departure but a point of arrival, it is the ensemble of the superstructures moving towards concrete and objectively universal unification and it is not a unitary presupposition.

Gramsci PM 1971: 445

This process of unification has gone furthest in the physical sciences, Gramsci notes, where the different material interests of individuals in a class divided society has less direct effect on their approaches:





Gramsci asks whether by science we mean the ‘theoretical activity or the practical-experimental activity of scientists, or a synthesis of the two?’ Gramsci’s answer establishes the ‘perfect unity of theory and practice’ through the ‘new form of active union of man and nature’:

One might say that the typical unitary process of reality is found here in the experimental activity of the scientist, which is the first model of dialectical mediation between man and nature, and the elementary historical cell through which man puts himself into relation with nature by means of technology, knows her and dominates her. There can be no doubt that the rise of the experimental method separates two historical worlds, two epochs, and initiates the process of dissolution of theology and metaphysics and the process of development of modern thought whose consummation is in the philosophy of praxis. Scientific experiment is the first cell of the new method of production, of the new form of active union of man and nature. The scientist-experimenter is also a worker, not a pure thinker, and his thought is continually controlled by practice and vice versa, until there is formed the perfect unity of theory and practice.

Gramsci PN 1971: 446

Within a class-divided social reality, the different practical concerns of different groups and classes are expressed in terms of different approaches to reality, with those associated with the dominant classes unable to go beyond a partial viewpoint. In generalising these particular viewpoints as the universal view of the whole, such classes produce necessarily contradictory accounts of the world. In Marx’s view, however, there is no external vantage point yielding an objective standard of transcendent truth by which we may come to arbitrate these practical struggles. In identifying the working class as the ‘universal class,’ Marx, I shall show in Part 3, has given us the key to the ‘cultural unification’ that is the condition of a true ‘science of man,’ a ‘unified science’ that is a ‘human science,’ attaining a universal standpoint that is able to resolve disputes by way of what are traditionally considered transcendent truths, values and norms. Marx, in identifying the historical struggle to embody these transcendent standards in time and place with the practical struggles for emancipation undertaken by the working class as the universal class, shows how the unification of humanity overcomes the internal contradictions of systems of thought mediated through class relations to give us a true ‘science of man.’ The one ‘unified science’ of man thus proceeds hand in hand with a unified humanity.

The upshot of the above analysis is that Marx engages in a critique of all abstract conceptions of ‘objective reality,’ emphasizing that we only truly know reality in a practical and mediated way that presupposes an active engagement with that reality from within. He neither denies nor repudiates ‘Reason,’ or ‘Man,’ or ‘God,’ or ‘Nature,’ but points out their abstract unreality outside of conscious practical activity and mediation. In conceiving the world as an external objective datum, the truths yielded by philosophers, intellectuals, scientists etc. cannot but be abstract, speculative, idealistic. 

In this understanding, philosophy, science and religion are the different ways by which human beings seek answers to different questions about the one ‘objective reality.’ Which answers we find plausible depends upon which questions we are most interested in. And so humanity divides even further according statements of fact, value, significance and meaning, and within that division we get bogged down in utterly trivial and irrelevant debates of science vs religion, with philosophy claiming to occupy a mediating role in the no-man’s land in between, determining the true relation between the realms of fact and value. For Marx this merely points to a humanity divided between rival ways of conceiving reality, endlessly debating its meaning and significance, whilst being unable to achieve a unified view. Such philosophy, science and religion all count as idealistic to Marx in being conducted in abstraction from a reality that is conceived as an objective external datum. 

Moreover, the problem cannot be resolved by merely integrating philosophy/science/religion, with each discipline confined to its own sphere or, even worse, one discipline absorbing the others. There are indeed problems that arise when one discipline encroaches on the terrain of the other. The argument for complementarity in this sense thus seems reasonable, in that it might possibly restore some peace among those concerned to advance their view as the one and only true view of a multi-faceted reality. But most probably not. Because the problem is that we live in the one reality, and whilst no one discipline has a right to claim this terrain as their own, only to the terms by which they investigate and evaluate that terrain, reality and the truth about it will always be more than the knowledge yielded by all disciplines in their separation. Encroachment in this sense expresses – however aggressively and illegitimately – a genuine desire to achieve what Marx called a ‘unified science.’ That encroachment becomes illegitimate and hostile in conditions which lack the ‘means of union,’ to paraphrase Marx. (Marx EW EPM 1975: 355-356). Marx wants that union. Which is to say that encroachment should be reconfigured expansively, and understood as integration rather than as incorporation (still less than as what E.O. Wilson demands, that science cannibalizes or biologizes the human sciences).

How Marx provides the ‘means of union’ through his abolition/realization of religion/philosophy/science is sketched below. Basically, his idea is that it is our practical mediation to that reality that yields knowledge, not theoretical speculation from a position outside of that reality. Philosophy, natural science and religion are different ways of handling the human apprehension of reality, meeting different human concerns and interests. But none of them in themselves are capable of constituting the whole truth about this reality, and that whole truth is also more than the sum of these different disciplines in their separation. A whole truth presupposes a ‘unified science’ achieved through the unification of humanity. 

In arguing for Marx’s ‘unified science,’ let me make it immediately clear what the view I set out here does not entail, and so avoid wasting time and energy on criticisms and in debates that are beside the point. The debate concerning the differences between the human sciences and the natural sciences has rightly been abandoned, or has moved on. The positivist thesis of a unified science which assimilates all the sciences in accordance with a natural-scientific model is untenable. The days have gone, one would hope, when biologists such as E.O. Wilson could argue for science to cannibalize ethics and philosophy, demanding that sociology be replaced by biology. (Wilson 1978). The interaction between humanity and nature via society works both ways, but if we had to choose just the one way, the naturalist cannibalizers are going in the wrong direction.

Wilson speaks for a common view among the scientistically inclined when he argues that the neurologists should replace the moralists, philosophers and politicians. Wilson begins reasonably enough: ‘What... made the hypothalamus and limbic system? They evolved by natural selection. That simple biological statement must be pursued to explain ethics and ethical philosophers, if not epistemology and epistemologists, at all depths’ (Wilson 1975: 3). This merely introduces Wilson’s central idea that ‘Scientists and humanists should consider together the suggestion that the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized’ (Wilson 1975: 562). To which, I say, try it, and see how quickly that position flounders in its own ignorance and naivety.

The appeal of Wilson’s idea should be obvious – it is simple in its promise to clarify and resolve all those knotty, tiresome and troubling questions of human social existence that seem to have been around since ever. I heard biologist Robert Winston speak recently, and he declared science to be ‘simple,’ because it is ‘rational’ and therefore easier to show something to be right or wrong according to its rational methods. But he added the crucial rider – human life isn’t the same as that simple ‘something’ that is studied by the natural sciences. That hasn’t prevented excitement and enthusiasm all manner of neuro-nonsense, all manner of promises to unravel the problems that plague human life and thought about it. Wilson again:





The problem is that a full, neuronal explanation of the human brain establishes first principles only for neuro-science, not psychology, philosophy, ethics, or sociology. A neuronal explanation of the brain explains nothing about how individuals – a fully functioning human being as actor, creator, thinker in relation to other such human beings, the natural being as a social being – lives his or her life, acts, creates, thinks within contexts, cultures and networks of social relations, interactions, solidary exchanges and how these in turn shape individuals. If you really want to know about human beings, study what they have done in history and study what they do in society. It’s an open book! The only thing that Wilson’s neuronal determinism will cannibalize is humanity itself, reducing it to physical existence without the meaning that is added by creative human agency.

Marx’s unified science, then, is most certainly not a naturalism in the sense of being a physicalism. The positivist conception of a unified science fails on account of the intimate, interactive relationship between human beings, society and nature, and the fact that knowledge here is based on ‘a situation-specific understanding of meaning that can be explicated only "hermeneutically,"’ in the words of Jurgen Habermas. (Habermas 1990: 43). As Habermas explained, ‘access to a symbolically prestructured reality cannot be gained by observation alone.’ (Habermas, 'Objektivismus in den Sozialwissenschaften', p. 549)

Many are inclined to accept a methodological dualism, and live with the separation and peaceful coexistence of the natural and the human sciences. It may be the most tolerable position, in the absence of means of union, but it isn’t actually a solution since, in light of the above, the social sciences will be faced with the problem of having to ‘resolve the tension between the two approaches under one roof.’ (Habermas 1990: 95). If Marx is right – and he is – and human history and natural history are part of the one and the same reality – and they are - then notions of a unified science are not fanciful, and a unity rather than a dualism (a complementarity which is a mutual tolerance at a distance at best, an explicit antagonism generating false debates at worst) is achievable. But it will be a unity that is more than the sum of all the separate disciplines, and not the triumph of a partial perspective generalised over all others.

Marx’s naturalism was a humanism rather than a physicalism. True, taken out of context, there are certain passages in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts which suggest that Marx may well have been one of the cannibalizers and biologizers himself, writing that ‘natural science will in time incorporate into itself the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate into itself natural science.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 355-356). But note, the incorporation for Marx goes both ways, and is not the same thing as annexation at all – it is a fusion that points to a unification, an integral unity. That unity is not a scientistic positivism or a naturalism as a physicalism since it indicates that this unification of the sciences involves a transformation of both sides in this integration, not the reduction of the human and social sciences to physics. 

Marx’s ambitions for a unified human science, then, rest on his argument for the mediated character of reality. Marx examines these mediations that human beings have created in society in interaction with nature. His argument is that human beings, through labour/production, will not only realize the human essence positively and creatively in fulfilment of their own nature but, in the process, will come also to humanize nature. We may find many reasons to criticize that view, but it is not a naturalism as a physicalism, and is all the better for it.

Alex Callinicos is therefore right to argue that ‘Marxism and physicalism are incompatible.’ ‘Marx argued that what sets man off from the rest of the natural world is his ability to act upon and transform his natural environment in an indefinite number of different ways. On the basis of this metabolism between man and nature there arise structures which in their complexity and capacity for internally generated transformation are unique to human beings, on this planet at any rate. While this process is only possible by virtue of capacities possessed by man as one among many natural species, once commenced, it is irreversible, short of the destruction of humanity (perhaps not such a remote prospect), and is governed by the laws relating to the historically evolving social relations bound up .with the interaction between man and nature in the labour-process. These laws presuppose those at work in the physical world, but are not reducible to them; human history is the process through which human beings, thanks to the development of their productive powers, acquire a certain autonomy of their natural environment, and are able, by virtue of this development and the scientific knowledge bound up with it, to enjoy some degree of control over this environment. Let us note that this argument, if valid, does not prove that physicalism is false; rather, it establishes that if Marxism is true, then physicalism is false. Establishing the truth or falsity of Marxism is another, empirical matter. At any rate, Marx had this argument in mind when he attacked “the abstract materialism of natural science, a materialism which excludes the historical process” (Marx C1 494,n.4).’ (Callinicos 1985: 103-104). 

Callinicos proceeds to add another reason for rejecting the view that Marx’s materialism is a physicalism or naturalism: ‘Marx believed that man's ability to engage in redirective activity, that is, to perform more than a fixed and limited set of tasks, to set himself qualitatively new goals, is inseparably connected to his capacity to reflect upon his activities, and, indeed, on his reflections. Now, if we accept, as Marx certainly did ('language is as old as consciousness,' he wrote, 'language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as well' (CW 5:44)), that thought and language are similarly inseparable, then certain consequences follow. In particular, one dimension of explaining human conduct is that of interpretation, in other words, of assigning a definite sense to the sounds an individual utters, the marks he or she makes on paper. As the work of contemporary analytical philosophers, and especially Donald Davidson, has shown, interpretation is in principle a highly complex process… assigning a sense to the sentences uttered by an individual is bound up with attributing beliefs to him or her. Further, we are unlikely to succeed in giving a sentence the correct sense, or attributing the right belief, without reference to other sentences and beliefs, and without introducing considerations concerning the interpretand's rationality. Even though, Davidson argues, every mental event possesses a physical description (say, as a brain-state) under which it may be explained by the physical sciences, qua mental event it cannot be so explained, for the attribution of the belief, intention, desire, or whatever makes it a mental event depends on the complex of other beliefs etc. one attributes to the interpretand, and upon the assumption that he or she is rational…. (Callinicos 1985: 104-105).

The role of interpretation, anti-naturalists from Dilthey to Gadamer have argued, means that understanding human behaviour is more like reading a book than explaining an ellipse. Nevertheless, interpretation is inescapable in any social enquiry. Unpalatable though this may be for an anti-humanist of Althusserian or post-structuralist persuasion, any description of social practices makes irreducible reference to human beliefs and intentions; whatever else we may want to say about a factory or a prison, it is an institution whose existence depends upon the intentional activities of human beings. Such is the rational kernel of Max Weber's conception of sociology as 'a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of human action.’ (In volume 3 I come to analyse Nietzsche’s view that there are no facts, only interpretations).

Callinicos goes on to explain why Marx, although he well understood the intentional character of human action, refused to take the views, values and beliefs of individual agents at face value – for Marx there was a discrepancy between appearance and reality, and not least in capitalist society as an inverted reality. Marx thus sought to penetrate beneath the surface level of appearances to grasp the inner essence of things in their inner connections, relations and movement:





Those ‘hidden structures’ and inner essential patterns indicate the extent to which Marx’s materialist conception of history is essentialist to the core, however much those who insist on its scientific status baulk at the idea of metaphysics. I have no problem with Marx’s insistence upon the scientific nature of his critical project, so long as people understand what Marx meant by the ‘one science.’

The abolition/realization/unification of religion, philosophy, ethics, the state and natural science

In 1844, Marx argued that ‘Philosophy cannot realize itself without the transcendence [Aufhebung] of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization [Verwirklichung] of philosophy.’ (Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 257). That idea has intrigued over the ages. Adorno thus comments: ‘Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed’ (Adorno 1973: 3). And Althusser: ‘Remember: a philosopher is a man who fights in theory, and when he understands the reasons for this fight, he joined the ranks of the struggle of workers and popular classes.’ (Althusser 2017). That’s very far from Plato and Aristotle’s vision of the contemplative philosophical life as the best form of life. It could even be the invitation into unwisdom. In the ambition to make the world philosophical and philosophy worldly, we not only have our transcendent cake, we come to eat it too – for good, leaving the philosophized masses engaged in a permanent revolution without coherence, direction, point and purpose. That, I hasted to add, is far from Marx’s intentions.

What, asks Andrew Feenberg, is the meaning of this strange concept of a ‘realization’ of philosophy? He sets out his answer in Realizing Philosophy: Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School (2013) and The Philosophy Of Praxis: Marx, Lukács And The Frankfurt School (2014). Here, I develop this idea in terms of Marx’s attempt to realize a unified science.

Earlier, I explained what is entailed by Marx’s ‘abolition of the state,’ showing that such abolition had to be understood in the dialectical sense of a process that realizes preserves and transcends a substance at the same time as it abolishes it. Marx’s abolition thus describes realization as a dialectical transcendence. It is in this way that the abolition of the state is the realization of the universal principle of the state. The abolition of the state us thus not the end of politics but the realization of the political. Since the commonality and universality human beings as social beings need in order to fulfil themselves is denied in an atomistic, antagonistic civil society, human beings project these things outwards and upwards to the heavenly realm of the state, having to exist as communal beings within the abstract citizenship of the state. The abolition of the state entails the abolition of the diremptive conditions that generate the need for the abstract community of the state. The state’s abolition through social transformation thus entails the realization of the political, the realization of the universal truths contained in the principle of the state. The norms and principles of political philosophy are not merely ideological rationalizations of the state and the way it serves as a surrogate of private power in the capital economy, but are capable of holding to account and even subverting those existing regimes which do not conform to the standards of the best regime. This is precisely how Marx became a marxist, by condemning any state that did not conform to the principle of ‘rational freedom’ as a ‘bad state.’ A good state, it follows, embodies and lives up to the norms of universal reason. In his first contribution to the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx wrote in a very Hegelian manner:

Modern philosophy considers the state as the great organism in which must be realized the juridical, moral and political freedom and in which the individual citizen, in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, that is to say of human reason.

Marx and Engels Historische Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt, Berlin and Moscow 1927, vol. I, i (i), p. 249

Marx abolishes God and religion in the same way, as a positive transcendence, claiming the ideal attributes assigned to God for the human species as it comes to realize its essence. To consider Marx as anti-religious or as atheist in the negative sense of rejecting God and religion is to profoundly misunderstand his argument, and to read him as a crude rationalist in the simple sense of scientific truth vs religion illusion. Marx isn’t simply rejecting religion as an illusion on the basis of a rationalist humanist position. Marx’s atheism as a communist humanism is a positive affirmation and appropriation that puts an end to the estranged conditions that generate religious illusion and the need for such illusion as compensation for a lack. Provide for that lack positively through social transformation and the human need to project the need for meaning, belonging, wholeness etc. outward and upwards disappears. 

Likewise with ethics. In Part 3 I examine Marx’s position on morality at length. Marx has been considered to lack a morality and moral theory, indeed, to be against morality. His communism, it is often argued, entails the abolition of morality as something that belongs in the ideological superstructure. Again, as I shall show in Part 3, this is more correctly formulated as Marx putting an end to the abstract existence of morality by realizing moral truths at the level of material relations.

Marx abolishes philosophy and natural science precisely the same way, and for the same reason – he wants the realization of the truths contained in all these abstract and ideal human disciplines. 

Religion
Let me take Marx’s comments on the abolition of religion first, because Marx is clear that religious criticism needs to be converted, and quickly, into the criticism of the social forms that generate religion. He plainly feared that the criticisms of some would begin with God and religion, and end there, leaving the unholy forms of human self-alienation firmly in place.

It is in this sense of abolition as a positive realization that Marx’s criticisms of religion need to be set. Far too often for comfort, Marx’s words on religion as the ‘opium of the people’ are wrenched from their context and made to do service in the science vs religion, reason vs illusion wars. That is precisely the negative statement of atheism that Marx was arguing against as redundant and beside the point. For Marx, atheism as communism is a positive affirmation of humanism, not a negative statement against God and religion. There is no need for a negative statement, he argues. His criticisms of religion also recognise the moral, psychic and experiential truths contained in religion. Marx isn’t out to extirpate such truths, he is out to transform social conditions so that the illusory form of their expression is discarded to enable a profoundly human expression. 

Marx states the foundation of irreligious criticism as lying in the fact that ‘Man makes religion, religion does not make man.’ He recognizes that ‘religion is indeed the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself or has already lost himself again.’ It follows that we are dealing with a particular kind of illusion or inversion here, and to simply extirpate religion and reject God would risk losing something essential to human beings. Marx points out that if religion is the ‘inverted consciousness of the world,’ then that is because it is produced by a society that is itself ‘an inverted world.’ In other words, Marx’s critical comments are directed not directly at religion but at the society that needs religion in order to express its suffering, ‘its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement and its universal basis of consolation and justification.’ Marx declares none of those things false. Herein lies the body of religious truth or, more accurately, a human truth that an inverted world allows us to express only in inverted form. Religion, Marx writes, ‘is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.’ (Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 244). To turn this into a negative demand aimed at the extirpation of religion is to miss Marx’s point by a very wide mark. (I shall note in passing the implication that human suffering is a social production, and will disappear in the right social conditions. I think this is a huge blind spot in Marx, ignores the personal dimension of religion, and ignores the facts of weakness, frailty and vulnerability as universal and eternal facts of human life. I therefore restate the religious dimension in volume 3)

It should be remembered that Marx was directing these words to his atheist friends and colleagues who were making the attack on religion central to their emancipatory project. For Marx, energies were much more profitably focused on the criticism of politics allied to a practical commitment to transform society. Stated in the positive sense that Marx intended, this argument is a demand for the true realization of the human essence, giving the human essence a ‘true reality.’ It made no sense to Marx to fight this struggle indirectly in a war against God and religion; the real source of illusion was the inversion at the heart of society. To extirpate religion without doing anything about transforming the social conditions which generated a popular need for religion is to deprive people of the comfort, solace and meaning they found in religion and nowhere else, however fantastical or illusory we may think it, without removing the social causes of their suffering. Frankly, such a humanism is a profound inhumanism, and it has nought to do with Marx. Marx’s struggle against religiosity cuts far deeper than such rationalist humanism:

Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975

The suffering is ‘real,’ notes Marx, and religion is a ‘protest against real suffering.’ The ‘opium of the people’ line is frequently misinterpreted out of ‘rationalist’ prejudice. Marx is not arguing that religion has been ‘made up’ by the ruling class to brainwash and stupefy the people; the opium here is self-administered. Marx’s criticism is directed against the conditions that generate the need for the religious expression of the human condition. As with his argument with respect to the state, Marx points to a real human need that is denied in society coming to be projected outwards and upwards to take abstract form. Marx’s target is that abstraction. Religion expresses the heart and soul of the people, and contains a demand that we put an end to heartless and soulless conditions:

The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo…
The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true sun... 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 245

I shall note, in anticipation of the final volume the explicit anthropocentrism implied in the notion of human beings coming to move around the true sun of their own reason and self-creation. Here, I want to make it clear that Marx doesn’t hang around too long with the criticism of religion. He is critical, of course. But in Marx’s view the source of the problem lies not in religion but elsewhere. At a time when the working class were becoming active in politics, when social transformation was on the agenda and the democratic revolution underway, the atheist attack on God and religion was not merely indirect and beside the point, it risked being reactionary. It may have meant something in the eighteenth century, but times had moved on:

It is therefore the task of history, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is the immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms once the holy form of human self-estrangement has been unmasked. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.

Marx EW CHPR: I 1975: 245

Marx was interested in converting the critique of religion into the critique of politics and society as quickly as possible, exposing and abolishing human self-estrangement in its social forms, targeting the capital system and its alienated forms of mediation. Communism didn’t need to express humanism indirectly through the negation of God and religion. Instead, Marx argues for the positive supersession of self-alienation through the practical affirmation of the human essence. Atheism, as a denial of the unreality of ‘a being above nature and man,’ no longer has any meaning once we proceed from the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as essential beings. Marx thus puts the accent on communism as the affirmation of the reality through the positive self-consciousness of human beings:

But since for socialist man the whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the creation of man through human labour, and the development of nature for man, he therefore has palpable and incontrovertible proof of his self-mediated birth, of his process of emergence. Since the essentiality [Wesenhaftigkeit] of man and of nature, man as the existence of nature for man and nature as the existence of man for man, has become practically and sensuously perceptible, the question of an alien being, a being above nature and man - a question which implies an admission of the unreality of nature and of man - has become impossible in practice. Atheism, which is a denial of this unreality, no longer has any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, through which negation it asserts the existence of man. But socialism as such no longer needs such mediation. Its starting-point is the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as essential beings. It is the positive self-consciousness of man, no longer mediated through the abolition of religion, just as real life is positive reality no longer mediated through the abolition of private property, through communism. Communism is the act of positing as the negation of the negation, and is therefore a real phase, necessary for the next period of historical development, in the emancipation and recovery of mankind.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 358

Marx thus conceives communism as a ‘positive humanism,’ superseding the abstract and theoretical expression of humanism through atheism as a mere negation of God. Communism is the ‘real objectification of man’ as the positive human appropriation of objective being:

The act of superseding as an objective movement which re-absorbs alienation into itself. This is the insight, expressed within estrangement, into the appropriation of objective being through the supersession of its alienation; it is the estranged insight into the real objectification of man, into the real appropriation of his objective being through the destruction of the estranged character of the objective world, through the supersession of its estranged mode of existence, just as atheism as the supersession of God is the emergence of theoretical humanism, and communism as the supersession of private property the vindication of real human life as man's property, the emergence of practical humanism. Atheism is humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of religion; communism is humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of private property. Only when we have superseded this mediation - which is, however, a necessary precondition - will positive humanism, positively originating in itself, come into being. 

Marx EW EPM 1975: 396

Marx concludes by pointing out that ‘atheism and communism are no flight, no abstraction, no loss of the objective world created by man or of his essential powers projected into objectivity, no impoverished regression to unnatural, primitive simplicity.’ Rather, they are ‘the first real emergence, the realization become real for man, of his essence as something real.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 396). 

Marx thus proceeds to unmasking human self-estrangement in its unholy forms.

Philosophy and Politics
The concept of ‘rational freedom’ has its origins in Plato’s concern with the need to develop a comprehensive overarching moral and political framework in order to articulate the common good in a fractious or pluralist society: ‘the more closely I studied the politicians and the laws and customs of the day .. the more difficult it seemed to me to govern rightly .. in an age which had abandoned its traditional moral code but found it impossibly difficult to create a new one’. Plato found the remedy for political ills in philosophy: ‘I was forced .. to the belief that the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy and that mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become by some miracle true philosophers’ (Plato, The Seventh Letter 1987: xvi). The good was to be realised through the integration of politics and philosophy. Marx took Plato’s philosopher-ruler and democratized it as the rule of philosophy through a positive human appropriation of the world on the part of each and all. The view entails the rule of reason, with an ethical component firmly in place in the form of a normative concern with human development and flourishing. The end in view is the fusion of politics and philosophy so that reason comes to rule human affairs. As philosophy becomes worldly and political, it loses its abstract nature; likewise, as politics becomes philosophical it loses its connection with the pursuit of sectional interests at the expense of the common good and comes to embody and articulate ideals of truth and good. Reason is to rule the world for the common good of each and all. 

theory and critique – against fideism
I have repeatedly argued that Marx did not write ‘theory’ but engaged in critique. That view needs qualifying. For Terry Eagleton, ‘we can never be “after theory,” in the sense that there can be no reflective human life without it. We can simply run out of particular styles of thinking, as our situation changes.’

Eagleton has some cautionary words for those who would reject theory for a practical critique. The danger lies in the loss of reason in favour of practice, the replacement of reasoned arguments in favour of ethos as a way of life:

For anti-theorists like Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish, theory is how you try to justify your way of life. It gives you some fundamental reasons for what you do. But this, for anti-theorists, is neither possible nor necessary. You cannot justify your way of life by theory because theory is part of that way of life, not something set apart from it. What counts as a legitimate reason or a valid idea will be determined for you by your way of life itself. So cultures have no foundation in reason. They just do what they do. You can justify this or that bit of your behaviour, but you cannot give reasons for your way of life or set of beliefs as a whole. It would be like saying that Peru is a bad thing. 

Eagleton 2003 ch 3

See, for example, Rorty 1989, and Fish 1989.

Please ponder these words at length: You cannot justify your way of life by theory if that theory is part of your way of life, and ‘not something set apart from it.’ That, precisely, is the case for affirming transcendent truths, norms and values against the customary and the conventional, as well as against the idea of a self-legislating reason. As rational and as liberatory as it sounds for human beings to live in accordance with their own reason, that reason is the shakiest of grounds – it is self-referential. ‘What counts as a legitimate reason or a valid idea will be determined for you by your way of life itself. So cultures have no foundation in reason.’ In forthcoming work I set out the case for transcendent standards at length – without those standards, these is no check against the descent into sophism, relativism, subjectivism, nihilism. There is such a thing as moral truth as well as scientific truth, and these notions rest on transcendent standards. I say that Marx, despite his historicism, has those, but I also think his critical project inclined him to eat them up. I say more in the next volume, and much more in forthcoming work.

This is the latest form of what the middle ages knew as the heresy of fideism. Your life is based on certain beliefs which are immune to rational scrutiny. Faith moves in a different sphere from reason. You did not choose your beliefs on any rational grounds; instead, like chicken-pox, they chose you. They are now so much part of you that you could not even get a fix on them if you tried. Culture is just not the kind of thing that could be or needs to be justified, any more than you need to back up why you have just clipped your toe-nails with a string of intricately metaphysical explanations, each one more baroque than the other. And this also means that there are no rational grounds for judging between cultures. I cannot judge between my culture and yours, because my judgement is bound to be made from within my own culture, not from some disinterested point outside it. There is no such place to stand. So either we are inside or complicit, or outside and irrelevant. 

Eagleton 2003 ch 3

Marx’s resolving of philosophy into practical critique involves more than ethos. Marx’s realisation of philosophy is concerned to establish the conditions of rational freedom, which aims at communities and cultures that are founded in reason. This is of a piece with the virtue tradition. Virtues as qualities for successful living concern more than habits that allow one to take one’s place in existing society, but are based upon right reasons, actions being ordered to their true ends.

Rational freedom – the realization of philosophy
Marx is very much concerned with truth, and thinks that such a thing exists. And he thinks that human beings should live in truth in this world. He thus writes:

It is therefore the task of history, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is the immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms once the holy form of human self-estrangement has been unmasked. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 245

Note well the connection of the critique of religion with the practical critique of social reality. Through such social transformation, human beings come to affirm their existence positively, through a human appropriation of reality:

Clearly the weapon of criticism cannot replace the criticism of weapons, and material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses when it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself. Clear proof of the radicalism of German theory and its practical energy is the fact that it takes as its point of departure a decisive and positive transcendence of religion. The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that for man the supreme being is man, and thus with the categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible being.

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 251

Marx’s abolition of philosophy is thus its realization, putting an end to a ‘scholastic’ philosophy that engages in endless speculation over a truth and reality that is always mediated and can only be known practically. Marx was bringing philosophy down to earth, in an integral politics and ethics, a reason that is no longer consigned to the attic of an abstract universality whose truths exist outside of time and space in some city of mind and remain there. Marx wanted them realized in time and place. The practical activity that Marx saw as transforming the world incorporates the philosophical dimension, translating the philosophical idea into actuality (Mészáros 1970: 221 233; West 1991: 35/7 39/42). Marx didn’t repudiate philosophy, but criticised the passive-contemplative approach to knowledge in which philosophy comes to the world after the fact in order to develop a more intimate approach to reality, seeing the truth about the world as being yielded actively from the inside through interaction with the world:

You demand that we make the real seeds of life our point of departure, but you forget that the real seed of life of the German people has up to now only flourished inside its cranium. In a word: You cannot transcend [aufheben] philosophy without realizing [verwirklichen] it. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975 

Marx thus looks to overcome the theoretical and the contemplative approach of a speculative philosophy that conceives the world in abstraction from practical interaction. In locating the philosophical idea in the world, the idea ceases to be philosophical in the abstract, contemplative and speculative sense. But it remains an idea and the practical activity upon which Marx places emphasis remains principled.

[Rational freedom - realization of philosophy 
Marx exposes the ‘basic defect’ of the German political consciousness of his day: ‘it believed that it could realize philosophy without transcending it.’ (Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 250). To transcend philosophy is to realize its truths:

The emancipation of the German is the emancipation of man. The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart the proletariat. Philosophy cannot realize itself without the transcendence [Aufhebung] of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization [Verwirklichung] of philosophy.

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 257

The formulation here is crude and dualistic and doesn’t have the genuinely interactive quality of Marx’s later formulations. But Marx is on the right lines in seeking to put theory and practice together in the one practical philosophy. The important point to note here is the conception of abolition as transcendence [Aufhebung] and realization [Verwirklichung]. This is Marx’s approach to the abolition of the state, law, morality, religion – the positive affirmation of their truths, ideals and norms within the reality of human beings, overcoming the depoliticisation ad demoralisation of the capitalist world. 

And key to this transformation is the practical struggle on the part of the proletariat, the class with radical chains. Marx thus came to acknowledge the proletariat as the active subject of the revolutionary-emancipatory process as opposed to being the passive, object as in the theoretico-elitist model. This is the realization of reason and philosophy as a democratisation:





Marx realizes philosophy by socializing it. Marx was not anti-philosophical in the crude sense of asserting practice over against theory. He did not deny the key questions of philosophy, but sought the social roots of philosophical controversies to demand their resolution through practical transformation. Marx thus proceeded to resolve philosophical criticism into a practical social critique:

the criticism of the speculative philosophy of law finds its progression not within itself but in tasks which can only be solved in one way - through practice [Praxis]. 

Marx EW CHPR: I 1975: 251

In overcoming the ‘scholastic’ character of professional philosophy, Marx realized a society in which all exist as philosophers.

The conception of revolutionary-critical praxis, which Marx outlined in the Theses on Feuerbach and developed at length in The German Ideology, allowed Marx to thoroughly repudiate the theoretico-elitist model, subverting the position of the philosophers and the politicians in favour of the proletariat as the true subjects of social transformation and, indeed, of its own emancipation (Callinicos 1985: 45/6).

Through the experience of their material practices and struggles, deriving from their location within an exploitative class system, the working class first resists and then, more positively and proactively, to engage in constructive actions designed to overcome the exploitation and dehumanisation to which they are subject. To realize its rational truths and normative ideals, philosophy has to shed its abstract nature and participate in the struggles to abolish a class society. It does this by being incorporated into class praxis of the proletariat. The experience of the reality of the class struggle and the participation in practical collective actions, moreover, transforms the consciousness of the workers, enlightening them as to the true nature of reality in a way that a purely abstract philosophy could never do. It is this experience which leads to the formation of socialist ideas embodying the realized philosophical idea. And this is a result of praxis:

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.

Marx, Thesis III on Feuerbach

There is, in light of this, an inherent substitutionism in the concept of the party. The party form is predicated upon the incapacity of the proletariat. Marx's original hopes that philosophy would be abolished by being realised through the transformative activity of the proletariat, the triumph of the proletariat as the universal class, thus come to be thwarted, with the view that socialism is the product of the intellectuals and is brought into the workers’ movement from the outside. That’s the Kautsky-Lenin thesis from shortly after Marx’s death, when leaders of socialist parties had to deal with the problem of organising the transition to the socialist society. I don’t dismiss such people as heretics or renegades (Lenin accused Kautsky of being a renegade, a term that could easily be applied to him. Maybe, if we follow Marx’s example as a critical thinker in the tradition of the Enlightenment, we should all be heretics). They were facing organisational questions that Marx only began to see the beginning of (and what Marx had to say about the newly formed socialist parties was not complementary). If Lenin and Kautsky were right on this, then Marx was wrong. Marx had been confident in bringing philosophy down from the idealist plane into the material reality made by human practice, affirming the unity of theory and practice. Yet, at this very level of practice, it has proven more difficult to overcome the distinction between the 'is' and the 'ought’ than Marx maybe realized, something which subsequent Marxism has had to struggle with since (Jay 1984: 56/7). 

To this day, Marxist politics is a case of chercher le proletariat. ‘Today, 164 years after Marx and Engels wrote about grave-diggers, the truth is almost the exact opposite. The proletariat, far from burying capitalism, are keeping it on life support. Overworked, underpaid workers ostensibly liberated by the largest socialist revolution in history (China's) are driven to the brink of suicide to keep those in the west playing with their iPads. Chinese money bankrolls an otherwise bankrupt America.’ The irony is not lost on leading Marxist thinkers. ‘The domination of capitalism globally depends today on the existence of a Chinese Communist party that gives de-localised capitalist enterprises cheap labour to lower prices and deprive workers of the rights of self-organisation, says Jacques Rancière, the French marxist thinker and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris VIII. ‘Happily, it is possible to hope for a world less absurd and more just than today's.’ It was ever thus. The ‘irony’ of the situation, of course, was not lost on Marx, however, who noted the condition of the proletariat as both in and against the capital system, the force which created the power that enslaves it, the force which possessed the capacity for subverting its enslavement. Marx’s explosive point was this: the power of capital is secondary and derivative in relation to labour: capital can never autonomize itself from labour, but labour has the capacity to autonomize itself from capital. Whether that will ever happen, and how, and how labour can them come to constitute a new mode of production, is another, and much more difficult, question.

Marx subverted the position of the philosophers by transforming philosophical problems requiring intellectual treatment into social problems requiring the practical transformation of the world. In the process, Marx struck a blow for life affirmation against the intellectualisation of modern society. Revolutionary-critical praxis is, from this standpoint, an affirmative materialism. It’s just that this realization has been such a long time coming, and socialist revolutionaries by their nature are impatient to see socialism realized in the here and now, and not something consigned, like Kant’s good will, to a heavenly realm of timeless truths. Contemplation or action? Marx’s ambitions to realize philosophy involves him in the substantial enterprise of making the world, and the people in it, philosophical. And that, regardless of the impatience of revolutionaries, is not the work of a summer’s day.

Natural Science
Marx’s apparent enthusiasm for abolishing things is quite exciting, particular for those people who have particular dislikes and who seem to find in Marx some kind of philosophical sanction for indulging those dislikes. The finer argumentation with respect to the dialectical character of abolition in Marx can easily be lost as the enthusiasms take over, which hardly augurs well for future practice. Those harbouring a particular loathing for religion will seize on the ‘opium of the people’ passage, those who think all our problems arise from the state will focus their energies and passions there. Those who see ethical systems and moral codes as repressive will likewise respond to Marx’s apparent abolition of morality. Those who object to idle philosophizing in the academy will likewise enjoy Marx for his apparent extirpation of philosophy. Same with law and legal fetishism. Once we internalize reason and determine to live in accordance with what is true and right, we will have no need of law. That Martin Luther argued the same thing with respect to the love of God should tell us to temper our revolutionary enthusiasms and look more deeply at servitude as a condition of salvation.

The problem is that something essential comes to be missed as a result of an over-enthusiasm that misses the true meaning of that word. Marx’s ‘abolition’ entails a holistic approach of self- and social transformation by which the truths, norms and values contained in all the things to be abolished are realized in actual social forms and relations. That implies that Marx isn’t strictly against the state, politics, law, philosophy, religion etc. but is seeking to liberate their truths from with the abstract and ideological forms within which they are contained. 

The clear indication that something essential has been misunderstood in Marx’s argument is the fact that in the wish-list of things to be abolished, natural science rarely, if ever, features. No one but the wilfully stupid, self-interested and hopelessly irrational is against natural science, and so there is no enthusiasm for its abolition. But here is the final proof that abolition for Marx entails a positive transcendence, affirmation and realization – the same arguments he made with respect to the abolition of religion, the state, law, ethics and philosophy he made also with respect to natural science. Of course, Marx is not against natural science, no more than he is simply against all the other human forms and disciplines – he is against truths and values existing only in abstract and idealistic form. This comes out clearly in Marx’s comments on overcoming the idealism of natural science in order to realise a ‘human science’:

Natural science will lose its abstractly material — or rather, its idealistic — tendency, and will become the basis of human science, as it has already become - albeit in an estranged form - the basis of actual human life. ... Natural science will in time incorporate into itself the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate into itself natural science: there will be one science.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 355-356

Marx, it should be clear by now, is seeking the one ‘science of man,’ a ‘unified science’ which incorporates all the disciplines he seeks to realization beyond their abstraction and idealism. He achieves this by going beyond the idea of the world as an external objective datum. Instead, Marx sees the human relation to the world as mediated from within. By overcoming estrangement in the forms of estrangement here, human beings will attain a self-understanding and self-knowledge from a position of active relation to and interaction with the world. Thus ‘subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, lose their antithetical character, and hence their existence as such antitheses, only in the social condition.’ It is these antitheses that are responsible for abstraction and idealism, preventing the realization of truths, the embodiment of ideals in the true reality of human beings. The resolution of these ‘theoretical antitheses’ is possible ‘only in a practical way, only through the practical energy of man.’ Marx thus argues that the resolution of these antitheses is ‘by no means only a problem of knowledge, but a real problem of life, a problem which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it treated it as a purely theoretical problem.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 354-55).

Marx was thus well on his way to his breakthrough to praxis in the Theses on Feuerbach, throwing off the scholasticism of purely theoretical approaches to the questions of objective truth and reality, as well as the passive epistemologies that conceived the world in abstraction from practice.

Marx proceeds to declare industry and the objective existence of industry as ‘the open book of the essential powers of man, man's psychology present in tangible form.’ In failing to understand this history in its connection with ‘the nature of man,’ remaining within the ‘realm of estrangement’ by grasping only its ‘external utilitarian aspect,’ humans have only understood ‘the general existence of man - religion, or history in its abstract and universal form of politics, art, literature, etc. - as the reality of man's essential powers and as man's species-activity.’ In everyday, material industry, we are presented with ‘the objectified powers of the human essence, in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects, in the form of estrangement.’ It is how we deal with these powers and their estrangement that determines, for Marx, whether we shall have a ‘science of man’ that is worthy of the name or not, a science with a human content that recognizes that the truth about reality is a mediated truth, with practice, industry and labour at its core:

A psychology for which this book, the most tangible and accessible part of history, is closed, can never become a real science with a genuine content. What indeed should we think of a science which primly abstracts from this large area of human labour, and fails to sense its own inadequacy, even though such an extended wealth of human activity says nothing more to it perhaps than what can be said in one word - 'need', 'common need'?

Marx EW EPM 1975: 355-356

Marx refers to the way in which the natural sciences and philosophy have remained alien to each other, describing their ‘momentary union’ as ‘only a fantastic illusion.’ ‘The will was there,’ Marx says, ‘but not the means.’ Marx plainly wills that union, and is concerned to supply the means. 

With respect to natural science, Marx emphasizes once more the real practical relation of human beings to the world:

But natural science has intervened in and transformed human life all the more practically through industry and has prepared the conditions for human emancipation, however much its immediate effect was to complete the process of dehumanization. Industry is the real historical relationship of nature, and hence of natural science, to man. If it is then conceived as the exoteric revelation of man's essential powers, the human essence of nature or the natural essence of man can also be understood. Hence natural science will lose its abstractly material, or rather idealist, orientation and become the basis of a human science, just as it has already become - though in an estranged form - the basis of actual human life. The idea of one basis for life and another for science is from the very outset a lie. Nature as it comes into being in human history - in the act of creation of human society - is the true nature of man; hence nature as it comes into being through industry, though in an estranged form, is true anthropological nature. 

Marx EW EPM 1975: 355-356

A ‘unified’ ‘human’ science will be one that overcomes estrangement, (the separations and antitheses mentioned earlier), the merely theoretical approaches to the world, the idealism and abstraction that lacks a self-conscious awareness of the practical mediation of human beings to the world. That ‘science of man,’ as a ‘human science,’ will be the affirmation of the essential human powers, seeing the human essence of nature and the natural essence of man as one. This ‘one science’ as a ‘human science’ is also a genuine naturalism: ‘Nature as it comes into being in human history - in the act of creation of human society - is the true nature of man; hence nature as it comes into being through industry, though in an estranged form, is true anthropological nature.’ This naturalism is not a passive determinist materialism but a mediated, practical, metabolic interaction. As Marx puts the point: ‘The social reality of nature and human natural science or the natural science of man are identical expressions.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975). 

Sense perception (see Feuerbach) must be the basis of all science. Only when science starts out from sense perception in the dual form of sensuous consciousness and sensuous need - i.e. only when science starts out from nature - is it real science. The whole of history is a preparation, a development, for 'man' to become the object of sensuous consciousness and for the needs of 'man as man' to become [sensuous] needs. History itself is a real part of natural history and of nature's becoming man. Natural science will in time subsume the science of man just as the science of man will subsume natural science: there will be one science.

Man is the immediate object of natural science; for immediate sensuous nature for man is, immediately, human sense perception (an identical expression) in the form of the other man who is present in his sensuous immediacy for him. His own sense perception only exists as human sense perception for himself through the other man. But nature is the immediate object of the science of man. Man's first object - man - is nature, sense perception; and the particular sensuous human powers, since they can find objective realization only in natural objects, can find self-knowledge only in the science of nature in general. The element of thought itself, the element of the vital expression of thought - language - is sensuous nature. The social reality of nature and human natural science or the natural science of man are identical expressions.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 355-356

This commitment to the one, human science was not a youthful flourish on Marx’s part, but remained a lifelong commitment, embracing the socially mediated nature of reality, human beings as social beings, the integration of humanity and nature through the mediating term of society, the history of human self-creation set within natural history, the ‘active relation’ of human beings to nature via labour/production/industry/technology. Importantly, Marx points to the ‘uncritical’ character of any investigation that proceeds ‘in abstraction from this material basis.’ Marx thus refers to the ‘weaknesses of the abstract materialism of natural science’ on account of the extent to which it ‘excludes the historical process.’ These weaknesses are ‘immediately evident from the abstract and ideological conceptions expressed by its spokesmen whenever they venture beyond the bounds of their own speciality.’ (Marx CI 1976 ch 15 494-495).

Here is the ‘science of man’ that Pinker demands in his Enlightenment Now. I shall leave others to decide whether Pinker’s ‘science of man’ involves a ‘psychology for which this book, the most tangible and accessible part of history, is closed,’ and therefore ‘can never become a real science with a genuine content.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 355-356)


PART 2 MARX’S ESSENTIALIST ANTHROPOLOGY

7 Essentialism and Atomism

Scott Meikle describes Marx’s view as ‘remarkably Aristotelian’ (Meikle 1985: 58). Terry Eagleton remarks that Marx ‘did not seem to realize that he was the Aristotle of the modern age.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 6 142-143). Marx was Aristotelian and that comes with certain modes of thought that gives his critique of the capital system a peculiar flavour. (Pike 1999). Marx’s critique rests upon philosophical and methodological assumptions that set him apart from dominant modes of thought in the modern age. Miss that undercurrent, and you miss a great deal of what Marx was about. I wish to demonstrate that an essentialist metaphysics not only characterizes Marx’s philosophical anthropology, but constitutes its strength, powering Marx’s emancipatory, normative and immanent critique.

Marx’s essentialist historical materialism – the metaphysics of self-mediation
An essentialist metaphysics lies at the heart of Marx’s work and gives it its critical and explanatory power. It is as well to establish from the first that Marx does not define essence as a timeless, unchanging, eternal substance, focusing on the ways in which that essence is unfolded within specific historical and social relations. Against such a notion, Marx proposes a creative unfolding, writing of the self-creation of human beings through labour, ‘man's act of self-creation,’ and the ‘self-mediated birth’ of human beings. (Marx EW EPM 1975: 386; 394-95 357). The prefix ‘self-’ here, requires qualification. The process of creative unfolding is not arbitrary, but pertains to a certain thing becoming in actual what it has the potential to be. And this proceeds within an environment in relation to other organisms. Marx thus refers to ‘the self-mediated being [Durchsichselbstsein] of nature and of man.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 356). Marx’s conception is environmental in the sense that it focuses on the mediated relation and metabolic interaction between humanity and nature. He writes that ‘for socialist man the whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the creation of man through human labour, and the development of nature for man,’ which gives ‘palpable and incontrovertible proof of his self-mediated birth, of his process of emergence.’ This ‘essentiality [Wesenhaftigkeit] of man and of nature, man as the existence of nature for man and nature as the existence of man for man, has become practically and sensuously perceptible.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 357).

Given the tendency among certain dominant cultural viewpoints to caricature essences as timeless, eternal and fixed, it is worthwhile giving a concise presentation of the key terms of essentialism. Safe to say that if essences were anything like what critics allege, Marx would have been nowhere near them, pioneer as he was of that mode of critical thinking that was concerned to historicize what apologists and ideologists sought to naturalize. Scott Meikle defines the key essentialist categories concisely in the glossary to his book Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx (1985):

Essence
A specification of the essence of an entity specifies those characteristics that make it the kind of thing it is (or the very thing it is) and without which it could not exist or be what it is. The essence of an entity is not something lying around on the surface which simply has to be apprehended, nor can it be got from a dictionary definition. It has to be discovered by means of observation, investigation and analysis of facts. For example, part of the essence of gold as we presently understand it is that it is that element having the atomic number 79. We did not always know this; we discovered it. It was part of the essence of gold before we knew it to be so, and would still have been part of that essence even if there had never existed any intelligent creatures like humans to discover it. Other entities, such as forms of human society, also have essences which have to be discovered.

Teleology
Often thought of as a theory that sees the world as the artefact of a God or Guiding Intelligence and each thing in the world as existing and behaving in the way that it does as a fulfilment of his purpose. That is not the theory of teleology adopted in this book. Here it is a theory about how the real nature (essence) of a whole entity is to be identified; how its development from immature, to mature (telos) and declining forms is to be explained; and how its characteristic behaviour (ergon) is to be explained in a law-like fashion. A whole entity can be anything from an amoeba to a form of human society, or an astronomical system.

Telos
The form, state or condition towards which an entity develops by its nature, unless its development is interrupted (either by external accident, or, in the case of a nature which contains a constitutive contradiction, by the way in which that contradiction develops). The telos is the final form attained in an entity's process of development.

Metaphysics
As employed here, metaphysics means enquiry into the most fundamental categories used in thought and science. In this sense, even the Logical Positivists had a metaphysics (since they had a theory about which were the fundamental categories), notwithstanding the fact that in their conception of philosophy, metaphysics was the prime enemy, and in their vocabulary the word 'metaphysical' was the ultimate insult. They understood metaphysics to be a variety of philosophy which claimed to be able to make the world intelligible at a level deeper than science could ever penetrate. The two senses of the term should be kept apart; only the first is used in this book.

Atomism




It may seem strange to see the word ‘teleology’ crop up as an essential part of Marx’s thought. Marx, along with Hegel, are frequently accused of developing teleological accounts of history in which development proceeds over the heads of the real individuals who make history. Marx didn’t care for the word ‘teleology,’ and was clearly sensitive on the point. He praised Darwin for putting the final nail in the coffin of teleology. Well, as Queen Gertrude would say, ‘The Lady doth protest too much.’ Teleology is at the heart of Marx, an integral part of his essentialist metaphysics. Marx, of course, is concerned to avoid two things commonly associated with teleological thinking, the idea of purpose as something extraneous and brought into the world from the outside, and the idea of history as proceeding over the heads of the individual agents.

Marx is clear on the point:

History does nothing, it “possesses no immense wealth”, it “wages no battles”. It is man, real, living man who does all that, who possesses and fights; “history” is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.

Marx The Holy Family 1956 ch 6, 2) Absolute Criticism’s Second Campaign

In Marx, teleology concerns the essence of an entity, its real nature, how it is identified and how its process of development in becoming what it is is to be explained. As Meikle states, a whole entity can be anything from an amoeba to an astronomical system. It can also be the form of human society, which is the focus of Marx’s critical concern. He conceived his project as that of identifying 'the laws of motion of modern society'. At the heart of Marx’s critique of political economy are the essentialist categories of law, form and necessity, which enable him to identify the underlying realities behind surface level economic categories. Marx agreed with an early reviewer of volume one of Capital who considered Marx to be seeking ‘the law of the phenomena ... of their development, i.e. of their transition from one form into another ... the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions’ (Afterword to the Second German Edn., Cap. 1, italics added). That’s precisely what Marx was doing, the italicised words highlighting the extent to which Marx considered these essentialist categories as crucial to his thought.

An important point to establish from the first is that essentialism is not a determinism, and in Marx is quite the opposite. And essentialism is not necessarily ahistorical, and in Marx is most certainly an historical unfolding. Change is central to essentialist metaphysics, something which Marx, following Hegel, translates into human history and society. A nature is not preserved through history, but is developed through successive forms. This has the result of making existing reality a field of immanent potential that is always in the process of becoming actual. Reality is thus a field of materialist immanence in the process of transcending itself, realising its potentials as actualities. In being elevated into the universal, a species transcends its former state.

This view is firmly grounded in Aristotle’s conception that the nature of a thing is revealed by what it is in its completed state:

the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. 

Aristotle Politics Bk1 7252627 191: 58

For a thing to be fully developed and completed, in accordance with its nature is a necessary development. A thing is an organism which has a telos, a purpose, which is to be fully developed in order to realise its nature. As Philippa Foot argues in Natural Goodness, ‘to know whether an individual is or is not as it should be, one must know the life form of the species.’ (Foot 2001: 91). Aristotle’s argument is plainly teleological. The ‘aim’ (‘that for-the-sake-of which,’) is the ‘final cause,’ the ‘end’ or purpose towards which a process of development is directed and in which it culminates.

Hegel and Marx developed this Aristotelian essentialism in terms of a unity of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be’. That is, the ‘is’ of existing material reality is conceived to be the ‘ought-to-be’ in the process of becoming. Hegel and Marx thus enjoin us to realize what is already in existence as potential. And that expresses a normative concern, defining an ethics of immanence in relation to an internal development. Existing reality is therefore conceived as a field of immanent potential in the process of transcending itself to become a fully developed actual. 

In an age reared on atomism, reductionism and accident, the language of essentialism and its meaning is unfamiliar, repellent even. We have been brought up on the philosophical convention that it is illegitimate to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ But if ever a convention stands in need of challenge, then it is this one, not least because its author, David Hume, himself did not live up to it. It’s difficult to see how anyone could live up to this convention, it’s not how social beings live their lives, or ever could, (Finnis 1980). I’m sure that David Hume would be the first to dissent from the way in which the is/ought fallacy is employed as a philosophical convention. Hume’s ethics – and his politics that were in line with them - were a form of proto-utilitarianism based on the observation of human nature. Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature contains this passage in the Introduction:

’Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties…

If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind.

Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingring method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pure curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz’d in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.
And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation.

Hume Treatise on Human Nature Introduction

In fine, Hume was guilty of committing the is/ought fallacy. Which is no crime and no fallacy at all. It all depends on how one moves from the ‘is’ to the ‘ought.’ In The Moral Landscape (2011), Sam Harris, as part of his project of promoting an atheistic humanism, challenges Hume’s distinction between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be.’ Harris argues that there is such a thing as moral truth and that this truth can be derived from a knowledge of biological nature. Well, praise be to the recognition that moral truth exists! Now we are getting somewhere. The contentious bit pertains to the grounding of this truth in biological nature. The possibility of this project is defended by Daniel Dennett:





After wading through acres of – excuse my impolite language – twaddle written on ethics and morality in recent decades, I can scarce forbear to cheer, very loudly. I agree very much with Dennett here (and Harris above), only to have to point out that this is not naturalism! But Dennett and Harris at least have put us back on the right lines. Moral naturalism concerns the existence of moral values and the truth of moral judgments. The facts about humanity and human nature inform our ethics and politics, which doesn’t imply a simple or direct line from facts to values. There is no such ‘greedy’ reductionism in Aristotle, a pioneer biologist who drew out the implications of his scientific studies in his Ethics and Politics.

My point is that the entire essentialist tradition in philosophy has consistently argued that the ‘ought’ is conceived in relation to the ‘is,’ and has ever been concerned to develop the practical, political implications of this position as a necessary development for human beings as social beings in terms of what Aristotle called a politikon bion, a public life of flourishing human beings. Essentialism, however, is not a simple naturalism and is quite distinct from the reduction of moral values to biological facts. (At this point, we need to refer to Marx’s depiction of communism as a consistent humanism and naturalism) (see Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, ch 3 Labour, Need and Production). In reducing the ‘ought-to-be’ to the ‘is,’ we come to sell our moral birthright for a mess of scientistic pottage – we exchange the normative dimension for scientism. An essentialism conceived in the manner of Aristotle, Hegel and Marx seeks to realise the ‘ought-to-be’ out of the ‘is’ as an immanent ethics. The biological approach is the denial of morality as integral to the human ontology; the essentialist approach is the realisation of this morality. The idea that this view is a denigration and rejection of science is mistaken. It was Aristotle’s view, and he was a pioneer biologist who examined the implications of natural knowledge in the fields of politics and ethics. (Leroi 2014). Whether the ethics of immanence is itself a quasi-scientific naturalism that fails to do justice to the cosmic dimensions of Aristotle’s thought is another question (see the work of David McPherson, with which I am in agreement. To pursue the question in the depth it deserves is beyond the scope of this book. I examine it at length elsewhere in work that is forthcoming).

The emphasis within an essentialist framework is upon identifying the real nature or essence of an entity and understanding how its development from potential to actual form proceeds. A whole entity can be anything from the smallest thing to the social organism. Telos may be defined as the form, state or condition towards which an entity develops as it realises its nature. This line of development is necessary, in that this is what is required if a thing is to complete itself by attaining its final form. This necessary development is not, however, inevitable, in that it can be frustrated by external accident. All that a teleological argument states here is that the telos is the final form an entity achieves through its process of development.

Since Aristotle, history has swung continuously between atomism and essentialism, with forms of essentialism being dominant throughout the Middle Ages, and atomism coming to be dominant in the context of the mechanistic materialism of the scientific and industrial revolutions. Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Descartes are exemplary figures with respect to the atomism of the modern age. Essentialism returned with Hegel and the idealism that followed in his wake, including later Oxford idealists like T.H. Green, McTaggart, Bradley, as well as Santayana. Marx is also part of this development.

The atomist view, going back to Democritus and Epicurus, holds that reality is composed of discrete entities and events, possessing no overall significance. Against this, Aristotle argues that an account of the persisting natures of things, species and genera is possible only by acknowledging a category of form or essence. In the essentialist view, it is impossible to explain what a thing is in terms of its constituent matter (atoms), since the entity retains its nature and identity even as its constituent matter changes over time. A thing changes but stays the same in terms of its essence. It completes itself. The development is necessary.

Essentialists argue that there are organic wholes with real natures and hence with laws, forms and necessities. Essentialists may also be called organicists in that essentialism is a metabolic form of thinking, seeing parts as related together within wholes. Atomists deny the existence of essences, or, at least, of essences which are knowable. Atomists may also be called empiricists (but not always, Descartes, for example). Rather than discern a meaning and purpose in the movement of history, atomists see only discrete events and accidental relations at the level of appearances. For atomists, there is no meaning in history, no pattern, and no progress. This is the dominant intellectual and philosophical view of the modern world. But the times may well be a-changin’

Marx explicitly challenges this view. The words Marx directed against Gustav Hugo apply to the atomists: ‘He is a sceptic as regards the necessary essence of things, so as to be a courtier as regards their accidental appearance.’ (Marx MECW I 1975: 204). Those who are sceptical of any and all meaning in history are soon lost in the thickets of accident. It was for this reason that Jurgen Habermas characterised the poststructuralists as ‘young conservatives.’ If you deny the possibility of meaning and purpose in reality, then you have no basis to propose an alternative to the existing state of things; whether by default or design, you end up as a supporter of the status quo, or in the very least confined within it. The view applies to all those who see no meaning in the world, who deny such thing as purpose. They are atomists and empiricists whose vision is confined to surface level events, and who are incapable of penetrating to the underlying structures.

The point is that the essentialist view holds that human reason is capable of penetrating beyond the accidents and illusions of the empirical world presented to the senses to give us access to true reality. Without that capacity, we are condemned to remain enchained to empirical immediacy and necessity at the surface level of reality. To the atomists and accidentalists, the future is no more than the present enlarged, and they see no direction and no necessary relations or lines of development beyond the accident of discrete events. They may express hopes of a political alternative, but they have no philosophical grounds to argue this alternative is better than prevailing arrangements. 

Back in the 1980s, postmodernism and postructuralism were the new intellectual fashions; marxism, the working class and class politics were out. Norman Geras, who was in Manchester as I began my study of Marx, didn’t mince his words at the time. In Discourses of Extremity, after a painstaking analysis revealing the fallacies of post-marxism, Geras concludes the final chapter, entitled Ex-Marxism without Substance, with these pertinent words:

But socialist thought presently also confronts, on the other hand, a singularly hostile political and intellectual environment. It is pressed in from all directions by those ready to write it off, deride it, belittle both its hopes and its achievements as illusion or dross.




In this book, Geras eviscerates the arbitrariness of discourse-based theory. Scepticism with respect to essences sapped the strength and meaning of socialism as an emancipatory project and provides no basis for anything with which to replace it beyond vacuous phraseaology. Today we face a civilisation-threatening crisis in the climate system. To confront that problem we are going to need thinking of real perception and depth with respect to parts and wholes and any necessary relations between and within. I am concerned to demonstrate the centrality of essentialism to the critical metabolic thought of Karl Marx. Marx shows that it is precisely because of the reality of essences that a future creative self-realisation, beyond the vagaries and accidents of sensory experience, is always possible. Indeed, in the essentialist terms I shall develop, this development is necessary, although not in the sense of being inevitable, since lines of development are always frustratable. Whether development occurs as it ought depends upon human agency, the ways in which, or whether at all, human beings come to act. This development is necessary if human beings – and other organisms – are to become what they essentially are, that is, what they have the potential to be. But not inevitable. It all depends upon agency, upon will and consciousness, upon, in short, morality and politics, and is therefore not a naturalism.

I shall argue that it is possible to transform the world in pursuit of the ‘ought to be’ of alternative arrangements without disappearing into the fantasy world of subjective wishes and delusions, precisely because that ‘ought’ is always in some way existent and in immanent relation to the ‘is.’ Anglophone philosophy since David Hume has imposed the philosophical convention that one cannot derive an ‘ought to be’ from an ‘is’. Philosophers such as Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett are developing the intellectual nerve to state that not only is there such a thing as the ‘ought to be’ – and that moral truth as well as scientific truth does indeed exist – but that the ‘ought’ can only be derived from the ‘is.’ They have seen how scepticism and relativism in this respect is opening the door to various reactionary fundamentalisms and irrationalisms generated by people who see the need for a moral ought and are not afraid to derive it from anywhere they like. As atheists, Dennett and Harris have no time for God. But they have seen the practical moral inadequacies of scepticism, relativism and nihilism, and want an ‘ought to be’ that is grounded in reality, in nature and human nature. In my view, they can only do this by way of an essentialist metaphysics. I doubt that’s a view that either Harris or Dennett would be prepared to countenance. (I’ll make the same claim for Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to human development). I note in the footnotes to his book The Moral Landscape that Harris acknowledges the similarities of his argument with that of Aristotle, only to be careful to distinguish himself from the ‘great man’:

I am not the first person to argue that morality can and should be integrated with our scientific understanding of the natural world. Of late, the philosophers William Casebeer and Owen Flanagan have each built similar cases (Casebeer, 2003; Flanagan, 2007). Both Casebeer and Flanagan have resurrected Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia, which is generally translated as "flourishing," "fulfillment," or "well-being." While I rely heavily on these English equivalents, I have elected not to pay any attention to Aristotle. While much of what Aristotle wrote in his Nichomachean Ethics is of great interest and convergent with the case I wish to make, some of it isn't. And I'd rather not be beholden to the quirks of the great man's philosophy.’

Harris 2010 footnote 9 Introduction 

Always search the footnotes, my old history tutor Dr. L.W. Brady advised me, they often contain essential information, clues and significant revelations. Which is good historical training. Iris Murdoch remarked: ‘It is always a significant question to ask of any philosopher: what is he afraid of?’ (Murdoch 1985: 72). Which is good philosophical training.

As the reference to Casebeer makes clear, moral truth can rest upon natural ethical facts, and some such thing, you would have thought, is what Aristotle was up to in relating his biological studies to ethics and politics. But not quite. Harris is cautious and careful with respect to Aristotle for good reason. As important as Aristotle was as the world’s first scientist, as a pioneer biologist and zoologist who explored the ethical and political implications of the facts revealed by natural science, Aristotle was also clear to establish the dignity of ethics and politics in themselves, as the science of the human good integrating all the other sciences. And Aristotle also set his argument within a conception of God and the cosmic dimension in a way that those pursuing a scientific ethics will feel less than comfortable with. Harris’ view, citing the likes of Pinker, Wilson, is clearly scientistic, and proceeds in the contrary direction to Aristotle. Rather than a genuine integration of ethics and science in a ‘unified science of man,’ this view is conceived along the lines of Wilson’s cannibalisation of ethics and philosophy by natural science. That’s not Aristotle and that’s not an essentialism conceived on Aristotelian lines, still less Hegelian and Marxist.

Harris is plainly aware of the implications and leery of the ‘quirks’ of Aristotle’s essentialist metaphysics. Here, I not only embrace such metaphysics, I openly claim that Marx is an essentialist, Hegel too. And the essentialist tradition to which they belong, going back to Aristotle, has always deduced the ‘ought to be’ from the ‘is,’ avoiding the paralysis, controversy and constipation into which modern thought has fallen. This is to conceive the ‘is’ as composed of natural essences. Thus Hegel and Marx are able to locate the ideal within the real, conceiving the future as an immanent society in the process of becoming actual.

Those who allege elitism and totalitarianism here, in the sense of essentialism as entailing a privileged access to knowledge, are simply wrong, and badly wrong, with all manner of politically disabling and disastrous consequences following. (There are too many names to name in respect of this charge, and it is not worth my while to name them, involving me in controversies and inviting arguments that, time and resources ever pressing, I can well do without. Instead, I shall state the case for essentialism positively, without engaging the anti-essentialists directly – they are not, in any case, hard to find, they seem to be everywhere). I shall argue that the reverse is true. It is because of the possession of innate capacities and natural essences that human beings are protected from a totalizing manipulation and management exercised on the part of external agencies. It is only because of this connection at the level of essence that it is possible for philosophy to lead every thinking person from the world of the ‘is’ to what ‘ought to be.’ 

To return to the caricature of essentialism, Laclau and Mouffe made a good career out of subjecting Marx and Marxism to the methods of deconstructionism. (I have no intentions of engaging in a rebuttal of their work, Norman Geras did it most emphatically in 1986, ending with the words that enough, by now, is more than enough. Three decades on, it is beyond reason and endurance).

Deconstructionism ‘denies theoretical texts their apparent cognitive content, reducing them to an array of rhetorical devices and thereby effacing any difference between them and explicitly literary texts' (Callinicos 1989: 70). With respect to its formation as a sort of knowledge, Marxism, in Laclau’s view, ‘constituted itself as an essentially objectivist conception, as an assertion of the rationality of the real, in the best Hegelian tradition’ (Laclau 1990: 180-1). That’s an objectivism which locates the ideal within the real, then, the ‘ought’ within the ‘is.’ This, for Laclau, produces an 'objectivism' in the comprehension of social relations, which is ultimately reduced to the ‘metaphysics of presence’ that is considered to be implicit in sociological categories. In other words, essentialism holds that society may be understood as an objective and coherent ensemble from foundations or laws of movement that are conceptually graspable (Laclau 1990: 180). Laclau’s problem with this is that essentialism postulates essences and necessary relations that don’t exist – he presents the atomist and accidentalist case, in other words, a nominalism as against a realism. It is certainly the case that Marxism, insofar as it is on nodding terms with Marx, is linked to a critical Hegelianism in which the rationality of the real becomes revolutionary transformation and the proletariat is something very different to how it is understood with respect to the problem that Derrida (and therefore Laclau) has with ‘presence.’ How different becomes clear when one reads Laclau’s claim that:





That sounds profound in a superficial way, but is caricature. Rather than respond to these charges, I’d prefer to state a positive philosophy based on essentialism (see Geras 1990 if you have time to waste on Laclau and Mouffe’s extremities, I came from the building sites to cut my teeth on this drivel of discourse and am not surprised to have seen it utterly disarm the Left politically and ethically – liberalism will be pleased, of course). I have taken the key tasks of these volumes on Marx to show the extent to which Marx was concerned to avoid an idealistic form of materialism, naturalism and objectivism. In this second part of volume 2, I seek to show that Marx’s understanding of essences and their unfolding stems not from any idealist theory written into nature and history, but from an awareness of real natures and how they unfold in history. If Marxist political practice has indeed demonstrated a 'slippage' from the concrete to the idealist, then the reasons for this are to be sought not in any idealism in Marx’s essentialist categories but in the failure to appreciate the precise nature in which Marx overcame the idealistic approaches to objective knowledge and reality. It is postmodernists and deconstructionists like Laclau and Mouffe who, by crying ‘ambivalence’ and ‘objectivist,’ decrying essentialism as a naturalism and an eternalism, jettisoning Marx’s critical categories, invite the return of idealist modes of thought. More than this, I argue forthrightly that anything that anything post-modernism, post-structuralism and deconstructionism claims to be able to do, a Marxism based on a true understanding of essentialist categories can do much better.

All men desire to know, wrote Aristotle in the opening lines of his Metaphysics. In the Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci writes: 

It is essential to destroy the widespread prejudice that philosophy is a strange and difficult thing just because it is the specific intellectual activity of a particular category of specialists or of professional and systematic philosophers. It must first be shown that all men are ‘philosophers’, by defining the limits and characteristics of the ‘spontaneous philosophy’ which is proper to everybody.

Marx, I argue, sought to effect the switch from Plato’s philosopher-rulers to achieve the rule of reason through all becoming philosophers, rational-social beings in collective conscious control of their common affairs. That’s quite a switch, associated with the move from contemplation to action, and comes with its own dangers with respect to misunderstanding and mistranslation. Are all really up to the task of being philosophers? The problem with big ambitions is that, when they go wrong, they go badly wrong. Kant in his Motto of Enlightenment called upon us to have the courage to use our reason. (Kant What is Enlightenment, Political Writings H Reiss ed 1996 Cambridge). To retreat from this is to fall back into the world of empirical inclination, impulse and desire. To ascend to the ‘ought to be’ of the moral law, Kant requires the fact of conscience as something that exists within the realm of the ‘is.’ And that implies an innateness that is central to the essentialist view, holding that human beings are something essentially and essentially something, something more substantially existent than merely cultural and, even worse, political creations. Here is Marx’s moral and ontological ultimacy, with reference to human beings as social beings, persons capable of individuating themselves only in relation to each other in community. 

The extent to which the understanding of this essentialist conception has been lost in modern times is made clear in this interview with Noam Chomsky in The Guardian (A Life of Protest, The Saturday Interview, Aida Edemariam, The Guardian 23 March 2013). Chomsky, indeed, is worth discussing at length, since his work in linguistics proceeds from a very distinct philosophical viewpoint, the rationalist tradition that I am defending with respect to Marx and rational freedom. 

Chomsky’s breakthrough as a linguist came with the argument that, contrary to the prevailing idea that children learned language by copying and by reinforcement (i.e. behaviourism), basic grammatical arrangements are already present at birth. Published in 1957, Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures defined linguistics for the rest of the century. Chomsky's concern is with language learning and the 'syntactic structures' that underlie different languages. But his views have wider moral and political implications which show the strength of essentialism and innateness. 

Chomsky’s social and political commentaries, in which he criticises totalitarian power and politics, are informed by the same rationalist philosophical assumptions. He finds the capacity on the part of human beings to resist totalitarianism in this rationalism. Chomsky's work in linguistics is predicated on a rationalist theory of mind. The empiricist tradition emanating from Locke holds that the mind is a blank slate, a ‘tabula rasa,’ at birth. Against this, Chomsky argues that the mind is constrained in its operations by certain innate structures. For Chomsky, all languages at a fundamental level share a universal structure or grammar. Rather than being something that is learned through teaching and experience, as the empiricist tradition holds, this universal grammar is 'hardwired' in our brains.

The idea of a universal grammar may be explained thus: Although there are some 5,000 known varieties of human language, they are all constrained by certain parameters above and beyond their many surface differences. These principles are innate, and unique, to the human mind. The grammatical rules are hardwired in the mind and do not need to be learned. The early exposure to language merely acts as a trigger and the child develops a linguistic competence at an accelerated rate. For Chomsky, this hardwiring is an aspect of our human nature. And this applies to our other cognitive faculties.

The argument that there is such a thing as an innate linguistic structure, and by extension an innate moral grammar, is an essentialist argument. Chomsky’s argument revolutionised linguistics, and had fundamental implications for our notions of the human mind and human nature. Chomsky’s view has political implications too. Those brought up on the idea that we choose our existence over against our essence are inclined to see these ideas of innateness as implying a biological or natural determinism. Atomists and empiricists can only see necessity in the form of determinism in such arguments. They embrace the illusion that human life and culture can proceed apart from foundations and can therefore be ‘made-up’ in some way. It is the old existentialist conceit and supports a superficially libertarian rhetoric, the idea that one can choose one’s identity. But it’s an illusion, and a potentially inhuman one at that. Such a view confines human beings to the surface level of appearance and accident, frustrating inherent potentialities for a better, richer life. It also permits external agencies, such as the state, business, church and the military, to intervene and shape a pliable human nature this way or that to fit. Human beings end up serving ends which are external to them – economic growth, military conquest, state power etc. There are now developments in biotechnology which are encouraging scientists with a commercial interest to claim that we can engineer the future. By this, they declare their intention to engineer human beings. Such a notion may be reprehensible, but it becomes entirely comprehensible once we deny the idea of human essences and innate structures.

And here we see the damage that an atomist and empiricist metaphysics has done. Anti-foundationalist libertarians have been trained to see structures and essences as determinist constraints on freedom, and so choose to embrace the arbitrary freedom on the surface level of events. And thus walk straight into the new behaviourism that is emerging with human and planetary engineering. Constructing identities whilst being chained to empirical desire and impulse is an illusory freedom. 

Edemariam has no idea how to deal with the bedrock of Chomsky’s argument that there are such things as innate structures. She writes that the idea of an innate capacity ‘has interesting, even troubling ramifications for his politics. If we are born with innate structures of linguistic and by extension moral thought, isn't this a kind of determinism that denies political agency? What is the point of arguing for any change at all?’

Edemariam speaks as though there is a stark contradiction between Chomsky’s innatism/rationalism and his politics that Chomsky himself is unaware of! In the implication that the existence of innate structures yields a passive determinism that denies change and agency, Edemariam fails completely to understand how Chomsky’s innatism and rationalism feed directly into his politics as capable of resisting totalitarian control and political repression. Her argument completely misses the fact that the possession of an innate moral grammar implies the capacity for a moral position, with all that that entails with respect to the capacity to identify and choose between right and wrong, good and bad, and to assume responsibility and act as moral beings. In fine, there is nothing passive or inevitable about the possession of a nature or an innate capacity. There has to be a moral act in that that capacity has to be used and that nature has to be realised.

An essentialist metaphysics is all about change, but a change that proceeds in a necessary way according to the realisation of inherent potentialities. That is precisely what flourishing is all about. That is precisely why Marx argued for a social order that enhanced the human ontology as against one that inhibited it; that is why Marx demanded a social order that corresponded to creative human nature rather than contradicted it; that is why Marx repudiated the autonomy-impairing and autonomy-denying structures of the capital system; and that is why Marx rejected the capital system as a dehumanisation and a determinism. Marx did all of these things in the name of a revolutionary-critical praxis that placed the accent on creative human agency in realizing an essential nature as a necessary development. 

Chomsky makes short work of Edemariam’s objections. ‘The most libertarian positions accept the same view,’ he responds:

That there are instincts, basic conditions of human nature that lead to a preferred social order. In fact, if you're in favour of any policy - reform, revolution, stability, regression, whatever - if you're at least minimally moral, it's because you think it's somehow good for people. And good for people means conforming to their fundamental nature. So whoever you are, whatever your position is, you're making some tacit assumptions about fundamental human nature... The question is: what do we strive for in developing a social order that is conducive to fundamental human needs? Are human beings born to be servants to masters, or are they born to be free, creative individuals who work with others to inquire, create, develop their own lives? I mean, if humans were totally unstructured creatures, they would be ... a tool which can properly be shaped by outside forces. That's why if you look at the history of what's called radical behaviourism, [where] you can be completely shaped by outside forces - when [the advocates of this] spell out what they think society ought to be, it's totalitarian.

Chomsky explicitly repudiates the notion of human beings as totally unstructured creatures on account of such a view rendering humans as tools to be shaped by outside forces. Against this, he sees human development as proceeding within certain parameters, throwing the charge of determinism or totalitarianism against the existentialists and constructivists themselves on account of denying the existence of a human nature. The idea that we may choose our existence over against our essence may sound liberatory, all the more if it is the individual agent who does the choosing. But there’s the rub, in a world of supra-individual forces, the individual is always set within a context of collective powers and beliefs and norms. If existence prevails over essence, then there is nothing to stop an external agency, a state, a political movement, an organisation of any kind, economic, religious, mobilising to manipulate and manage individuals according to purposes which are external to them. This external manipulation is entirely possible if the individual human being is merely the blank sheet of Lockean empiricism, or the unconstrained free agent of existentialism. 

For Chomsky, it is the fact that we possess a nature that prevents us from being subjugated by external forces and directed by anything other than our own purposes. Our innate, essential nature is our best protection against tyranny and totalitarianism. The range of possible political structures that human beings can tolerate is limited. Those who still cling to the idea of freedom as some unconstrained choice may reject this view as narrow. But if the view rules out some of the more fanciful utopias of the human mind, it also checks oppressive political systems, such as Orwell's 1984 or Huxley's Brave New World. In constraining us to essential realities with respect to nature and human nature, the rationalist view has the merit of focusing on the realisation of our natures, as against the libertarian and repressive fantasies that lead us astray. The point is that external agencies, whatever their political colours, cannot completely mould our minds, however much they may try. 

In an era of all manner of biological determinisms and naturalisms, from behaviourism to neuro-Darwinism, the concept of innate rationalism needs to be recovered as our best defence against tyranny. Our thoughts are not, as behavioural psychologists had argued, conditioned responses to repeated stimuli. Now we have neuroscientists arguing that they have ‘explained’ the processes of the human mind. So what? The philosopher John Searle’s question to neuro-determinists and reductionists remains unanswered: ‘How is it possible for physical, objective, quantitatively describable neuron firings to cause qualitative, private, subjective experiences?’ (Searle 1995.) And even if an answer to that question should come, it would still say nothing about those experiences themselves.

Innateness comes with uniqueness, and that is what gives human beings autonomy in thought, morality and politics. And it is here that we come to appreciate the political and moral implications of Chomsky’s linguistics. The concept of being a ‘free agent’ is as hardwired into our nature as the constraints that act on our forms of speech. Those who would denounce this belief as a delusion are working against innate human nature, seeking to diminish or destroy the very capacity that protects us against external manipulation.

Chomsky's linguistic theory can therefore be developed in the social, political and moral landscape. The nature of language reveals the nature of the human mind, not simply in the sense that language is a uniquely human activity, but because language ‘is the vehicle of thought’ and therefore uniquely placed to illuminate the essence of the human mind. By ‘mind,’ Chomsky means the cognitive principles and processes that underlie human behaviour.

Chomsky’s ‘innatist’ theory is part of a tradition which goes back to Plato’s innate ideas and embraces such key figures of philosophy as Leibniz, Descartes, and Kant. According to this philosophy, the human mind is endowed with innate ideas or categories that shape who we are, what we are, and what we can know. With the dominance of mechanical materialism and atomist and empiricist methods, this tradition has fallen into neglect. Detached from realities grounded in innate ideas and essential natures, human beings have entered the realm of fantasy and fiction and, mistaking this madness for freedom, have shot for the stars, threatening to take civilisation off the planet. The tradition of organic, essentialist rationalism will pull us back to realities and focus us upon the realisation of real purposes. Essentialism is a constraint in the healthiest sense, ruling out fantasies and focusing us upon genuine potentialities. Essentialism points us the direction of an emancipated society which corresponds to the free and full realisation of our nature within what Marx describes as ‘the universal metabolism of nature,’ integrating nature within and nature without.

Since the scientific and industrial revolutions, atomist and empiricist thought has been in the ascendant, with essentialist categories coming to be misunderstood, distorted, caricatured, and rejected accordingly. This has political implications. In Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, I argue for Marx’s active materialism as the democratisation of knowledge, politics and power. Essentialist metaphysics stands at the bedrock of this view. Against this stands the bureaucratisation of knowledge and power through idealistic abstraction, a central theme in Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State:

Since the “state as formalism” is the essence of bureaucracy, it must also be its purpose. Accordingly, the real purpose of the state appears to the bureaucracy as a purpose opposed to the state. The mind of the bureaucracy is the 'formal mind of the state'. It therefore makes the 'formal mind of the state' or the real mindlessness of the state into a categorical imperative. The bureaucracy appears to itself as the ultimate purpose of the state. As the bureaucracy converts its 'formal' purposes into its content, it comes into conflict with 'real' purposes at every point. It is therefore compelled to pass off form as content and content as form. The purposes of the state are transformed into purposes of offices and vice-versa. The bureaucracy is a magic circle from which no one can escape. Its hierarchy is a hierarchy of knowledge. The apex entrusts insight into particulars to the lower echelons while the lower echelons credit the apex with insight into the universal, and so each deceives the other.
The bureaucracy is the imaginary state alongside the real state; it is the spiritualism of the state. Hence everything acquires a double meaning: a real meaning and a bureaucratic one; in like fashion, there is both real knowledge and bureaucratic knowledge (and the same applies to the will). Whatever is real is treated bureaucratically, in accordance with its transcendental, spiritual, essence. The bureaucracy holds the state, the spiritual essence of society, in thrall, as its private property. The universal spirit of bureaucracy is secrecy, it is mystery preserved within itself by means of the hierarchical structure and appearing to the outside world as a self-contained corporation. Openly avowed political spirit, even patriotic sentiment, appears to the bureaucracy as a betrayal of its mystery. The principle of its knowledge is therefore authority, and its patriotism is the adulation of authority. Within itself, however, spiritualism degenerates into crass materialism, the materialism of passive obedience, the worship of authority, the mechanism of fixed, formal action, of rigid principles, views and traditions. As for the individual bureaucrat, the purpose of the state becomes his private purpose, a hunt for promotion, careerism. On the one hand, he regards real life as something material because the spirit of that life leads its own independent existence in the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy must therefore strive to make life as material as possible. On the other hand, real life is material for him in so far as it becomes an object of bureaucratic treatment, because his mind is prescribed for him, his purpose lies outside himself, his existence is the existence of his office. The state thus exists only as a series of fixed bureaucratic minds held together by passive obedience and their subordinate position in a hierarchy. Real knowledge appears lacking in content, just as real life appears dead, for this imaginary knowledge and imaginary life pass for the substance. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the bureaucrat must behave Jesuitically towards the real state. Inevitably, however, as soon as he finds himself opposed by knowledge, he must likewise become self-conscious and his Jesuitism must become deliberate. While in one respect the bureaucracy is a crass materialism, in another respect its crass spiritualism is revealed in its wish to do everything. That is to say, it makes will the prime cause because it is nothing but active existence and receives its content from outside itself, and can therefore only prove its own existence by moulding and limiting that content. For the bureaucrat the world is no more than an object on which he acts.’

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 108-109

Marx didn’t need critics of socialism pointing out the dangers of ‘bureaucracy’ or the dictatorship of philosopher-rulers, Marx knew these dangers well, and sought to trace them to source (the same goes for libertarian critics of Marx’s supposed rule of the educated over the people, Bakunin’s charge, which is repeated as a necessary truth in light of the Soviet experience, but which has no basis in Marx’s thought). 

This idea of the world – and the people in it – as no more than an object acted upon by outside forces is precisely what Chomsky is concerned to check in his defence of innatism with respect to human nature. When that nature is considered to be entirely unstructured, there is nothing to stop individuals becoming tools to be moulded or manipulated this way or that by the bureaucrats of external power and knowledge.

The mandarins of politics and culture have a vested interest in the world being complicated rather than simple, composed of nothing more than discrete events with no connecting thread or meaning, none of the ‘internal connections’ that Marx wrote about. Significantly, Marx writes of connections that ‘ordinary’ people are able to see and grasp clearly being ‘hidden’ from the view of the ideologues:

Vulgar economics actually does nothing more than interpret, systematize and turn into apologetics the notions of agents trapped within bourgeois relations of production. So it should not surprise us that precisely in the estranged form of appearance of economic relations that involves these prima facie absurd and complete contradictions - and all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their essence - that precisely here vulgar economics feels completely at home, these relationships appearing all the more self-evident to it, the more their inner connections remain hidden, even though they are comprehensible to the popular mind.

Marx C3 1981: 955

Terry Eagleton exposes the potential for manipulation that exists in the post-structuralist view that there is ‘no necessary relation’ between economic position and political and ideological positions. He comments wryly that if there is indeed ‘no logical connection whatsoever’ between class position and the political/ideological, then it is wholly coincidental that all capitalists are not also revolutionary socialists, or merchant bankers are not marxists. (Eagleton 1991: 214). The denial of necessary relations leaves the protagonists in the worlds of politics and ideology free to determine all that there is, and direct human beings according to their whim. It is the plainest idealism. The material world, it appears, does not exist until it is defined into existence; it is clay in the hands of the politicians and the intellectuals. And so too are the people. Eagleton thus exposes the determinism implicit in the anti-essentialist position:





An essentialist position is capable of revealing what capital and labour are, of revealing reveal the fundamental nature of social relations and forms, and of demonstrating that workers’ interests necessarily entail socialism. It can go beyond the form of appearance of things to access the reality contained within. And that distinction between appearance and essence, which comes with a commitment to penetrate the surface world of appearances to gain knowledge of the real nature of things, does not entail some totalitarian claim to elite, esoteric knowledge, a criticism that is so profoundly mistaken as to bring about the very totalitarian elitism it claims to oppose. Whereas the knowledge of the real essence of things is premised on the capacity of each and all as rational beings to know the truth about the world, an obscurantism which confines us to the surface level of appearances plays into the hands of the bureaucrats of knowledge and power. The argument that workers have no necessary interests, only those interests they are ‘constructed’ into, cannot explain why workers should bother to become socialists rather than, say, fascists. It cannot show why anyone should be anything politically. The world becomes a matter of arbitrary choice. And that choice is in the hands of those doing the constructing.

Scott Meikle writes of the ascendency of ‘the bureaucrat of knowledge’ in the modern world, with essentialism being discarded in the process. ‘The bureaucrat of knowledge has a vested interest in things being complicated rather than simple; just as a pretentious but unaccomplished savant will have a vested interest in the truth being unsayable.’ (Meikle 1985: 11). 

With an atomist metaphysics, the world is broken up into discrete entities and made the possession of the bureaucrat, the ideologist of existing relations. In the same manner that a pretentious savant will prefer to put ‘the truth’ in inverted commas, rendering what needs to be said unsayable and therefore left unsaid, this bureaucratisation of knowledge under an atomist metaphysics possesses a clear political dimension. The denial of real essences in favour of a view which sees the world as the accidental occurrence of discrete events suits those who wish to see, manage and manipulate reality and individuals – nature and human nature - as they see fit. 

Meikle notes the political attractions of notions of ‘multiple causality,’ the idea that history is the result of the accidental interweaving of 'many factors,’ and the concomitant rejection of the existence of real essences and the possibility of their being known. ‘If the society is essentially something, or is something essentially, then however much you may mess around with it in all sorts of ways, you do not alter what it is unless you change that something.’ (Meikle 1985: 11-12). For those defending an existing practice, comfortable with prevailing arrangements, and seeking to preserve the world from change ‘it was convenient not to be too clear about essential natures.’





Meikle describes the attractions of atomism and accidentalism over essentialism in this respect, declaring the ‘the thicket of accident’ to be the ‘natural habitat of that repulsive creature, the bureaucrat of knowledge’ (Meikle 1985: 12).





Meikle calls some of the claims made against essentialism for what they are: ‘the merest tripe.’ Terry Eagleton calls much of anti-essentialism the product of ‘philosophical amateurism and ignorance.’ Much of what postmodernist thinkers repudiate as ‘essentialist’ involves positions on essences ‘defended by nobody.’ (Eagleton 2003: 119-122).

essentialism - human nature
Eagleton is concerned to identify the mistake made by the anti-essentialists. He asks what human beings are for and what the function of human beings is. The answer is to realize our nature as an end in itself. The word ‘nature’ is required here to avoid having to say ‘realize ourselves as an end in itself, since a good deal of what we are capable of should by no means see the light of day.’ ‘Nature,’ then, here means ‘the way we are most likely to flourish.’ And since what is involved in such flourishing is by no means obvious, it becomes easy ‘to mistake this situation for not having a nature at all.’ This, Eagleton contends, ‘is the mistake of the anti-essentialists.’

‘They might concede that humans have a nature in a physical, material sense - that there are certain peculiar features which characterize us as a species… It is just that they see no particular moral or political consequences as following from this. For them, it is too general a way of talking to tell us anything very informative.’ There is, the objection goes, no clear ‘ought’ that follows from the ‘is’ of human nature. But is that true? People who are most vocal about human rights seem to have a very clear notion of what human beings are and how they ought to be treated and respected. The complaint that much talk about human nature is disturbingly general is valid, but one doesn’t need to be an anti-essentialist to complain about that. Marx made precisely the same point, and made it in a much more pointed and precise way from an essentialist position, getting us to identify specific social forms and material relations. In this respect, Eagleton is right to point to the danger of the anti-essentialist position ‘falling into a form of idealism.’ 





Hence Marx’s critical assault on ‘the German ideology’ and historically and socially vague talk about ‘man.’ Marx sought to overcome generalisations and abstractions with respect to nature and human nature. Hence my insistence on re-establishing Marx’s materialist (social and natural) ontology in volume 1.

The anti-essentialists are guilty of the culturalist fallacy. Where naturalists are guilty of the naturalist fallacy of deriving an ‘ought to be’ from an ‘is,’ the culturalists are guilty of the reverse naturalist fallacy, deriving the ‘is’ from an ‘ought to be’ that they make up and impose from the outside. The solution is to establish the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ in their true relation, bringing innatism and culturalism together so that we have a nature via nurture. 


I come now to objectivity and objectivism, another bugbear of post-modernist critics. Marx described the question of objective truth and reality as ‘scholastic.’ Nevertheless, in his view of human development, he clearly affirmed a notion of objectivity with respect to what human beings are and what they ought to be. This comes out clearly in the way that Eagleton defends the notion of objectivity:

If absolute truth is out of favour these days, so is the idea of objectivity. Perhaps we can begin the rehabilitation of this idea by considering it first in relation to the question of human well-being. All men and women are in pursuit of well-being, but the problem lies in knowing what this consists in. Perhaps it means something different for everybody, or for every period and culture. It is because what counts as well-being is far from clear that we need elaborate discourses like moral and political philosophy to help unravel it. If we were transparent to ourselves, there might be no need for these esoteric ways of talking. We might be able to know what it was to live well just by looking into ourselves, or simply by instinct.
This is the enviable situation of toads, who know by instinct how to do what it is best for toads to do. They simply follow their toad-like nature, and for them to do this is for them to prosper. It is to be a good toad rather than a bad one, living a fulfilling, toad-like existence. Good toads are very toad-like. This is not the kind of goodness you can congratulate them on, however, since being toad-like is something they can't help being. It is not an achievement. Toads do not win medals for being toads. You can have a good toad, but not a virtuous one. On one view, however (not the most popular view today, especially among cultural theorists), human beings have to work fairly hard to become human beings, and so can indeed be congratulated on being human. Because we are able to be false to our natures, there is some virtue in our being true to them.
It may be, then, that we resemble toads in the sense that we, too, have a nature, in the sense of a way of living which is peculiar to being a successful human, and which, if we are true to it, will allow us to prosper. It is just that we are not sure what it is. Or perhaps it changes from one time to another. Because we are linguistic animals, our nature, if we have one at all, is far more tractable and complicated than that of toads. Because of language and labour, and the cultural possibilities they bring in their wake, we can transform what we are in ways that non-linguistic animals cannot. To discover what we are, to know our own natures, we have to think hard about it; and the result is that we have come up over the centuries with a bewildering array of versions of what it is to be human. Or, if you like, what it is for a human animal, as opposed to a slug or a daisy, to live well and to flourish. The history of moral philosophy is littered with rusting, abandoned models of the good life.

Eagleton 2003 ch 5

The same points apply with respect to happiness, expressing what human beings desire, specifying their particular mode of living well. Human beings desire happiness. But what is happiness? Many may be content slumped in front of the television set for hours on end, feeding their faces with handfuls of tasty, but potentially lethal substances, as they go. Living a good life as a fulfilled human being may, however, involve more than such sluggish contentment. Individuals can deceive themselves when it comes to whether they are happy or not. Eagleton gives the example of George Best, living a lavish lifestyle, dating Miss World and drinking champagne, but no longer playing to the best of his abilities as a professional footballer, facing the question: ‘George, where did it all go wrong?’ Best failed to see that at the umpteenth time of telling, the joke was no longer funny but tragic. ‘Best's life had gone wrong. He was not doing what it was in him to do.’ (Eagleton 2003: 112 113). He may have been enjoying himself in an hedonistic sense, and may have thought he was happy. Interviews I have seen with him indicate that he knew fine well that something had gone wrong, and his addictions were the product of unhappiness. The inner emptiness became more and more apparent over time, including to himself. Best was not flourishing; he was failing in what he was supremely equipped to excel at.

Importantly, Eagleton points out that Aristotle, who believed in such a thing as human nature, did not believe that ethics was a matter of universal principles.

To define the good life, as Marx does, as one in which each and all human beings come to fulfil their nature as freely and fully as possible doesn’t, in itself, indicate what that nature is and hence is less than clear with respect to how that realization is attained in practical social and institutional terms with respect to specific goods. What nature? Which of the many different powers and capacities that human beings possess at any given historical time should they strive to realize, and in what ways? Human beings are capable of many things, but since not all potentialities are healthy, not all potentialities should be realized. A reference to ‘human nature’ can refer to both the kind of creatures human beings are and how human beings ought to behave: ‘and it is not easy to see how we can leap from the descriptive sense to the normative one.’ (Eagleton 2003: 122).

How Marx integrated the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ to define an immanent ethics means that we do not have to make such a leap, overcoming the separation of science and ethics which lies behind the neo-Kantian position. Eagleton is worth quoting at length here to give an indication of the blend of Aristotelian and Judaeo-Christian ethics at work in Marx’s view:

Aristotle thought that there was a particular way of living which allowed us, so to speak, to be at our best for the kind of creatures we are. This was the life conducted according to the virtues. The Judaeo-Christian tradition considers that it is the life of charity or love. What this means, roughly speaking, is that we become the occasion for each other's self-realization. It is only through being the means of your self-fulfilment that I can attain my own, and vice versa. There is little about such reciprocity in Aristotle himself. The political form of this ethic is known as socialism, for which, as Marx comments, the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. It is, as it were, politicized love, or reciprocity all round.




Whisper it, but Marx’s ethics does seem to contain a religious dimension, and becomes skewed without it. I address this point further in volume 3. At the moment I am concerned to develop Marx’s essentialism. An essentialist metaphysics sees necessary relations and lines of development as leading workers to pursue the realisation of the inherent potentials of creative labour in a society of the associated producers. Without that conception of necessity – which is not a determinism, since it entails creative human agency in the actualisation of potential – the working class will become socialists only when their existing identities have been transformed in the process of becoming socialist. But, Eagleton asks, how could they ever come to embark on this process in the first place?





An essentialist metaphysics can provide the interest, explanation and motivation in that present conditions always contain an inherent potential which is to be realised. Eagleton asks why, if political interests are in no sense a response to the way society is, someone should become a socialist, a feminist or an anti-racist. Without an essentialist foundation, there is no reason at all. If we reduce the question to naked self-interest and power struggles, so that it’s in our interests to be socialist, feminist or anti-racist, then it is the self-interest that does all the work, with no need for reasons or ethics. The day may come when it is in our self- or sectional interest to cease being socialist, feminist and anti-racist and instead become anti-socialist, anti-feminist and racist. 

Eagleton reminds us that in the view of Hindess and Hirst, (and the point applies to Laclau and Mouffe), society doesn’t even exist until it has come to be politically constructed in a certain manner. Which begs the question as to why society should be politically constructed this way rather than that way – and why in a socialist, feminist and anti-racist rather way rather than an anti-socialist, anti-feminist and racist way? And that position begs the further questions of whose constructions are more legitimate than others and who, precisely, it is, that does the constructing:





Precisely! Once we start to argue why we are to be socialist, feminist and anti-racist, we will start to refer to the way human society is and the way it ought to be, and we will start to refer to the way human beings are and the way they ought to be – and could be – in order to flourish well. Such a notion is available only to those who proceed from an essentialist understanding. There is no way of answering these questions from an anti-essentialist perspective, which delivers us into a sophist world characterised by an endless circulation of power. Without essentialist categories, politics becomes a technology of manipulation divorced from any grounding in natural essences and rationalised by a moralism. Such a position suits all political and intellectual positions and packages which are ‘made-up’ and marketed over the heads of people. It is an open invitation to the theoretico-elitist model of power and politics that Marx sought to overcome. Society, and the individuals composing the demos, become anything that the bureaucrats of knowledge and power choose.

An essentialist metaphysics of the kind infusing Marx’s critique is the surest guard against totalitarianism since, if human beings are essentially something and something essentially, then however much you engineer them in one way or another - social, political, bio-tech - you cannot alter what that something is unless you change it. The same point pertains to society as essentially something and something essentially. The only real change that is possible is through the realisation of real essences, inherent potentials in the process of becoming actual. Those engaged in the politics of management and manipulation - and the same applies to those intellectuals engaged in the ‘construction’ of perspectives and persons – have a vested interest in denying essential natures. The absence of a notion of essential natures blurs the line that separates accidental changes at the level of appearances from fundamental changes at the level of a deeper reality, and makes it easier for thought and action to remain within an existing system rather than see and pursue a line of development that leads beyond it.

Without essentialism, there is no possibility of developing a genuine teleological conception that is capable of understanding change in history. Essentialist metaphysics provide the categories required for identifying the nature of a system and for distinguishing necessary change from accidental change in a system. Without essentialist categories, history can only come to be understood as it appears, as the interplay of unrelated ‘many factors’ and discrete events, signifying nothing. Without essentialist categories revealing necessary relations, we cannot see the wood for the trees. We end up lost within the thicket of accident, unable to see any meaning or direction or unity or interconnection. The bureaucrats of knowledge and power take control of a world that is as they tell us it is. We are deprived of our voices, and the unsayable truth remains unsaid.

The essentialist idea that there is purpose and direction in the world now stands condemned as an illusion born of a mythical belief in ‘progress,’ deriving from religious eschatology and naïve Enlightenment rationalism. Since the last blast of Hegelianism in the shape of the Oxford Idealists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the likes of Croce in Italy, and Marxists like Gramsci and Lukács shortly after, philosophical orthodoxy has been atomist and empiricist. The ‘progress’ which John Gray considers to be so spectacularly misfiring in the contemporary world (1998 2004 2007 2013) is a product of this orthodoxy, not of teleological thinking at all. Organicism and essentialism have been systematically denigrated and destroyed, expunged from the political and moral and intellectual world. Karl Popper in The Open Society and its Enemies selected his targets well – Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. (Popper 1962 1966). The only key figure he missed was St Thomas Aquinas.

These are the key figures in the essentialist tradition and, as such, are the main threats to any ruling class that is content to reside in the status quo and reconcile people to the world of appearance as the one and only true reality. 

Essentialists are habitually accused of reasoning according to a ‘biological analogy,’ meaning that the categories which are appropriate to natural forms come to be applied illicitly to human society and history. This is plain wrong if offered as necessarily true and merely reveals that the critics are simply ignorant of Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel and Marx. That direct biological analogy is precisely what these figures don’t do. (For those at serious risk of committing that error, critics should look at the naturalists who really are intent on the natural sciences cannibalizing ethics, politics and philosophy). Essentialism is not a Social Darwinism or socio-biology, and it is not a scientism either, quite the contrary. Human agency, morality, culture etc. – the subjective factor – possess a key creative role in realising potentials. Accusations that essentialism is a determinism also fail for the same reason. The categories of essentialist philosophy such as law, form, matter, necessity entail an organic dialectics which pertain to both natural and historical processes of coming-to-be and passing-away within whole entities or systems, whether one refers to Nature, the physical universe or the social organism. 

(Mentioning the nice blend of Aristotelianism, Catholicism and Marxism I have going on in my work allows me to quote this rather enjoyable view of Terry Eagleton:

‘I have never even heard of this man Eagleton. But he seems to be a rather lethal combination of having been a Roman Catholic and become a Marxist - that strikes me as a rather uncomfortable progression, to put it mildly. He strikes me as like a spitting cobra - if you get within his range, he'll unleash some poison.’
(Elizabeth Jane Howard, Daily Mail, 11/10/07). 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-486941/Spicier-novel-literary-feud-raging-Amis-dynasty-Marxist-critic.html#ixzz5FswDGOV5 

I don’t know how uncomfortable that progression from Catholic to Marxist is supposed to be. I seem to continuously go backwards and forwards and back again, for the most part combining the strengths of both positions at the same time, easily indeed. And I don’t ignore the awkward bits, the bits that are not easily reconcilable, that may not be reconcilable at all. Oddly, I combine Marx’s concern with power with Tolkien’s emphasis on humility – and end up with a natural anarchy that is hard won by the appropriate ethico-institutional framework and social infrastructure – but, then, the Marx I have offered has been identified in turn as an anarchist and a conservative. If you can make sense of that, then you have made sense of the concept of rational freedom and how I seek to realize it. ‘Waffle’ someone told me, who then proceeded to blunder into the usual errors of the ‘nature is good’ school, the counterpart of the ‘nature is bad’ perspective. Read John Gray, who sees volition, and therefore morality, as an illusion. Seems right, many citing neuroscience say. In which case, just desist from making moral demands and drop the moral ‘ought to be.’ And try to build a viable society on that basis. Behave as you like, claim it was natural and take it to a court of law. And hope and pray that free will and facts count for nothing and that proceedings take place in a postmodern court. Gray portrays humanity as a ravenous species engaging in the extermination of all forms of life, including itself. Gray thus writes that ‘humans ... cannot destroy the Earth, but they can easily wreck the environment that sustains them.’ (Gray 2002: 12). And if that is true, then it is perfectly natural… There is much more going on, of course. So all you pagan poets out there who have given me grief for my insistence on ethics, wise up quick smart and see the self-defeating delusions of naturalism. Terry Eagleton writes with respect to Gray: ‘mixing nihilism and New Ageism in equal measure, Gray scoffs at the notion of progress for 150 pages before conceding that there is something to be said for anaesthetics. The enemy in his sights is not so much a Straw Dog as a Straw Man: the kind of starry-eyed rationalist who passed away with John Stuart Mill, but who he has to pretend still rules the world.’ (Eagleton 2002).

For Danny Postel, Gray’s claim that environmental destruction was the result of the flawed nature of human beings would be ‘welcome news to the captains of industry and the architects of the global economy; the ecological devastation they leave in their wake, according to Gray, has nothing to do with their exploits.’ (Postel 2003). The same for those who are quick to generalize on human greed and stupidity, and yet go remarkably quiet when it comes to specific social relations and forms. Postel condemns Gray’s use of the term ‘plague of people’ as an outdated ‘neo-Malthusian persiflage about overpopulation’ and criticizes Gray’s position for inducing a ‘complete political passivity’ in which ‘there is no point whatsoever in our attempting to make the world a less cruel or more livable place.’ (Postel 2003). Those criticisms, of course, apply to all who indulge in such amoral naturalism and misanthropy, a position which seems designed to prevent environmentalism from becoming the mass movement it needs to be to be politically effective.)

There is still a tendency to identify Karl Marx as an economist and to read Capital as a work of economics. Actually, Capital, like Marx’s other works on economics, was a critique of political economy. Marx was not offering a correct economics to replace an incorrect economics. A failure to understand that point will continue to mislead people as to what Marx was doing. Marx was engaged in a project of human self-knowledge, bringing the Socratic tradition of the examined life to its highest stage of development. With Marx, Scott Meikle writes, ‘human self-understanding reached a point of attainment yet to be surpassed.’ He points out, however, that not everyone is so interested in self-understanding, those least of all with a vested interest in the status quo:

Those whose interest was not to understand, or have others understand, sought to draw back from that high point, and they struck at its base: the categories of essentialist or dialectical method. Modern social science is the institutionalisation of that attack. Its effectiveness can be judged by the degree to which atomistic method has replaced essentialism within Marxism itself. Without essentialism, there is no possibility of reaching an understanding of change, for there can be no basis for distinguishing accidental from necessary change in a system; nor can it be possible to identify the nature of the system. History can then come to be seen only as the interplay of ‘factors.’

Those with dominant positions within the social system have a vested interested in denying the possibility of such knowledge, certainly in denying it to those whose alienated sovereignty and labour forms the basis of the social system and its reproduction. So they have struck hard at the basis of human self-knowledge – essentialist categories and organic dialectics, the essentialist metaphysics that is concerned to identify necessary relations and lines of development. Meikle writes of the ‘historical hatchet-job done on dialectics, essentialism and organicism.’ The effectiveness of this assault can be judged by the extent to which atomism has taken the place of essentialism within Marxism itself, in the form of analytic and rational choice marxism (Elster 1985; Cohen 1978; Roemer 1981). So effective has that hatchet-job been that even professed Marxists engage in anti-essentialism. ‘In the absence of essences, the category of law becomes that of regularities between “factors,” rather than Marx's essentialist laws relating to the natures of whole entities. So law follows necessity and essence down the tubes.’ (Meikle 1985: 12). 

Even philosophers with no axe to grind one way or another can fail to understand the nature of essentialist categories. Philosopher John Passmore doesn’t quite get it:





Vagueness? Essentialist metaphysics are about clarity and precision with respect to identifying potentialities and lines of development. But the understanding of the terms and their meaning has been lost. We can also see the effectiveness of the atomist assault in the linguistic turn in philosophy and cultural studies, in the way that identity politics has encouraged a narcissism of differences to the neglect of universal themes. From there, it is no step at all to the post-structuralism that insists there are no logical connections, no necessary connections, no hidden connections, no essences, no underlying realities, and no marxism at all; frankly, it is an ex-marxism as Norman Geras put it. (If it ever understood Marxism in the first place). Hopefully, the discovery of the importance of metabolism in Marx’s work will lead people back to Marx’s essentialism, understanding Marx’s emancipatory critique properly as a result.

The issue is not merely academic and philosophical but has profound political implications. In January 1997, Chomsky gave a talk at a conference in Washington DC entitled The Common Good. Chomsky based his talk on Aristotle's Politics, ‘the foundation of most subsequent political theory.’ Chomsky explains what the talk was about:

Aristotle took it for granted that a democracy should be fully participatory (with some notable exceptions, like women and slaves) and that it should aim for the common good. In order to achieve that, it has to ensure relative equality, "moderate and sufficient property" and "lasting prosperity" for everyone. 




That is indeed true! Witness Karl Popper’s tendentious assault on Aristotle as one of the ‘totalitarian’ enemies of the ‘open’ – that is, liberal - society. (The charge is that Aristotle is not a liberal and therefore his view points to a society that is not a liberal society. So what? How ‘open’ is a society that cannot tolerate criticisms of the liberal position? Note the ideological equation of liberal society with the ‘open society’, and note also the heavily circumscribed nature of that openness). It’s not that Aristotle was a ‘dangerous radical,’ of course, it’s just that the people in charge of the business and politics of the world have gone to extremes. Aristotle was a conservative gentleman of moderation, proposing values which are firmly grounded in natural essences. 

Eric Hobsbawm emphasised that universalistic values are crucial to the project of the Left. Hobsbawm wanted us to address the implications of the turn to identity politics, given that the political project of the Left is genuinely inclusive in extending emancipation to all. The Left, Hobsbawm argued, cannot base itself on identity politics as such given its universal commitments: ‘Now the wider agenda of the Left does, of course, mean it supports many identity groups .. and they, in turn look to the Left.. What united them was the hunger for equality and social justice, and a programme believed capable of advancing both’ (Hobsbawm NLR 217 May/June 1996: 43/4). Social justice and equality are universal themes, they incorporate identities but do not reduce to them. There is, in other words, such a thing as the common interest and this defines the Left in politics as something more than an identity politics. Hobsbawm thus fears the ‘increasing tendency’ ‘to see the Left essentially as a coalition of minority groups and interests’ (Hobsbawm NLR 217 May/June 1996: 44). He points out the dangers. The ‘danger of disintegrating into a pure alliance of minorities is unusually great on the Left because the decline of the great universalising slogans of the Enlightenment, which were essentially slogans of the Left, leaves it without any obvious way of formulating a common interest across sectional boundaries. The only one of the so-called “new social movements” which crosses all such boundaries is that of the ecologists. But, alas, its political appeal is limited and likely to remain so' (Hobsbawm NLR 217 May/June 1996: 45). 

In this respect, Gitlin asks a pertinent question: ‘What is a Left if it is not, plausibly at least, the voice of the whole people? ... If there is no people, but only peoples, there is no Left’ (Gitlin 1995: 165). 

Common interests, common dreams, and universal themes all go for the making of the common good. We can see now how right Hobsbawm was. Universal values are crucial to the project of the Left. People are crying out for the common good, but have lost the ability to envisage it and constitute it. A congeries of sectional interests and constructed identities is no basis for a common life based on universal values, and common life is more than an aggregation. ‘So what?’ comes the reply of those content within the politics of difference, holding that notions of the common good are oppressive of identity. But this means that a superficial liberty at the level of accident and appearance has been exchanged for a deeper, richer freedom that comes through the realisation of the social essence of human beings. The challenge is to realise universal values within a common good in such a way as to incorporate plural social identities. In Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, I argued that Marx gives us this with his multi-faceted conception of praxis embodying social power within a differentiated system of mediation. My point here is that without an essentialist metaphysics, there is no possibility of distinguishing appearance from reality, accidental change from necessary change. We remain content with a superficial ‘made-up’ libertarianism that proceeds through the assertion of identities. A genuine freedom requires that we move beyond constructed identities to the realisation of the inherent potentials within essential natures, most of all those contained in the nature of the whole social organism. Essentialism in this sense is key to a metabolic understanding of the humanity-labour/production-nature relation.

I would argue that the plausibility of the atomist view in the contemporary age is due not to some general ‘delusion of progress’, whether Christian or secular (with respect to the promises of industry, economic growth and technology) but to a bad and bogus teleology deriving from the alienation of social power, the inversion of subject and object, ends and means, and from the frustration of necessary lines of development. The solution to modernist delusions is not to abandon ‘progress’ and ideas of patterns and directions in history, but to recover a genuine essentialist metaphysics and to start understanding ‘progress’ right, that is, as an organic potential, development and growth. Progress is more than economic growth, scientific advance and technological innovation. The idea that such things in themselves denote progress denotes the false teleology that is inevitably misfiring in the modern world. That is not a case for abandoning teleology but for recovering the telos of historical development as the necessary realisation of inherent potentials, necessary, that is, in the sense of an entity completing itself by turning potential into actual.

That is precisely what I propose to do in what follows.

8 Essentialism, Purpose, and Human Agency

Purposeless materialism and its overcoming
Lewis Mumford identifies a problem at the heart of the modern world as lying in ‘purposeless materialism’, describing this as ‘the vice that now threatens to overwhelm our own civilization in the very midst of its technological advancement’. (Mumford 1966 ch 4). He refers to a sudden evaporation of meaning and value that often occurs when a civilisation appears to be at its height. Declaring this to be one of the enigmas of history, he says ‘we face it again in our own time.’ Our mistake is to have treated materialization as an end in itself. Mumford finds the causes of this vice to lie in ‘man’s self-alienation from the sources of life’:

If the values of civilisation were in fact a sufficient fulfilment of man's nature, it would be impossible to explain this inner emptiness and purposelessness. Military defeats, economic crises, political dissensions, do not account for this inner collapse: at best they are symptomatic, for the victor is equally the victim and he who becomes rich feels impoverished. The deeper cause seems to be man's self-alienation from the sources of life. 

Mumford 1957 ch 3

Notions of inner collapse again accent inner motives, pointing to this self-alienation as at root an individual self-alienation from God as the origin and end of all things. We are back to the religious core beyond materialism. I address the religious dimension in volume 3.
 
Mumford’s criticism of purposeless materialism implies the need to revalue and recover purpose, to appreciate the teleological nature of life and its processes. This amounts to a call for a natural organic growth and development to take the place of a mechanical and systemic expansionism that disregards limits and boundaries. Mumford issues a call for the recovery of purpose within an organic order:

An age that worships the machine and seeks only those goods that the machine provides, in ever larger amounts, at ever rising profits, actually has lost contact with reality; and in the next moment or the next generation may translate its general denial of life into one last savage gesture of nuclear extermination. Within the context of organic order and human purpose, our whole technology has still potentially a large part to play; but much of the riches of modern technics will remain unusable until organic functions and human purposes, rather than the mechanical process, dominate.

Mumford 1962 in Miller ed. 1986: 82

The argument, then, rests on an understanding of ‘purpose’ as something that is immanent in all natural processes, integral to the human-nature relation as a metabolic interchange, as against being something that is superimposed upon the world via an abstract moral system or, even worse, takes the form of systemic imperatives and organisational functions overriding natural processes, or is just plain discarded altogether, as in mechanistic and reductionist science.

Behind the whole problem of purposeless materialism is a reductionism in thought allied to a self-alienation from the essential sources of life, leading to a disenchantment that removes meaning, value and purpose from the world. In an objectively valueless world, there is no meaning beyond subjective human choices. In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Mackie describes the ‘queerness’ of the view that the world could contain values. He questions how objective values could relate to or co-exist with those characteristics revealed by natural science; by what means we could come to know of them; and what possible relevance they could have to our existence (Mackie 1977: 38/42). We live in an objectively valueless world, states Mackie, and in such a world there can be no right and wrong, however heated our moral discussions.

Mackie’s view is not a minority one. No matter how seriously we take our values and ethics, no matter how much passion we bring to the debates between rival positions, we seem to be presuming standards of good and bad, right and wrong that many consider not to exist:





Even if this is true, and we do indeed live in an objectively valueless world, it doesn’t stop us being morally concerned in determining the terms upon which we live our lives in common. It doesn’t ring true, and I hope that I have provided enough reasons throughout to show that a common-sensical ‘folk’ wisdom in tune with an inherent meaning and purpose has far more substantial – essential – grounding than the sceptics can allow.

Such scepticism holds out no prospect of ever reconstituting a substantive morality. Indeed, Mackie would dismiss the attempt to recover values as a refusal to confront the hard facts of a meaningless world. (Mackie 1977: 48-49). At least Mackie left us with the brutally honest view that we have to get used to living without values. The only merit of that view is that it is at least consistent with the reductionist worldview. The continued insistence of people in pressing the human rights of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalised would seem to indicate that not only are people not happy at all to live without values, they see living as human beings precisely in terms of living in accordance with those values. Which begs the question of how assertions of subjective value can be expected to succeed when they lack any grounding in an objectively valueless world. Power is as power does and has no need of value. The cry of protest speaks of the existence of God.

In this context, existentialism was – and is - an attempt, through subject human choice, to project value and meaning upon an objectively valueless and meaningless world. The problem is that any such choices – detached from the world - could only ever be arbitrary, self-legislating, self-justifying, and circular, ‘as void as the spacetime in which their particles move. Our human choices, made by ourselves as human agents, are still, when the full science shall have been done, mere happenings, ultimately to be explained by physics.’ (Kauffman 2008).

In complete contrast to the essentialist conception, an atomist metaphysics sees change only in terms of discrete ‘events,’ which together have no overall meaning or direction. Change is just accidental change, leading nowhere particularly or essentially. Ronnie de Sousa makes the claim that evolutionary biology makes existentialists of us all (Natural-born existentialists: Ethics cannot be based on human nature because, as evolutionary biology tells us, there is no such thing).

If this is so, and if life is all a matter of individual choice, then we need to ask the further question of what this free choice is based upon. If there is nothing, then all such choices can only be arbitrary and empty. The view implies that the argument that the preservation and health of nature and human nature is merely a subjective choice. That view may strike us as plainly wrong but, in purely existentialist terms, no good reasons can be offered to persuade others as to the rightness or wrongness of choices made in this respect. The question of whether life is worth living, let alone preserving, is entirely arbitrary in existential terms. And the same with respect to the preservation of ecosystems. All that there is is an enlightened self-interest. But, subjectively, we are entitled to be unenlightened. Enlightenment here presupposes the existence of a value beyond the arbitrariness of subjective choice.

But, maybe, human beings, as teleological beings, are equipped to be in tune with an immanent meaning, purpose and value that philosophy, in its conceptual abstraction from the world, is incapable of hearing. The fact that human beings are meaning seeking creatures and that no society or civilisation can endure without a sense of value and purpose strongly suggests that human beings will never be reconciled to living without values. And that suggests a substantial grounding for meaning that is much more than ignorance and wishful-thinking. 

Lewis Mumford wrote well on the barrenness of the disenchanted terrain of modernity, holding out the possibility of something more, something that lies beyond the limited purview of the disenchanters:





In this part I make the case for Marx’s essentialist materialism as proposing a teleological process of immanent growth and development. There is a purpose and a meaning to history, one that Marx develops in terms of the creative self-actualisation of human beings in their mediated social and natural existence.

In Manuscript Found in Accra, Paulo Coelho writes: ‘The great wisdom of life is that we can be masters of the things that try to enslave us.’ That statement could have been made by Marx in response to Max Weber’s claim that human beings are destined to remain confined within the ‘iron cage’ of a rationalised modernity. (Weber 1985: 181). Marx reveals that the things that try to enslave us are in fact our own alienated powers; they have no will of their own, only institutional and systemic imperatives which, in failing to recognise our subjectivity in the world we have created, we blindly obey. 

How do we become masters of these alien powers? ‘By taking responsibility,’ declares Coelho. ‘Today people aren’t encouraged to take responsibility. It’s easy to obey because you can blame a wrong decision on the person who told you to do this or that. From the moment you accept that you’re the master of your own destiny you have to accept responsibility for every single action of yours.’

That’s an important view, emphasising transformation as requiring a personal moral effort on the part of the individual. Without that, transformation is lacking in moral content and significance. But this is not enough. In the absence of the social media and mechanisms enabling common control of collective forces, human beings cannot assume responsibility. The problem we face is one of systemic irresponsibility. The forces which govern the lives of individuals are supra-individual, and hence beyond the control of any single individual. Coelho is on the right lines, but assuming the moral responsibility he demands is a collective project, and not just an individual one. Character formation has to proceed alongside an emphasis on social formation. Personal and social transformation proceed together.

Our alien powers are supra-individual powers, powers which escape the comprehension and control of individuals. John Steinbeck expresses the idea well in The Grapes of Wrath:

"We’re sorry. It’s not us. It’s the monster. The bank isn’t like a man."
"Yes, but the bank is only made of men."
"No, you’re wrong there—quite wrong there. The bank is something else than men. It happens that every man in a bank hates what the bank does, and yet the bank does it. The bank is something more than men, I tell you. It’s the monster. Men made it, but they can’t control it.” 

“The bank - the monster has to have profits all the time. It can't wait. It'll die. No, taxes go on. When the monster stops growing, it dies. It can't stay one size.” 

This points to alienation as comprising supra-individual forces which require collective mechanisms of control. Society is a social organism, and mastery in the sense of moral responsibility is only possible in the context of a social control on the part of associated individuals.

I examine the case for social control throughout Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration. Here, I am concerned with the way that the case for social self-mediation is grounded in an essentialist metaphysics. This essentialism is central to Marx’s conception of metabolism and to his application of metabolic thinking to the human-society-nature interchange. This book, as volume 2, then, establishes the philosophical anthropological foundations of the presentation of Marx as a metabolic thinker in volume 1.

In a condition of alienation, the creations of human agency come to be invested with existential significance as the human creators come to be divested of subjectivity and reduced to being appendages of objects. ‘Things’ come to acquire a living quality independent of human beings. Capital, the state, money and commodities come to develop an independent existence as powers in their own right. The teleology identified by the likes of John Gray as a delusion is revealed by Marx to be an external determinism imposed by the alien powers of human beings. The problem is not one of teleology, but of the alienation of social power, the inversion of subject and object, and the imposition of a mechanical systemic-institutional force upon the living power of human beings and society. Telos, purpose, is something that is proper to a natural essence and its realisation, and it is precisely this living quality that has come to be replaced by systemic imperatives and functions within the accumulative logic of capital. Marx consistently employs organic metaphors throughout his work, contrasting the living qualities of healthy social forces with their ossification and petrification within capital’s political and economic machine. Instead of an emphasis on the potentials of essences and their realisation, ‘things’ have acquired an existential significance and, in the process, replaced purposes with systemic functions and imperatives. Instead of a genuine teleology unfolding through an organic growth, change comes to be driven by way of systemic mechanical force.

Set within the frame of an essentialist metaphysics, it soon becomes apparent that the problem with the modern obsession with ‘progress’ is not teleology as such, or even teleology at all, and the problem is not ‘growth’ as such, but a false promise and false necessity within an economic expansionism that has assumed the form of a surrogate teleology within specific social relations. Marx analyses this in terms of the inversion of subject and object as a result of the alienated form taken by social labour within capitalist relations of production, showing how ‘things’ have come to acquire the existential significance that properly belongs to human beings. Human subjects have become mere puppets of the impersonal forces which they themselves have initiated in their social action, and which they themselves sustain through their social practices. 

With bitter irony, the rejection of ‘progress’ as the rejection of teleology delivers us to the false teleology and necessity through which capitalist social relations and alien forms – the very things driving the secular myth of (industrial, technological) progress - come to be naturalised, and rendered untranscendable and permanent. Rather than envisage the end of the capital system, the end of history is asserted, and the future is rendered as no more than the present enlarged. Weber can see no way out of the impasse of capitalist modernity, precisely because he identifies its forms as rational. His prognosis is appropriately gloomy:

Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now. Where there is nothing, not only the Kaiser but the proletarian has lost his rights.

Weber Politics as a Vocation 1970: 128

In saying ‘there is nothing,’ Weber was arguing in light of the advance of natural science revealing the world to be objectively valueless, meaningless and purposeless. In such a world, the struggle over rights, liberties and choices is empty, signifying nothing more than a power struggle, with a meaningless victory going to those who are the most assertive, those with the most power to make their view of reality the most compelling. Meaning is only possible as a matter of existential imposition. Weber thus advocated an ethics of responsibility. But he understood clearly that the position was empty and that such choices were empty.

Employing a genuine essentialist metaphysics, Marx can envisage a way out of the impasse of bourgeois nihilism, sophism and delusion by identifying the proper end of human action in history. Instead of naturalising historically specific capitalist relations by rendering them rational, Marx explained the power of objectified labour to be the social power of labour in alienated form, a power that may be reclaimed. In other words, behind any ‘delusions of progress’ lies not teleology but its denial as a natural growth. Rather than the realisation of the human essence through labour, there is the frustration of this essence through alienated labour. And behind this alienated condition lies specific, alterable, social relations of production. 

Marx’s general point comes out clearly in the way that he praises Hegel in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts:

The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phanomenologie ... lies in the fact that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of object, as alienation and as transcendence [supersession] of this alienation; that he therefore grasps the essence of labour and conceives objective man — true, because real man — as the result of his own labour. The real, active relation of man to himself as a species-being, or the realization of himself as a real species-being, i.e. as a human being, is only possible if he really employs all his species-powers - which again is only possible through the cooperation of mankind and as a result of history - and treats them as objects, which is at first only possible in the form of estrangement. 

Marx EW EPM 1975: 386-387

Far from essentialism being ahistorical, as critics routinely claim, Marx is clear that the human essence has a history. This, in turn, opens Marx up to the charge from those with a biological view of humanity that Marx lacks a conception of human nature. This, too, is false. In their one-sidedness, both sides miss Marx’s emphasis on the mediated character of human nature and its unfolding in history. Marx’s point is that there is no timeless, fixed human essence or nature, but that this essence or nature is something that unfolds through different social relations in history, in determinate contexts in time and place. Marx argues plainly for socialism as that socio-institutional context which enables the fullest realization of that essence. He can only argue this in light of a conception of human nature. Eagleton states the point concisely, once more drawing the analogy between Aristotle and Marx with respect to flourishing as the realization of healthy potentialities:

You are free to realize your nature, but not in the falsely naturalistic sense of simply expressing an impulse because it happens to be yours. That would not rule out torture and murder. Rather, you realize your nature in a way which allows the other to do so too. And that means that you realize your nature at its best - since if the other's self-fulfilment is the medium through which you flourish yourself, you are not at liberty to be violent, dominative or self-seeking.




For Marx, natural essence is not a passive, given state, fixed for all times, but is developed through social relations. The argument that essentialism entails a determinism is simply false. As is the argument that essentialism is a naturalism, and the argument that Marx lacks a concept of human nature.

Marx makes it clear in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts that he is concerned with alienation as a denial of the essence of a thing, labour, and that any genuine ‘progress’ has to be conceived in terms of the ‘transcendence of this alienation’ and the realisation of this essence, a necessary development as an organic growth. That is precisely what is denied by capitalist relations of production and that is precisely why the promises of salvation through technical economic advance contained in the secular mythology of progress misfire. That constitutes a case not for abandoning teleology with respect to organic, metabolic processes but for abandoning its fetishized, systematised form within capitalist social relations of production, in which social production is subordinated to the private appropriation and accumulation of surplus value, the alienated form of surplus labour.

The delusions of progress are not accidental, but neither are they the result of teleology in its proper sense. Rather, they are determined by the alienated character of the social relations of production, whose reproduction is mediated through the indirect supply of social labour through the value form. That alien mediation frustrates the realisation of necessary lines of development and it is that frustration which lies behind the destructive fantasies and illusions at the heart of the secular myth of progress.

In fine, it is the domination of an atomist and empiricist metaphysics that, in denying us the essentialist categories which alone can make sense of human social development through history, delivers us into the hands of a secular mythology that has supplanted a genuine teleology. It is this that gives us a socially and ecologically destructive economic growth driven by an accumulative dynamic in place of a natural organic growth.

In essentialist manner, Marx writes frequently of an ‘inner connection’ between things and of ‘the true relation hidden behind the appearance’ of things. (Marx C1 1976: 177). However, the necessary development that Marx, in line of descent from Aristotle, advocates is not an occultism in which some hidden extraneous force acts causally upon events in the manner of Providential design. Rather, it is a philosophical position that is solidly grounded in the fact that whole entities or organisms have essential natures and therefore have potentials to be realised and lines of development to be furthered from within. There is no supra-historical or supra-natural force at work since, in fully coming-to-be, these entities or organisms are simply realising the potentials which are inherent in their natures. Immanence and transcendence are joined together in the existence of potentials and the realisation of potentials.

Of course, atomistic metaphysics cannot discern a pattern in history and, of course, the functions and imperatives of alienated powers cannot redeem their promises of progress. What we have here is something that is neither fish nor fowl, a secular mythology that has appropriated the form of teleology but, inverting means and ends, object and subject, has none of the essentialist content. That is why the secular myth cannot deliver the progress it promises, only extend the nihilistic cycle of means being accumulated for the sake of further means without ultimate end. As philosopher Ross Poole argues, the instrumental rationality of the capital system ‘is concerned with production for the sake of further production, consumption for the sake of further consumption, and above all, profit for the sake of further profit. In other words, it is concerned not with ends in themselves, but with ends insofar as they may be used to pursue further ends.’ (Poole 1991: ch 4). And that is a nihilism in that it is endless, in that it lacks moral ends. It is world in which means have come to be enlarged to take the place of ends. That is the dis-godded world of modernity rationalized as irrevocable by Max Weber. 

We can indulge in the pessimism of Weber and bemoan the meaningless of the world. We can spend the rest of our time on earth writing our own obituaries, contemplating the end of civilisation that is certain to come with the adoption of that mentality. Or we can properly identify the causes of this nihilism as lying in an alienated system of production, throw off this narcissistic condition of ‘convulsive self-importance’ (as Weber characterised this stage of history 1985: 181) and commit ourselves to doing something to constitute an alternative … an alternative grounded in an understanding that makes it a necessary development if self-fulfilment is to be achieved.

Atomism and empiricism gives us a bad teleology that is congenitally incapable of redeeming its promises of freedom and happiness through economic growth, incapable of delivering salvation, precisely because it is divorced from the essential natures and potentials that alone give content to telos. But the solution to the bad teleology behind the delusions of progress is not the rejection of teleology as such but the rejection of an atomist metaphysics and the alienated social relations that are its accompaniment, and the development of an organic dialectics capable of grasping society as a living organism. (Fisk 1973).


9 Aristotle and Essentialism

Lewis Mumford correctly identifies the distinctive character of Aristotle’s philosophy in understanding power as something that inheres in things and as something which is balanced and proportionate. The ideal for Aristotle is not a rationally abstract form to be arbitrarily imposed on the community from the outside, ‘it was rather a form already potential in the very nature of the species, needing only to be brought out and developed.’ (Mumford 1966 ch 7). Whilst this actualisation is necessary in order to achieve healthy growth and flourishing, it is not thereby inevitable. Lines of development have to be completed. Aristotle’s work expresses a profound understanding of ‘the teleological, goal-seeking, self-actualizing nature of all organisms, and of the natural limits that define normal growth.’ Aristotle, Mumford continues, was not handicapped by the restricted conception of causality that seventeenth-century physics imposed upon modern thought, a conception which serves ‘to keep all changes on the plane of the external and the observable.’ Aristotle ‘realized, as a later generation will perhaps again realize, that “purpose” is engrained in all natural processes, not superimposed by man, though purpose no more admits the ulterior explanation than does causality.’ (Mumford 1966: 215).

Time out of mind it has been by the way of the ‘final cause,’ by the teleological concept of end, of purpose or of ‘design,’ in one of its many forms .. . that men have been chiefly wont to explain the phenomena of the living world: and it will be so while men have eyes to see and ears to hear withal. With Galen as with Aristotle, it was the physician's way; with John Ray as with Aristotle it was the naturalist's way; with Kant as with Aristotle it was the philosopher's way. ... It is a common way, and a great way; for it brings with it a glimpse of a great vision, and it lies deep as the love of nature in the hearts of men.

D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, On Growth and Form, 1942

…. as with Aristotle … My interest lies not in sounding the clarion call pf ‘back to Aristotle,’ nor even in updating Aristotle, but in calling immanent purpose back so as to make it possible to see growth and development in their true form. And a little understanding of Aristotle goes a very long way in this regard.

In identifying the importance of purpose, growth, self-actualisation, and inherent potential, Mumford highlights the essentialist metaphysics which forms the core of Aristotle’s philosophy. But the point is not to prove Aristotle right, once more making the mistake of treating Aristotle as an authority – something which froze his thought and rendered him anathema to the modern world – but to recover the sense of being parts of a living, purposeful, interconnected, creative universe.

Essentialism is Aristotelian in origin: ‘What each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature’ (Aristotle, Politics). It follows that each thing is to be fully developed, completed, in accordance with its nature. This is a necessary development. A thing is an organism which has a telos, a purpose, which is to be fully developed in order to realise its nature. This telos forms the basis of a genuine teleology.

Aristotle’s philosophy is infused by essentialist categories. This is what lies behind his statement that ‘poetry is a more philosophical and serious thing than history, as it speaks rather of the general history rather of the particular.’ In the various histories of his day, Aristotle found nothing general, merely accounts of particular events that took place in certain times and places, with nothing to connect them together to deliver a point or meaning or purpose to all that had happened. Chance and accident was all that there was, and for Aristotle this formed no basis for science. In Aristotle’s view, ‘what happens always or for the most part’ happens, not fortuitously, but ‘by nature.’ (Aristotle Physics 2. 198b33ff). All development is a necessary development. Things happen by virtue of some essential nature whose reality is manifested by the fact that certain kinds of thing tend to happen ‘always or for the most part.’ 

For Aristotle, then, science reveals essential forms, natures or ‘causes,’ the very things he found to be lacking in the histories of his day. Whereas history deals with particularity, science deals with generality in the particular. For Aristotle, ‘we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause’ (Post. An. 71b30f) and ‘the general is honoured because it reveals the cause.’ (Post. An. 88a5) In other words, to have scientific knowledge we must first look for the general and then identify a line of necessity with a view to revealing the cause. Such an approach is possible only with a view of a whole organism in whose development according to its nature (ergon or telos) the necessity lies. In the Politics, Aristotle sets out his essentialist methodology in the clearest terms, putting the accent on the natural origin and growth of things: ‘We shall, I think, in this as in other subjects, get the best view of the matter if we look at the natural growth of things from the beginning.’ (Aristotle Politics 1.1252a24.)

Aristotle’s approach can be compared to Plato who, when seeking to discern the truth of a thing, would first look to the general and then to the particular. Thus, to discover the true nature of political and social justice, Plato argued that it is necessary to ‘first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less’ (Plato, Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, eds., Collected Dialogues, 368e-369a). In similar fashion, Immanuel Kant tended to state his argument in the architectonic form: ‘there is yet another consideration which is more philosophical and architectonic in character; namely to grasp the idea of the whole correctly and thence to view all parts in their mutual relations’ (Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason). 

This architectonic exists also in Marx. As Marx argued in Theories of Surplus Value, the ‘faulty architectonics’ of a theory is ‘not accidental, rather it is the result of... and . . . expresses the scientific deficiencies of the method of investigation itself.’ (Marx TSV vol. II, 1968: 166-167). This conception of architectonics indicates that, for Marx, a true theory is compelled on account of its ‘deep insight’ to develop an elegant conceptual structure. It seems that Marx, then, adhered to the Platonic trinity of the true, the good and the beautiful and affirmed the rationalist belief in the harmony of truth, goodness (as human freedom) and beauty. Marx’s method is essentialist, and his notion of architectonics here identifies him with the non-relativist school of timeless truths, values about the right order of the world that are true in themselves, regardless of political and social institutions and social customs and conventions, holding them to account and calling them into question. 

Such views can only be understood in the essentialist and organicist sense of relating the parts to the whole organism. The categories of atomist and essentialist thought are completely incompatible. To point to the myths and delusions of progress and salvation explains nothing – it is the real social forces behind those very things that stand in need of explanation, and revealing these requires the essentialist categories that are capable of identifying necessary lines of development. A closer examination of the social problems that afflict us reveals not teleology as the source of our miseries but the bogus form that teleology takes within an alienated system of production. There is no genuine purpose at work here, only the institutional force and systemic imperatives of alienated human powers; there is no genuine end point here, only the endless accumulative dynamic of capital; and there is no real progress in the sense of a qualitative organic development and growth, only more of the same in greater quantities on a planet of finite resources. Whatever else the capital system is, it has nothing to do with the realisation of healthy potentials, the unfolding of natural essences and with the fulfilment of human social nature. 

The problem is not teleology and a natural organic growth but mechanicism and atomism allied to a systemic expansionism. This comes out clearly when comparing contractarian political thought to the ancient conception of politics as creative human self-realisation. Plato’s discussion with Adeimantus in Book 2 of the Republic, concerning the ‘first principles of social organisation,’ makes it clear that the ancients considered co-operation among individuals as social beings to be the basis of the state, ensuring a more efficient and abundant supply of physical goods, 'the provision of food ... shelter ... clothing of various kinds.’ (Plato, Republic 369b-371e).









The argument continues in like manner, as Plato proceeds to build the state out of the human need for cooperation. This development is part of the realisation of the human essence. Aristotle took the discussion beyond such humdrum and utilitarian justification to present the case for human association in terms of the good life. Aristotle therefore made the telos of human association central to his practical philosophy. For Aristotle, ‘a state’s purpose is not merely to provide a living but to make a life that is good.’ The state provides something more than ‘a military pact of protection against injustice’ in a society concerned with the ‘exchange of goods.’ The state is not morally neutral but is directly concerned with ‘the virtue and vice of the citizens.’ Without the conception of the good ‘the association is a mere military alliance .. and law .. a mere agreement,’ ‘a mutual guarantor of justice’ which is ‘unable to make citizens good and just’ (Aristotle P Ill.ix 1981:196).

For Aristotle, the telos of human association (or the state) is to make citizens good and just. Human beings are zoon politikons, social beings, requiring a politkon bion or public life in order to realise their potentialities. 

The State and the Individual




The state is the larger community of the smaller communities, all formed with a view of the good in mind, their own and the good of the whole. Human association, from the lowest level upwards, is about the higher provision of ‘the good life’ in order to realise the potentialities inherent in the essence of man. (Aristotle Politics 1252b29).

Eagleton points out that not everyone agrees on which virtues are important or what constitutes self-fulfilment in this model of the good life at all:





The great achievement of Hegel and Marx is to have located this unfolding of the telos of human association within the historical process as the realisation of inherent potentiality of human beings as social and rational beings. There is, in other words, a telos of human history, in that history is the unfolding of human purpose.

10 Hegel and the Telos of History
As against the dominant categories of mechanicism and atomism, Hegel’s dialectical philosophy is firmly based upon Aristotelian categories of essentialism and organicism. Hegel’s great achievement is to have developed essentialist categories into dialectical form. Marx praised the advance that Hegel made here: 

It is a great step forward to have seen that the political state is an organism and that, therefore, its various powers are no longer to be seen as organic but as the product of living, rational divisions of functions.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 67

Marx draws attention to the way that the various aspects of the constitution, the various state powers, are related organically and rationally to each other. This may, Marx writes, be a tautology. But it is an essentialist conception in which the parts are understood in relation to each other and in relation to the whole. Whilst Marx’s point here is specific, his argument possesses a general significance in revealing the essentialist metaphysics at work in his critique.

Hegel’s philosophy is infused by essentialist Aristotelian categories from first to last, although he applies them to history and to society to a greater extent than did Aristotle. Indeed, there is a strong case for arguing that Marx’s own Aristotelianism was reinforced by his close reading of Hegel. Hegel advances a number of Aristotelian and essentialist theses that reappear in Marx.

1) Hegel affirmed that law and order rather than chance is the basis of phenomena. Hegel criticises Epicurus ‘who ascribed all events to chance'. (Hegel 1953: 14). And whilst Anaxagoras thought the world to be lawlike, Hegel criticizes that ‘he did not apply the universal to the concrete.’ (Hegel 1953: 13/4) Hegel thus praises Socrates for taking the first step of ‘comprehending the union of the concrete and the universal'. (Hegel 1953: 15).
2) Hegel conceives the form of law in terms of the realisation of potentialities in a whole organism which possesses an essence in which those potentialities inhere. ‘A principle, a law is something implicit, which ... is not completely real (actual) ... not yet in reality ... a possibility.’ (Hegel 1953: 27).
3) Hegel argues that the phenomena of history arise from a whole which contains an essence which possesses an end or telos and which undergoes transformation of form. The essence of history is ‘that freedom of spirit (which) is the very essence of man's nature’ (Hegel 1953: 24) and the telos of world history is ‘the actualisation of this freedom,’ which Hegel identifies as ‘the final purpose of the world.’ (Hegel 1953: 15). Hegel conceives history as ‘the union of freedom and necessity. We consider the inner development of the Spirit ... as necessary, while we refer to freedom the interests contained in men's conscious volitions.’ (Hegel 1953: 31). Necessity is immanent in the line of development in which a nature attains fulfilment or completion by realising its potential. And this is freedom or flourishing.

Note Hegel’s consistent emphasis upon an immanent process of development. This is key in understanding an ethics of immanence:





The realisation of essential potentialities within the whole organism brings about the union of the concrete and the universal, necessity and freedom. This is the resolution of the dialectic of immanence and transcendence. It is this that allows us to ground progress as an organic development and growth in realities rather than in fantasies, in natural purposes rather than technical powers.

For Hegel, world history passes through stages and each stage has its own ‘principle’ or law. A higher level of human consciousness of freedom is attained at each of these teleological stages. (Hegel 1953: 70). Hegel is frequently accused of having proposed a Reason operating behind the backs of individuals in history. Hegel certainly argues that individual actions can produce consequences they had not intended but which serve to move history onwards, but this is a very different notion. In historian E.P. Thompson’s apposite phrase, that refers to history as an ‘unmastered practice.’ That is the very thing that Hegel, and Marx after him, is trying to overcome through the realization of a self-conscious mastery within the historical process. Hegel offers a way of achieving the mastery of historical practice by highlighting the creative role of conscious human agency. 

For Hegel, for the potentiality of an essence to become actual, ‘a second element must be added ... namely activity, actualisation,’ and this is human will, passion and interest. Hegel thus argues that ‘the main efficient causation’ behind the movement of history are 'the actions of men (which) spring from their needs, their passions, their interests ...' (Hegel 1953: 26). Hegel therefore identifies a key role for creative human agency in the historical process. There is no purpose here which is detached from individuals and their actions, interests, wills, passions etc. 

Hegel distinguishes between natural and historical change in terms of the different manner in which organic categories apply in human society and in organic nature:





Hegel’s teleological conception thus values creative human agency. Human will, thought, activity etc. possess a creative role in the realisation of immanent purposes:





There is no distance at all from here to Marx's view that human beings are able to adapt society to themselves in order to realise their inherent human potentials, rather than adapting to society (or nature) conceived as fixed entities and to the requirements and imperatives of some external entity, whether this is Nature or a social metabolic order which frustrates the human essence, even though it is a human creation.

The historical development of human beings is a much more complex process than the development of organic natural entities. An essentialist metaphysics does not argue by way of biological analogy and is much more sophisticated than a socio-biology. An essentialist metaphysics recognises that whilst lines of development may be necessary for the realisation of potentials, they may be frustrated. The process of historical development is internally more complex than natural development, with the interplay of component forces capable of advancing, slowing or frustrating development in various ways. This reveals the dialectical aspect of the whole process. The line of necessary development is not direct and uni-linear, but mediated and frustratable. Hegel thus emphasizes the creative role of human agency: ‘The transition of its potentiality into actuality is mediated through consciousness and will.’ (Hegel 1953: 69). 

The subjective factor is, therefore, the crucial difference between the natural and historical process of development. This point is worth emphasising given the tendency to write off essentialism as a mode of thinking which sees purpose and direction as operating independently of human agency. Not in Aristotle, not in Hegel, not in Marx. This accusation applies most of all to the false teleology of the capital system, whose imperatives are not purposes at all, only systemic expressions of the determinist logic of the alienated, unmastered, powers of human beings. Here, vast processes of employment, investment and production operate independently of individuals, with the promise of salvation being made in terms of economic growth. But this is true to neither the Judaeo-Christian eschatology nor essentialist teleology, and is merely what the capitalist world offers in the absence of either of these things - the secular myth of progress, theological and teleological assumptions becoming detached from true purposes and re-attached to systemic functions and imperatives. This is a world of false gods and false idols, false fixities and determinisms. It’s a world of false promises organised around capital’s endless process of accumulation.

The criticism also applies to those who see development purely in terms of biological nature. Again, criticisms of a biological naturalism do not apply to an essentialism conceived in the tradition of Aristotle, only to those who would collapse humanity back into natural cycles and physical causality. Essentialism is not a socio-biology or Social Darwinism, and neither is it a primitivism or romantic naturalism: it emphasises the creative moral agency and praxis of human beings, and their mediated existence within nature and society.

With respect to this obsessive concern with naturalization, Eagleton comments:

Fundamentalism is formidably hard to budge - which should warn us against assuming that culture is endlessly malleable while Nature is always fixed. This is another dogma of postmodernists, who are perpetually on the watch for those who 'naturalize' social or cultural facts, and so make what is changeable appear permanent and inevitable. They seem not to have noticed that this view of Nature as unchangeable has itself changed rather a lot since the days of Wordsworth. Living as they apparently do in a pre-Darwinist, pre-technological world, they fail to see that Nature is in some ways much more pliable stuff than culture. It has proved a lot easier to level mountains than to change patriarchal values. Cloning sheep is child's play compared to persuading chauvinists out of their prejudices. Cultural beliefs, not least the fundamentalist variety which are bound up with fears for one's identity, are far harder to uproot than forests.

Eagleton 2003 ch 3

Marx was a pioneer critic of the way that philosophy and political economy rendered socially and culturally produced facts into eternal truths and principles, thus rendering the historically changeable appear permanent features of human existence. At the same time, he was careful not to make the error of thinking the world as such to be entirely ‘made-up,’ a human social and cultural creation that proceeds ex nihilo. This is where his essentialist understanding comes in. 

Culture, will and agency – ethics and politics
The process of growth and development is natural and organic, but not naturalistic in the sense of a physicalism or biologism. In arguing for an essentialist position in terms of a natural growth of potentials, there is a clear danger of emphasizing change so much as an immanent development that the importance of conscious creative agency is lost. This is not the case in Hegel and Marx, both of whom emphasize human beings as a history making force. Human history involves will, consciousness, ideas, intentionality – in other words, it involves culture, ethics and politics. Whilst human historical development may have necessary features internal to its forms, there is nothing inevitable about its processes.

To elaborate upon this historical aspect of emergence and development beyond physical laws, I’d like to quote a couple of passages from systems scientist Peter Corning, who argues that living systems cannot be reduced to underlying laws of physics:





The game of chess illustrates precisely why any laws or rules of emergence and evolution are insufficient.
http://www.emergence.co.uk/the-science/what-is-emergence-theory/chess-the-classic-example-of-emergence-theory/ (​http:​/​​/​www.emergence.co.uk​/​the-science​/​what-is-emergence-theory​/​chess-the-classic-example-of-emergence-theory​/​​)

A thank you here to my friend Eric Schaetzle for bringing the work of Peter Corning to my attention. As Eric rightly says, ‘Teleology is very often associated with religion, but that is just one possible meaning and use for the term. Contemporary evolutionary theorists often distinguish between evolved, internal purposiveness (“teleonomy”) and an externally imposed purpose, or “teleology.”’ 

(For an in-depth discussion of teleonomy, I highly recommend reading Corning's paper on the subject. 
http://complexsystems.org/.../evolution-on-purpose-how.../

Marx, evidently, was leery of the idea of an externally imposed purpose, and argued against it, emphasizing his scientific approach all the more against mere metaphysics. But Marx does have a teleology, one that is plainly an internal process of development.

Eric comments: ‘I find it fascinating how behavioural influences contribute to the ongoing evolutionary process. The implication is that we are the authors of our destiny, and capable of writing any future we want. Like all life before us, we influence the next chapter by our daily choices and actions. It's a radically free idea, and it should inform our current situation - we need to be very conscious about the decisions we make (as individuals and as collectives), because they in turn make us. But what's more, this process is common to all life.’ (Eric Schaetzle).

I’m interested in the view that ‘rules, or laws, have no causal efficacy’ and do not ‘generate’ anything. That view seems to go against the view of essentialism I am developing here, in terms of Aristotle’s four causal explanation of growth and development. Corning’s view denies causal efficacy. Theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman describes internal self-organisation through emergent properties as ‘order for free.’ Corning’s view is slightly different: ‘It is not simply a self-ordered process; it involves an organized, “purposeful” activity.’ Here, as Kauffman himself argues, we are talking about an endlessly creative universe that is beyond physical laws. But it is teleological all the same:





Marx is an essentialist in precisely these terms of an historic metabolic interaction, a process in which choice, will, consciousness, intentionality, and agency all play a creative, and not merely functional, role. To reiterate, Marx insisted that the unfolding of essences has a history within specific social relations. 

And that view came directly from Hegel. Hegel shows how immanence and transcendence relate in an essentialist metaphysics. A nature is not preserved through history, it is developed through successive forms. This notion of development is key in differentiating a healthy organic growth from a mechanistic systemic growth:





With respect to historical development, the situation is much more complex:





This makes all existing reality a field of inherent potentiality in the process of becoming actuality. In being elevated into the universal, a species transcends its former state. The instability here is the contradiction between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be,’ between what a thing is in its existence as potential and what it is in the process of becoming through the actualisation of that potential. The ‘is’ of existing reality is thus the ‘ought-to-be’ in the process of becoming, the potential in the process of becoming actual. The ‘is’ contains the potential for the completed state which defines what a thing is. Hegel describes this potential as ‘the opposite’ of the actual, meaning that what exists contains both itself and its opposite (as potential). He therefore proposes a dialectical process which unfolds through contradiction and the resolution of contradiction. Hegel does not propose some passive evolution which proceeds through a gradual unfolding of natural essences. Rather, the opposite, the potential, is the 'germ', 'impulse' or 'urge' within the existing world which generates change towards completion through the realisation of potential. ‘Possibility points towards something which shall become real; more precisely, the Aristotelian dynamis is also potentia, force and power.’ (Hegel 1953: 71). 'The Imperfect, as involving its opposite, is a contradiction, which certainly exists, but which is continually annulled and solved.’ (Hegel 1953: 59).

I shall shortly come to analyse the way that Marx critically appropriated the organic dialectics developed by Hegel and developed them further to expose the contradictory dynamics of the capital system. For the moment it is sufficient to note that the relation between Aristotle, Hegel and Marx in terms of an essentialist metaphysics is clear. The main difference between these three thinkers lies in the understanding of the character and relation of natural and historical change. There is also a greater emphasis upon contradiction in Hegel and Marx, change as a dialectical process through history. What in Aristotle is the telos of human association becomes in Hegel and Marx the telos of the historical process, human beings acting to realise their social and rational natures. This is what Marx calls the ‘truly human society.’

The creative universe
Before coming to an analysis of Marx’s essentialism, it is worthwhile taking our bearings here and setting the philosophical presentation within a creative, purposive material universe. 

There is a need here to demonstrate the inadequacy of atomism and reductionism and to recover the sense of value and purpose in the world. There is indeed more to human life than meets the atomizers eye, and the process as a whole has significance and meaning. Pointing to the waters, rocks, soil, and solar energy out of which life originally emerged, Lewis Mumford draws attention to ‘the immense fecundity of all living beings, the inexhaustible creativeness of nature herself.’ (Mumford 1952: 27). 

That phrase suggests the ceaselessly creative universe that theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman makes central to his work. Kauffman argues that ‘life, and with it agency, came naturally to exist in the universe.’ And ‘with agency came values, meaning, and doing, all of which are as real in the universe as particles in motion.’ Kauffman stresses the word ‘real’ here, explaining that ‘while life, agency, value, and doing presumably have physical explanations in any specific organism, the evolutionary emergence of these cannot be derived from or reduced to physics alone.’ The explanation is a naturalism, therefore, but not a physicalism – as with the essentialism of Hegel and Marx, there is a creative role for agency, will, consciousness, value. For Kauffman, life, agency, values, meaning, and doing, come naturally to emerge within the ceaselessly creative universe. 





This stance is called emergence, and it is a view that seems easy to reconcile with Aristotelian essentialism:





Emergence forms a major part of the new scientific worldview. ‘Emergence says that, while no laws of physics are violated, life in the biosphere, the evolution of the biosphere, the fullness of our human historicity, and our practical everyday worlds are also real, are not reducible to physics nor explicable from it, and are central to our lives.’ (Kauffman 2008 Pref). We are beyond mechanicism, beyond reductionism, beyond atomism and beyond the futile existentialist search for meaning in an objectively valueless world. Kauffman thus exposes the limitations of the reductionism that has dominated Western science at least since Galileo and Newton, but which has left us ‘in a meaningless world of facts devoid of values.’ Against this, Kauffman proposes a worldview which sees human beings as ‘members of a universe of ceaseless creativity in which life, agency, meaning, value, consciousness, and the full richness of human action have emerged.’ (Kauffman 2008 ch 1).

It seems that, in ‘reinventing the sacred,’ we are back in the purpose-driven universe, a world which contains values, a world of meaning. That doesn’t mean that God is back, Kauffman stating that the endlessly creative universe is ‘God enough.’ Kauffman also argues for an immanent self-organisation as ‘order for free,’ in a way that rules out teleology understood as extraneous purpose, but implies it as immanent purpose. ‘There is certainly more than a whiff of teleology about Kauffman's arguments’, writes Denton, and he is right. Kauffman explicitly argues that agency is built into the ceaselessly creative universe, and with agency comes value, purpose and meaning. It’s just that such teleology is of an entirely naturalistic kind and renders the notion of a transcendent Creator God neatly redundant. (I cover the issue at length in The Search for Meaning in the Universe: Seeing God in the Face of the Other, forthcoming).

Kauffman’s conception of the endlessly creative universe savours a great deal of Lewis Mumford’s awareness of the inventiveness of life beyond reductionism, of immanent purpose and of life as being directional in tendency. And it all sounds like Aristotelian essentialism to me, a purpose-filled universe of immanent tendencies and potentialities, of things in the process of becoming what they are and flourishing. Mumford calls it what it is, creative, ceaseless and purposive:
 
This exuberance of life, this audacious inventiveness, cannot be reduced to an endless series of accidents. 
When ‘coincidences’ multiply far beyond the bounds of probability one must call the result ‘purpose,’ and suspect that it shows likenesses with similar processes and patterns man discovers in his own life. 

Mumford 1952: 28 29

We the creative, participatory, universe we live in moves ever onward, ‘impelled by an immanent purpose that in man becomes a conscious one’:

Life, even at the lowest level, is a selective process: a process of choosing, restraining, promoting, taking from the environment just such sustenance as is helpful toward the creature's development, rejecting what is irrelevant. But life does not float on a timeless ocean of existence: it moves forward, impelled by an immanent purpose that in man becomes a conscious one. 









Human beings becoming themselves and being themselves returns us to the core of the essentialist metaphysics at the core of Marx’s emancipatory project, and reveals the normative anthropology underpinning Marx’s commitment to flourishing and fulfilment as the free and full development of each and all. Set that view properly within forms of social self-mediation ensuring a harmonious interaction between social and natural metabolisms, and we have something not dissimilar from Stuart Kauffman’s view of human beings as co-creators in the endlessly creative universe:

Science cannot foretell the evolution of the biosphere, of human technologies, or of human culture or history. A central implication of this new Worldview is that we are co-creators of a universe, biosphere, and culture of endlessly novel creativity.

Kauffman 2008 ch 1

It all depends, exactly, on what Kauffman means by saying that we ‘cannot foretell the evolution’ of nature, society and history. We cannot predict the future, since we are dealing with a creative universe. In an essentialist conception, lines of development are necessary, if a thing is to become what it is and flourish, but not thereby inevitable – the process is frustratable. But immanent lines of development mean that evolution is not random, arbitrary and accidental, either.

Mumford identifies balance, autonomy, symbiosis and directional development as the fundamental concepts which can be discerned in living organisms and applied toward the understanding and development of the life and destiny of human beings in society. ‘Where these features are lacking, where life has become purposeless and unbalanced, we have reason to suspect that a profound miscarriage has taken place.’ (Mumford 1952: 33). We can only argue this on an essentialist understanding that a thing is something essentially and essentially something and that, therefore, it ought to take a certain form if it is to become what it is.

Human beings have a deep need to learn how to live their lives well. They do this by participating with the creativity at work in the universe, and thus coming to understand the world as a co-creation. That’s a summary of Kauffman’s argument in Reinventing the Sacred (2008), and it fits the argument I make with respect to the normative essentialism that Marx sees unfolding in the metabolic interaction between human society and nature. The result is for human beings to come to see themselves and their conscious productive activity as integral parts of the ‘conditions of becoming’ in the biosphere. Kauffman does recognize here the significance of Aristotle’s essentialism in giving us more than a naturalism defined in terms of physical laws:

Again, if a scientific law is, as Murray Gell-Mann suggests, a compact description, available beforehand, of the regularities that will unfold, then evolution of the biosphere by preadaptations and the economy by similar preadaptations are not describable by ‘law.’ In fact, as Aristotle already argued with his four causes, scientific knowledge fails for practical human action, where, he thought, final, formal, efficient, and material causes were necessary. 

Kauffman proceeds to point out that ‘even Aristotle did not discuss the implications of the persistent limitations of our knowledge for how we manage to act anyway. How inarticulately we speak of practical action. Yet we live it every day.’ Kauffman goes on to discuss the way in which legal reasoning covers this field of practical action, effectively discussing the tradition of rational freedom as a lawful freedom concerned with the human good:





How to bridge the gap between the world of theoretical reason – our scientific knowledge of the world - and the world of practical reason – ethics and politics, the field where we put that knowledge to effect – has been a key question since Plato. In this volume and in Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration I show the way in which Marx’s praxis as an active materialism effects a breakthrough from philosophy to reality, enabling us to live through a normative practical reasoning embodied in social forms. The possibility of some such society is hinted at in Kauffman’s words above: no matter how difficult it is to conceive and write of practical action, we succeed in living it every day. We have been equipped for the job by evolution (although note how Kauffman’s argument transcends natural selection). 

The breakthrough from the philosopher-ruler to the rule of philosophy through a rational unity forged in social relationships is possible. In arguing for a social self-mediation, Marx is working with the grain of nature and human nature. It is the capital system, in fracturing what belongs together, atomizing society, estranging civilisation from its sources of life, and imposing mechanical, systemic imperatives upon society, that is out of kilter. This is to affirm a natural organic growth and development as against capital’s cancerous exponential mechanistic growth and development. Marx’s self-mediating relation between social and natural metabolisms is in alignment with the ceaselessly creative, interconnected, participatory universe, and stands as a viable alternative to the destructiveness of capital’s fundamentally decreative, dissociative, diremptive and nihilistic void. Marx’s active, affirmative, essentialist materialism stands overcomes the purposeless materialism of the capital system. This is precisely what Lewis Mumford demanded as the resolution of the problems of the modern age:

Within the context of organic order and human purpose, our whole technology has still potentially a large part to play; but much of the riches of modern technics will remain unusable until organic functions and human purposes, rather than the mechanical process, dominate.

Mumford 1962 in Miller ed. 1986: 82


11 Marx’s Essentialist Metaphysics

I turn now to examine the role of immanence and transcendence in the thought of Karl Marx. Marx combines two key themes in the preceding analysis. His essentialism draws on the Aristotelian tradition of potential becoming actual whilst his dialectic is based on the Hegelian sense of locating the ideal within the realm of the real.

In seeking ‘the laws of motion of modern society.’ Marx employed conceptions of law, form and necessity which derive from an essentialist metaphysics of Aristotelian origin and which are quite opposed to empiricist and atomist perspectives. Marx therefore endorsed the view of an early reviewer of volume one of Capital who wrote that he [Marx] sought 'the law of the phenomena ... of their development, i.e. of their transition from one form into another ... the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions' (Afterword to the Second German Edn., Cap. I). 

Without an understanding of an essentialist metaphysics, it is well-nigh impossible to make sense of Marx’s arguments, either in Capital or in his work as whole. And reading the reviews of his newly published Capital, Marx soon appreciated the extent to which his views were being misunderstood:

That the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it.
Thus the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me in that, on the one hand, I treat economics metaphysically, and on the other hand — imagine! — confine myself to the mere critical analysis of actual facts, instead of writing recipes (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future.

Marx 1873 Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital 

That method involves essentialist metaphysics and organic dialectics, and is still prone to be misunderstood. That Marx seems to object to the term metaphysics also suggests a certain reticence on his part as to what, precisely, he was doing. Marx’s economics are metaphysical, whether Marx chooses to present his view that way or not.

This certainly applies with respect to what Marx meant by abolition, as in the abolition of the state, Aufhebung as overcoming, transcendence, preservation and realization at the same time. Essentialism provides the key to the understanding of Marx's meaning here, how Marx can be both an immanentist and a transcendentalist at the same time.

In Marx's Theory of Ideology, Bhikhu Parekh writes:





A ‘vision’ of the historically immanent society is an ideal which is located within the real lines of development of a prevailing social order but which points beyond that social order, that is, transcends it. By referring to these essential lines of development, Marx exposes the ills of the prevailing society, ‘and demonstrates that these can be eliminated in a differently structured society which is both possible and necessary.’ The key word here is necessary. Pointing to immanent potentialities, Marx does much more than project possibilities – he points to necessary lines of development, lines which must be brought to fruition if fulfilment is to be achieved in the sense of completion, a thing becoming what it essentially is. That concept of necessity derives from Marx’s essentialist metaphysics. This concept is much more than a weak possibilism and much less than a strong inevitabilism but points to necessary, but frustratable, lines of development in the process of the realisation of an essence. 

Parekh’s words not only highlight Marx’s immanentism, but also his particular kind of (self-)transcendentalism:





Parekh is correct to argue that Marx sought the realisation of the historically maturing possibilities immanent within existing lines of development. But Parekh’s words need to be re-written in terms of an essentialist metaphysics in order to convey the true sense of Marx’s meaning. Marx is referring to something much more than possibilities. Communism to Marx is more than just one possibility amongst many others, which people may choose according to will or whim: Communism is the necessary society, if existing lines of essential development are to be realised.

Reference to potentialities in the process of becoming actualities explains communism as the historically necessary, but not inevitable, society. Lines of development can be frustrated. There is a role for creative human agency, and hence for politics and morality as the field of practical reason, in the realisation of these immanent potentialities. And that is the role of formulating an ‘image’ or an ideal of the potential future society.

In presenting essentialism in terms of a ‘necessary’ development in history, there is a need to avoid ascribing an evolutionary perspective to Marx, one that diminishes or even extinguishes human beings as change-agents. Marx’s criticisms of morality and politics is not a repudiation of morality and politics as such. Marx was engaged in politics his entire life, whilst his emancipatory commitments are moral to the core, however much Marx sought to conceal the ethical dimensions of his argument and refused to couch his arguments in moral terms. What Marx was against was the autonomy and independence of morality and politics; that is, he resisted an idealism that saw morality and politics as forces outside of the real movement of change and history.

In underlining Marx’s conception of historical change as an organic process of development, noting his repeated emphasis on the emergence of socialism from within the bounds of present society – Marx explicitly refers to womb here (Marx CGP 1974: 346-347; Marx EW Letters 1975: 206) – there is a need to understand how Marx’s essentialism not only preserves a creative role for human agency, but actually accents it. 

In the main text I stated that Marx saw revolutionary events in the superstructure as the expressions of long, slow evolutionary processes proceeding within the base. I’m not happy with the formulation, and believe Marx to have been unhappy with that base-superstructure distinction on account of expressing his essentialist thought very clumsily. In this respect, I agree very much with S.S. Prawer’s view:





For these reasons and many more, I emphasize Marx’s organic dialectics, his essentialist categories, and his principle of interaction. My only concern is to establish that Marx’s emphasis on ‘socialism from within’ does not entail a passive evolutionism that diminishes the role of human agency.

Marx makes this statement:

I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense couleur de rose. But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relating whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.

Marx C1 Preface to the First German Edition

Whilst that determinism and impersonalism fits the alienation of the capital system well, as a general methodological statement, it undercuts the very purpose of communism as a repersonalisation and rehumanisation. But viewing society as a ‘process of natural history’ does imply an environmentalism as a naturalism and a determinism, premised on forces which are beyond individual character, choice, control and responsibility. And that has been a familiar liberal criticism of Marx and Marxism, the idea that Marx eliminates morality as an independent and creative category within human life, and also diminishes politics to the level of a residual in the wider social process. The clear implication of Marx’s view here is that political events and actions are not independent and autonomous in making history but are determined by deeper social forces and causes. There is a danger of coming to define essentialism as a societal determinism based on ‘necessary’ laws governing social development, which even the understanding of which is insufficient to help individuals avoid the inevitable consequences of their unfolding. Or, as Marx wrote elsewhere, ‘to what avail lamentation in face of historical necessity.’ I would be interested to see Marx’s reaction should I put to him the view that the human misery and degradation he recounted in such detail in Capital were all historically necessary so that people such as I, decades after, could live so well. I think he would have considered such views, sacrificing the lives of individuals in the present, as a form of capitalist apologetics. We hear the same views expressed today in favour of free trade.

Human agency, it seems, is free to the extent that it aligns with the inexorable development which makes society what it is. But a natural development in tune with the realities of life curtails not the agency of life, only an arbitrary freedom asserted over against those realities. Freedom is about working with nature and natural development. As Marx states the point: ‘even when a society has got upon the right track for the discovery of the natural laws of its movement — and it is the ultimate aim of this work, to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society — it can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development. But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs.’ (Marx C1 Preface to the First German Edition).

So we need to clarify here that essentialism is not a determinism, and the notion of necessary development does not entail an inevitable development. And we need to clarify that essentialism is not a moral positivism or futurism in which something is just merely on account of being historically necessary. The idea of immanence does point to real processes, laws of motion, potentials, lines of development, so that the idea of any human sphere, be it morality or politics, being autonomous is inadmissible. By definition, all things exist in relation in the essentialist conception, seeing society as an organic whole, a metabolism. There is agency and creativity in this whole, but Marx’s point is that these things proceed in relation to real processes of development. 

The controversy here results from a failure to understand Marx’s essentialist metaphysics properly. There is a difference between natural change and historical change, so when Marx refers to a society’s ‘natural laws of movement,’ he doesn’t actually mean that these laws are natural, certainly not in some physical sense, but that they are necessary within that process of historical change. History, as Hegel points out in the Philosophy of History, possesses a dialectical character. Development in 'organic natural objects,’ argues Hegel, ‘proceeds from an inner principle, a simple essence, which first exists as a germ. From this simple existence it brings forth out of itself differentiations which connect it with other things. Thus it lives a life of continuous transformation.' Nothing new is produced by this process of natural change; rather, the same nature is reproduced. The organic natural object 'makes itself actually into that which it is in itself (potentially) ... The development of the organism proceeds in an immediate, direct (undialectical), unhindered manner. Nothing can interfere between the concept and its realisation, the inherent nature of the germ and the adaptation of its existence to this nature.' Whilst accidents can frustrate these natural organic developments, getting in the way of and preventing their completion, these come from the outside rather than from within the development process of natural organic change. Things are different with respect to historical change, where the interplay between various component forces can serve to advance development, or slow it down. This points to the dialectical character of human social development. The line of necessary development in history is not direct and uni-linear, frustratable only by outside accident, but is mediated within. As Hegel puts it: 'The transition of its potentiality into actuality is mediated through consciousness and will.' (G.W.F. Hegel, Reason in History, trs. Robert S. Hartman, NY (1953), 69).

The critical difference between natural change and historical change, then, is the creative role of conscious human agency. Whilst the natural process of development reproduces the same unchanged natures smoothly, an internal process of development that is frustrated only by accidents from outside the natural essence, the historical process of development produces something novel and is not smooth.

The misunderstanding of Marx as a determinist materialist here arises from the failure to understand Marx’s essentialist metaphysics, meaning that Marx’s argument on ‘natural’ laws and ‘necessary’ lines comes to be interpreted from philosophical and methodological perspectives that are unable to understand the true meaning of those terms, but are more than capable of misunderstanding and misreading them. Many people, including many Marxists, prefer to stay away from essentialism, opting to ‘make sense’ of Marx from an analytical perspective. (Elster 1985). The result, however, is that they come to make a nonsense of Marx.

Scott Meikle sums the argument up concisely, and establishes the key point with respect to the active role of human agency (and hence morality and politics), giving this quote from Marx:

The entire movement of history is therefore the actual act of creation of this communism — the birth of its empirical existence — and, for its thinking consciousness, the comprehended and known movement of its becoming.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 348

Marx's overall view of the historical process is that it is the process of development, or genesis, of human society through particular forms towards its fullest and highest form, in which its inherent potentials are fully realised. That is to say, the historical process is an ideological process whose subject is human society, and the telos to which the process tends is communism… 




There is a difference between a natural process of development and a historical process of development in that the former produces nothing new and development proceeds smoothly and is frustrated only by outside accidents whilst the latter produces things that are new, is not immediate, is frustratable by its component parts, and that it is therefore the realm of an organic dialectics. In fine, the process of social development happening before our eyes is a process in which there is an interplay in which something new is in the process of emergence, involving human agency, consciousness, will – and that points to a very active role for politics and morality. Marx’s key point is that these things are internal to the process of development, part of its necessary realization, or, indeed, part of its frustration. There is nothing in Marx’s essentialism that implies a naturalism or determinism that eliminates the active, creative role of human agency. The ‘ought to be’ located within the ‘is’ remains precisely that, something that enjoins human beings to act, realizing the potentials for the future society as an act of freedom. By the same token, it also exists as something that conservative forces, who have succeeded in institutionalizing their power within present society, can mobilize against in order to frustrate its realization, also from within. That necessary lines of development are frustratable internally in this way, on the part of its internal components, emphasizes that agency, conscious, morality and politics possess an active role in development.

Refer back to the quote from Marx, and this becomes clear. Marx argues that the ‘entire movement of history’ is ‘the actual act of creation of this communism.’ Communism is created as an act of freedom. It also involves morality and politics, human agency, will, ‘thinking consciousness,’ human comprehension and knowledge. 

Joseph Ferraro makes similar points with respect to the thought of Engels. He writes that ‘for the mature Engels, taking political power and control of the means of production is not automatic. Rather, the proletarians must consciously turn against the necessity that is imposed on them by the capitalist economy. It is a question of an act of freedom on the part of the working class.’ Engels writes that ‘the forces operating in society work exactly like the forces operating in Nature: blindly, violently, destructively,’ but ‘when once we have recognized them and understood how they work, their direction and their effects, the gradual subjection of them to our will and the use of them for the attainment of our ends depends entirely upon ourselves.’ This is how Engels conceives of freedom before the forces of nature and how he conceives of freedom in relation to modern forces of production. According to Engels, ‘so long as we obstinately refuse to understand their nature and their character—and the capitalist mode of production and its defenders set themselves against any such attempt— so long do these forces operate in spite of us, against us, and so long do they control us’—as the historical experience of the working class shows. Engels emphasizes, then, the capacity of the working class to further lines of development, and the capacity of conservative forces to retard and obstruct them. Lines of development are frustratable. But ‘once their nature is grasped, in the hands of the producers working in association they can be transformed from demoniac masters into willing servants.’ Engels argues by way of analogy that ‘it is the difference between the destructive force of electricity in the lightning of a thunderstorm and the tamed electricity of the telegraph and the arc light; the difference between a conflagration and fire in the service of man.’ As a result, ‘this treatment of the productive forces of the present day, on the basis of their real nature at last recognised by society, opens the way to the replacement of the anarchy of social production by a socially planned regulation of production in accordance with the needs both of society as a whole and of each individual’ (305-6).

And that describes Marx’s associative production managing the interchange with nature in a ‘rational way’ through a ‘collective control.’ However, Ferraro emphasizes, ‘this is not an automatic process, determined blindly by the laws of capitalist economy: the proletariat must become class conscious.’ (Ferraro 1992: 169-170). 





Actually, in accordance with a proper understanding of Marx’s essentialist categories, the socialist revolution is a ‘necessary’ realization, it’s just that within that essentialist understanding the notion of ‘necessary’ is quite compatible with human agency and revolution as an act of freedom and creation on the part of human agents. Mechanistic interpretations are not the same thing as essentialist interpretations, and do not understand the essentialist meaning of ‘necessary’ development. The ‘act of freedom’ remains crucial to the realization of ‘necessary’ lines of development in Marx’s essentialist understanding.

Marx's emancipatory project is based on the realistic grasp of historically emerging potentialities yielded by essentialist categories of form, law and necessity. I would argue that these categories lie at the heart of any serious theory, hence my attempt to link them to the rejection of the determinism and reductionism inherent in a biological or scientistic naturalism. 

Resolving the issues of immanence and transcendence requires that these essentialist categories be placed on a firm foundation. Essentialism and the categories of essence, law, form and necessity are bound up inextricably with dialectics. These categories are central to Marx’s conception of the real nature of the historical process, showing how necessary lines of development will lead (unless frustrated) to the full realisation of human society and thereby to the full realisation of the social nature of humankind. 

The organic dialectics of Aufhebung – abolition as a positive transcendence and realisation - thus entail an expanding field of the human capacity to understand and experience the world as infused with human subjectivity and conscious purpose, as against an alienated condition in which the world confronts human beings as an objective and external datum. This process will issue ultimately in the truly human society.

Marx’s metaphysics of essentialism derive from Aristotle via Hegel. This gives Marx’s arguments a peculiar flavour. The dominant methodology since the scientific and industrial revolutions has been empiricism, atomism and reductionism, the breaking up of entities into dissociated discrete parts. Where Marx believes in essences and necessary lines of development, the dominant methodology sees single events and accidents. That puts Marx at a disadvantage in any academic or theoretical appraisal of his work. Marx, frankly, is outdated. That, I would argue, is his strength, indicating the threat he poses to the existing order. And I would argue further that essentialist and organicist categories are crucial to the resolution of the problem of immanence and transcendence, and are the source of revealing the way to a happy and fulfilled life. 

Marx offers a way of transcending the status quo by way of realising its potentials to the full. That is, Marx’s view is firmly founded on the ‘necessary essence of things’ and how their completion points beyond the existing order. Marx conceives societies as whole organisms and employs the categories of an essentialist metaphysics to examine and understand the changes they undergo - essence and form; form and matter (or content); necessary and accidental change; potential and its realisation; law; adequate form, finished form, etc.

Marx understands the material world in dialectical terms as a world in constant motion, contradiction, and change. The material world is in motion because ontologically, ‘all that exists . . . lives by some kind of motion’ (Marx and Engels, 6/1976: 163). But motion, Farr writes, is to be understood as a process of qualitative change, not merely quantitative or spatial change. 

The organic metaphors of Aristotle - "the great investigator who was the first to analyse ... so many . . . forms of thought, society, and nature" - better capture the primitive notions at work here for Marx than do the mechanistic ones of David Hume or Feuerbach (Marx, 1977: 151). Qualitative changes are experienced internally by an entity, as its very identity changes or unfolds. Slaves into freemen, dependents into citizens, commodities into money, feudalism into capitalism: all suggest the sort of motion and qualitative change to which Marx refers. The first terms of these pairs are identified in large part by how they are not the second terms; in this way there is contradiction between them. But they have in them "inner connections" and "hidden potentialities" to develop into the other (Marx, 1977: 733). As their potentialities unfold, they become the other. Though material reminders of their previous identities linger on, strictly speaking, they cease to exist. They are negated as they pass out of existence and emerge into newer and usually higher forms. Forms or stages of development thus come to mark these qualitative changes in the identity of a thing as it passes through negations and contradictions.

Farr in Carver ed 1991: 112-113

This essentialist metaphysics is clear in the centrality Marx accorded to the value-form in Capital. Marx proceeds from 'the elementary form of value' through the money form, the commodity form, and so on, revealing the necessary developments of the value form as it comes to be universalised over society as a whole in its final form, capital. These developments are necessary, in that they realise potentials immanent within the value-form. But not inevitable, since necessary lines of development can be frustrated by accident. (Excuse the repetition, but acres of twaddle have been written on essentialism over the years and I am concerned to leave no opportunity for misunderstanding here).

Marx's emancipatory socialist project is based on the realistic grasp of historically emerging potentialities within the capital system yielded by categories of essence, form, law and necessity. These essentialist and organicist categories are crucial to identifying what is required to live a happy and fulfilled life. Any teleology at work in Marx concerns the unfolding and flourishing of natural essences. The modern teleology of progress – as something distinct from necessary development as organic growth - operates according to a supra-human, supra-natural force, what Nietzsche referred to as the ‘new idols’ of modernity. (Stauth and Turner 1988 ch 3 Cultural Control). Stauth and Turner write of ‘Nietzsche's playful, danceful critique of the modern state and its ideologies or idolatries.’ (Stauth and Turner 1988: ch 1 Moral Society). ‘Nietzsche has increasingly emerged as a profound critic of the rationalist assumptions which lie behind both capitalism and state socialism,’ write Stauth and Turner. The whole issue can be better formulated in terms of Marx’s critique of alienation. In truth, there is no ‘supra’ dimension involved at all. As Marx writes in the Paris Manuscripts, it is neither the gods nor nature, involved in the imposition of alien power but other human beings, and understanding and resolving this problem is a matter of social relationships. The practical reappropriation of these alienated human powers and their reorganisation as social powers realises ‘human emancipation’ in general. (Marx OJQ EW 1975: 234). Marx defines communism as the 'regaining of self’ (Selbstgewinnung) and ‘the reintegration or return of man to himself, transcendence of human self-alienation’ (MEGA III 113/4 in Tucker 1964: 151). Everything that Marx writes with respect to communism gains its true meaning with respect to this essentialist conception of nature and human nature. Marx therefore saw the emergence of the generic human self in a new stage of history.

Marx is concerned to check the tendency for Reason to become detached from real natures and thus determines to rest essentialist categories on the most fundamental ontological level of human social being. Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State is not so much a rejection of Hegel as an attempt to make his essentialist philosophical structure live up to its potential. Time and again, Marx accuses Hegel not of falsehood but of inverting the true relations between things. True relation between the parts within the whole is Marx’s driving concern. He thus makes constant reference to ‘real relationship’, ‘real mediation’, ‘real subjects’ and ‘real subject,’ ‘real parts,’ ‘real essence’ and ‘real existence’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 61-61 62 65 67 73). I count over three hundred references to the words ‘real’ and ‘reality’ in the Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State. Any teleology on Marx’s part is firmly grounded in the concrete reality of real individuals. Here, again, we see what Marx means by a ‘true state,’ one whose authority conforms to expressed human need, constantly subject to the control of ‘real human beings,’ and does not ‘shackle’ their subjectivity:

Hegel's argument only implies that a state in which the 'constitution' and the character and development of its self-consciousness are in conflict is no true state. Of course, it would be petty to point out that a constitution produced by a past consciousness can become an oppressive shackle for a consciousness which has progressed. Such views would only lead to the demand for a constitution that had the property and principle of advancing in step with consciousness; i.e. advancing in step with real human beings - which is only possible when 'man' has become the principle of the constitution. Here Hegel is a sophist.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 75

And by ‘sophist,’ Marx means plainly someone in denial of ‘objective reality’ (six references in this work) and truth (thirty two references), and therefore someone very wrong and very bad. Marx didn’t care for sophism in the same way that Rousseau didn’t care for it.
 
(see chapter 9 Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration).

For Marx, individuals, the family and civil society are ‘real parts of the state, real spiritual manifestations of will’, the ‘state's forms of existence’ and the ‘driving force’ of the state. However, Marx accuses, Hegel makes them the products of the real Idea: 

it is not the course of their own life that joins them together to comprise the state, but the life of the Idea which has distinguished them from itself.

Marx CHDS EW 1975: 69

Whether or not Marx’s criticism of Hegel is correct is not the issue. (My view is that Marx has written hastily and is so concerned to press his point that he has missed the extent to which he is actually in agreement with Hegel. It is interesting that Marx has been accused of the very things that he accuses Hegel of, of making some overarching Reason independent of real individuals.) More important is to establish the extent to which Marx shares Hegel’s essentialist metaphysics, before going on to show what Marx does with those essentialist categories. Marx posits ‘real subjects’ as the basis of political and social reality so that he has no need to subjectivize human creations such as the state or capital ‘in a mystical way’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 78), proceeding to accuse Hegel of inverting true relations: ‘If Hegel had begun by positing real subjects as the basis of the state he would not have found it necessary to subjectivize the state in a mystical way.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 78). 

The solution to a false teleology is clear – put subject and object the right way round and posit ‘real subjects’ as the basis of all social forms. For Marx, all human history is human social individuals and the forms that they engender. Proceeding from the fundamental ontology of ‘real human existence,’ Marx criticises the modern inversion which ‘does not proceed from the real person to the state, but from the state to the real person.’ This results in the subjective coming to be converted into the objective and the objective into the subjective ‘with the inevitable result that an empirical person is uncritically enthroned as the real truth of the Idea.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 99). 

Whilst Marx’s criticism here refers to a specific aspect in Hegel’s political philosophy, the point he makes is capable of generalisation. The implication is that the alienation of social power to the state and capital results in the inversion of subject and object. Marx is committed to the true account which establishes the right relation between subject and object and thus proceeds from ‘real persons’ to the state and all other social forms. As an alienated system of production, the capital system is characterised by the inversion of subject and object. Human beings are ‘thingified’, made appendages of objects as their creations come to acquire existential significance. In this condition, human ends come to be displaced by means whilst the extension of an instrumental rationality disenchants or removes purpose from the world. We do not, however, lose teleology or theology in the process. Instead, someone or, more likely, something comes to be ‘uncritically enthroned’ as the real purpose of history. (In Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, I show how Marx moves from a view in which he says only human beings can be the powers that rule over human beings not the gods, not nature, to a view that all human beings are now ruled by abstractions). And that is precisely what I mean about the problem of capitalist modernity being not a genuine teleology at all but a substitute or fake teleology which rationalises the systemic and institutional imperatives involved in terms of the secular myth of progress. 

The solution to this bogus teleology is to put subject and object in their true relation, with the human creators coming to take conscious moral and collective responsibility for their creations. For Marx, the social forms created by human praxis should be brought under the conscious common control of the associated individuals, as part of the process leading to the truly human society.

For this reason, Marx can retain the powerful philosophical essentialism developed by Hegel, employing it to examine the human social organism, the nature of both the whole and its parts in their relation and movement.

According to Marx, in Hegel 'what should be a starting point becomes a mystical result and what should be a rational result becomes mystical starting point.’ For Marx, the true starting point of social and historical analysis are real individuals as the concrete universal: ‘the real essence of the finite real, i.e. of what exists and is determined' and ‘real existent things as the true subject of the infinite.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 81). For Marx, real individuals are the ‘real state’. ‘The state is an abstraction. Only the people is a concrete reality.’ (Marx CHDS EW 1975: 86). Marx writes of the inversion of true reality that results from ascribing ‘living qualities to the abstraction’ (Marx CHDS EW 1975: 86).

Marx endorses Hegel's organicism and repudiates mechanistic materialism for its neglect of the active side of human subjectivity (Theses on Feuerbach). Against Hegel, Marx seeks to develop a materialist organicism on the basis of the 'various powers' of a thing being determined and explained by their underlying essence. Those powers develop so as to express or manifest that essence, that is, the necessary line of development is located within an actually existing essence rather than, as with Hegel (in Marx’s view), being derived from the 'nature of the concept', or from 'the universal relationship of freedom and necessity.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 75 65).

Marx affirms that the concrete reality behind the state, the executive power, the monarch, the bureaucracy, etc., is the existence of the real individuals composing the demos. Marx takes this to be a self-evident truth:

We have already seen that subjectivity is the subject, and that the subject is necessarily a single empirical individual. We now learn that the concept of immediate individuality implies also natural, corporeal existence. Hegel has proved nothing that is not self-evident, namely that subjectivity can exist only as a corporeal individual, and of course an essential aspect of the corporeal individual is his birth in the course of nature.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 91

The significant point, in Marx's view, is how these real individuals mediate their existence. This points to democracy: 

In democracy no moment acquires a meaning other than what is proper to it. Each is only a moment of the demos as a whole ... democracy is the essence of all political constitutions, socialised man as a particular constitution.

In democracy, man does not exist for the sake of the law, but the law exists for the sake of man, it is human existence, whereas in other political systems man is a legal existence. This is the fundamental distinguishing feature of democracy.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 87 89

But Marx’s democracy is democracy possessing a particular character, considered not as a radical political movement, but as the realisation of a social essence to constitute a genuine universality. To understand this we need to understand the term Aufhebung which Marx uses when writing of the abolition of alienation. Aufhebung means ‘abolition’ as a positive transcendence, something which preserves and realises through the completion of an immanent potential. Marx’s Aufhebung is a philosophical term with clear dialectical connotations with respect to the relation between immanence and transcendence. In his various 1843 essays, Marx refers to the Aufhebung des Staates. As I argue in chapter 9 State, Community and Individuality in Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, Marx conceives the state to be caught between the ideal of universality, transcending the particularistic interests of civil society, and the reality of having to serve these interests themselves in its practical existence. Marx is concerned to expose and resolve that contradiction through the social embodiment of the principle of rational freedom.

For Marx, the universality which human beings as social beings require is frustrated in atomistic civil society through the institution of private property. The result is that this universality comes to be projected outwards and upwards to the alien state, coming to exist in an unreal fashion in the ideal realm of the state:

The perfected political state is by its nature the species-life of man in opposition to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist outside the sphere of the state in civil society, but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its full degree of development man leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers. The relationship of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relationship of heaven to earth. The state stands in the same opposition to civil society and overcomes it in the same way as religion overcomes the restrictions of the profane world, i.e. it has to acknowledge it again, reinstate it and allow itself to be dominated by it. Man in his immediate reality, in civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he regards himself and is regarded by others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where he is considered to be a species-being, he is the imaginary member of a fictitious sovereignty, he is divested of his real individual life and filled with an unreal universality. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 221

For Marx, universal suffrage is not just the realization of a radical democratic political vision but the Aufhebung of the state in order to realise a true universality. For Marx, the suffrage is the extension and the greatest possible universalization of the vote, i.e. of both active and passive suffrage. (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 191). This democratisation as a universalisation would amount to ‘the abolition [Aufhebung] of the state and of civil society.' The important point to grasp with respect to the essentialism at the heart of Marx’s critique is that the Aufhebung of the state requires that the political structure comes to realise all of its potentialities. In other words, Aufhebung means abolition in the sense of something being transcended, realised and preserved. The realisation of the ideal universality of the state is thus only possible through the abolition of the state. In becoming identical with its universal content, the form of the state, always partial, ceases to be mere form, and universalisation becomes a democratisation with respect to concrete reality. 

Aufhebung is a dialectical process of transcendence, a social praxis which creates a new reality, resolving an ideal universality into a true universality:

Only when civil society has achieved unrestricted active and passive suffrage has it really raised itself to the point of abstraction from itself, to the political existence which constitutes its true, universal, essential existence. But the perfection of this abstraction is also its transcendence [Aufhebung = abolition]. By really establishing its political existence as its authentic existence, civil society ensures that its civil existence, in so far as it is distinct from its political existence, is inessential. And with the demise of the one, the other, its opposite collapses also. Therefore, electoral reform in the abstract political state is the equivalent to a demand for its dissolution and this in turn implies the dissolution of civil society.

Marx CHDS EW 1975: 191

Marx’s reasoning here follows Feuerbach, according to whom Christianity is self-destroying in that its historical appearance abolished the need for religion. To paraphrase Jesus Christ, the fulfilment of the law would amount to its abolition. Aufhebung functions in the same way in Marx’s argument. Democracy as an active and universal suffrage amounts to the abolition (Aufhebung) of the political constitution, i.e. the realisation and transcendence of the state. 

Marx argues that ‘Democracy is both form and content. Monarchy is supposed to be only a form, but it falsifies the content.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975). He explains:

In democracy the constitution itself appears only as one determining characteristic of the people, and indeed as its self-determination. In monarchy we have the people of the constitution, in democracy the constitution of the people. Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we find the constitution founded on its true ground: real human beings and the real people; not merely implicitly and in essence, but in existence and in reality. The constitution is thus posited as the people's own creation. The constitution is in appearance what it is in reality: the free creation of man. 

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 88/9

In affirming the political constitution as the ‘free creation of man’, ‘the people’s own creation,’ Marx resolves power on its true ground of real individuals:

In democracy, man does not exist for the sake of the law, but the law exists for the sake of man, it is human existence, whereas in other political systems man is a legal existence. This is the fundamental distinguishing feature of democracy.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 88/9

The phrase ‘for the sake of’ here is plainly teleological and denotes purpose, telos, related to the realisation of essential potentiality. We can only understand Marx’s reasoning here if we grasp the Hegelian meaning of the term Aufhebung as abolition, transcendence and preservation simultaneously. Both the (abstract) state and (atomistic) civil society are abolished and transcended in such a way that their contents are preserved at the higher level of a genuine universality. The Aufhebung of the state means that once its universal nature comes to be fulfilled, the state becomes superfluous as a separate organization embodying only an unreal universality. In other words, a state that succeeds in realizing the principle of rational freedom ceases to exist as an institutional abstraction apart from social reality. Thus, Marx's demand for universal suffrage is not based upon the radical democratic or republican traditions and politics but is a dialectical tool designed to bring about the simultaneous abolition/transformation of the state and civil society, bringing both of them to their apex and transcendence. The granting of universal suffrage will be its last act of the state as a state. For Marx, democracy is the realisation of the universal postulate of the state so as to abolish the institution of the state.

These remarks also apply to what Marx writes with respect to private property. In opposing the ‘rule of man’ to the ‘rule of property,’ Marx is demanding that a repoliticization overcomes a condition of depoliticization so that ‘universally human emancipation’ is achieved (Marx OJQ EW 1975: 216). 

Political emancipation from religion is not complete and consistent emancipation from religion, because political emancipation is not the complete and consistent form of human emancipation. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 217/8

Complete and consistent human emancipation requires the extension of democratization as a universalisation to social relations, as against the projection of a universality denied in real civil society upwards and outwards to the abstract level of the state. (Thomas 1994). The transcendence that Marx has in mind is the positive transcendence/abolition of the state and private property through the practical reappropriation of alienated human powers and potentialities. Only Aufhebung in the dialectical sense of abolition, transcendence and preservation at a higher, i.e. more universal, level will realise a humanity that is no longer split between the general and the particular. With the humanisation of the world, both cognitively and practically, humanity comes to realise itself fully. 

This dialectical conception of Aufhebung runs throughout Marx’s writing, so that communism is the positive transcendence of capital, entailing the realization of those potentialities which are immanent within but frustrated by the social relations of the capital system. It is in this sense that Marx refers to share capital and the joint stock principle as ‘the abolition [Aufhebung] of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself, and hence a self-dissolving contradiction, which prima facie represent a mere phase of transition to a new form of production.’ (Marx C3 1981 ch 27 pp569/70)

Aufhebung is the abolition of an alienated form through the realisation of content. The unity of form and content amounts to the restoration of human powers to human control. The human creators regain conscious and common control of their free creation. The truly human society is based upon the free creative self-realisation of human power.

The telos of history doesn’t belong to some supra-natural entity at work in the historical process, but to the purposes of real individuals. Concrete reality remained Marx's starting point throughout the rest of work. For Marx, human history is about real individuals and the forms they engender. The character of the telos of history as Marx employs is apparent in what Marx writes of Hegel. Marx emphasises that 

the importance of Hegel’s Phenomenology ... lies in the fact that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of object [Entgegenstandlichung], as alienation and as supersession of this alienation; that he therefore grasps the nature of labour and conceives objective man - true, because real man - as the result of his own labour. The real, active relation of man to himself as a species-being, or the realization of himself as a real species-being, i.e. as a human being, is only possible if he really employs all his species-powers - which again is only possible through the cooperation of mankind and as a result of history - and treats them as objects, which is at first only possible in the form of estrangement.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 386/7

For human beings to realise their social natures in the truly human society, the supersession or positive transcendence of alienation is required. But – and this is the crucial point – real individuals and concrete reality form the basis of Marx’s essentialist metaphysics. ‘The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.’ (Marx and Engels GI 1999: 42). Marx’s teleology is connected to the purpose immanent within human beings and their social praxis:

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way. 
The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself—geological, orohydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men. 

Marx GI 1999: 42

Marx identifies the forces operating independently of conscious, acting, choosing human beings not as God or Reason or History or any kind of telos properly understood, but the imperatives of the alien power of capital. With alienation, we enter the world of unintended consequences, false fixities and systemic imperatives and all manner of societal and biological determinisms and false naturalisms. It is not purpose that is the problem here but functional necessity and determinism in their many forms, and most particularly in the basic form of capital accumulation. ‘Globalisation’, ‘there is no alternative’, ‘economic growth’, ‘it’s the economy, stupid’, ‘investment’, ‘jobs’ etc. etc., these are only the terms by which the personifications and mouthpieces of capital employ as they proselytise for the captive flock. (And on top of these are the various neurodeterminisms and genetic determinisms being proposed by those who see nature as a purely physical realm.)

In the above passage from The German Ideology, Marx makes it clear that his organic dialectic proceeds from real premises – individuals in their real material relations within an empirically verifiable process of development under definite conditions. It is the mediation between associated individuals in society, nature and the social organism which counts, not some purpose detached from this mediation and identified with an entity apart from human praxis, whether we refer to the gods or to nature. The problem is one that is settled within the social relationships by which the humanity-nature interchange is mediated.

The reference to ‘social humanity’ as the standpoint of the new materialism in Thesis X on Feuerbach points to the old essentialism predating the mechanical, reductionist, atomist materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It confirms the idea of fundamental essence in human history as forming the basis of Marx’s ontology. Marx develops this idea further with respect to the class of ‘concrete labour.’ In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx writes of the concrete universal of human labour, which manifests itself through a series of social forms in history, organic social wholes defined according to the specific way in which social labour is supplied. Marx’s thinking is metabolic, with Marx arguing that each social metabolic order has its own specific laws or realisable potentials which, in coming to be, move history on until, finally, the essence is realised to its fullest potential to bring about a realised society of realised human beings.

For Marx, the fundamental entities that compose society are essences manifested in different ways within specific social relations. On this essentialist basis, Marx identifies a line of historical development as a broad threefold demarcation of pre-capitalist formations - 'primitive communism’, ‘clan society', feudalism – the capital system and class division; then socialism or classless society on a high technological level (Kiernan 1983: 61; Gould 1978:1 4 5). This also appears or as 'tribalism - slavery - feudalism - capitalism - communism’ (Gandy 1979: 5). These schema pertain to three basic forms of social relations: community based upon personal dependence; individuality and external sociality resting upon personal independence based upon objective dependence; communal individuality based upon free social individuality (Gould 1978:4/5). Individuals become fully human and fully social beings through coming to realise human potentialities in the course of historical development. 

In the Grundrisse Marx outlined three stages of human development by reference to the social forms through which human productivity is developed. These are the three social metabolic orders in history:

Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous at the outset) are the first social forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to a slight extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on objective dependence is the second great form, in which a system of general social metabolism, of universal relations, of all round needs and universal capacities is formed for the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on the subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, is the third stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third.

Marx Gr 1973: 158

The social relations appropriate to these three stages may be defined as undifferentiated community, replaced by an individuality subject to an external sociality, finally giving way to communal individuality (Gould 1978:4-5). Marx refers to the third stage in terms of ‘free individuality.’ The guiding principle of development through these stages is toward the ‘universal development of individuals’ and the ‘subordination of communal, social productivity as social wealth’ (Marx 1973: 158). Marx traces a development from a unity without differentiation to a differentiation without unity (capital) to a final stage characterised by a unity with differentiation (communism).

Stated in broad outline, Marx would appear to be indulging in the kind of bad teleology that provokes scepticism these days, as though history is propelled forwards by some supra-human Providence or supra-individual Reason. I hope by now it is clear that this is precisely what Marx is seeking to avoid by premising his argument upon real individuals, social forms and metabolic orders within historically emerging social relations. The point, however, is that it is impossible to make true sense of Marx’s argument without an understanding of his essentialist metaphysics. In light of this essentialism, Marx’s view may be stated thus: The historical development of human society is the development of the value-form, from its coming-to-be to its becoming a general and universal social metabolism to its passing-away and supersession. The history of human society is the history of forms of extraction of surplus labour, from relations of dependence or unfree labour to the indirect supply of social labour through the value-form (wage-labour) to the direct supply of social labour through the freely associated producers. The whole process concerns the realisation of the essence of human beings in society, which is, at the same time, the realisation of the social essence of human beings. 

Understanding Marx’s essentialism is key to understanding how Marx resolves the issue between freedom and determinism. There has been a tendency to identify Marx with the very determinism he sought to overcome – the inexorable logic and imperatives of alien powers. Against this, Marx conceived human freedom in terms of human self-determination through the reappropriation of alienated social powers and their conscious control and exercise on the part of the freely associated producers (O Neill 1973: 12/3). Indeed, with respect to his conception of individuality, Marx is not merely accenting the social individual of Aristotle, the zoon politikon or social being, arguing that human beings are social beings who individuate themselves only in community. Marx says this, of course, but he says much more, arguing for the free individual: 'society for the individual under communism changes quite substantially. It is not the social individual that communism allows for the first time, but the transcendence of that individual’ (Forbes 1990: xviii).

Marx is therefore doing more than asserting an undifferentiated species essence, the realisation of which brings about a homogeneous communal existence. Marx’s essentialism distinguishes between individualism, which contradicts the social nature of human beings, and individuality, which corresponds to that social nature. Whereas pre-capitalist formations are characterised by a unity without differentiation, and the capital system is characterised by a differentiation without unity, communism produces a unity with differentiation. Marx highlights the extent to which the individuality of human beings is social and is connected to the development of the human essence in history. The human potential to be an individual is connected to the way that social labour is supplied through history. 





Marx’s view is firmly grounded in the view that society has an essence and that the accidents and necessities that comprise the stuff of history are more than discrete events but can be properly understood only by reference to that essence. The capital system, as a society of class division, is in its essence a social metabolic order for the extraction of surplus labour from one class by another, which it achieves through the indirect supply of social labour via the value form. Marx articulates his essentialist understanding of human development with perfect clarity in Capital III: ‘The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers . . . reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure.’ To give the full quote:

The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers — a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity — which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state. This does not prevent the same economic basis — the same from the standpoint of its main conditions — due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc. from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances.

Karl Marx C3 1981: 927 

Marx defines human freedom in terms of the practical reappropriation of alienated human power and its recognition, reorganisation and exercise as social power:

All emancipation is reduction of the human world and of relationships to man himself. 
Only when real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself and as an individual man has become a species-being in his empirical life, his individual work and his individual relationships, only when man has recognized and organized his forces propres as social forces so that social force is no longer separated from him in the form of political force, only then will human emancipation be completed. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 234

Human beings are to be in conscious control of their own creations and powers. Arguing that in history there are only human beings and the forms that they engender, Marx takes his stand on ‘the people’s own creation’ and ‘the free creation of man.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 87). Human creation and power as a living social force are at the heart of Marx’s demand for the truly human society. 

It follows from this that human beings only realise themselves as human to the extent that they objectify their essential, generic powers. Alienation is a dehumanisation and a depersonalisation in the sense of denying and perverting these powers. However, the abolition of alienation is not just a rehumanisation and repersonalisation, it is a rehumanisation and repersonalisation at a higher level of development. How high a level? An essentialist understanding would answer in terms of the complete fulfilment of the human species essence. Marx sees the process as ending in the truly human society of truly human beings:

But since for socialist man the whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the creation of man through human labour, and the development of nature for man, he therefore has palpable and incontrovertible proof of his self-mediated birth, of his process of emergence. Since the essentiality [Wesenhaftigkeit] of man and of nature, man as the existence of nature for man and nature as the existence of man for man, has become practically and sensuously perceptible, the question of an alien being, a being above nature and man - a question which implies an admission of the unreality of nature and of man - has become impossible in practice. Atheism, which is a denial of this unreality, no longer has any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, through which negation it asserts the existence of man. But socialism as such no longer needs such mediation. Its starting-point is the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as essential beings. It is the positive self-consciousness of man, no longer mediated through the abolition of religion, just as real life is positive reality no longer mediated through the abolition of private property, through communism. Communism is the act of positing as the negation of the negation, and is therefore a real phase, necessary for the next period of historical development, in the emancipation and recovery of mankind. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism is not as such the goal of human development - the form of human society. 

Marx EPM EW 1975: 359.

Note the terms, ‘essentiality’, ‘essential beings’, ‘necessary form’, ‘dynamic principle of the immediate future’. Marx’s argument is set within the framework of an essentialist metaphysics concerning potentiality in the process of becoming actuality, essences in the process of realisation and completion. Such essentialist metaphysics offers the basis for a genuine teleology, restoring meaning to the world. Purpose is connected to the realisation of the human essence, to human growth, not the endless expansion of things and accumulation of quantities. Human history has a point:





Marx’s rich and expansive conception of wealth and mastery is made clear by this following passage, which is replete with essentialist notions of necessary development in history:

Wealth appears as an end in itself only among the few commercial peoples - monopolists of the carrying trade - who live in the pores of the ancient world, like the Jews in medieval society. Now, wealth is on one side a thing, realized in things, material products, which a human being confronts as subject; on the other side, as value, wealth is merely command over alien labour not with the aim of ruling, but with the aim of private consumption etc. It appears in all forms in the shape of a thing, be it an object or be it a relation mediated through the object, which is external and accidental to the individual. Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the aim of production, regardless of his limited national, religious, political character, seems to be very lofty when contrasted to the modern world, where production appears as the aim of mankind and wealth as the aim of production. In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick! Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? In bourgeois economics -and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds - this complete working-out of the human content appears as a complete emptying-out, this universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end. This is why the childish world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier. On the other side, it really is loftier in all matters where closed shapes, forms and given limits are sought for. It is satisfaction from a limited standpoint; while the modern gives no satisfaction; or, where it appears satisfied with itself, it is vulgar.

Marx Gr 1973: 488-489

The social self-mediation Marx’s mastery embodies overcomes the split between a transcendence conceived in the sense of a Megamachine Society detached from Nature, and an immanence conceived in the sense of a purely physical Nature. Marx’s truly human society, critically absorbing Aristotle’s Politikon Bion and Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, entails human beings as social, moral and rational beings consciously determining their ends over against the requirements and imperatives of some wider entity, whether this is Nature or a social metabolic order of alien control which frustrates the human essence, even though it is a human creation. In other words, this line of thinking sees the social metabolism and the natural metabolism in relation to each other, beyond the dictates of a natural and social necessity, the interaction between them being mediated by human activity and its organisation. Marx is seeking a social order which corresponds to rather than contradicts the human ontology, and such an order is the truly human society achieved by the realisation of the social essence of human beings.

The end of an essentialist metaphysics, then, is a social order which corresponds to rather than contradicts the human ontology, and such an order is the truly human society achieved by the realisation of the social essence of human beings. The necessary lines of development entailed by essentialism is not direct and unmediated, but mediated by human praxis. Such development is necessary but frustratable and hence is not inevitable. There is a key role for creative human agency as expressed in social action, ethics and politics.

This is a liberatory vision, certainly. The full realisation of human capacities and abilities implies a defetishised social order which has transcended the alienation of power. The key is the abolition of an alienated system of production. A condition of alienation entails an inability to comprehend the social forms engendered by human subjects as human products, mistaking them instead for entities with an independent existence of their own. What critics of the delusions of progress identify as teleology is actually the determinism of alienated social powers that have escaped human comprehension and control, and which in their independence come to impose their alien logic upon human subjects from the outside. The solution to this bad teleology is to understand these powers as forms possessing an underlying essence, which are comprehensible and controllable by the human agents who are the originary power. And this requires a recovery of essentialist categories and teleological thinking in terms of real individuals, concrete reality, the relation of the part and the whole, notions of necessary and accidental change, the real natures of history’s successive organic wholes and social metabolic orders, an understanding of their specific social forms, potential and the realisations of potential in the coming-to-be of the truly human society of truly human beings – true as defined in terms of an essence, and purpose as defined in terms of the realisation of that essence.

12 The Metaphysical (Re)construction of Economic Life

Marx’s Aristotelian economics
In clarifying the meaning of essentialism, Terry Eagleton makes clear the extent to which ‘this kind of moral thinking … was inherited by Karl Marx, who was much indebted to Aristotle even in his economic thought.’ (Eagleton 2003: 142 143-144).

That reference to Marx being influenced by Aristotle in his economic thought sheds interesting light on the essentialist metaphysics at the core of Marx’s Capital. In the Marx 1873 Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital, Marx complains that ‘the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me in that … I treat economics metaphysically’ whilst failing to write ‘recipes (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future.’ This, says Marx, shows how ‘little understood’ his method is.

Such misunderstanding can only be avoided if we familiarize ourselves with the philosophical roots of Marx’s critique. In Aristotle's Economic Thought (1995), Scott Meikle goes in search of Aristotle’s economic theory only to find that he doesn’t have one! Meikle writes on it being ‘mysterious that economics, alone among the disciplines of modern thought, should appear to find so little foundation in the Greek heritage, which has been so profoundly influential almost everywhere else,’ noting that ‘even those texts that have the strongest “economic” flavour—Aristotle's—are really entirely ethical in character rather than “economic” in any sense.’ (Meikle 1995: Introduction). When I read that comment I was immediately struck by its implications with respect to the familiar criticism that Marx is weak on the institutions of a functioning economy precisely because he possessed a disdain for the economic, condemning it on moral grounds. Aron thus criticises that Marx, locating all the evils of mankind in the commodity form, demands that it is ‘the very category of the economic that must be abolished’ (Aron 1984). It should come as no surprise, then, that Marx does not provide a constructive model of a viable socialist economy. For Merquior, Marx’s critique of alienation implies nothing less than the end of the economy and of economics (Merquior 1986: 53). I could counter by arguing that, for Marx, the end of the capital and commodity forms does not mean the end of productive activity but its liberation from the domination and distortion of exchange value under capitalist relations, but that would be beside the point here. In another part of his critique, Merquior alleges that Marx was not prepared to think of communism as ‘a moral supersession of capitalism.’ Actually, Marx did precisely that, leaving him open to the criticism that he sought the extirpation of the economic as such on moral grounds. The controversies here cannot be resolved by trading texts back and forth, but only by understanding the different philosophical and methodological standpoints in play. In effect, two modes of thought are talking past one another here. Marx is being misunderstood, and hence falsely criticised. Eagleton and Meikle give us the clue in pointing to the influence of Aristotle.

Before going deeper into the metaphysics, let me set the argument in some kind of popular context. In Quality and Quantity in Economics: The Metaphysical Construction of the Economic Realm, Scott Meikle refers to a popular feeling in the world today that accountants, economists, and other official and authoritative types who deal mainly with money inhabit a different world from everyone else. Whilst this ‘economic world’ maps roughly onto the ordinary world of things, people, and the activities of life, ‘it comes subtly adrift at important points in ways that produce bafﬂement.’ (Meikle 2001).

The insistence on the part of economists that it is they who live in the ‘real world’ comes with the heavy implication that their critics and detractors inhabit a world of dreams, delusions, and fantasies. Whilst that insistence is often enough to silence opposition, coming as it does from such authoritative sources, the common folk rarely find their claims wholly convincing or satisfactory, least of all coming from a profession that advanced the idea that complex derivatives were key to increasing economic efficiency in the financial services industry. In some vague way, people sense that economic science isn’t, maybe, as scientific as its exponents claim, and is very far from always being right. Meikle argues that this popular feeling with respect to the strangeness of the economic world has substantial grounding of a kind that cannot simply be brushed aside as inexpert ‘folk economics.’ Actually, this ‘folk economics’ is closer to the truth, closer to the true ‘science of man,’ than is economic science. 

‘The feeling presupposes a contrast between a commonsense world and an economic world, and if there is such a contrast to be drawn, it ought to be possible to say something about these worlds and how and why they differ.’ The commonsense world refers to the world as it is ordinarily thought of and spoken about, with ‘ordinary’ thought and speech referring to thought and speech conducted in terms of the concepts of the natural language we all use. Likewise, the economic world is the world as it is thought of and spoken about using economic concepts. To make his point simply, Meikle focuses on two ordinary concepts which have fundamental places in our common conceptual scheme for dealing with the world and its contents, that of a thing and that of an activity. ‘Ordinary English has been partly penetrated by economic or market conceptions, but by considering old and fundamental concepts there may be some hope of navigating around this obstacle.’ He explains that these ordinary or natural language concepts have logical features which characterize them and connect them with other concepts in the scheme. Meikle describes this tissue of characteristics and connections as ‘the metaphysics of natural language.’ Since the eighteenth century, economists have sought new forms of expression to better describe the new capitalist economy that emerged in that age. Through the reformation of the metaphysics of the ordinary concepts of a thing and an activity, economics emerged as a discrete science. Meikle charts that reformation and its consequences in his article.

Alasdair MacIntyre has illuminated aspects of modernity by ways of a contrast with premodernity in the philosophies of knowledge, ethics, and politics. Likewise, Meikle contrasts thought about matters that are today called ‘economic’ with an older tradition of metaphysics. The ordinary concepts of thing and activity, and their corresponding economic ones of utility and labour, evidently contest the same ground as elements of alternative or rival ways of handling certain portions and aspects of the world of ordinary experience. Meikle thus draws a contrast between modern market thinking and premodern thought which did not suffer from this modern difﬁculty. In the process, he shows that the ‘commonsense’ ‘folk’ feeling that there is something badly awry in the modern science of economics to be fundamentally right. He goes further to show that the substantive grounding of this feeling can be found in an essentialist metaphysics going back to Aristotle:

Aristotle’s philosophy sticks very closely to the metaphysics of natural language. He saw it as the task of philosophy as he understood it to discover the logical characteristics of the concepts in common use in the natural language and the connections they have with other concepts in the scheme. This is a descriptive conception of the philosophical task rather than a reforming, or “revisionary,” one, as P. F. Strawson put it. Wittgenstein was alarmed at the relaxed habits which mainstream Anglophone philosophy had got into regarding attempts to reform the metaphysics of natural language, which some in that tradition have disdained as the “metaphysics of the Stone Age.” Whether or not one is inclined to share Wittgenstein’s general alarm, there is, I think, good reason for caution about such reforms in the case of economics. Aristotle’s accounts of the ideas of a thing and an activity provide insight into just what our ordinary ideas of these things are, both in classical Greek and in English. That is one reason why Aristotle is a useful author to consider here.

Meikle adds the further, not inconsiderable reason, that the ideas contained in the Nicomachean Ethics 5.5 and Politics 1.8–10, dealing with matters that are today considered ‘economic,’ have exerted a ‘profound inﬂuence on the ideas of modern critics of the market, especially Marx and Keynes.’

In Aristotle’s Economic Thought, Meikle refers to the Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy published in 1742 by Francis Hutcheson, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Glasgow and the teacher of Adam Smith. Book 3 of this work is entitled ‘The Principles of Oeconomics and Polities,’ a book almost exclusively devoted to politics. Book 2 is entitled 'Elements of the Law of Nature' and contains an account of property, succession, contracts, the value of goods and coin, and the laws of war. Commenting on this in The Ancient Economy, Finley writes that ‘these were evidently not part of “oeconomics”’ for Hutcheson. Finley’s sarcasm here makes it clear that he has missed the point, just as others do with respect to the nature of Marx’s economics. Hutcheson was neither careless nor perverse, writes Meikle in response: ‘he stood at the end of a tradition stretching back more than 2000 years. The book that became the model for the tradition still represented by Hutcheson was the Oifeonomifeos written by the Athenian Xenophon before the middle of the fourth century bc.’ This was a work of practical advice to the gentleman landowner about the sound management of an estate, its slaves, household, and land. Finley’s conclusion here is significant: ‘There was no road from the "oeconomics" of Francis Hutcheson to the Wealth of Nations of Adam Smith, published twenty-four years later.’ (Finley 1973: 17 20.) Which is to say that the economics of the modern world and the economics of this 2000 year old tradition are not the same, have different concerns and set economic activity within different frames of behaviour and different ends. It is a conclusion drawn by Tomas Sedlacek in the Economics of Good and Evil (2011). And since that is so, Meikle writes, ‘then questions about our own time are thrown into relief.’ 

Here we find Marx’s Aristotelian roots in his emphasis on public life, politics as creative self-actualisation, and the intertwining of politics and ethics. And here we reveal the profoundly and inherently ethical character of Marx’s practical concern with transforming the world. With this understanding we see clearly the way that Marx is seeking to repoliticize and remoralize the world through the provision of extensive public spaces that reclaim the political and ethical commons from the market economy, enabling individuals to associate together and govern their common affairs as citizens of the public realm, as against being self-interested atoms cancelling each other out in a market society characterised by universal egoism and antagonism:





The modern world is characterised by the divorce between fact and value, science and ethics. This points to the pathos of means and ends in a society in which untrammelled economic imperatives have been freed from communal, governmental, ethical and ecological constraints to become ends in themselves – an endless expansionism of means ensuring a constant diminution of meaning. The most important decisions with respect to the means of material life have been removed from the common control of the people, whether this is exercised politically or ethically – the two go together in the ancient tradition – and placed under the systemic control of the capital system, mediated by economic ‘science.’ Marx contested this capitalistic annexation of the commons as a desolidarisation, demoralisation and depoliticisation, and so has been criticised as being against the economic as such. The clue to understanding this criticism of Marx is to be found in the Aristotelian and essentialist roots of Marx’s metaphysics. The words that Meikle writes on Aristotle apply also to Marx:





This Aristotelian or essentialist metaphysics runs right through Marx. And it isn’t concealed, either. Marx is quite explicit in employing essentialist categories. These categories are crucial to his distinction between use value and exchange value. In the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy from 1859, the warm-up for Capital, Marx writes at length on the distinction between use-value and exchange-value. Use-value, he declares, is the immediate physical entity in which a definite economic relationship – exchange-value – is expressed. At first, exchange-value appears to be ‘a quantitative relation,’ the proportion in which use-values are exchanged for one another. In this relation they constitute equal exchangeable magnitudes. Thus one volume of Propertius and eight ounces of snuff may have the same exchange-value, despite the dissimilar use-values of snuff and elegies. Considered as exchange-value, one use-value is worth just as much as another, provided the two are available in the appropriate proportion. Irrespective of their natural form of existence, and without regard to the specific character of the needs they satisfy as use-values, ‘commodities in definite quantities are congruent, they take one another’s place in the exchange process, are regarded as equivalents, and despite their motley appearance have a common denominator.’
Use-values serve directly as means of existence. They are themselves, though, the ‘products of social activity, the result of expended human energy, materialized labour.’ As objectification of social labour, all commodities are crystallisations of the same substance. Marx proceeds to examine the specific character of this substance, i.e., of labour which is embodied in exchange-value.

Let us suppose that one ounce of gold, one ton of iron, one quarter of wheat and twenty yards of silk are exchange-values of equal magnitude. As exchange-values in which the qualitative difference between their use-values is eliminated, they represent equal amounts of the same kind of labour. The labour which is uniformly materialised in them must be uniform, homogeneous, simple labour; it matters as little whether this is embodied in gold, iron, wheat or silk, as it matters to oxygen whether it is found in rusty iron, in the atmosphere, in the juice of grapes or in human blood. But digging gold, mining iron, cultivating wheat and weaving silk are qualitatively different kinds of labour. In fact, what appears objectively as diversity of the use-values, appears, when looked at dynamically, as diversity of the activities which produce those use-values.

Karl Marx Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. 1859 Part 1 The Commodity 29.

‘Since Marx is so explicit,’ Meikle writes, ‘it needs explaining why so many of his expositors, friendly or otherwise, should have missed his main point, as they have in seeing little difference between his theory of value and that of Smith and Ricardo.’ Far from being a minor post-Ricardian and far from rehashing the economic theories of others, (which is how economists have tended to dismiss Marx, e.g. Samuelson and Keynes), Marx is working within an entirely different mode of thought. Meikle thus considers the likeliest explanation for such misunderstanding to be the ‘lack of familiarity among Marx's readers with the Aristotelian theory he was working from.’ Marx was an Aristotelian among the moderns, and hence at constant cross-purposes with those who had thought the Enlightenment to have rendered the old Stagirite obsolete. The lack of familiarity 





Paul Samuelson dismissed Marx as ‘a minor post-Ricardian,’ ‘an autodidact cut off in his lifetime from competent criticism and stimulus.’ (Samuelson 1957: 911). OK, but when it came to the crash of the 1980s, Samuelson admitted that neither he nor the professional economics had any idea what caused it. Then came the crash of 2007. ‘The only guy who really called this right was Karl Marx.’ (Time, "10 Questions for Jim Cramer,’ May 14, 2009.) I would have thought that may have stimulated professional economists to ponder why Marx’s ‘prophecies’ retain a power and relevance over such a long period of time, beyond more sophisticated mathematical models. But Samuelson’s condescending view has been common in the economics profession. Guild Socialist G. D. H. Cole wrote that 

not one single idea in this theory of value was invented by Marx, or would have been regarded by him as an original contribution of his own to economic science, Marx merely took over this conception from the classical economists broadly repeating what they had said, and what most economists of the earlier nineteenth century implicitly believed. There is nothing specifically Marxian about Marx's theory of value; what is novel is the use to which he puts the theory, and not the theory itself.

Cole, Introduction to the Everyman edn. of Capital (London, 1930), p. xxi.

Cole’s view may be true insofar as it goes, it’s just that it doesn’t go very far at all. The fact that this point needs to be made indicates that the real point – Marx’s novelty in ‘the use to which he puts the theory’ – is missed:





I could fill a book with similar criticisms of Marx from professional economists, so many, indeed, that many would conclude that the critics must be right. Or have misunderstood Marx’s method so as to be referring to something that is besides the point. Keynes treated Capital with disdain, writing in a letter to George Bernard Shaw:

As for my view of Marx, I said nothing in that article except to accuse you and Stalin of being still satisfied with his view of the capitalist world 'which had much verisimilitude in his day is unrecognisable three quarters of a century later'. Surely it is certain that the picture has changed out of recognition.
My feelings about Das Kapital are the same as my feelings about the Koran. I know that it is historically important and I know that many people, not all of whom are idiots, find it a sort of Rock of Ages and containing inspiration. Yet when I look into it, it is to me inexplicable that it can have this effect. Its dreary, out-of-date, academic controversialising seems so extraordinarily unsuitable as material for the purpose. But then, as I have said, I feel just the same about the Koran. How could either of these books carry fire and sword round half the world? It beats me. Clearly there is some defect in my understanding. Do you believe both Das Kapital and the Koran? Or only Das Kapital? But whatever the sociological value of the latter, I am sure that its contemporary economic value (apart from occasional but inconstructive and discontinuous flashes of insight) is nil. Will you promise to read it again, if I do?

Keynes CW, vol 28

Economic theorists look for an economic theory in Marx and can’t find one, and so dismiss Marx’s economics as ‘barren’ and ‘inconstructive.’ ‘Clearly there is some defect in my understanding,’ writes Keynes, before concluding that the ‘economic value’ of Marx’s Capital is ‘nil.’ What Keynes, like many, fail to understand is that Marx did not write economic theory and was not concerned to replace existing economic theories of the capital system with a theory of his own concerning the socialist economy. In that sense of economic theory and constructive models of an alternative society, the value of Marx’s Capital is, if not exactly ‘nil,’ then negligible. It isn’t Marx’s point. Marx wrote the critique of political economy. Marx’s economics has been ignored or dismissed by professional economists. Karl Marx referred to economists as experts by way of bourgeois stupidity, ‘sycophants of the bourgeois.’ (Marx Gr 1973: 273/4). 

Back in 1994, Paul Ormerod, professor of economics, wrote the book The Death of Economics, showing how economists’ claims to knowledge are false in theory and often disastrous in practice. Ormerod is on the right lines, on the way to catching up with Marx’s insight and achievement on this relation of theory and practice. Marx is not writing theory, he is engaged in critique, and that critique is steeped in an essentialist metaphysics which employs categories that are quite distinct from those in the theories of classical economics which Marx is alleged to have borrowed. That Marx’s economic ‘theory’ is unoriginal and derivative is neither here nor there.

Nature and Commensurability
The Aristotelian and utilitarian theories of action are quite different, and the difference is important to understand since Marx subscribes to the former and is critical of the latter. The dominance of the utilitarian theory is such that it can appear to be the only theory of action, with the result that Marx can appear to be not just out of kilter, but beyond the pale and just plain wrong for that reason. The truth is that Marx stands in a long and noble tradition, and it is utilitarianism that is out of kilter, albeit entirely in tune with the ‘inverted’ economic system which straddles the modern world, with all that that implies with respect to a social and planetary unravelling.

Scott Meikle acknowledges the great influence that the utilitarian theory of action has had among economically literate readers of all shades of opinion. Utilitarianism recognizes only one end, pleasure or utility, and all actions are considered to be means to that end. These actions differ not by end but only in their efficacy in promoting the single end they are all considered to share. Meikle emphasizes that this conception of action harmonizes well with the economic concept of ‘labour’ and the way it aggregates activities without regard to differences of end. Marx found this economic concept of ‘labour’ ‘peculiar,’ Meikle writes, ‘for recognizably Aristotelian reasons,’ it’s just that his expositors, friends and foe alike, ‘seldom have because they seldom grasped those reasons.’ Instead, it is Marx who can be made to look ‘peculiar.’ But it is this that gives him the critical edge:

If it is supposed, as it was by Marx, that labour is the matter of exchange value (or its 'substance' as Marx was apt to put it), then it cannot have this role in the form of the natural or useful labour which produces use values, as Smith and Ricardo had believed. Such a role can be played only by a metaphysically peculiar kind of labour, one which is homogeneous, uniform, and without quality, or as Marx put it, 'equal human labour, and consequently labour of equal quality.’ (Marx, Capital, I 152).

Meikle 1995 ch 9, emphasis added

If natural labours were to be at the bottom of this, then they would have to have undergone a metaphysical transformation into an abstract sort of labour with the same properties as exchange value itself; a transformation from something qualitative, which is discriminated into species, into a quantity without species. Marx explains that this transformation is brought about by the process of systematic exchange; it is through the adjustments of prices that labour is allocated in a market economy.

With respect to the twofold nature of labour, Marx claimed this to have been his original discovery. Marx was proud of this distinction because he considered that it overturned Smith and Ricardo, who had held the theory that (natural) labour is the substance of value, a view which, ironically, and mistakenly is often attributed to Marx himself. Marx writes: ‘I was the first to point out and to examine critically this twofold nature of the labour contained in commodities’ (Marx C1 ch. 1, sect. 2). Marx would have found the controversy over his originality, or lack of, with respect to the theories of classical economics unamusing, indicating as it does an almost complete misunderstanding of his method and purpose. Marx claimed to have been original in the discovery of three things, and this distinction with respect to the twofold nature of labour is one of them. Meikle thus finds it ‘strange’ that the precise distinction he had in mind should have been so generally overlooked by his expositors. ‘To suggest, as it sometimes has been, that machinery and de-skilling can by a sociological process turn useful labour into abstract labour is a category mistake, because natural labour cannot be the substance of exchange value, not at any rate without some modulation into a non-natural and quantitative property. Rosdolsky, who is aware of the importance of the distinction, none the less commits the category mistake (Rosdolsky 1977: 510-12. See also Cohen, who can be at least construed as suggesting the same idea in writing that 'labour becomes abstract under capitalism in a further sense', since the considerations he goes on to offer describe changes in natural labour, 1988: 194).

Aristotle has no labour theory of value, declares Meikle. In fact, ‘he simply has no theory of value at all. His contribution is not to have offered such a theory, but to have given a precise formulation of the problem which a theory of value has to solve.’ Eric Roll is therefore right to conclude that ‘While Aristotle is thus responsible for the beginning of a real analysis of the problem of exchange-value, it was not until the rise of the classical political economy of the eighteenth century that a positive theory of value was first developed.’ (Roll 1954: 37). But that doesn’t mean that classical political economy was an advance on the Aristotelian view of the economic. It does mean that there is a metaphysical difference in the approaches, which is important to understand, since Marx is an Aristotelian on the matter, employing the concepts of classical economics but with essentialist meanings. Hence the confusion and bafflement of economists and critics, hence the early reviewer of Capital drawing attention to the metaphysical character of Marx’s economics.

‘Aristotle's metaphysics was a metaphysics of the solid world of use value, and because of that he was able to frame the problem of exchange value. But he was unable to solve it for the same reason. On his metaphysics, the concepts needed for the solution are conceptual impossibilities.’

Meikle explains what he means by this:





Meikle notes that ‘economic theory has ridden roughshod over the category distinction between quality and quantity which holds between use value and exchange value.’ (Meikle 1995: 190-91). Indeed, in the course of its development, economic science, liberating the economic from communal, ethical, political, and ecological constraints, has increasingly suppressed use value as an independent category. The consequences of that suppression are all around us. We live in a world of a quantitative levelling that proceeds at the expense of qualitative expression. Stated so baldly, people may come to appreciate the distinction being made. But the point goes deeper. It goes into something that E.F. Schumacher insisted on, but which was nevertheless overlooked in his own work. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful is a well-known, well-loved text, but not well-understood. People responded to his call for appropriate scale and technology, but they missed his most important condition of restoration – ‘metaphysical reconstruction.’ 

What I’m struggling to do is to help recapture something our ancestors had. If we can just regain the consciousness the West had before the Cartesian Revolution, which I call the Second Fall of Man, then we’ll be getting somewhere.

E.F. Schumacher, quoted in Peter Critchley, The Economics of Purpose – E.F. Schumacher and R.H. Tawney 2015 
http://pcritchley2.wixsite.com/beingandplace/single-post/2015/05/08/The-Economics-of-Purpose---EF-Schumacher-and-RH-Tawney (​http:​/​​/​pcritchley2.wixsite.com​/​beingandplace​/​single-post​/​2015​/​05​/​08​/​The-Economics-of-Purpose---EF-Schumacher-and-RH-Tawney​))

Smith and Ricardo had themselves distinguished between use value and exchange value, but they did not probe the distinction with any metaphysical care. In contrast, Marx recognized the distinction and ‘worked painstakingly through the metaphysics of economic value in chapter 1 of Capital.’ (Meikle). Marx took ‘metaphysical reconstruction’ seriously, to the extent that he returned to this issue over and again, up to and including the Notes on Wagner in 1881. 

If the issue seems arcane, then consider the practical and political implications. Bakunin accused Marx of wanting to make logicians of us all, demanding ‘action’ instead of all this logic chopping. ‘Bakunin held that it was less important to get one’s metaphysics together than to act. Unlike Marx, Bakunin was inclined to believe it was more valuable to reach thousands with a message that was a little less clear than to reach scores with the tightly argued results of years of research.’ (Leier 141). For Marx, it matters a great deal how we act and to what ends our actions are ordered. The metaphysics matter. Lack clarity in your own principles of action, and you very easily end up the prisoners of another’s, or of those of ‘the system.’ For instance, the distinction between capitalism and the capital system matters. Just ‘act,’ without making the fine distinctions here, and you very easily end up remaining within the capital relation, reproducing the capital system at a more general level, and all in the name of socialism.

The conclusion that Marx reached was that ‘use value and exchange value are distinct and largely incompatible ends, which in their natures cannot both be pursued satisfactorily in a society at the same time.’ Gudeman and Rivera thus declare that ‘the analytical division between use value and exchange value has remained a central theme in Marxist economics.’ (Gudeman and Rivera 1990: 49). After chapter 1 on The Commodity in Capital, Marx proceeds to demonstrate the law-like nature of the capital economy ‘as a system organized by, and for, the pursuit primarily of exchange value, and to showing how this entails the systematic subordination of use value and human good.’ (Meikle 1995: 190-191).

Whilst the distinction between use value and exchange value was central to Marx’s critique of political economy, it was progressively elided in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Given the extent to which the name of John Stuart Mill continues to figure prominently in left liberal/green thinking, seeking an alternative to capitalism that is not socialist and decidedly not Marxist, it is worth noticing the extent to which Mill is complicit in this elision, and hence complicit in the quantifying of the world and the levelling of use value. Mill blurs the distinction between value in use and price in a way that causes value to lose its conceptual independence, defining wealth as ‘all useful or agreeable things, which possess exchangeable value.’ That definition says nothing, but merely asserts the very thing that stands in need of explanation. We are back to what Marx said about Bentham, ‘a genius of bourgeois stupidity,’ his views on utility as the ‘most homespun commonplace’ strutting about in a ‘self-satisfied a way.’ (Karl Marx, Capital, vol.I. Footnote to Chapter XXII.). Mill’s hopes for the stationary state on these terms are pious and, in light of clarification, exposed as hypocritical. The emphasis on exchangeable value is an emphasis on quantity, on something that is easily monetized and mathemetized. The door was thus opened, with the elision that began here going much further with the arrival of neo-classical economics. Here, we see the marginalist revolution and the replacing of value with price, and with it the loss of the possibility of Marx’s immanent critique of capital through the metaphysical category of labour. Economics had become a ‘science.’ 

With Stanley Jevons, the focus is shifted decisively away from usefulness in production and consumption toward usefulness in buying and selling so that the independent notion of value in use comes to be lost entirely. Jevons considered that most errors in economics were the result of the presence of qualitative notions – notions such as those employed most critically by Marx. 

Accordingly Jevons’ overriding concern was to replace qualitative economic concepts – such as those employed by Marx - with quantitative versions of them. And utility, or what had once been called ‘value in use,’ was at the top of his list. In the preface to The Theory of Political Economy, Jevons presents his view of economics:

I have long thought that it deals throughout with quantities ... I have endeavoured to arrive at accurate quantitative notions concerning Utility, Value, Labour, Capital, &c . . . Mathematical readers may think that I have explained some elementary notions, that of degree of utility, for instance, with unnecessary prolixity. But it is to the neglect of economists to obtain clear and accurate notions of quantity and degree of utility that I venture to attribute the present difficulties and imperfections of the science.

The classical notion of usefulness, or value in use, stood in the way of these ambitions. The idea that things are useful for particular purposes is a heterogeneous notion that is capable of only limited quantification. Jevons proceeded to remove it, presenting in its place a notion of utility that is severed from the heterogeneous notion. Against this notion, Jevons’ utility denotes a generic ‘usefulness’ which is not discriminated into species, and which may inhere indiscriminately in things of any kind. In other words, Jevons proposes a ‘usefulness’ that is ‘unconnected with the actual usefulness of a thing, or with the purpose it was made to serve, and it is indifferent to the physical constitution of things of that kind in virtue of which they are useful for a purpose.’ (Meikle in Mäki 2001).

This undifferentiated ‘usefulness’ is an economic construct which, unlike the ordinary concept of usefulness, is common to all things. Usefulness, by this device, had been made into something uniform, homogeneous, and measurable, just like money or exchange-value, with which it could then be aligned or confused. The impression is given that the difficulty posed for economic thought by recalcitrant fact that things fall into incommensurable kinds has been overcome. The differences of purpose which those things of different kinds are useful for, have been put out of the picture and replaced by the single purpose of exchanging them, that is, their usefulness in use has been subordinated to their usefulness in exchange or buying and selling. Things are regarded only or primarily as exchangeable items, and one differs from another only or primarily in the magnitude of its value in exchange.

Meikle in Mäki 2001

The very points that Marx had made as criticisms of the capital system had come to be raised to the status of necessary principle. The price of not taking metaphysics seriously is to live in subjection to the metaphysics of another. The metaphysical (re)construction of the economic realm, and of life in general, matters, and matters for the most practical of reasons. The quantitative levelling of the world to the neglect, even the destruction of, the qualitative realm of use value is the result of the bad metaphysics inherent in the accumulative dynamics of the capital system. Marx saw it this tyranny of the quantitative coming:

If commodities could speak, they would say this: our use-value may interest men, but it does not belong to us as objects. What does belong to us as objects, however, is our value. Our own intercourse as commodities proves it. We relate to each other merely as exchange-values.

Marx C1 1976: 177

Economic science, it seems, is not interested in human beings and human intercourse, only the monetized intercourse of commodities. If you are not taking metaphysics seriously, rest assured, the other side will be. Jevons made his intentions on this plain, beginning the preface to the second edition of The Theory of Political Economy by explaining that ‘certain new sections have been added, the most important of which are those treating of the dimensions of economic quantities. The subject, of course, is one which lies at the basis of all clear thought about economic science. It cannot be surprising that many debates end in logomachy [a dispute over or about words], when it is still uncertain … what kind of quantity utility itself is.’

The contrast with Aristotle and Marx is stark, as indeed it must be given the express intention to extinguish essentialist metaphysics. The category distinction between use value and exchange value is fundamental to Aristotle. In the Politics Aristotle examines the ends of action that must flow from this difference between use value and exchange, contrasting the pursuit of exchange value as an end of action with the pursuit of use value as an end. The controlling principle of Aristotle’s analysis is the good for human beings, and the conclusions he establishes with respect to the ends of action are drawn in relation to that principle. Meikle thus emphasizes that ‘Aristotle’s discussion is ethical not economic. Economics itself does not consider ends, and indeed it makes a virtue of this, as a condition of its scientific status. (For an amusing and telling onslaught by an economist on the instrumental view of reason adopted in contemporary economics in preference to a substantive one, see Campbell 1983: 122 35; also Ormerod 1990).





Meikle concludes that Aristotle’s inquiries are therefore ‘ethical and metaphysical, not economic.’ And given that ‘Marx’s analysis of exchange value follows out the logic of Aristotle’s,’ and ‘is worked out on the basis of Aristotelian metaphysics,’ the same can be said of Marx’s critical analysis. Here, we come to the clash of metaphysics, and the importance of metaphysical clarification and reconstruction. And we see here why anti-essentialism is such a live political issue, given that it is conceived as the direct antithesis of Marx’s substantive notions. Identified with the Left, anti-essentialism effectively incapacitates Marxism from within, rendering its emancipatory critique ineffective. As Meikle remarks on essentialist metaphysics, ‘most of the common arguments usually regarded as fatal to it rest on principles of Humean metaphysics, so that it is fair to say that the case against Marx’s theory largely depends on a decision to favour Humean rather than Aristotelian metaphysics.’ (Meikle 1995: 198). But those arguments commonly regarded as fatal to essentialism are anything but, they are poorly reasoned and conceived in ignorance or misrepresentation of essentialist categories:





Where the topic is considered, it proceeds not through direct engagement with essentialist metaphysics, but at second-hand via phantoms and caricatures.

Meikle’s conclusion makes the case for metaphysical reconstruction. The idea that the analysis of exchange value, or economic value, belongs properly or exclusively to economics is not only a mistake, but a mistake with deleterious practical consequences. In driving out substantive, qualitative notions with respect to use value, scientific status has been attained at the expense of the good and the science of the good. We have lost the true ends of action and with them clarity with respect to constituting the good life for human beings. That, of course, is an ethical question, and such philosophical inquiries as to value and its nature are ruled out as incapable of being quantified and therefore unscientific. The analysis here has shown that ‘this is a mistake, and that such an analysis must of its nature be metaphysical.’ However, this issue is not merely one of disciplinary rights and rivalries with respect to the key questions of living. The issue goes deeper into what it is to be human and what, indeed, constitutes the good life for human beings. 

If much of what I have written sounds like the familiar refrain ‘back to Aristotle,’ then the reason for that has to do with more than nostalgia. It has to do with a critical recovery of the key dimensions of ethics, politics and philosophy. Historically, these disciplines were not merely systems of study but regimes of living, involving a rigorous ‘science of man’ concerned with enlightening and aiding human beings in their quest for the good life. Consciousness of the difference between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ is not only an important component of this quest, in the scientific terms of a distinction between appearance and reality, but in the ethical terms of a distinction between an existent reality and a non-existent, but potentially existent, future reality contained in some way within that reality. This future reality could be conceived as a morally desirable future in terms of corresponding to the human good, and could therefore become the object of human will and action. Of course, human beings being what they are, there is much messiness, untidiness, confusion and wishful thinking involved in this blurring of the distinction between fact and value. It’s just that, in being human, and continually engaged in the quest of becoming fully human, something essential is lost when we discard substantive questions in favour of quantitative precision – we lose a large part of what it is to be human, we lose what it is to be a political animal, which, for Aristotle, is the whole point of the human enterprise.

The mistake, then, in this dualism of quantity and quality, fact and value, exchange value and use value is a mistake which, in denigrating philosophy, politics and ethics in their ancient understanding, divorces us from the true ends of action, oriented toward the human good, with the result that our knowledge and know-how continues to misfire. The traditional concern of philosophy has been generally understood to be aiding human beings in understanding themselves, their world and their place in it. Politics and ethics (with economics conceived as a branch of both) as the field of practical reason are understood in this sense as determining the means by which human beings attain this self-understanding through taking their true place in the world. Plato and Aristotle thus devoted large parts of their work to the attempt to understand human social existence with a view to realizing the good. 

I have throughout emphasized Marx’s roots in this traditional concern of philosophy. I have at the same time made it clear that Marx was engaged in no mere project of recovery or updating, for the simple reason that Marx well knew the impossibilities of such things. As Meikle argues:





That’s the capitalist world of extensive connections and disconnections that Marx analysed at length. Such a world is not easily transformed. Mediation matters. There is no going ‘back to nature’ or back to earlier, simpler, forms of premodern social life. It can’t be done, not least because the problem is not simply chronological, it is structural, and must therefore be resolved in accordance with the sociohistorical specificities of the prevailing reproductive order. (Mészáros 1995: 140). Marx examined the quantitative levelling of the world and everyone and everything in it under the pursuit of exchange value at length. Meikle summarizes:





Meikle concludes with a call for clarity: ‘If we are to make as good a job of our task as Plato and Aristotle made of theirs, we need to understand this difference between their world and ours, and that is not possible if exchange value is taken for granted, or consigned to the “dismal science” of economics. Looked at in this light, the analysis of exchange value is the main problem in modern social philosophy.’ (Meikle 1995: 200).

Minds impatient for action, who know intrinsically, as part of their inexpert folk wisdom, may baulk at Marx’s supposed attempt to turn us all into logicians. I’d strongly advise, before acting, that the action men familiarize themselves with the nature of Marx’s critique, with its categories, with the substantive values he deals with. It could save us yet more detours and deviations in the future, and yet more retreats and returns to capital in consequence. Practical failure is the result of metaphysical failure.

13 The Transcendence of the Immanent Contradictions of Capital
There are clear affinities between the organic dialectics which Hegel develops and Marx's concern with the contradictory dynamics of the capital system, what Marx called an ‘immanent contradiction’ within various aspects of capitalist production (Marx 1976 ch 15 pp 531/3). Chapter 15 of Capital III is titled ‘Development of the Law’s Internal Contradictions’. 

There are, however, key differences between Hegel and Marx, differences which ensure that Hegel remained incapable of transcending capital’s alienated system of mediation, hence Marx’s criticism. Hegel, indeed, presented capital’s alienated forms as rational (as did Max Weber a century later), whilst Marx could see these alien forms as capable of being uprooted and, indeed, as needing to be uprooted if indeed appearance and essence were to be united.

The critical awareness of the distinction between appearance and reality permeates the analyses that Marx undertook. In Capital III, he makes this distinction clear with a critical comment on those who remain on the surface level of appearances:

Vulgar economics actually does nothing more than interpret, systematize and turn into apologetics the notions of agents trapped within bourgeois relations of production. So it should not surprise us that precisely in the estranged form of appearance of economic relations that involves these prima facie absurd and complete contradictions - and all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their essence - that precisely here vulgar economics feels completely at home, these relationships appearing all the more self-evident to it, the more their inner connections remain hidden, even though they are comprehensible to the popular mind.

Marx C3 1981 ch 48 956

Marx’s critical comments here apply to all those who render the alien forms of the capital system rational, permanent and untranscendable. I have, in Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, addressed rationalization as a form of apologetics, an ideological project that naturalizes what ought to be historicized, tracing this approach in its evolution from classical political economy up to and including Max Weber. Here, I am concerned to establish Marx’s distinction between appearance and essence. In discussing ‘prices of production,’ Marx comments:

In competition, therefore, everything appears upside-down. The finished configuration [Gestalt] of economic relations, as these are visible on the surface, in their actual existence [realen Existenz], and therefore also in the notions [Vorstellungen] with which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to gain an understanding of them, is very different from the configuration of their inner core, which is essential [wesentlichen] but concealed [verhullten], and the concept [Begriff] corresponding to it. It is in fact the very reverse and antithesis of this.

Marx C3 1981: 311 

Marx opposes ‘actual existence’ with the surface level appearance, pointing to an ‘inner core’ that is essential but concealed, something immanent that needs to be brought to consciousness.

The parallels I have been concerned to draw between Hegel and Marx on method are apparent. However, there is this key difference: Marx doesn’t just draw a distinction between appearance and essence, he goes further to ask why these things come to diverge so markedly and even come to exist in opposition to each other. In line with his demand for a ‘unified science,’ Marx seeks to bring about a situation in which appearance and reality coincide. That commitment to truth and reality lies behind Marx’s relentless critique of theories, social forms, systems and institutions as well as of his concern with social transformation and the realization of communist society.

As I have been concerned to argue, Marx did not write a political economy of his own, and did not write theories of any kind – whether of the state, the party, capital, crisis, the proletariat. Occasionally, struggling to outline the contours of the socialist society through a reading of Marx’s sketchy proposals, I can express regret that Marx did not write a socialist update of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. I, like many others, seized on Marx’s outlines of future society contained in his idealisation of the Paris Commune with enthusiasm. But to demand a fully articulated model of the future society from Marx is to profoundly misunderstand what Marx was actually doing. Marx could not write such a thing given his view of reality and agency. Marx’s dialectic is not the same as Hegel’s at all. Marx’s key insight took him away from the theorisation of an objective world and its evolution into practical critique. Marx took the 1873 edition of Capital as an opportunity to spell this out clearly: ‘my dialectic is not only different from that of Hegel, but its direct opposite.’ 

Understanding that difference between Hegel and Marx here is important. Marx’s critique of political economy developed out of his critique of Hegel’s dialectic, showing the way in which Hegel not only could not transcend capital’s alienated second order mediations, but how his logic rationalized the state, private property, bureaucracy, money and capital and was therefore implicated in the alienation, inversion and dehumanization of the capital system. Hegel thus asserted, as did David Ricardo, that money simply functioned as a ‘universal means of exchange’ to promote justice and equality. (Hegel PR para 299). Marx understood better, seeking out the causes for the split between appearance and reality in capital’s alienated system of production:

Now economics conceives of the community of man, or the self-activating essence of man, man's attainment of a species-life, a truly human existence through the mutuality of men, in terms of exchange and trade.... We see then how economics establishes the estranged form of social commerce as the essential and fundamental form appropriate to man’s nature.

Marx EW JM 1975: 266; Marx and Engels CW 1975-94 3:217

Against the understanding of political economy, Marx argues that

Since the essence of man is the true community of man, men, by activating their own essence, produce, create this human community, this social being which is no abstract, universal power standing over against the solitary individual, but is the essence of every individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth.

Marx EW JM 1975: 265

Marx’s point is not that economics and its categories were wrong. The problem is much worse than that – the economists were right but they were right about the wrong kind of economic system. The implication of that view is that it is more important to proceed to the practical critique and transformation of this system than it is to engage in theoretical disputation over how best to run this system or over the institutional forms of the future society. What is needed is not a new economic theory but a new economic system. As Marx argued in Capital I:

The categories of bourgeois economics … are forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for the relations of production belonging to this historically determined mode of social production, i.e. commodity production.

These formulas, which bear the unmistakeable stamp of belonging to a social formation in which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite, appear to the political economists' consciousness to be as much a self-evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labour itself.

Marx C1 1976: 169

The contradictory dynamics of the capital system are at the heart of Marx’s critique of political economy. In unravelling these immanent contradictions, Marx thus showed how the capital system pointed beyond itself to a new social metabolic order of social control. (see chapter 10 of Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration). Hence Marx’s emphasis upon the critique of political economy. Marx was exposing the realities behind the value form, the commodity form, the money form etc:

Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude, however incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms. But it has never once asked the question why this content has assumed that particular form, that is to say, why labour is expressed in value, and why the measurement of labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product.

Marx CI 1976: 174

The approach that Marx takes and the categories he uses are essentialist to the core. The references to ‘form’ and ‘content’ presuppose the existence of a substance that is essentially something and something essentially. Marx is attempting to penetrate beyond surface level appearance to expose the true reality below. Without an essentialist metaphysics, we remain on the terrain of immediacy, continuing to suffer the effects of capital’s contradictory dynamics, without being able to apprehend them cognitively and practically. Without an essentialist metaphysics, we understand little of Marx or of the social metabolic order he analysed. Marx did not offer a political economy of his own in the place of prevailing economic doctrines; instead, he offered a critical approach that was designed to raise to consciousness the internal realities at work in the capital economy, showing how capital’s form transcended itself. Of course, this is not a passive or automatic evolution, hence Marx’s emphasis on the subjective factor in history. Marx thus points out that capital creates its own grave digger in the form of the proletariat. (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973: 79).

The sense of contradiction, of potential as an opposite which points beyond existing reality, is evident in the following passage from Marx:

But on the other hand, in its capitalist form it reproduces the old division of labour with its ossified particularities. We have seen how this absolute contradiction does away with all repose, all fixity and all security as far as the worker's life-situation is concerned; how it constantly threatens, by taking away the instruments of labour, to snatch from his hands the means of subsistence, and, by suppressing his specialized function, to make him superfluous. We have seen, too, how this contradiction bursts forth without restraint in the ceaseless human sacrifices required from the working class, in the reckless squandering of labour-powers, and in the devastating effects of social anarchy. This is the negative side. But if, at present, variation of labour imposes itself after the manner of an overpowering natural law, and with the blindly destructive action of a natural law that meets with obstacles everywhere, large-scale industry, through its very catastrophes, makes the recognition of variation of labour and hence of the fitness of the worker for the maximum number of different kinds of labour into a question of life and death. This possibility of varying labour must become a general law of social production, and the existing relations must be adapted to permit its realization in practice. That monstrosity, the disposable working population held in reserve, in misery, for the changing requirements of capitalist exploitation, must be replaced by the individual man who is absolutely available for the different kinds of labour required of him; the partially developed individual, who is merely the bearer of one specialized social function, must be replaced by the totally developed individual, for whom the different social functions are different modes of activity he takes up in turn. 

Marx CI 1976 ch 15 619

Also worth noting is the way that Marx identifies capital as a new god or idol demanding human sacrifice. Marx exposes capitalist development as a fake teleology which operates independently of human agency and purpose, impacting upon human society in the ‘manner of an overpowering natural law.’ Marx emphasises the extent to which the contradictory dynamics and systemic imperatives of capital have all ‘the blindly destructive action of a natural law’. (Marx CI 1976 ch 15 619). To repeat, against critics who see the problem as one of teleology, purpose, progress and hopes for salvation, the forms these things take in capitalist society do not express a genuine teleology at all. The things they criticize are not explanations in themselves and stand in need of explanation. This is what Marx does. The problem of capitalist modernity is that the disenchantment of which Weber wrote has never been a thoroughgoing secularisation, and maybe never could have been. Whilst nature and labour, which Marx identified as the two sources of wealth, have been profaned or ‘dis-godded’, (Schiller’s term), divinity as such has not been extirpated and, as a necessary transcendental ideal, never could be. Instead, theological assumptions and teleological categories have been detached from their true objects and re-attached to the alien powers of the capital system. These are the powers which impact in ‘overpowering’ and ‘blindly destructive’ fashion, in the manner of a natural law. But, in being detached from natural purposes and essences, it is a bogus teleology and a false natural law. These purposes and essences need to be reinstated. Human beings are teleological beings who require and seek meaning in life. It is as well to recognise that fact and abandon the project of dis-godding and instead seek the re-enchantment of the world, in the sense of recovering a genuine sense of purpose. (I make these points whilst recognizing that Marx did not present himself as a teleological thinker at all, quite the opposite. He was more concerned to present himself as a scientific thinker rather than a metaphysician. In my view, he needed to spell out more clearly that his ‘unified science’ was metaphysics of the highest, fullest type).

Marx’s purpose in exposing the immanent contradictions within the capitalist mode of production is to reveal the potential for further development in the social forms created by human activity. Marx is worth quoting at length here, to indicate the extent to which he is identifying the content that exists as an innate but repressed potential within capitalist forms. Marx’s essentialist approach is designed to liberate potential and bring about the realised society of realised human beings:

To express this contradiction in the most general terms, it consists in the fact that the capitalist mode of production tends towards an absolute development of the productive forces irrespective of value and the surplus-value this contains, and even irrespective of the social relations within which capitalist production takes place; while on the other hand its purpose is to maintain the existing capital value and to valorize it to the utmost extent possible (i.e. an ever accelerated increase in this value). In its specific character it is directed towards using the existing capital value as a means for the greatest possible valorization of this value. The methods through which it attains this end involve a decline in the profit rate, the devaluation of the existing capital and the development of the productive forces of labour at the cost of the productive forces already produced. 
The periodical devaluation of the existing capital, which is a means, immanent to the capitalist mode of production, for delaying the fall in the profit rate and accelerating the accumulation of capital value by the formation of new capital, disturbs the given conditions in which the circulation and reproduction process of capital takes place, and is therefore accompanied by sudden stoppages and crises in the production process. 
The relative decline in the variable capital as against the constant, which goes hand in hand with the development of the productive forces, gives a spur to the growth of the working population, while it continuously creates an artificial surplus population as well. The accumulation of capital, from the point of view of value, is slowed down by the falling rate of profit, which then serves yet again to accelerate the accumulation of use-value, while this in turn accelerates the course of accumulation in terms of value. 
Capitalist production constantly strives to overcome these immanent barriers, but it overcomes them only by means that set up the barriers afresh and on a more powerful scale.

The true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself. It is that capital and its self-valorization appear as the starting and finishing point, as the motive and purpose of production; production is production only for capital, and not the reverse, i.e. the means of production are not simply means for a steadily expanding pattern of life for the society of the producers. The barriers within which the maintenance and valorization of the capital-value has necessarily to move - and this in turn depends on the dispossession and impoverishment of the great mass of the producers - therefore come constantly into contradiction with the methods of production that capital must apply to its purpose and which set its course towards an unlimited expansion of production, to production as an end in itself, to an unrestricted development of the social productive powers of labour. The means - the unrestricted development of the forces of social production - comes into persistent conflict with the restricted end, the valorization of the existing capital. If the capitalist mode of production is therefore a historical means for developing the material powers of production and for creating a corresponding world market, it is at the same time the constant contradiction between this historical task and the social relations of production corresponding to it. 

Marx C3 1981 ch 15 pp 358/9

The most flagrant contradiction within the capital system is the distinction between social production and private appropriation. Marx’s Capital is less a work of economics than a book of human self-knowledge and self-understanding, describing humanity’s coming-to-be in a world which has overcome the alienating separation between appearance and essence, ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ Or, given the highlighting of the social nature of the human essence, Capital is a book of ‘co-understanding’ seeking to aid human beings in the realisation of their true natures in the society of the associated producers:

They are conditioned by a low stage of development of the productive powers of labour and correspondingly limited relations between men within the process of creating and reproducing their material life, hence also limited relations between man and nature. These real limitations are reflected in the ancient worship of nature, and in other elements of tribal religions. The religious reflections of the real world can, in any case, vanish only when the practical relations of everyday life between man and man, and man and nature, generally present themselves to him in a transparent and rational form. The veil is not removed from the countenance of the social life-process, i.e. the process of material production, until it becomes production by freely associated men, and stands under their conscious and planned control. This, however, requires that society possess a material foundation, or a series of material conditions of existence, which in their turn are the natural and spontaneous product of a long and tormented historical development.

Marx CI 1976: 173

Marx is clear that the form by which social labour is supplied is part of a necessary (teleological) process in which social labour as such is developed. Marx evaluates the alienation of labour under the capital system as a progressive force in that it represents a development which, through reappropriation, culminates in a form of society which achieves the full realisation of the potentials of the social nature of human beings:

To say that the division of labour and exchange are based on private property is simply to say that labour is the essence of private property - an assertion that the political economist is incapable of proving and which we intend to prove for him. It is precisely in the fact that the division of labour and exchange are configurations of private property that we find the proof, both that human life needed private property for its realisation and that it now needs the abolition of private property.

Marx EPM EW 1975: 374

Marx therefore sees historical development as progressing in terms of the unfolding of the telos of the social nature of human beings and, indeed, the human nature of society. The teleology that Marx identifies within the historical process is the realisation of human social nature within the truly human society.

For Marx, the historical process is a teleological process whose premises are real individuals and their social natures, whose telos is the realisation of humanity’s inherent potentials in their fullest and highest form:

The entire movement of history is therefore both the actual act of creation of communism - the birth of its empirical existence - and, for its thinking consciousness, the comprehended and known movement of its becoming; whereas the other communism, which is not yet fully developed, seeks in isolated historical forms opposed to private property a historical proof for itself, a proof drawn from what already exists, by wrenching isolated moments from their proper places in the process of development (a hobby horse Cabet, Villegardelle, etc., particularly like to ride) and advancing them as proofs of its historical pedigree. But all it succeeds in showing is that by far the greater part of this development contradicts its assertions and that if it did once exist, then the very fact that it existed in the past refutes its claim to essential being [Wesen].

Marx EW EPM 1975: 348

Communism is a process of becoming, with social and historical forms in their proper place within the whole to realize essential being. Communism the truly human society of truly human individuals in the process of becoming. Smith identifies Marx’s key question as what do humans have to do in order to live humanly? He reformulates this question thus: ‘how can humanity make itself what it is in essence?’ (Smith 1996: 64). 

The essence of historical development is the concrete universal of human labour, and its different 'principles' are the specific social forms which mediate the supply of social labour at different stages. The end or telos of history is the realised society of realised individuals, an end which is necessary if human beings are to realise their inherent potentials fully, but which is also frustratable – if human agency fails to act in accordance with its purposes, if the defenders of civilisation block an ascending class and arrest historical development, then these necessary lines of development can indeed be frustrated, with all manner of damaging and destructive consequences ensuing. Crashing economies, bankrupted states, despoiled environments are all entirely possible. Such an eventuality would deprive human beings of the fullest realisation of the potential of human society:

But atheism and communism are no flight, no abstraction, no loss of the objective world created by man or of his essential powers projected into objectivity, no impoverished regression to unnatural, primitive simplicity. They are rather the first real emergence, the realization become real for man, of his essence as something real. 

Marx EW EPM 1975: 395/6

The realisation of the truly human society and the realisation of the social essence of human beings is inextricably connected. For Marx, the individual and the social are two aspects of the same essence. Marx therefore is concerned to emphasise that the realisation of the social essence of human individuals and the realisation of the human essence of society are part of the same process.
Again, Marx is at pains to ground his essentialist categories in real individuals, ensuring that any telos that is involved in his argument remains on the ground of concrete reality and doesn’t become detached in some supra-individual determinism as under the capital system:

It is above all necessary to avoid once more establishing 'society' as an abstraction over against the individual. The individual is the social being. His vital expression - even when it does not appear in the direct form of a communal expression, conceived in association with other men - is therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. Man's individual and species-life are not two distinct things, however much - and this is necessarily so - the mode of existence of individual life is a more particular or a more general mode of the species-life, or species-life a more particular or more general individual life. 

Marx EW EPM 1975: 350/1

The full realisation of the potentiality of the social essence inherent in the human species is also the full realisation of the potentiality inherent in the essence of human society considered as a social organism. Individuality and sociality are both realised in being the two sides of the same human essence.

Marx’s 'species being' (Gattungswesen) refers to the real essence or nature of the human species, not an ideal human being divorced from biology and history. Marx’s argument proceeds from potentialities which inhere in human beings as species essence. These potentialities can only be realised historically within human society and the specific social forms which human beings develop in order to supply social labour. The ‘real, active relation of man to himself as a species being,’ or the ‘realisation of himself as a real species being ... is only possible through the co-operation of mankind and as a result of history'. (Marx EPM EW 1975: 385). The important point to establish here is that Marx binds any telos of history firmly to the real essence of human beings as a social species.

The reference to species essence is a core element in Marx’s essentialist metaphysics and is the foundation of his conception of history as process leading to the truly human society of truly human and truly free individuals. The social nature of human society and the human nature of society are two aspects of the same thing. The Aristotelian conception which Marx develops in his early writings reappears in his later writings. In the Grundrisse, Marx writes that

the human being is in the most literal sense a zoon politikon, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an isolated individual outside society - a rare exception which may well occur when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident into the wilderness - is as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other.

Marx Gr 1973: 85

Marx considered the view too obvious to labour. I rather like Marx’s bad tempered comment here that ‘there is no point in dwelling on this any longer’, calling the individualist argument ‘twaddle’. Suffice to say that Marx’s argument is Aristotelian, and liberals and their decadent progeny, dividing individual and society abstractly, dislike it and don’t understand it, and talk a lot of twaddle as a result, both in terms of the freedom they assert their own theories to support, and in terms of the criticisms of collectivism and totalitarianism they make with respect to Marx. ‘Man is the rational animal' said Aristotle. Man is a zoon politikon, a social animal, he also said. ‘He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god.’ (Aristotle Politics). Marx said all these things.

To conclude, the realisation of the social essence of human beings and the human essence of society are integral to each other. There is no telos of history in Marx apart from real individuals, and it is the detachment of historical development from these real premises that had led to all kinds of misunderstanding with regard to teleology and the operation of purpose within history. Marx traces the problem to its source in an alienated system of production.





Part 3 MARX AND MORALITY

14 Marx’s Normative Essentialism

A state which is not the realization of rational freedom is a bad state.

Marx and Engels Historische Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt, Berlin and Moscow 1927, vol. I, i (i), p. 247

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

Marx and Engels MCP 1973: 87 

There is a widespread view that Marx explicitly repudiated morality or that any ethical position he possesses is buried deep within ‘scientific’ analysis and thoroughly subordinated to his political commitments to be hardly a moral position at all. I shall show that for Marx, ethics and science go together and politics and morality are intertwined. Some consider Marx’s approach to morality to be incoherent, with Marx considered to dismiss the relevance of morality whilst at the same time making explicitly moral statements. (Critchley 2007: 93; Cohen 2000: 101-103). Marx could thus write that class division and the resulting struggle between capitalists and workers has ‘shattered the basis for all morality, whether the morality of asceticism or of enjoyment,’ (Marx and Engels, 1987b: 419) whilst at the same time employing a highly moral tone in condemning the ‘vampire-like’ parasitism of capital. (Marx 1976: 416 97 406). 

The bourgeois order, which at the beginning of the century made the state do sentry duty over the newly arisen smallholding, and manured it with laurels, has become a vampire that sucks out its blood and brains and throws them into the alchemist's cauldron of capital.

Marx EB SE 1973: 243

Marx is not merely being descriptive here, he is making a moral statement about something he plainly disapproves of. No doubt, Marx could back his argument here with a wealth of scientific analysis. His concern, however, is evidently moral. At risk of being provocative, this passage could almost be taken as evidence of the very moralism that Marx so vehemently decries in others. But not quite. Because Marx’s moral statements are always made on the basis of a critical analysis with a practical intent. In chapter 10 on The Working Day in Capital, Marx writes that ‘in fact the vampire will not let go “while there remains a single muscle, sinew or drop of blood to be exploited,”’ and will only be overthrown when the workers organise together and take action as a class against it:

For 'protection' against the serpent of their agonies, the workers have to put their heads together and, as a class, compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful social barrier by which they can be prevented from selling themselves and their families into slavery and death by voluntary contract with capital. In the place of the pompous catalogue of the 'inalienable rights of man' there steps the modest Magna Carta of the legally limited working day, which at last makes clear 'when the time which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins.

Marx C1 1976: 413-414

This passage explains Marx’s nuanced approach to morality, at once critical of the dominant conceptions of moral theory – indeed, of moral theory as such - whilst also being highly moral in the approach to practical action. In this specific instance, Marx is writing of the passing of the Factory Acts limiting the hours of labour, but the general point he makes is of much wider application in the war between the political economy of labour and the political economy of capital and its belief in the ‘perfect freedom of labour,’ i.e. unregulated, voluntary, ‘free’ labour bought and sold on the market where capital has all the power.

Marx’s seemingly contradictory statements are, in truth, not contradictory at all. Take the line in the above passage, ‘In the place of the pompous catalogue of the “inalienable rights of man” there steps the modest Magna Carta of the legally limited working day.’ What Marx considers plainly ‘pompous’ about such inalienable rights is the way that they are asserted in abstraction from the concrete conditions that deny such rights to the workers in the real. That assertion is not just hypocrisy, but expresses an inherent ideological bias in which statements of freedom in the abstract cover a structural and systemic unfreedom in the real. Marx condemned such pomposity as a pious moralism that served to conceal an immoral reality. Marx wanted a morality that practised what it preached, indeed that practised more than it preached, and practised its moral position through the entire social fabric, not the elevated formal terrain where it possessed a legalistic existence only.

It may be true, as Philip Kain has argued, that Marx has several ethical theories running alongside each other in his critique, particularly theories drawn from Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, that he never integrated into a systematic, internally consistent and coherent whole. (Kain 1988). But that point is a professional academic’s conceit. It’s easy enough to identify influences, but it is a dangerous game to reduce anyone’s thought to their influences, and positively hazardous to demand clarity and consistency in this respect. ‘It's not where you take things from — it's where you take them to.’ (Jean-Luc Godard). To demand a systematic ethical theory from Marx is to ask what he explicitly refused to provide. That point keeps being missed, generating any number of theoretical controversies and debates between ‘schools’ of thought. Something about Marx’s comment on ‘scholasticism’ has been missed. 

Those who find Marx’s ethics inconsistent, incoherent even, are joined by those who find his political theory sketchy and inadequate. And for the same reasons, professional economists are able to accuse Marx of running several theories together, taking the bits he needed at any one time, ignoring the rest, and failing to develop a systematic theory of his own. Marx’s political economy is the most misunderstood part of Marx’s work – along with the rest of it. If I had been given £10 every time I had seen the ‘opium of the people’ quote being used to cite Marx’s authority in an attack upon religious illusion in the name of science and reason, I’d be a lot richer than I am now, but no less virtuous. The ‘soul of soulless conditions …’ Marx’s point on religion is infinitely more profound and more radical than the rationalist truth vs illusion atheist reductionism into which Marx’s name is drawn. And Marx was at pains to make these points to his atheistic friends and colleagues, if only people could be bothered to put their prejudices to one side and actually read and understand. Marx’s first concern is not to drive religion out of the public realm but to transform the ‘soulless conditions’ that generate a need in human beings for religious compensation. Marx’s atheism is not negative but a positive human affirmation, one that involves profound social transformation, not merely a neutralized public sphere. I write elsewhere of Marx’s concern to realize a ‘unified science,’ something which entails the abolition – Hegelian sense – of religion, ethics, philosophy and natural science to overcome their idealism and abstraction by realizing the truths their views of the world contain within: ‘there will be one science,’ Marx writes. (Marx EW EPM 1975: 355-356). That commitment to the ‘one science’ is key to understanding Marx’s breakthrough from a theoretical interpretation of the world to reality and its internal transformation.

What goes for Marx and political theory, political economy and religion goes for Marx and ethics, too. Marx eschewed abstract theorizing, seeing this as a problem of philosophy and morality in the modern age. He wrote on German philosophy, the ‘German ideology,’ in the most scathing terms, accusing Kant of being content to consign his ethic of ends to the attic of heaven, where it exists merely as a religious ideal, rather than being applied practically on earth. Kant, for all the promise of his ethical system, developed only a regulative ideal above and outside and a legalistic framework constraining self-seeking individuals below, seeking to constrain rather than transform self-seeking behaviour. 

Kant, however, like all ethicists, was having to confront a real problem – a social world that contradicts ethics. To quote Keynes again: ‘Modern capitalism is absolutely irreligious, without internal union, without much public spirit, often, though not always, a mere congeries of possessors and pursuers.’ (Keynes 1932). For Marx, Kantian ethics implied the abolition of such conditions as a denial of the ends of persons. Instead of this, Kantian ethics came to be drawn into the definitive moral and legal problem of modern capitalist society, that of regulating and constraining this competition of possessors and pursuers, imposing an external union in place of the internal union whose emergence capitalist society works to prevent. Having fractured the social terrain of the moral life, atomising social beings into discrete individuals, modernity set its moral and political thinkers the impossible task of re-establishing unity theoretically from the outside. Marx refuses to undertake that task and instead seeks to restore the social conditions of the moral life; he sees, rightly, that no theory is up to the task of achieving unity in a fundamentally divided society: he sees how deep the divisions go and is concerned to bring them to light.

There are indeed a number of ethical strands running through Marx. Marx takes Aristotle’s flourishing and self-realization, Kant’s ethics of ends, and Hegel’s location of the ‘ought’ within the ‘is’ and synthesizes them as he socializes them. Kain, however, is more concerned to analyse Marx’s intellectual development, identifying shifts over the years. He thus sees the above combination of Aristotle, Kant and Hegel as true only of the early humanist Marx, with a noticeable determinist shift occurring with The German Ideology.





For Kain, those who argue that there is an essential unity to Marx’s thought, focus on the philosophical and humanistic writings of the early Marx and argue that these give us the key to unlocking the later Marx. The point of the essential unity theorists is to show that Marx from first to last is a thoroughgoing humanist, from his ethical early writings to his later scientific writings, and that there is no division between ethics and science. I’ll go with this ‘essential unity’ view and add, further, and firmly, that Marx is an essentialist, and that without an understanding of essentialist metaphysics, you will be as clueless reading Capital as professional economists have been. 

Standing against this view is that of Althusser, who divides the evolution of Marx's thought into four periods: (1) the early works of 1840-4, (2) the works of the break (the 'Theses on Feuerbach' and the German Ideology of 1845-6), (3) the transitional works of 1845-57, and (4) the mature works of 1857-83. I’m struck here by the parallel with a comment I read on Rousseau – if you want to misunderstand Rousseau and get him wrong, then read him in parts. Rousseau insisted on the fundamental unity of his thought. Critics find him ‘ambiguous’ and contradictory. Whenever I read those comments, I know that a critic hasn’t understood Rousseau at all. I take Marx whole, and only repudiate and qualify certain positions only where and when Marx himself explicitly repudiates and qualifies them, insofar as the point is fidelity to Marx. After that, it’s all tricks played by interpreters and their schools, or having the nerve to use your own reason and understanding critically.

Kain considers that essential unity theorists rarely achieve an adequate understanding of Marx’s concept of essence and its radical implications for social and political theory: ‘Moreover, essential unity theorists must refrain from a deep and adequate study of all that this concept implies if they are to avoid the conclusion that Marx abandons this understanding in the German Ideology, that his views then are altered fundamentally, and begin to develop in a new direction.’ (Kain 1988: 2). He accuses essential unity theorists of diluting Marx’s concept of essence and underestimating the determinism involved in The German Ideology. Kain’s position seems like a clear rejection of the view I am concerned to establish in this book (although in no way have I diluted Marx’s concept of essence to make it something vague and general, always relating it to specific social forms and relations, and in this Part coming to relate it to the practical struggles of the working class):





I see the clear shift in Marx’s thought from 1846, rendering the notion of human essence much more precise in terms of a focus on social relations that emerge historically within different formations. But a shift is not a break, and there is clear continuity in Marx’s argument. My argument makes it clear that Marx's essentialism is infused with an ethical conception of human beings and entails a normative commitment to a human development that is the realization of a genuine individuality and society through a ‘true community.’ At the centre of this developmental approach is a conception of human nature or essence and its flourishing. Through self-estrangement within capitalist society, human beings exist in an alienated condition that prevents them from realizing their essence. This essence is realized only in the communist society beyond alienation, through the creation of social relations and institutions that enable self-realization. Communism is thus a society which enables the full and free development of each and all. This view is stated generally in Marx’s early writings, and gains social and conceptual precision through the scientific approach of the later writings. Marx, therefore, integrates the realms of fact and value. 

In Part 2, I demonstrated at length the extent to which Marx’s Capital is infused with essentialist categories – form, necessity, law, numerous references to inner connections, movement, relations, potentialities becoming actualities. Read Capital again with the express purpose of identifying essentialist modes of thought, and you will see the plain and obvious truth that an essentialist metaphysics is central to Marx’s emancipatory project. I’m only interested as to why Marx objected to an early critical review of Capital that complained about the metaphysical nature of the work. Marx plainly thought he was doing science, our job is to know in precisely what way he thought he was doing this, because, as critics repeatedly point out, it isn’t natural science what Marx does. And it isn’t social science either. In establishing the integration of science and ethics in Marx, Rubel’s take is interesting. For him, Marx’s scientific investigations were born of an emancipatory commitment based on ethical imperatives: ‘Marx set out to demonstrate scientifically what he was already persuaded of intuitively and what appeared to him to be ethically necessary.’ (Rubel 1973). That’s an important point, not merely emphasising the Kantian dimension of Marx’s commitment to a democracy of ends, but reinstating the Aristotelian core of his thought in the intertwining of politics and ethics with respect to the best life for human beings. Everything else in Marx’s follows from that emancipatory commitment.

For Kain, the essential unity argument is so general as to be right about Marx as a whole, but only at the expense of telling us very little in precise terms: 





The man who generalizes generally lies … The whole truth of what ‘Marx really said’ is contained in every word he ever wrote, and in understanding the meaning of every word. Try to distil the essence to make his key arguments comprehensible, and we are involved in generalisation. Kain denies that Marx's theory of the overcoming of alienation and of the full realization of the individual is always based upon an ethical conception of individuals or on a concept of human nature or essence. He says that this is not the case in The German Ideology. I shall argue that it is, certainly with respect to the emphasis upon ‘united individuals’ assuming conscious control of their material relations, and demonstrate the point at length with textual support. (recognizing as I do that that Marx sharply qualified his view of species-essence in terms of an emphasis on material relations (chapter 9 Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration). Marx’s way of expressing the concept of human essence certainly changes. Marx sharpens that concept and gives it greater social and historical precision, so much so that it may appear that it is the historical process, and not the ethics of self-realization and human flourishing, that is doing all the work. That is the source of Kain’s reference to Marx’s determinism and science divorced from ethics. It should be remembered, though, that the concept of species-essence was never abstract and ahistorical in Marx’s early writings. On the contrary, Marx explicitly argues against such a notion by emphasising that ‘man’ is a social being who exists within historically determinate social relations. ‘But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man, state, society.’ (Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 244). ‘It is above all necessary to avoid once more establishing 'society' as an abstraction over against the individual.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 351).

My view is that Marx's concept of essence is the key to his concept of freedom as self-determination, something that is combined with a commitment to human happiness or flourishing as self-realization and the Kantian ethic of ends. Marx combines ancient and modern ethics in this respect. The early Marx sets out the view of the human essence being objectified in existence, human beings proceeding to seek these objects, coming to see them not as alien or heteronomous, but as parts of our essence, with the result that our relations to them come to be free and self-determined. Kain thinks Marx came to reject this view of human essence and of freedom understood as self-determination, as well as the attempt to locate the ‘ought’ within the ‘is’: ‘This approach is certainly abandoned in the German Ideology as, I think, is the general attempt to combine facts and values. In the German Ideology, this concept, is rejected.’ (Kain 1988: 4). 

Kain therefore presents a strong version of Marx’s historical materialism, identifying The German Ideology as the key text. His view is concerned to emphasise the role of determinism in Marx, accusing unity theorists of avoiding difficult passages which point to the incompatibility of ethics and determinism in Marx, misinterpreting others, presenting their own views in place of those of Marx. I recall here the question my DoS Jules Townshend put to me as I developed my views on Marx: ‘are you sure this is what Marx said? Or is this what you think Marx ought to have said?’ What Marx said is contained in what Marx wrote. But what Marx wrote is frequently misunderstood. Are we engaged in exegesis, criticism or philosophising in our own right? As a critical post-Enlightenment thinker, Marx would want us to be thinking critically, and practically, examining the society in front of our eyes, and criticising the theories about that society, identifying rationalizations, revealing truths, applying insights in practice. He did object when people got him wrong, though, which was often.

Kain is adamant that ‘Marx rejects freedom as self-determination in the German Ideology.’ (Kain 1988: 4). Kain claims that those scholars who do take the degree of determinism involved in Marx’s historical materialism seriously ‘conclude that Marx rejects ethics.’ (Kain 1988: 5; Hodges 1962-3: 1-22. Feuer 1942: 242-72). Here, Kain distinguishes his own view from determinists, pointing to the absence of such strict determinism in the early writings and in later writings like the Grundrisse and Capital (Kain 1988 Chapter 4). At which point, Kain starts to read like a unity theorist himself, with only the middle period works – The German Ideology in particular - standing out. The book was never published. ‘We abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly as we had achieved our main purpose — self-clarification,’ wrote Marx in the 1859 in the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. The implication of that statement is that Marx was satisfied that he had succeeded in formulating the basic principles of the new materialistic standpoint, a scientific practical-critical approach he had first sketched in the Theses on Feuerbach. The German Ideology is an important text, no doubt. But if it did establish the direction of Marx’s later thought, and Kain considers that that later thought to be without determinism, returning to the humanist themes of the early period, then we do indeed have a unity, albeit with a more detailed awareness of the evolution of Marx’s thought along the way.

As to Kain’s specific points, there are points of agreement and points of disagreement. To take one example, Kain gives this example of how essential unity theorists can be blind to the deeper significance of specific issues in Marx:





That view is certainly false with respect to my own work. I may well be classed as one of those who believe in the essential unity of Marx’s thought. I emphasize the Kantian (and Hegelian) nature of Marx’s ethical thought, whilst at the same time drawing out the extent to which Marx criticized Kant and Hegel, often quite savagely (and often incorrectly, in my view). Marx’s description/denigration of Kant as the ‘leathery tongued lick-spittle of the bourgeoisie’ is a tad unfair, I’d say, but in my doctoral work I spelled out in more measured philosophical terms as to why Marx could come to consider Kant’s morality as a bourgeois rationalization designed to restrain an atomized world of self-interested individuals, whilst doing nothing to uproot the social sources of that universal antagonism and competition. Yet I was clear that Marx’s criticism here was animated by his passionate awareness of the extent to which such rationalization contradicted Kant’s own ethics. I therefore argue that Marx sought to realize the categorical imperative as the true democracy of ends, and that there are things in Kant and Hegel, and Rousseau before them, that Marx absorbed into his critique, even as he criticized these philosophers for their inability to transcend the mediations of the capital system. The distinctiveness of Marx’s position is that he can do both things at the same time without falling into contradiction. There is no abstract either/or here, because Marx’s dialectical approach involves him in an immanent critique, both of philosophers and theorists, and of society. 

In fine, I argue that Marx does indeed combine a doctrine of essence deriving from Aristotle with a concept of universalization drawn from Kant along with Hegel’s unity of ‘ought’ and ‘is,’ with a view of democratisation that stems from Rousseau. None of this implies a view that the early Marx is the ‘real’ Marx and that the later ‘scientific’ Marx represents a departure from key ethical commitments. I don’t see a break, and see intellectualizing about the issue as idle and an invitation to scholasticism, at least insofar as it proceeds apart from the collective struggles to change the world. Marx sharpened those early commitments, modifying certain elements, changing the means of expression, rendering his critique more precise in the process. We can say more ‘scientific’ if we like, so long as this is understood in Marx’s sense of the ‘unified’ ‘one science.’ Aspects of his mature critique of political economy can be found in his early writings, just as aspects of his early humanist ethics can be found in Capital. 

essence and is and ought




In this respect, Kain is right to disagree with Althusser’s view that humanism is ideological in being ethical and is anti-scientific in constituting individuals as subjects and that the later Marx is an anti-humanist. Althusser rejects humanism on account of its alleged reduction of the forces and relations of production to being objectifications of the human essence. It is only the early Marx, Althusser contends, that explains the forces and relations of production and their development in terms of relationships and interactions between human individuals. The scientific approach of the mature Marx, Althusser continues, studies a reality conceived in terms of social structures, forces and relations of production which do not reduce to individuals and the relations between them in such a manner. These forces and relations are not the outcome of relations between individuals, but instead structure those relations. Rather than engage with the moral culture of liberalism, the structuralist tradition argued for a break with this tradition, organised as it is around a centred subject. (Althusser 1970: 139-41 180; Althusser 1977: 170-3; Althusser 1976: 200-6). I argue that Marx challenged liberalism to live up to its central values of autonomy and individual liberty, discarding those institutions of the liberal social order that contradict those values. Again, this is consistent with the immanent nature of Marx’s critique. But the point goes deeper – Marx does repudiate the autonomous liberal subject and self and the ontology upon which it is based. The Althusserian approach has no truck with liberalism and its central category of the autonomous subject, and repudiates it explicitly. Liberal critics accuse Marx of lacking the Kantian sense of persons as ends in themselves. I think this is wrong, and show that Marx’s critical focus was upon the reified capitalist relations which denies this ethic of ends. Does this imply a reading of Marx as a liberal? Has Marx really extinguished the person? Which begs the question of precisely what emancipation is about, whether it is even a meaningful concept, once we have lost the subject. Of course, what Marx has really repudiated is the autonomous subject, the abstract individual of the liberal ontology. I take Marx to be arguing for freedom as self-determination in the Kantian sense of autonomy as against heteronomy. Without the subject, such an ethic is meaningless. I say Althusser is wrong and took generations of leftist intellectuals into a cul-de-sac here, a dead-end, where many of them reside to this day debating their non-problems. (excuse the blunt language, but I spent a long and miserable time in the company of such thought in the 1990s, and don’t ever want to go back, see Norman Geras on the confusions, vagaries and plain errors and caricatures of this kind of thinking 1990). In Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, I argued this in terms of the split between reason/culture and nature that opened up in Western Marxism as a result of losing the dialectics of nature. With the dialectic confined to human history and culture, we lost Marx’s materialist (social and natural) ontology, inviting an abstract humanism and ethical Marxism divorced from class analysis, politics and economics (and natural science), a focus on culture and, in time, an inflation of discourse. Structuralism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, post-marxism, ex-marxism. (Geras 1990).

Althusser's For Marx (1970) demanded a shift from a humanism that rested upon a unified conception of human nature towards a science of history and politics that considered identities to be the ‘effects’ of dominant discourses. Althusser's anti-humanism proved influential in the long-run, his antagonism towards ‘essentialism’ being developed further in the perspectives of Foucault and Derrida. The hostility of this train of thought towards both ‘humanism’ and ‘essentialism’ is clear, although it is less than clear that critics here have understood essentialist categories correctly. Eagleton states bluntly – and shows why - that many of the key claims made by anti-essentialists are the product of ‘philosophical amateurism and ignorance,’ criticizing essentialist positions held by precisely no-one. (Eagleton 2003: 119-122). Criticisms of natural essences as timeless and fixed are, frankly, nonsense, and give evidence of superficial reading, ignorance or plain prejudice which, when, allied to tendentious claims, hinder attempts to delineate the relationship between morality, truth and politics. They miss precisely what is meant by transcendent standards and Platonic ideal forms, conflating different things. Political philosopher John O'Neill argues clearly and forthrightly that much of what poststructuralist and postmodern thinkers criticize as ‘essentialist’ does not represent essentialist thought at all, but is merely a caricature of the doctrine of essences which is set out by precisely no-one. (See O'Neill 1998 ch. 1) Essentialism is the philosophical position that there are properties which some things need to have if they are to be the kind of things they are. Eagleton points out the clarity and simplicity of that proposition:

For something to be copper, it must have ductility, malleability, fusibility, electrical conductivity, atom number 29, and so on. It does not follow that all the properties of an object are essential to it, or that there cannot be a great deal of difference and diversity between objects of the same class. All sheep are unique. Essentialism does not mean uniformity. Neither does it follow that all the objects assigned to the same class actually do share essential properties in common. We have to look and see. Essentialism does not involve ignoring the difference between natural and cultural phenomena. Cultural phenomena can have certain properties without which they would be something else. If songs don't have sounds they are not songs.

There is nothing to be gained and plenty to be lost from making the position more complicated and mystical than that. The most frequent charges launched against essentialism ascribe positions to essentialism that no essentialist philosopher of any repute holds. At which point Eagleton tells it like it is: ‘Anti-essentialism is largely the product of philosophical amateurism and ignorance.’ (Eagleton 2004: 120-121). It may be, it is nevertheless an advanced malady, quite acidic to the emancipatory project of the Left.

Anti-essentialists do not believe in natures, imagining that ‘for something to have a nature means that it must be eternally fixed and unalterable.’ This is manifestly false. ‘There is no need to imagine, as many anti-essentialists do, that natures need be eternally fixed. The most dramatic example we have of a nature which is perpetually re-making itself is human nature.’ (Eagleton 2003: 117 118). Marx is an essentialist who focuses upon the constant making and re-making of human nature. He praises Hegel for his emphasis on human self-creation, locating this creative activity within the historical process. Marx sees human nature as a field of immanent potentialities that are developed historically within specific social relations, not in terms of an eternal, unchanging essence. That latter view is precisely what Marx identified in Feuerbach and rejected in no uncertain terms. 

It is difficult not to conclude that the entire controversy here is so misconceived that to even attempt to unravel it involves entering into a debate whose terms are certain to be misunderstood and hence mislead, inviting rebuttals that further cloud the issue, thereby generating a controversy that feeds on its own inflated discourse. Ironically, lost in this culturalism, we end up confirming the loss of Marx’s materialist ontology, the very thing that has taken us back into idealist positions and empty abstractions. The rejection of essentialism has given us an intellectual left that has nothing essentially to say about anything, and so says essentially nothing, endlessly. ‘Enough is now more than enough,’ Norman Geras wrote in the last line of his book on this in 1985. By now, the vacuous nature of this ‘professorial twaddle’ (Marx Notes on Wagner 1879; Marx CI 1976: 187; he also refers to ‘theoretical twaddle’ in Capital) ought now be clear. We either get serious about essences or we don’t; and if we don’t we will continue to miss the real significance of Marx’s critical insight and achievement.

Marx does consistently refer to individuals and their relations and interactions, and the whole point of communism is to bring reified social relations back to their source in individual actions and interactions in context. He does this most clearly in The German Ideology. None of which implies a reductionism on Marx’s part. Marx is beyond issues of methodological individualism and collectivism, issues which are themselves the product of these reified modern relations. If Marx’s scientific approach does focus on the study of social structures, then it does so as a critique of capital’s fetish system of production, making it appear that structures, relations and forms are independent of individuals. Althusser, in effect, took the object of Marx’s critique – the fetish structures of capitalist society – and turned it into a methodological principle, in the process coming to rationalize the very thing that Marx sought to criticize and uproot. (I argued this point at length in my doctoral work, Marx, Reason and Freedom 2001; Marx, Praxis and Socialism from Below 1997). Where Althusser and those who were influenced by him sought to remove the individual subject from marxist analysis, my argument underlines the way that Marx constantly premised his arguments upon individuals in their relations to each other and to the wider society, whilst nevertheless uprooting the liberal ontology that presupposed the separation and abstraction of individuality and sociality. Marx is at pains to point out that ‘although an individual cannot become free in isolation from others, nonetheless it is only individuals who are free.’ (Gould 1978: 108). 

Marx states this point repeatedly in his defence of communism as a common control on the part of associated individuals:

We have further shown that private property can be abolished only on condition of an all-round development of individuals, because the existing character of intercourse and productive forces is an all-round one, and only individuals that are developing in an all-round fashion can appropriate them, i.e. can turn them into free manifestations of their lives. We have shown that at the present time individuals must abolish private property, because the productive forces and forms of intercourse have developed so far that, under the domination of private property, they have become destructive forces, and because the contradiction between the classes has reached its extreme limit. Finally, we have shown that the abolition of private property and of the division of labour is itself the union of individuals on the basis created by modern productive forces and world intercourse.

Marx GI Selections from Parts 2 and 3 The Free Development of Individuals 1999 1965: 482

The Left in politics has drifted off into abstract and repressive collectivisms too many times for us to fail to foreground Marx’s concern with individuality and the free development of individuals. Repudiating the autonomous subject of liberal theory is not the same thing as rejecting the individual. I do not think that Althusser understands Marx correctly, and I think his approach involves us controversies that feed on themselves, taking us further and further away from where we need to be, away from Marx’s materialist ontology, certainly, away from Marx’s ‘unified science’ as a science that integrates normative concerns and emancipatory commitments within. Althusser (mis)took the object of Marx’s emancipatory normative critique – the fetish systems and structures of capitalist society – and made it a scientific principle and method, neglecting to understand what Marx meant by the ‘one science.’ 

Marx’s point, of course, is that it is the capitalist reification of relations that makes the social world appear to be beyond the control and comprehension of individuals, alienation within material life processes giving the social relationships between individuals the appearance of being relationships between things. Marx’s critical method is based on an essentialism that distinguishes between appearance and reality. It is the purpose of that method to penetrate the fetishized surface level of appearances to grasp reality in its ‘inner connections’ and ‘hidden potentialities,’ to bring these relations to the light of consciousness and in the process aid a transformative practice that is concerned to end fetishism and bring relations back to the control and comprehension of individuals in society. As a result, as Kain argues, we come to understand clearly the truth that social relations are in fact relations between individuals, at which point theoretical science will wither away in the attainment of the communist society. (Kain 1986: ch. 3).

Kain considers Althusser to be correct in arguing that the later Marx rejects the concept of human essence which informed his early writings and correct to argue that the forces and relations of production, once fetishism is overcome, are not to be reduced to the human essence, but incorrect in claiming that they are not to be reduced to human relations. The restoration of reified social relations back to human comprehension and control is precisely Marx’s goal, and this is a humanist goal that implies a humanist ethic. 

Kain considers that Marx in The German Ideology rejected morality as an ideological illusion that was destined to disappear in communist society. He goes on to argue that, in the Grundrisse and Capital, Marx no longer rejects morality as an ideological illusion, and that morality does not after all disappear under communism. (Kain 1988 chapters 4 and 5). 





In all periods of his thought, it is Marx's goal to bring about a society which will realize the highest development of the individual, Kain argues, but in different periods we find different understandings of morality and the way in which it is connected with and contributes to this human development. I agree with that conclusion; I disagree with the convoluted way in which Kain has come to argue it. And I argue that not only is that view compatible with essentialist categories, it presupposes them and requires them. I argue that it is possible to affirm the essential unity of Marx’s thought whilst paying due attention to important shifts and developments in Marx’s thought, and I see the humanism of Marx’s later writings not as ‘different from’ (Kain 1988: 3) the humanism of his early writings but as an outgrowth of them. 

And that means that there is an implicit and ineradicable normative dimension to Marx’s thought. But to say that is not quite the same as saying that Marx has a moral theory. 

15 Marx, Morality and Moral Theory
Donald Hodges argues that for Marx, ‘moral ideas are ideological expressions of class antagonisms,’ a view that comes with the corollary that morality as such ends under communism (Hodges 1964: 232). Hodges’ view is forthright: there are no ethical foundations to Marxism and there can be no Marxist foundations of ethics (Hodges 1964: 234-5). Allen Wood also argues that marxism has no ethics, no morality and no position on rights and justice; Marx’s critique of capitalism in terms of its historical genesis and progress 'is not itself a moral theory' (Wood in Cohen, Nagel and Scanlon 1980: 40).

I would agree that Marx does not have a moral theory. But that is not the same as arguing that Marx lacked a moral standpoint. We need to understand precisely what kind of ethics is being rejected here. Marx certainly rejected an ethics that was conceived in abstraction from real society and its relations. He rejected notions of eternal justice, as well as a moral theorizing that proceeded from a position outside of social relations. There was no such position, Marx argued. In that respect, Hodges, Wood and the very many who argue that Marx was against morality are correct. He is against an abstract kind of morality. But neither the repudiation of an absolute, eternal morality nor the rejection of abstract moral theorizing necessarily entails the repudiation of morality as such. 

Marx's relation to morality is nuanced, and statements taken in isolation are certain to give only a partial and misleading view. Maximilien Rubel notes here that Marx has been badly served by disciples in being presented as ‘a symbol of the omniscience and omnipotence of homo faber, maker of his own destiny.’ (Rubel 1973). This gross simplification of Marx came as a result of the triumph of Marxism as a State doctrine and Party ideology. Rubel recognises that there is no dualism of science and ethics for Marx, writing of the ‘scientific basis and ethical purpose’ of Marx’s social thought. Rubel clarifies the distinctiveness of Marx’s position here: 





Rubel comments that ‘political Marxism cannot appeal to Marx’s science and at the same time escape the critical analysis which that science uses to unmask the ideologies of power and exploitation.’ Marxism as the ‘ideology of a master class’ may have succeeded in emptying the concepts of socialism and communism of Marx’s original meaning, but they are entirely vulnerable to Marx’s critical method in exposing ideology in the service of asymmetries of power. 

The key point is that for Marx moral and material force go hand in hand in a critical practice that is designed to expose and subvert ideology and the way it serves to conceal, rationalize and preserve asymmetrical relations of power. A morality that is severed from such material force, proclaimed in terms of ideal and eternal principles, is impotent or, in the service of existing material relations, is a rationalization.

What Marx was most certainly concerned to overcome was the ‘impotence’ of the moralistic criticisms of capitalism, whether in the form of Utopian socialism or Christian conservatism. (see the Communist Manifesto on this, also Marx quoting the utopian socialist Charles Fourier with approval in The Holy Family, Marx and Engels, 1987a: 201). Rejecting the notion of universally valid moral principles and abstract moral theorizing, Marx argues that moral concepts and principles are appropriate to specific historical social forms. This does not constitute an outright repudiation of ethics as such, as many argue. (Brenkert, 1983, p17). On the contrary, these moral concepts and principles are immanent, they are located within society, its relations, practices, communities and struggles. And they are all the moral for that. 

Marx’s view of morality should therefore be understood as being of a piece with his views of philosophy, religion and science. He is concerned not so much to abolish these things, in the sense of rejection and extirpation, but to realize their truths in a concrete material, and humanized, reality. In all these areas, Marx’s critical focus is targeted precisely upon abstraction and idealism. 

With respect to morality, Marx’s humanism as a naturalism is concerned to reject the idea of morality as an abstract imposition of a ‘higher’ self upon a ‘lower’ self, a view that conceives moral behaviour in terms of suppressing natural desires and constraining individual appetites. Such a view of morality as an ethical regulation from the outside is particularly appropriate to a competitive market society that viewed human beings not as social beings but as inherently egoistic and selfish. (Wood 2005: 132-134 149). In On the Jewish Question, Marx analyses bourgeois civil society at length, condemning it as a sphere of universal antagonism and egoism, exposing the social roots of its competitive individualism in the private property system. (Marx EW OJQ 1975). In this individualistic society, individuals live within instrumental relations: each seeks to use the other as a means to personal ends, with the result that all become subordinated to the external force of things. Marx makes the distinction between the heavenly sphere of citizenship within the abstract community of the state and the earthly reality of competition and egoism:

The perfected political state is by its nature the species-life of man in opposition to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist outside the sphere of the state in civil society, but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its full degree of development man leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers. The relationship of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relationship of heaven to earth. The state stands in the same opposition to civil society and overcomes it in the same way as religion overcomes the restrictions of the profane world, i.e. it has to acknowledge it again, reinstate it and allow itself to be dominated by it. Man in his immediate reality, in civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he regards himself and is regarded by others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where he is considered to be a species-being, he is the imaginary member of a fictitious sovereignty, he is divested of his real individual life and filled with an unreal universality.

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 220-221

In making these critical observations, Marx is demanding reality as against illusion, a concrete universality as against abstraction – he is demanding the abolition of inverted conditions that give rise to the need for illusions, whether we consider this in terms of the commonality and universality denied in society that is projected outwards and upwards to the level of the heavenly realm of the abstract state or the soul denied in soulless social conditions that we come to seek in religion. That is Marx’s point with respect to the rational freedom of the state, the truths of philosophy, religion as the soul of soulless conditions, and it is his point with respect to morality – Marx demands a lived truth, a moral living in true reality. My old school priest spoke of living the Gospel. Accordingly, Marx’s ethics are embedded in practices, real associations, social struggles, all of which exposed the reality or otherwise of moral claims, whether these are made in codes of ethics, constitutions or theories. Ethics is a practice in community for Marx. In particular, Marx was interested in class struggle and the way in which the struggle against relations of domination and exploitation demonstrated the restrictive nature of freedom in a capitalist society. Marx highlights the ways in which association in a common cause served to develop the solidaristic virtues that transcended the abstract and individualistic conceptions of liberal morality. It is from this embedded standpoint on ethics that Marx exposed the inherent biases of moral theory within capitalist modernity, as well as its emptiness, and came to reject all such moralizing as sanctimonious, ‘pompous,’ ideological and impotent. Marx didn’t reject morality, he demanded its realization as against its unreality within prevailing society.

16 Ancients and Moderns
The individualism of modern moral theory forms a stark contrast with the ancient Greek conception of ethics. Marx’s view bears a great similarity with the ancient idea of ethics as ethos, a practice embedded in a communal modus vivendi. My focus throughout has been upon Aristotle, for the reason that much of what Aristotle says found its way into Marx. Marx, indeed, described Aristotle ‘a giant thinker,’ the ‘greatest thinker of antiquity’ (before pointing out what even Aristotle had missed, Marx 1976: 175 532). 

Aristotle establishes the good in terms of Eudaimonia (Aristotle 1976: 63). This refers to happiness as human flourishing, well-being, or self-realisation with respect to human nature or the human essence. In this conception, the virtues are qualities of successful living defined in the above terms. And since, as Aristotle argues – and Marx stresses – human beings are social beings, then flourishing occurs within a socio-relational context, a public life, a community. This communal society enables individuals as social beings to realize their essence and flourish in relation to others. (MacIntyre 1985: 148). Aristotle’s specific description of human beings is ‘political animals,’ the political here being employed in an expansive sense to encompass the entire human association. Aristotle thus affirmed the intertwining of politics and ethics, with human flourishing within community as denoting a developmental concern possessing a core normative dimension. That concern begs practical and institutional questions with respect to the precise forms of political community and social life that would best facilitate human flourishing. The problem is that modern moral theory, in establishing an unbridgeable divide between ethics and politics, comes to see the realm of politics as a neutral sphere imposing a legal framework that allows individuals to choose and pursue the (subjective) good as they see fit within the context of a competitive market society of self-interested agents. That view fits the contours of a modern separation of state and civil society in the context of disenchantment, but cuts individuals off from the public community they need in order to individuate themselves. The loss of an overarching moral framework has made existentialists of all individuals in the modern world; we are free to choose our own gods or devils, with there being no objective standard available by which we could differentiate between the two and thereby evaluate our choices whilst holding the choices of others to account. In an objectively valueless world, notions of an objective good have ceased to be tenable, meaning that individuals are charged with finding meaning in a meaningless world as an existential act.

The moral world of Aristotle is very different. For Aristotle, ethics and politics are closely intertwined. He thus declared politics to be the science of the good life: ‘The science that studies the supreme Good for man is politics.’ (Aristotle 1976: 64; MacIntyre 1966: 57). For Aristotle, the interwovenness of ethics and politics is all about excelling at being human, and this, since human beings are social beings, cannot be achieved in separation from others and in abstraction from community. Flourishing is only possible through the existence of the political institutions and social forms that enable the acquisition and exercise of the appropriate virtues. Eagleton thus establishes the necessity of virtue:

You can have a good toad, but not a virtuous one. On one view, however (not the most popular view today, especially among cultural theorists), human beings have to work fairly hard to become human beings, and so can indeed be congratulated on being human. Because we are able to be false to our natures, there is some virtue in our being true to them.

Eagleton 2003 ch 5

Eagleton’s distinction here establishes the difference between naturalism as a physicalism or biologism and a genuinely ethical view. You can be a good human being in terms of functioning as a natural being, but not necessarily a virtuous one, as captured by the notion of flourishing well. That distinction makes it clear that human beings have to make a moral effort in becoming truly human beings. Human beings are more than capable of being false to their natures, misusing and misapplying their essential attributes, which means that virtues are required as a form of training enabling us to be true to our natures.

Aristotle’s naturalistic ethics is not a simplistic naturalism, but is concerned with the realization of healthy potentialities, a view which involves evaluation, differentiating between good and bad. Some potentials are harmful to self and to others and ought not be realized. As Eagleton writes:





That unity of each individual and all individuals is central to the conception of rational freedom that I have defined in this book. The abstract liberal legal framework establishes this unity negatively as a principle of non-harm, leaving individuals free to determine the good as they choose, so long as they do no harm to others. But that conception of non-harm is immanent within the essentialist ‘rational’ conception of human beings as social beings, and is stated positively in seeking to constitute mutual relations and connections in such a way as not to require an abstract legal protection:





Eagleton makes clear the extent to which ‘this kind of moral thinking … was inherited by Karl Marx, who was much indebted to Aristotle even in his economic thought,’ writing of ‘the precious heritage of Aristotle and Marx’ in terms of ‘the interwovenness of the moral and political, power and the personal.’ (Eagleton 2003: 142 143-144).

Alasdair MacIntyre is alive to the ‘class-bound conservatism’ of Aristotle’s account of the specific virtues required to enable human beings to flourish (MacIntyre 1966: 68) but nevertheless develops Aristotelian virtue theory as the most satisfying moral theory we have. Dependent Rational Animals is a further development of the account of the virtues in After Virtue, to the extent that MacIntyre’s view is now biologically informed. In this, MacIntyre has come to correct his earlier qualified endorsement of Aristotle, now implicitly recognizing the importance of essentialism, what he describes below as Aristotle’s ‘metaphysical biology’:





MacIntyre’s argument here makes the case for essentialism with respect to the emphasis on the form of life required for the kind of beings human beings are. I note, however, that Dependent Rational Animals contains no reference to essences or to essentialism. I wonder if, like others, MacIntyre considers essentialism one of Aristotle’s ‘quirks,’ (Marx’s too) that it is better to pass silently over, little realizing that it is this essentialist metaphysics that gives Aristotle’s work (and Marx’s) its long-range power and depth. 

I agree with MacIntyre that it is Aristotle himself who supplies the best resources for identifying any errors in his work and correcting them. It is in that sense that MacIntyre’s claim to turn Aristotle against Aristotle himself makes sense (MacIntyre 1999: 7-8). We can identify the class-bound constraints of Aristotle’s original presentation of virtue theory, recognizing that since there is nothing inherently elitist about Aristotle’s virtue theory (Knight 2007: 14ff; see also Nederman 2008), then there is nothing to prevent us giving it a democratic and egalitarian reading. 

It is not a stretch to argue that Marx possesses a conception of social citizenship which entails the universalization of Aristotle’s virtue ethic as against the atomism he finds in the rights of man as rights of isolation and separation fracturing the public community. Whilst Marx’s emphasis upon the human essence as unfolding through different social forms in history does advance upon Aristotle’s view of human nature, both views are quite distinct from the modern liberal ontology grounded in the discrete individual. Holding the individual and society in abstraction from each other, liberalism affirms the moral and ontological ultimacy of the individual self. Aristotle and Marx reject this figure of the discrete individual at the heart of the liberal ontology. To Aristotle and Marx, such an individual is a fiction, an unreal being, existing nowhere. In the Politics, Aristotle writes:

Man is by nature a social animal; an individual who is unsocial naturally and not accidentally is either beneath our notice or more than human. Society is something that precedes the individual. Anyone who either cannot lead the common life or is so self-sufficient as not to need to, and therefore does not partake of society, is either a beast or a god.

Whether the modern individual is a god or a beast is not a question that we are likely to resolve in terms of contemporary ethics. As Max Weber argued at length, shorn of a standard of objective good, each individual is free to choose their own gods or devils, with there being no way of differentiating which is which. In the conclusion to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber gives a gloomy view of narcissistic individuals who think themselves all-important and all-powerful – gods indeed - and yet who are confined within the steel-hard cage of capitalist modernity:





The first systematic account of this modern existentialism, sophism, conventionalism and nihilism was given by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan (1651). Hobbes made self-preservation the defining characteristic of human nature. From this premise, he argues that in a condition of material scarcity in the state of nature, individuals would be brought into conflict with each other in a competition for scarce resources, resulting in a ‘war of all against all.’ (Hobbes 1998. See especially chapter 13). Hobbes proposes as a ‘general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.’ (Hobbes 1998 ch 4). Without the common power of the strong state, Hobbes says, life for this discrete individual would be nasty, brutish and short:

During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that conditions called war; and such a war, as if of every man, against every man.
To this war of every man against every man, this also in consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law, where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the cardinal virtues.
No arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death: and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.

Hobbes 1998 Ch 12

Hobbes thus argues that moral philosophy is ‘nothing else but the science of what is good, and evil,’ and that good and evil are simply ‘names that signify our appetites, and aversions’ with respect to the need for self-preservation. (Hobbes 1998 ch 13). It follows that power is its own justification, and that the might of the individual is the sole criterion for determining what is right. 

The fact that Hobbes’ philosophy is ugly doesn’t make it wrong. It was a scandal at the time, contradicting the lofty philosophical ideals with which people prefer to cloak politics. Macpherson writes that Hobbes ‘is widely, and rightly, regarded as the most formidable of English political theorists; formidable not because he is difficult to understand but because his doctrine is at once so clear, so sweeping, and so disliked. His postulates about the nature of man are unflattering, his political conclusions are illiberal, and his logic appears to deny us any way out.’ (Mcpherson 1962). I would just argue that Hobbes’ ‘illiberal conclusions’ follow directly from his very liberal premises: those of the abstract self-interested, self-maximising individual in competitive relation to all other individuals. The life of the ‘solitary’ individual would undoubtedly prove to ‘poor, nasty, brutish and short’ were it not for the external union imposed on such self-seeking atoms from the outside. The question posed from within the tradition of ‘rational freedom’ is how human beings may come to form a moral and political association so as to be able to supply that union from within as a collective self-constraint.

Macpherson goes on to demonstrate at length the extent to which Hobbes has read the chief characteristics of the emerging bourgeois society of his day back into nature, to find natural justifications for socially and historically specific and created bourgeois institutions. As a result, Hobbes’ philosophy reveals more about the possessive individualism of capitalist market society, and the liberal morality and politics that goes with it, than it does about nature and human nature. Moral theory ever since has been attempting to deal with the relativistic, not to say nihilistic, implications of Hobbes’ thought – and the diremptive reality which Hobbes’ thought accurately describes - whilst nevertheless affirming the right of the individual to pursue the good, or power, as they see fit, in accordance with their own self-interest. Modern moral theory is thus characterised by an attempt to secure protection and ensure non-harm within Hobbes’ model of competitive individualism. Of course, that competitive individualism is not the philosophical creation of Hobbes, but Hobbes’ very accurate characterisation of modern market society. Hobbes bequeathed moral and political philosophy with a problem with which it has been dealing, inadequately, ever since. In Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment, David Lay Williams argues for Rousseau as the greatest and most sophisticated of the modern Platonists in affirming transcendent norms against the conventionalism and sophism of Hobbes and all who have followed in his wake (which is many indeed, of all persuasions). (Williams 2007).

I have to leave for another day the issue of whether or not Marx affirmed transcendent truths, norms and values. His praxis-based philosophy stands in line of descent from Kant, with praxis as a projection of truth upon the world. Kant himself is Platonist, but with a twist in seeing telos, the true, and the good as human projections upon the world. Which leaves us facing the same question, is there an objective reality, morality and good? I address that question elsewhere.

Marx had no trouble in seeing Hobbes’ state of nature not as nature at all but as the reality of modern market society as a realm of universal egoism and antagonism. Absorbing the lessons of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, Marx identifies the central problematic of modern political philosophy and ethics as the extent to which the competitive individualism of modern capitalist society comes to contradict the lofty philosophical ideals of the common good. He notes this as Hegel’s central concern in the Philosophy of Right, where Hegel writes:

Just as civil society is the battlefield where everyone's individual private interest wars against everyone else's, so here we have the struggle
(a)	of private interests against particular matters of common concern and
(b)	of both of these together against the organization of the state and its higher outlook.

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 101

This idea of civil society as constituting a ‘battleground’ clearly refers to Hobbes’ description of the bellum omnium contra omnes. Hegel presents his system of Sittlichkeit as an attempt to constrain and overcome this social war. Yet, Marx notes, Hegel gives us not a genuine resolution of the problem but a rationalization of the private property system, yet more lofty philosophical ideals with respect to the universal interest, whilst preserving the social structures of competitive individualism intact. And this establishes the context of Marx’s criticism of political emancipation as an emancipation that leaves the individual confined within market society as a sphere of universal competition, egoism and antagonism:

Political emancipation is certainly a big step forward. It may not be the last form of general human emancipation, but it is the last form of human emancipation within the prevailing scheme of things. Needless to say, we are here speaking of real, practical emancipation. 
Man emancipates himself politically from religion by banishing it from the province of public law to that of private law. It is no longer the spirit of the state where man behaves - although in a limited way, in a particular form and a particular sphere - as a species-being, in community with other men. It has become the spirit of civil society, the sphere of egoism and of the bellum omnium contra omnes. It is no longer the essence of community but the essence of difference. It has become the expression of the separation of man from his community, from himself and from other men, which is what it was originally. It is now only the abstract confession of an individual oddity, of a private whim, a caprice.

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 221-222

Having learned his Aristotelian lessons well, Marx identifies the fundamental problem of politics as lying at the heart of the liberal ontology and the way that this ontology fitted the contours of a competitive market society. This society, and the liberal philosophy that rationalized it, expressed the separation of individuals from each other, from community and from notions of a good that is held in common.

The modern liberal conception is abstract, separating those things that belonged together. ‘The more deeply we go back into history,’ Marx writes in the Grundrisse, ‘the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole.’ Up to modern civil society, the individual’s sense of self was mediated, in a natural way through the family and the family expanded into the clan, then through various forms of communal society. ‘Only in the eighteenth century,’ Marx argues, ‘in “civil society,” do the various forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity.’ (Marx 1973: 84). As Marx had argued earlier, in civil society, the human being is ‘active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers.’ (Marx EW OJQ 1975: 220-1). Marx is concerned with this reification of social relations, not merely in the way it takes the world beyond human comprehension, but in the way it separates individuals from each other, from the community and from the forms of the common life they need in order to flourish. 

The key point is that the emptiness and impotence of modern political philosophy and ethical theory has social, not theoretical, causes, and that the problems of modern society have a practical social solution rather than a theoretical solution. Marx gives us the key in resolving the question by identifying the ‘private interests’ that Hobbes, and those who followed him in modern moral theory, naturalized, to be products of history, characteristics of a specific society. And here, Marx gets into the very core of liberal freedom as a mutual self-cancellation on the part of competing individuals:

The economists express this as follows: Each pursues his private interest and only his private interest; and thereby serves the private interests of all, the general interest, without willing or knowing it. The real point is not that each individual's pursuit of his private interest promotes the totality of private interests, the general interest. One could just as well deduce from this abstract phrase that each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the others' interests, so that, instead of a general affirmation, this war of all against all produces a general negation. The point is rather that private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of these conditions and means. It is the interest of private persons; but its content, as well as the form and means of its realization, is given by social conditions independent of all.

Marx Gr 1973: 156-157

Marx is thus concerned to end the reification of social relations in which individuals are governed by forces that have achieved an independence of them, establishing the appropriate forms of social connection so as to facilitate the reciprocal and all-sided dependence. In such a way would internal union be achieved, ending the need to have recourse to an external union in order to keep a society of competitive individualism from fracturing apart.

Whereas individuals formerly mediated their social lives directly so that they could conceive themselves, their freedoms and obligations through mutual relations, the ‘free’ individual of modern capitalist society appears to be ‘unconstrained by any social bonds.’ (MacIntyre 1966: 121-128). Of course, that appearance is illusory, since the freedom of the individual from direct and personal constraint exists in conditions of an external constraint that encompasses all. Marx writes that ‘the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the hitherto most developed social (from this standpoint, general) relations.’ (Marx Gr 1973: 84). The problem is that these modern relations have become abstract and independent, taking the form of an external necessity and constraint. The problem Marx sets himself is one of overcoming this reification of social relations so that individuals can come to individuate themselves in a social context and become as a result genuinely free. He cites Aristotle at this point: ‘The human being is in the most literal sense a zoon politikon, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society.’ (Marx Gr 1973: 84). 

Marx then has some ill-tempered words on ‘twaddle:’

Production by an isolated individual outside society - a rare exception which may well occur when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident into the wilderness - is as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other. There is no point in dwelling on this any longer. The point could go entirely unmentioned if this twaddle, which had sense and reason for the eighteenth-century characters, had not been earnestly pulled back into the centre of the most modern economics by Bastiat, Carey, Proudhon etc.

Marx Gr 1973: 84

Marx is perfectly reasonable on this. Unfortunately, for all that ‘this twaddle’ is out of kilter with the basic notions of Aristotelian and essentialist philosophy, it does rather fit the dominant atomist, accidentalist, reductionist and empiricist modes of modern thought and society. And that gives modern theories in politics, ethics and economics problems which, within their own theoretical terms set within the context of modern social relations, they cannot resolve. Putting aside the world of endless theoretical disputation, Marx is concerned to identify the social causes.

In medieval society, production and appropriation was carried out individually within local bonds of solidarity underpinned by forms of communal land (Engels 1972: 123ff, 216). Within modern capitalist relations, by way of contrast, production has become socialised whilst appropriation remains individualised. (Engels 1947 327-328). It is the contradictory relationship between social production and individual appropriation that most interests Marx. He shows that a socialization on these terms embroils individuals in an extensive web of connections, even though individual appropriation implies their separation from each other as competitors for scarce resources. It is an unsocial socialization. The problems of modern political philosophy and ethics arose from within this diremptive terrain and the way in which it separated the individual and the social, holding apart and in abstraction things that once related together within the ‘greater whole.’ 

Marx sees how political philosophy has attempted to deal with this problem. He examines Hegel at length on this. He has clearly studied Rousseau too, referring to him approvingly when writing that ‘Rousseau's description of the abstraction of the political man is a good one.’ Marx proceeds to quote Rousseau to this effect from The Social Contract:

Whoever dares to undertake the founding of a people's institutions must feel himself capable of changing, so to speak, human nature, of transforming each individual, who in himself is a complete and solitary whole, into a part of a greater whole from which he somehow receives his life and his being, of substituting a partial and moral existence for physical and independent existence. He must take man's own powers away from him and substitute for them alien ones which he can only use with the assistance of others.

But Marx nevertheless understands that neither Rousseau nor Hegel have succeeded in transcending the alienated mediations of the capital system and the way it is that these drive they individualism and diremption they seek to overcome in the first place. Modern moral and political philosophy is saddled with a problem that it cannot, on its own terms, within the context of this contradiction between social production and individual appropriation, resolve.

To achieve the relations of the parts within the ‘greater whole’ requires more than association within the universal state: it requires that bonds of commonality and universality – wholeness – be forged within social relationships. It is this insight that led Marx to identify the working class as the universal class. His reasoning proceeds thus:

Only in the name of the universal rights of society can a particular class lay claim to universal domination. Revolutionary energy and spiritual self-confidence are not enough to storm this position of liberator and to ensure thereby the political exploitation of all the other spheres of society in the interests of one's own sphere. If the revolution of a people and the emancipation of a particular class [Klasse] of civil society are to coincide, if one class is to stand for the whole of society, then all the deficiencies of society must be concentrated in another class [Stand], one particular class must be the class which gives universal offence, the embodiment of a general limitation; one particular sphere of society must appear as the notorious crime of the whole of society, so that the liberation of this sphere appears as universal self-liberation. If one class [Stand] is to be the class of liberation par excellence, then another class must be the class of overt oppression.

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 255

Every class, Marx writes, is involved in a struggle with the class beneath it as soon as it takes up the struggle against the class above it. ‘Thus princes struggle against kings, bureaucrats against aristocrats, and the bourgeoisie against all of these, while the proletariat is already beginning to struggle against the bourgeoisie.’ And it is in that struggle against exploitation and oppression that virtues of solidarity come to be fostered, inculcated and shared. Class struggle is thus the site of an embedded morality, for Marx. He asks as to where the ‘positive possibility’ of emancipation lies, and answers:

In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class [Stand] which is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere which has a universal character because of its universal suffering and which lays claim to no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular wrong but wrong in general', a sphere of society which can no longer lay claim to a historical title, but merely to a human one, which does not stand in one-sided opposition to the consequences but in all-sided opposition to the premises of the German political system; and finally a sphere which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from - and thereby emancipating - all the other spheres of society, which is, in a word, the total loss of humanity and which can therefore redeem itself only through the total redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society as a particular class is the proletariat.

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 256-257

The proletariat is the positive possibility contained within society of overcoming that ‘society's acute disintegration’ to restore wholeness:

When the proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the existing world order, it is only declaring the secret of its own existence, for it is the actual dissolution of that order. When the proletariat demands the negation of private property, it is only elevating to a principle for society what society has already made a principle for the proletariat, what is embodied in the proletariat, without its consent, as the negative result of society.

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 257

For all that Hegel shared the contemporary German admiration for ancient Greece, (Shklar J 1971 'Hegel's Phenomenology: An Elegy for Hellas in Pelczynski ed 1971), he understood that the ancient life was beyond recall. He thus asked in what way we in the present were different from the ancient Greeks. This led him to see that morality had a history, and how it took different forms in different social contexts. This gave Marx the clue as to how to integrate the insights of Aristotelian and Kantian ethical systems, whilst transcending the socially-bound limitations of both.

Aristotle established his ethics and politics on a conception of the human essence. In like manner, Hegel argued that ethics must proceed from an understanding of ‘what human beings are.’ In answering that question, Hegel gives us a deeply historicized concept of human beings, as distinct from a naturalised one. That view would upset those who accent an inherited or biological nature. Hegel has been criticized on this. Hursthouse thus presents a naturalist view in which biology is central to the naturalist view. Eschewing references to ‘persons’ or ‘rational beings’, she writes:

But “ethical naturalism” is usually thought of as not only basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature, but also as taking human beings to be part of the natural, biological order of living things. Its standard first premise is that what human beings are is a species of rational, social animals and thereby a species of living things – which unlike “persons” or “rational beings”, have a particular biological make-up and a natural life cycle.

Hursthouse On Virtue Ethics 206

MacIntyre, describing human beings as dependent rational animals (1999), would not disagree. And social animals, too. It all depends on what we mean by rational beings. And it depends on what we mean by being grounded. As biological beings, we are grounded in nature, a simple truth that Marx affirmed repeatedly. As social beings, we are grounded in history and culture, where we are also rational beings. This was where Marx’s interest lay, being concerned to show what human beings did with their nature, and with nature as such, through their conscious practical activity. It is only in being grounded in this expansive sense that we may conceive of human self-realization, conceiving human beings as natural, social and rational beings. Allen Wood writes here:





Whilst Hegel followed Aristotle in arguing self-realization to be the goal of human life, he nevertheless broke with him with respect to how the good was formulated in these terms. For Aristotle, the end of human life was happiness as flourishing; for Hegel, the end was freedom. (Wood: 1990: 33ff 20.) And for Hegel, this freedom was to be realized through the historical process:





Arguing that to act freely was to act in accordance with necessity, Hegel criticised ‘Kant for seeing dichotomies in the self between freedom and nature…where he ought to have seen freedom as actualising nature.’ (Hegel 1956: 26; Lukács 1975: 354; Engels 1947: 140; Wood 1990: 70). Locating the realization of freedom in the historical process, Hegel denies that morality is universal in some transhistoric sense; on the contrary, moral laws are only intelligible ‘in the context of a particular community,’ and can only be universalised to the extent that ‘communities grow and consolidate into an international community.’ (Solomon 1983: 480-481).

Hegel thus invested the Kantian concept of freedom as self-determination with a social content in being related to the movement of ‘a living social whole.’ (Lukács 1975: 153). In the process, Hegel reworked Aristotle’s notion of happiness. Once human nature is conceived as evolving with the social and cultural evolution of the communities within which human beings live, the meaning of human self-realization changes. Hegel thus develops an ethics that is best understood as a ‘dialectical or historicised naturalism.’ (Wood 1990: 33).





That’s the view I’ve been concerned to present and develop throughout this thesis. Allen Wood proceeds to point out that both classical and historicized naturalism are considered to be an embarrassment to contemporary ethical naturalists. I don’t have any political or academic ambitions to pursue or positions to protect and, having combined the work of anarchists, Marxists, poets, Blake, Dante, Catholics and conservatives, saints and sinners, orthodox and heretics alike over the years, I am long past embarrassment. And I’m not too embarrassed to call ‘grand theory naturalism’ for what it is: essentialism! 

Both classical and historicized naturalism are an embarrassment to some contemporary ethical naturalists, because they are so unashamedly part of a philosophical tradition of grand theorizing about human nature and history. Easily embarrassed naturalists would rather start with people's conscious desires and preferences, yielding a theory that looks more like empirical social science than old fashioned philosophy. But conscious desires and preferences are sometimes the result of misinformation, pathology, ideology, and other distorting processes, whose effects it is one of the tasks of a theory of the good to expose and correct. Thus ethical naturalists such as Richard Brandt and Peter Railton prefer what we might call idealized preference naturalism : A person's good is to be identified not with what that person in fact desires or prefers, but with what the person would desire or prefer if fully informed about and lucidly aware of all the relevant facts." Although they describe themselves as "stark raving moral realists," idealized preference naturalists seem to regard even hypothetical subjective preferences as more real than ordinary objective goodness and badness. 

Wood 1995 ch 1

I very much agree with Wood here, particularly in the way he distinguishes Aristotelian, Hegelian and Marxist naturalism from the evident egoism and individualism of contemporary naturalism. This is the difference between essentialism and atomism. I’d be happy to be known as a ‘stark raving essentialist,’ and be considered to be living life to some purpose. Choose your sides carefully here, for there is a clear dividing line, and it concerns the difference between remaining mired within the impasse of modernity and modern moral theory and coming out of it as freely flourishing beings. Hegel’s understanding of human nature as a creative dialectical unfolding through history that gave Marx the basis to transcend the limitations of prevailing dualist accounts of individual agency, split as they were between egoism and altruism, materialism and idealism, Hobbesian war and Kantian peace, passion and reason.

Wood is worth quoting at length when it comes to clarifying the key issue of morals and ideals with respect to future society. Marx did not write kitchen recipes for a very good reason:

Historicized naturalism does face a problem of indeterminacy when it comes to the good of future generations, which classical naturalism does not. Some things about people's needs and the conditions of their self-actualization will, no doubt, remain the same; and some changes might even be predictable. Yet if human self-understanding is always growing, and if the action based on it is always modifying and deepening the nature of human beings, then the historicized naturalist must confess that our present self-conception is inadequate, in ways we can never hope to repair, for deciding the good of future human beings.




There is the answer to those who criticize Marx for failing to show us the way out of our problems. He did, just not in the way people demand. The way out is before our eyes and under our feet, all around us in the world we live in. What Marx didn’t do is bind our hands with instruction manuals, plans and programmes. It is our responsibility, as change-agents within the specific social relations of a time and place, to write our own guidelines and directives as appropriate. It is indeed easier to live with these limitations, as Wood writes, ‘than with those that idealized preference naturalism would impose on us.’ Marx shows the extent to which the egoism and atomism of ‘free’ market society generates an external constraint that diminishes the freedom of each and all, constraining us within capital’s ‘objective dependency relations.’ (Marx Gr 1973: 162-164). 

If the history of philosophy is the history of spectacular failures, then Hegel’s was the biggest and most spectacular failure of all. 





Michael Rosen asks: ‘What is living in the logic of Hegel?’ He answers: ‘Nothing.’ (Michael Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982: 179). Wood points out that when the theory of logic was revolutionized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the new theory was built upon precisely those features of traditional logic that Hegel thought most dispensable. That pretty much describes what happened to the metaphysical underpinnings of Marx’s economics. The grand theoretical structures of Hegel and Marx, pointing to the great line of emancipation leading us to the future realized society, were pretty much ruined edifices from their moment of construction. The ‘grand’ ambitions of Hegel and Marx have been scaled down. In fact, they don’t exist anymore. And our ambitions have been accordingly lowered. Philosophy is not so much about building castles and towers anymore, but tidying the house and throwing out clutter. We can hardly be expected to honour those who will only those the small things that are within easy reach (not least because they so often fail to accomplish even those). In fact, we don’t need philosophy or theory for that, most people can manage very well to de-clutter, throwing out philosophical overcomplication in the process:





Marx was an enthusiast. And I’m incorrigible. (Or so my old school teacher called me). I don’t see Hegel and Marx as having failed at all. I think there is purpose in the world. I think human beings are teleological beings. And I don’t think the reign of the atomists either can or will endure.

17 The Impasse of Modern Moral Theory
To bring the discussion back to ethics, whereas pre-modern thinkers proceeded from the assumption that human beings are social beings, with the corollary that the individual can only be understood in relation to others as part of society, modern modes of thought are faced with the paradox of the individual living within a society of extensive, yet reified, connections, separated from each other and from their social relations. Far from increasing sociality, such abstraction means that society exists as a sphere of universal egoism and competition. Modern political philosophy and ethics are confronted with the problem of how it is possible to formulate a common good out of a world of egoistic individuals, a good that is capable of securing the agreement of these self-interested individuals, motivating them, binding and obligating them in its attainment. 

Social contract theory, utilitarianism/consequentialism, and deontology/Kantianism are all attempts to crack this central problem of modernity. And, reading some of the essays in Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader (Daniel Statman 1997 Edinburgh) with increasing disappointment and frustration, so too is some modern virtue ethics, which is hardly virtue ethics at all, merely an attempt to appropriate virtue ethics in order to reinvigorate modern moral theories in all their exhaustion, emptiness, impotence, and pointlessness. It can’t be done. The problem is intractable in the terms attempted by moral theory in the academy. This corpse was never alive in the first place. ‘It is what it is,’ as Holyhead on Holy Island, Anglesey was described to me. And it can be no more than that. 

There is no solution to the modern moral problematic within the diremptive terrain of modernity. All we can do is make a virtue out of vice, put a brave face on it, and pretend to celebrate difference, conflict, meaninglessness, choice, pluralism, narcissism, nihilism, self-importance, powerlessness, identity, emancipation in this, the best of all times, and the worst too. Or, once the pretence gets tiring and the impossibilities get exhausting, we may go beyond impotent theorising to seek a social resolution through a practical ethics and reasoning that restores wholeness and wholesomeness to the world. I write more on this in volume 3 with respect to communities of practice, character formation, virtue, enabling traditions, and narrativity.

This is what Marx did. And in doing so, it is important to understand that this did not involve a crude rejection of theory for practice or a rejection of morality. Marx is not a fideist (and neither am I, for all of the emphasis on critique against theory, and for all the emphasis on practice and mediation against philosophical disputation of ontological truth and reality, and for all of the awareness of God as the anarchic surplus forever beyond the capture of Reason – we are sailing close, though). Marx’s criticisms of abstract modern morality take him out of the endless theorising of contractarian, utilitarian and Kantian schools, but not thereby out of ethics as a rational system determining and evaluating behaviour. To return to a point made earlier, Kain holds that whereas once Marx was a Kantian, he came in time to reject Kant. That’s too crude, because in a critical sense Marx was criticizing Kant and repudiating key aspects of Kant’s ethical approach at the very same time that he was appropriating key Kantian values. Marx’s repudiation of modern political philosophy and ethics proceeds through an immanent critique which entailed the critical appropriation of key values and principles and their resolution on the material terrain. I have made ‘rational freedom’ central to this critical appropriation. Rational freedom lies at the core of Marx’s practical-critical revolutionary activity, his praxis as an active materialism, even as he accuses Hegel, Kant et al of failing to understand the true nature of human freedom.

Put simply, Kant argued that morality involves human beings coming to use their universal reason so as to overcome natural desires and inclinations. He envisaged a community of co-legislators living in accordance with a law established by this universal reason. This community is thus a community of ends characterised by mutual respect. As against Aristotle’s naturalistic approach to ethics, which saw reason as educating desire from within, Kant saw reason as educating this desire from the outside. He saw desire or appetite as inherently selfish and in need of constraint by reason to make moral order possible. The moral law for Kant, as for Rousseau before him, serves to restrain the selfish and sinful desires of individuals. Kant thus proceeds to establish rational freedom as a lawful freedom which serves to constrain self-seeking individual behaviours, without doing anything to alter the social relations driving such competitive individualism in the first place. (I have discussed this aspect of Kant’s morality and Kantianism as the rationalization of capitalist relations at length in my own work, and refer people to those works rather than repeat myself here; Peter Critchley, Kant and the Ethics of Rational Nature, 2007 chs 13, 14, 15). 2001 ch 13)

It is this abstraction running through the entire social fabric as a result of the reification of social relations that lies behind the modern philosophical convention that you cannot derive an ‘ought to be’ from an ‘is.’ That position was originally set out by Hume in the eighteenth century and was restated by G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica. (Cambridge, 1930), a work considered to be the pinnacle of ethical reasoning, for reasons that utterly defeat me. (Post)modern followers of this line of thought can be found in various poststructuralist schools, asserting that there is ‘no necessary relation’ between things where, to essentialists, there most certainly is a necessary relation. Such scepticism, in severing all necessary links between social conditions and political positions, leaves the emancipatory project of the Left without point, purpose and direction. Here, I can only praise Terry Eagleton’s indefatigable efforts to expose the inanities of this ‘twaddle’ over the years (Marx’s dismissive term is most appropriate here, Eagleton 1991 ch 7).





‘To repeat,’ writes Eagleton. He was repeating himself in 1991 and was still having to repeat himself long after. At which point, I start to get very angry at those intellectualizers who pitch up within the Left and embroil us in fantasies, travesties, delusions and nightmares of their own making. A dereliction, as Geras argues in Discourses of Extremity, at a time when the forces of the Left are assailed on all sides by defenders of a system whose crisis is threatening to take us all down with it. 

Here, I am more interested in the social causes of this denial and dissolution of necessary relations and how this came to be raised to the status of a philosophical convention, by the proposition that it is illegitimate to derive an ‘ought to be’ from an ‘is’ is repeated like a mantra. At last, there are signs of rebellion within the professional academy, with Dan Dennett having the nerve to ask that if an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from ‘is,’ then from where can it be derived. Sam Harris in The Moral Landscape writes of ‘moral truth’ as well as scientific truth. All of which, happily, presumes that an ‘ought’ does indeed still exist, something which the impasse in modern moral theory has left in increasing doubt. 

Hume was concerned to remove God as a grounding for ethics. Ironically, his philosophical strictures are an invitation to idealism, should one continue to insist on the need for an ‘ought to be’ at all. In the other direction lies scepticism, relativism, conventionalism, nihilism. Kant saw the dangers of moving in this direction. The abandonment of morally necessary ends, he argued, 'would do away with all moral philosophy'. (DV 1964 43, Ak. 384). Kant’s philosophy is an attempt to resist this descent into the subjectivist abyss. Was Kant successful? I’ll put it this way, if the greatest philosopher the modern world has produced can’t crack this problem of morality within modernity, then no-one can.

Hegel thought Kant to have failed, and criticized Kant’s separation of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought.’ So Hegel has a claim to being the greatest modern philosopher, then? But, Kantian philosopher Gary Banham pointed out to me, if Hegel himself had resolved the problem, then Marx would not have felt it necessary to subject Hegel to such extensive critique. Not that Gary was too impressed with Marx either. It was Kant for him. 

It seems that for the moderns there is an unbridgeable gulf between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ a problem whose intractability is apparent from the fact that even the immense intellects of Kant and Hegel failed to resolve between them. And Marx? He doesn’t attempt a philosophical or theoretical solution, he knows that such a thing is impossible given that the problems arise in the practical world.

I have written extensively, and favourably, on Kant’s ethic of ends over the years. (Kant’s Natural Teleology and Moral Praxis 2012; The Socratism of Immanuel Kant; Kant and Virtue). Kant enjoined us to ‘act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.’ In my work in the 1990s I criticised Kant for formulating a lawful freedom that was thin and formal, serving merely to constrain self-seeking individual behaviours within a capitalist framework rather than constituting a genuinely solidaristic framework. In response, Gary Banham recommended that I read Harry van der Linden’s Kantian Ethics and Socialism (1988). This book shows that Kant did indeed have a social and practical ethics and that Kant’s ethics exerted a powerful influence upon socialism, and it is instructive to consider the nature of this influence. Sometime around 1900, neo-Kantian socialist Hermann Cohen declared that Kant ‘is the true and real originator of German socialism.’ In 1925, the ‘Austro-Marxist’ confirmed that ‘Kant’s ethic represents a philosophical expression of the human aims of socialism.’ (Adler, 1978, p63). Somewhere in the maelstrom of the twentieth century, the very reasonable politics of Austro-Marxism has come to be lost. That tradition is well worth revisiting, for those who think the dominant Social Democratic and Communist positions inadequate and/or fanciful.

But what neo-Kantians argue for Kant I could argue for Hegel himself. This all seems paradoxical, given that Kant was a liberal in favour of the minimal state and Hegel a conservative (or corporate liberal), with both maintaining the basis institutions of capitalist market society firmly in place. What lies behind competing these claims? Harry van der Linden writes:

Kant's practical philosophy contains moral and philosophical-historical insights crucial to socialist thought and that his notion of the highest good, or moral society of colegislators who seek to enhance one another's ends, can be extrapolated to set forth the demand for the socialist ideal. Thus the statement suggests a conception of socialism that is ethical in nature and involves not a mere denial of liberal thought but rather its critical extension in the form of economic democracy.

He stresses a final aspect of Hermann Cohen's claim as lying in ‘its implicit criticism of Marx on the grounds that a morally defensible socialism is an ethical socialism and that the philosophical foundations of a tenable socialism are to be sought in Kant, not in Hegel.’ ("Critical Epilogue," p. 289.) 

In what way is Kant ethical, but Hegel (and, to the extent that he followed Hegel, Marx) not? These views are premised upon the neo-Kantian separation of Sein and Sollen, ‘is’ and ‘ought’, fact and value, science and ethics: that is, they accept as given the very point that, in Hegel and Marx, is at issue. That leaves us with a big issue to resolve. If socialism is an inherently moral project with an ineradicable normative and emancipatory dimension – and it is – then it needs to be set out in a defensible ethical form. From which vantage point is this ethics to be stated? This is the key question. In the Kantian argument, this points to the need to constitute an ethical system and theory explicitly and coherently. This is what Kant does, and what Hegel and Marx, embedding their ethics in history and notions of necessity, are claimed not to do. Hence the foundations of a ‘tenable socialism’ can be found only in an explicitly – and abstractly - moral theory, outside of social interests, practices, and identities. That’s the kind of moral theory that Kant provides, as against the historicism of Hegel and the way that this, the implication of this criticism is, misled Marx into a dubious writing of socialism into history, and invites socialists into a very dubious moral historicism and positivism. That’s the case for a transcendent ethics against an ethics of immanence. 

There is a serious point at issue here, with respect to the affirmation of transcendent truths, values and norms which hold objective standards that are beyond the relativism of time and place, holding laws, institutions and practices within time and place in account. Such transcendent standards take us beyond Hobbes’ conventionalism and sophism, and resolve the moral impasse of a modern world that sees individuals as existentialists having to project meaning, value and truth upon an objectively meaningless and valueless world. Marx’s praxis-based philosophy would seem to imply that Marx belongs with the projectors. But the moral force he brings to his critique in the very least implies a moral standard that is more than relative.

This conflict between Kant and Hegel flags up the need to reconstruct Marx’s essentialist metaphysics properly, so as to remove any dubious teleological historicisms and render the remaining ‘necessary’ lines of development benign. Marx’s ethics of immanence stand firmly within the essentialist tradition deriving from Aristotle, seeing ‘necessary’ change as proceeding from within the component elements of a system or substance. Hegel states the point thus:





Marx’s morality proceeds from the inside, not from the outside. His moral view is implicit in action, practice, relations and processes of realisation, and stands against an ethics – and politics – that comes from the outside. But that ethics of immanence still implies a moral standard and its realization in time and place – and that standard could only be in some way transcendent (pointing us back to the Platonism of Rousseau and Kant).

I no longer believe, as I once did, that Hegel was right in criticizing Kant’s ethics as an empty formalism. Nor do I think that Kant’s ethics are individualistic and legalistic; they have a social and practical dimension. Hegel criticised Kant’s separation of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, something which would leave his morality formal and his freedom abstract. Hegel and Hegelian Marxists such as Georg Lukács criticize Kant’s philosophy for its ‘sublime hollowness and uniquely consistent vacuity.’ (Lukács 1975: 287; Taylor 1975: 371; Hegel 1952: 89-90). For all of Kant’s practical ethics, Marx considered Kant to be content to project his ethic of ends to the heavenly realm, leaving the world of competitive individualism and instrumental relationships unchanged:

While the French bourgeoisie, by means of the most colossal revolution that history has ever known, was achieving domination and conquering the Continent of Europe, while the already politically emancipated English bourgeoisie was revolutionising industry and subjugating India politically, and all the rest of the world commercially, the impotent German burghers did not get any further than "good will". Kant was satisfied with "good will" alone, even if it remained entirely without result, and he transferred the realisation of this good will, the harmony between it and the needs and impulses of individuals, to the world beyond. Kant's good will fully corresponds to the impotence, depression and wretchedness of the German burghers, whose petty interests were never capable of developing into the common, national interests of a class and who were, therefore, constantly exploited by the bourgeois of all other nations.

Marx GI 1999, Kant and Liberalism [p. 206] 2 Selections from the remaining parts of the German Ideology (NOTE. The page references given are to the Complete Edition, Lawrence and Wishart, 1965.)

To be fair to Kant, I don’t think these are problems with Kant’s ethical system and philosophy – although Kant does go an awful long way round to get to where we ought to be (he is indeed meticulous) – but with the problematic and indirect relation between philosophy in an unphilosophical world. And given the way that Marx sought to realize philosophy, that is a big problem, as evinced by the frequent misinterpretations and unhappy misapplications of Marx in political practice.

Marx is not happy with a religious ethic divorced from practical effect. And nor is he happy with an ethic that is merely an attempt to legally constrain self-interested individuals – he is concerned to transform society from being a sphere of egoism and antagonism to being a genuine association. Wood argues that Kant’s moral standpoint, far from being constituted by pure reason, is the expression of bourgeois individualism:





This returns us to the problem of the ‘free’ individual located within extensive but reified social relations. This individual is isolated, self-interested, and competitive, confronted by social conditions that have become abstract and independent, with the result that all individuals become subject to an objective dependency, thereby losing identity and power. The philosophical dichotomies troubling the greatest thinkers in politics and ethics arise from within this diremptive social terrain. 

The philosophy of Kant assumes individuals in this antagonistic relation to each other, involving a relative ethical life, and fixes them in it. In abstraction from the specific, historical aspects of real social life, Kant comes to assert an abstracted moral individual who represents only one part of that life. Which is to say that the problem is not one of Kant’s empty formalism, or of the abstraction and emptiness of all other modern moral theories, but of the abstraction and emptiness of the conditions of modern society generating these irresolvable theoretical problems in the first place: ‘Relative ethical life is the life of isolated individuals who exist in a relation to each other which excludes any real unity.’ (Gillian Rose, Hegel: Contra Sociology p56). It is in respect of this that Lucien Goldmann argues that ‘it is not Kant’s ethic which is an empty form but that of actual man in bourgeois individualist society.’ (Goldmann 1971: 174). 

The failures of modern political philosophy and ethics are to be found not in theoretical errors but in the society which saddles theory with problems it cannot, in itself, resolve. In assuming a society of competitive individualism, theorists have no alternative but to establish a universal moral community at the abstract level; in a society of substantive inequality, theorists have no alternative but to establish equality at the formal level; in a society in which all individuals exist in a condition of objective dependency upon reified social relations, theorists have no alternative but to institute freedom at the legal level. The real material terrain of social life, constituted by capital, is off-limits to politics and ethics. Kant was unable to transcend these constraints. Instead of developing the ethic of ends as a socialized ethics – which, arguably, is what Marx did, in line with those who claim Kantianism constitutes the ethical foundation of socialism – Kant instituted rational freedom as a lawful freedom that is designed to constrain, but not change, individual self-seeking behaviours, thus giving us a morality from the outside: this is morality as an external constraint to be imposed upon recalcitrant self-seeking individuals, something which those individuals cannot but feel and resent as an inhibition and a prohibition with respect to their natural needs and inclinations. 

This is a world away from the Aristotelian intertwining of ethics and politics, human beings as social beings experiencing morality as a dimension of their freedom and happiness. Kant establishes morality not as a joy, as an integral part of human flourishing, but as a duty. Why, we need to ask, do human beings stand in need of such exacting constraint and obligation in order to perform acts that are integral to their self-realization and flourishing? Eagleton notes the extent to which people on the Left have shied away from morality, on grounds that it is heavy-handed and ‘often just a fancy name for oppressing other people.’ Describing this view as ‘mistaken,’ he argues that ‘Morality is all about enjoyment and abundance of life, and for classical thought ethics and politics are hard to distinguish.’ (Eagleton 2004: 140-141). That’s Aristotle’s view, that’s Marx’s view and that’s my view. In my thesis Marx and Rational Freedom I argued that:

The 'rational' tradition had promised to transform what Kant referred to as a 'pathologically enforced social union' into an internal moral coordination (UH 1991:44/5). This is a vision of an intersubjective community of ends, an association of individuals regulating their affairs internally. Nevertheless, unable to realise this ideal, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel resorted to institutional devices to compel individuals to behave as they ought, obeying reason over and against their natural inclinations. By rooting politics in the human ontology, Marx avoids having to denature individuals in this way.

In reinstating the most intimate aspects of everyday material and individual life as sources of politics and morality, Marx integrates universality and rationality with particularity and nature to overcome the hierarchical division between reason and nature. Unlike the other 'rational' thinkers, Marx has no need to denature individuals in order to realise freedom and therefore can dispense with the 'rational' institutional framework designed to connect individuals with their 'higher' selves and constrain them to the good. His notion of the 'true', as an integral notion, is quite distinct from the opposition of a 'higher' to a 'lower' self inherent in rational freedom's - and liberal modernity's - dualisms of reason-nature and public-private.

Peter Critchley Marx and Rational Freedom 2001 

I very much stand by that view. It’s an immanentist view that sees reason as working with and within nature and hence with desire, appetite and inclination in order to channel human beings into their self-realization. It offers a view of morality as an internal self-constraint worked out in relation to others in a social context, as against the external constraint of a duty formulated in abstraction from and imposed upon need and desire. And it realizes ‘rational freedom’ in a ‘true state’ that is also an anarchistic society. It gives us the socio-institutional framework and ethical infrastructure of a natural anarchy. 

In presuming an atomised, competitive market society of isolated individuals, Kant was unable to conceive of a social basis for individuals engaging together in actions bringing about the common good. As a result, he had no option but to have recourse to an abstract duty compelling individuals to the good in contradistinction to their immediate needs and desires. (​http:​/​​/​isj.org.uk​/​marxism-and-ethics​/​" \l "120blackledge_31​) 

I make these criticisms of Kant not because I think he was a poor philosopher with a bad ethical theory. On the contrary, he may well have been, as is often claimed, the greatest of all modern philosophers. He was certainly the greatest absolute ethicist of the Enlightenment. And if Kant’s ethical system is inadequate to the moral challenges of capitalist modernity, then other modern moral theories, in the teeth of the egoistic and competitive model of human nature and society, don’t bear examination. It’s Kant or no-one. Or …

“If my thesis is correct, Kant was right”: Revisiting Kant’s role within MacIntyre’s Critique of the Enlightenment Project, by Kelvin Knight





I’ll affirm the successes of political emancipation in these terms, and re-affirm the commitment to the rights of individuals to constitute a legitimate public under the rule of laws that they themselves have had a hand in making. That still leaves us with the impasse of moral theory and the problem of constituting an internal union on moral terms. But in terms of working out a solution to this problem, the combination of a ‘contemporary Aristotelianism’ and ‘revitalized Kantianism’ sounds very much like what Marx attempted, especially if we throw in notions of an Hegelian eco-Sittlichkeit that is capable of mediating the interchange between social and natural metabolisms. That sounds most genial.

Modern political philosophy and ethics are faced with the problem of overcoming the gap that capitalist social relations has opened up between individual needs and desires on the one hand and a social reality that has become all the more abstract as it has become more extensive on the other. As Marx put it in the Grundrisse, the ‘free’ individual is externally constrained within a condition of ‘objective dependency.’ (Marx Gr 1973: 162-164).

Eagleton is right to argue that morality is about joy and the abundance of life. The problem is that such a claim applies to morality in conditions of unity between individual and society, not their separation, and it applies to a society that is in tune with the sources of life. The gulf that has opened up between individual and society in modern times is unbridgeable within capitalist relations. Within these relations, the necessary mediation for universal ends can only come from the outside. Hence the appeal, and undoubted importance, of notions of a political order constituted under the rule of law. Read back and you will find Rousseau arguing for such a thing as the legitimate self-constraint of public community under the principle of self-assumed obligation. But read Rousseau closely when you do, because you will find that this is very much Rousseau’s second best order, a realistic recognition that human beings may well fall short of the virtuous community internally supplied. Read Rousseau even more closely, and he emerges as an anarchist, arguing for the internal ethico-social union as against external constraint, the implication being that once the law has fulfilled its educative moral purpose, human beings would be capable of governing themselves without external force. (Ellenburg 1976).

Given the gulf between individual and society in the modern world, liberal and libertarian theorists exhibit an almost universal tendency to view morality and community along with state, law and government as top-down authoritarian impositions upon free individuals, and thus reject them for being inimical to liberty. Whenever Marx is discussed as offering a way out of the crises and contradictions of the capital system, this accusation of totalitarian and authoritarian imposition and oppression will be made in one form or another. The accusations can never be rebutted by citing texts clearing Marx of any such imposition and oppression, texts which make it crystal clear that, far from extending state power, Marx sought its absorption into society. Because the problems are not merely theoretical. We can change theoretical assumptions in order to draw different conclusions, but the real problem doesn’t go away. In conditions of social atomism and competitive individualism, the dominant form of identity and rationality is that of the self-interest of the discrete individual. And for such an individual, each, any and every social or common purpose, entity or law is perceived as being an infringement upon liberty. The ‘debate,’ in other words, is useful only to the extent it allows us to clarify the real issues at stake, the real meanings underlying the terms exchanged between the protagonists. 

As for utilitarianism, like pragmatism, it is a refuge for those who want to break the theoretical impasse and get something practical done. ‘It depends on your ambitions,’ Jules Townshend once told me, in response to my question as to what we could legitimately expect from political and moral theory and how we are to judge its success or failure. Marxism’s failures are on a scale with its ambitions. Those who attempt the least, fail to a much less extent, but it doesn’t make them better. It depends upon what you can do and can’t do, and being wise enough to know the difference. There is no virtue in little achievements that fall far short of large possibilities. Utilitarianism may well be the dominant moral theory for the simple reason it denies that any real problem exists. Private vices generate public virtues and, as Peter Singer breezily asserts, the springs of cooperative wealth flow most abundantly from self-interest. Since individual self-interest generates an increase in wealth, let individuals free to serve themselves and all will be served as a result. And happiness will follow as a matter of course. Whatever the humanist intentions, this pragmatic approach to the greatest good of the greatest number has been implicated in inhuman actions and policies since its incipience, sacrificing the happiness of real individuals for promised future benefits accruing to others. (For MacIntyre’s critique of utilitarianism see 1964). In equating increased material wealth with happiness, utilitarianism is crude capitalist apologetics, generating not merely unhappiness but threatening human and planetary health and survival in the process. (Ferguson, 2008; See also Frank 1999, and Wilkinson 2005.) But it has the merit of setting its ambitions so low as to be achievable, so long as we keep subordinating all things to economic growth, and so long as economic growth continues (and so long as we ignore its deleterious social and ecological impact). It has to be significant that so philosophically deficient a moral theory as utilitarianism should command such widespread support among apologists for the existing order.

At which point, sensitive utilitarians – are there such creatures? – may well demand: show which theory is better. Kant? I’ve picked Kant as the greatest of modern philosophers. Yet I have shown Kant to be deficient in key respects. In making these criticisms, I have sought to emphasize that the problems of modern theory are not theoretical problems but reflect a deeper problem within society itself – a society which has separated and abstracted those things which belong together in unity to form a greater whole. We have lost that wholeness, and theorists have been left attempting to bridge the gaps and put the pieces back together. The more we fail, the more we scale our demands and expectations downwards, the more we accept utilitarianism, if for no other reason than it makes less errors than the other moral theories on offer and is remarkably self-correcting in practice, at least in theory.

It all gets very fractious here. Nietzsche famously abused John Stuart Mill as a ‘blockhead’ for arguing the equality of individuals. ‘I abhor the man's vulgarity,’ Nietzsche wrote, ‘when he says "what is right for one man is right for another.” 

Such principles will fain establish the whole of human traffic upon mutual services, so every action would appear to be a cash payment for something done to us. The hypothesis here is ignoble to the last degree; it is taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value between my actions and thine; the most personal value of an action is simply cancelled in this manner (that part of an action which has no equivalent and which cannot be remunerated). “Reciprocity” is a piece of egregious vulgarity: the mere fact that what I do cannot and may not be done by another, that there is no such thing as equivalent (except in those very select circles where one actually has one’s equal, inter pares), that in a really profound sense a man never requites because he is something unique in himself and can only do unique things, - this fundamental conviction contains the cause of aristocratic aloofness from the mob, because the latter believes in equality, and consequently in the feasibility of equivalent and “reciprocity.”

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power - An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values - Vol II Books III and IV 927

I feel the need here to praise utilitarianism’s democratic and egalitarian spirit against Nietzsche’s elitist aristocratic anarchism. But Nietzsche is right, utilitarianism’s equality is indeed vulgar and reductive, and fits a market society of monetary valuations and calculations like a glove. The ‘reciprocity’ Marx argues for can be constituted in much better ways. Utilitarianism as the unity of each and all under the nexus of callous cash payment, then, what Marx called the ‘objective dependency relations’ of the capital economy. Capital is the new god and commodity fetishism is the new religion. And not a genuine democracy at all, a democracy of universal unfreedom. 

We live under Weber’s shadow (Breen 2012) in that, in an objectively valueless and meaningless world, we are all existentialists now, having to choose the good as we see fit. Except that, as Weber was quick to point out, ‘where there is nothing’ both the Kaiser and the proletariat, the rich and the poor, the strong and the weak together, have lost their rights. In such a world there is no possibility of grounding rights in moral notions, instead issues are decided by the strength of the contending parties. The choices that free individuals make cannot but be empty and without content in a disenchanted world; the individual cannot simply make something true, good and meaningful by mere projection of a subjective truth, goodness and meaning upon the world. 

The loss of a social context is disabling. It is in this sense that Alasdair MacIntyre makes the telling point that values are incommensurate, with the result that individuals and groups are talking past one another, whether in ethics or politics, whether theorising in the academy or arguing in the public realm. There is no common ground and no common language, no shared or universal interest capable of commanding common assent. All that there is is a fragmented world of competing interests and a congeries of subjective preferences, with the result that morality itself becomes merely a series of irreducible value judgements, with no rational way of evaluating competing views in accordance with an objective, overarching standard of right and wrong, good and bad. Ethics becomes like society itself, a marketplace of irreducible arguments presenting many different and competing versions of what is right and good, no one of which is able to offer good reasons as for its superiority over the others. Libertarians, communitarians, egalitarians and utilitarians argue it out, and they do so endlessly. Herein lies the impasse of theory. Terry Eagleton writes on the extent to which the modern period in particular has made moral questions difficult to handle:





The problem is that given the diremption of the modern world theorists can only continue to bicker about the way the world is and human beings are, and how we are to live well. And bickering isn’t genuinely philosophizing. The main schools of ethics and philosophy are well known. None of them is capable of refuting the other in rational terms (which is what philosophy is concerned to do). So the bickering is endless:





Eagleton’s last comment points up the limitations of instrumentalism and of theories which are based upon egoism and self-interest. And it is indeed interesting to ask ourselves why. At least I think so. Within limits. An eminently practical friend of mind referred to my tendencies to philosophizing over certain arcane questions as an ‘idle intellectualizing.’ I’m sure Marx would have agreed, (and said some such thing in his Theses on Feuerbach). Those expecting answers to their questions in the academy are certain to be disappointed. But maybe it’s all about asking the right questions in the first place. Philosophers who love endless disputation will love it, of course, but those concerned with the resolution of problems and real movement will express frustration at the ‘various ways’ in which philosophers continue to interpret the world. Which is to say that this problem is not entirely a new one. Marx determined to break through from a philosophical critique which merely interpreted the world in various ways, passively, from a position outside of the world, to a sociological and practical critique that actively changed the world from within. 

Eagleton continues his sketch of competing modern theories:





I have argued strongly for the importance of Kant’s philosophy and practical ethics over the years, and will continue to do so. Kant is difficult but repays the effort. But it is pertinent to ask why ethics needs to be so difficult and requires so much effort. It takes moral effort to be a good human being, certainly, hence my emphasis on the virtues. Ethics is more than a naturalism. Human beings are more than capable of making choices and engaging in actions that are bad for them. To throw off constraints and inhibitions as inimical to natural freedom may sound liberatory, allowing the innate natural goodness of human beings to flower. But those believe in original sin and the reality of evil would draw attention to a capacity for badness, too. The failure to cultivate healthy qualities in the first instance generates not a natural goodness in the long run, but its opposite. Much depends on how we handle this cultivation of the virtues. For Kant, the only moral acts are those done out of duty, implying that those acts that are undertaken out of self- and social interest, joy, desire, inclination, love – all of those qualities internal to self and society – cannot constitute morality. Somewhere, Kant has divorced ethics from person and society and turned it into an abstract system. Kant displaces Aristotle’s direct connection with happiness; instead, human beings need to deserve happiness. Kant is a stern moralist, indeed. As Eagleton points out, Kant can only formulate moral action in such a way as to divorce end-in-itselfness from happiness and fulfilment. And it is precisely this combination moral action and true ends ‘that a more classical kind of moral thought is trying to get at.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 5).

This brings us ‘back to Aristotle,’ for whom happiness or well-being consists not just in bovine contentment or a state of perpetual orgasmic pleasure, or whatever hedonistic joy it is by which utilitarian theories incite our desires and imaginations to tempt us with, but in a life which one might describe as thriving or flourishing. The ethic of flourishing may connote some stern, exacting fitness programme, insisting that human beings strive to become as good as they could be but this need not be the case. It may include, Eagleton points out, ‘showing mercy or sympathetic listening. We need to take the idea of flourishing out of the gym.’ It involves being human, becoming what we are. And that notion of striving does not necessarily mean an effort that is excessively strenuous, savouring more of what Spinoza described as the conatus of a thing, its essence, denoting the principle of self-maintenance that exists within all organic and living systems. Each finite mode, interacting with other finite modes within the environment, exhibits a characteristic tendency to cohesion and to the preservation of its own identity. Spinoza defines this as a ‘striving (conatus), so far as it lies in itself to do so, to persist in its own being’ (Spinoza E Pt III Prop VII). And flourishing in this way is an enjoyment, argues Spinoza; not in the limited sense of titillatio, which, when pursued to excess, disturbs the balance and well-being of the whole organism, but in the sense of balanced and healthy development, a realization and exercise of the faculties. The wise and free person will avoid pain and aim necessarily ‘to act well and to rejoice’ (bene agere ac laetari). To act well is fully to enjoy oneself, and fully to enjoy oneself is to act well: ‘there cannot be too much joy: it is always good.’ (Spinoza E Pt IV Prop XLII).

With respect to Aristotle, Eagleton writes: ‘We live well when we fulfil our nature as an enjoyable end in itself. And since our nature is something we share with other creatures of our kind, morality is an inherently political matter.’ Which emphasizes the intertwining of ethics and politics in an eminently practical project of human self-development and self-realization. 





Getting good at being human is both worldly and unworldly, worldly in that the virtues, as qualities for flourishing, defined as successful living, can only be acquired and exercised in society, unworldly in that the virtues are also their own reward, in making a person as good as he or she could be. ‘Virtue is its own reward,’ I once said in a talk I gave at Liverpool in 2010. ‘Are you virtuous, Peter? I was asked by my friend Marilyn. ‘Me, I’m as virtuous as a Church mouse,’ was my all-too worldly response. 

For Aristotle, happiness is a practice or an activity, it is about what human beings repeatedly do in order to realize their capacities in their practical lives. We need the virtues for precisely the reason that the natural goodness of human beings is not enough, but stands in need of guidance, direction and ordering. Remove ethics as an obstruction to goodness, and human beings will lose the supports they need to differentiate between good and bad, making the right choices and avoiding the bad behaviours and habits. That is why we need the virtues. ‘Virtue for Aristotle is not a state of mind but a disposition -which means being permanently geared for acting in a certain way even when you are not acting at all. It is a matter of how you would customarily behave in a given situation. Goodness is a matter of habit. Like playing the flute, you get better at it the more you practise.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 5).

The return to Aristotle and the virtues points us away from theorising in the academy and into society as a continuous engagement with inherently political issues. As we shall see shortly, Marx takes this practical turn further by going into the heart of collective struggle in an unjust and exploitative society. In the struggle against that society, Marx shows, that we develop the communities of practice and character crucial to fostering and developing the solidaristic virtues of the future socialist society.

The practical turn has yet to go so far. In recent times, virtue theorists have joined the fray in an attempt to overcome the impasse in modern moral theory. The problem is that without the appropriate habitus, communities and practices enabling the acquisition and exercise of the virtues, virtue theory is just another theory like all the others. Alasdair MacIntyre thus argues that the various competing theories offering their views on how we ought to live are all examples of ‘emotivism’ — the view that the statement ‘this is good’ refers not to some objective standard of good but to the subjective view that ‘I approve of it.’ (MacIntyre 1985: 12). Morality is all about likes and dislikes, subjective preferences, with no objective standard available to judge the rightness and wrongness of any choices made. It is the age of the all-important and incontrovertible ‘I.’ I say this is good and, in an age of god-like self-importance, I am unanimous in that view. Except that so is everyone else in their own view.

The fracturing of morality into irreducible subjective opinion and preference explains the emptiness of modern moral theory and the intractability of the debates between these competing modern theories. In the absence of objective standards and/or an overarching ethical and social framework which commands common assent, there is no way of resolving disputes theoretically over how we may best live, and no way of agreeing, rationally, about the kind of world we should live in. That recognition begs the question of what next. This amounts to a tacit acknowledgement of the bankruptcy of moral theory in modern capitalism. We may become emotivists, existentialists, or nihilists. It doesn’t seem to matter. But if I was to say that we should become fascists, then people would vehemently and quite rightly protest. Upon what, we need to ask, is that protest based. That fascism is clearly wrong, bad, means that there are … objective standards of truth and goodness. It’s just that these elude our moral theories, which have lost their grounding in material life. 

We may come to reconcile ourselves to the capitalist world of subjective choice and preference. I call it for what it is, a demoralization, and no amount of utilitarianism putting a happy face on the situation can conceal the despair. Those who, in face of this bankruptcy, continue to theorize and philosophize, are merely complicit in the pervasive demoralization, becoming ideologists themselves by default. As theorists who openly deny the possibility of any positive model of an alternative social order, they become complicit in the preservation of the existing order. (Reiman, 1991, p147). I could urge people to read Kant again. And be countered by the objections of those who offer Mill instead. I could join with the chorus started by Anscombe way back when and shout ‘back to Aristotle!’ In many ways, we are indeed finding our way back to Aristotle. But all of these words merely reinforce the point that all this political philosophy and moral theory turns the academy into a cemetery for any hopes raised by political practice. At this stage, I am reminded of Alex Callinicos’ conclusion to Marxism and Philosophy:

For since a socialist conception of the world is implicit in the daily practice of the working class, it can only be elicited and rendered dominant over that of the ruling class which is also present in that practice, if revolutionaries actively involve themselves in the struggles of the working class. It was thus that he conceived the revolutionary party, as 'the result of a dialectical process, in which the spontaneous movement of the revolutionary masses and the organizing and directing will of the centre converge'. (A. Gramsci, Selections from the Political Writings 1921-1926 (London, 1978) 198.) Outside of such an interaction between theory and practice, party and class, the most brilliant Marxist philosopher is likely to degenerate into the paid jester of the ruling class. The point, after all, is to change the world.

Callinicos 1985: 158 

Or, if not a paid jester of the ruling class, then the unpaid killjoy of emancipatory human expectations. How about reinstating necessary relations and restoring the link between theory and practice?

Callinicos is correct here, his conclusion taking us back, not to Aristotle, but to Marx. Here we find the contemporary Aristotelianism and radicalized Kantianism (and Hegelian Sittlichkeit) that Kelvin Knight was getting excited about earlier. And in this way, we put happiness and freedom together, combining the greatest achievements of the ancients with the greatest achievements of the moderns to give us socialism. If my thesis was right … then Marx is right. Or on the right lines, at least.

18 Marx and the Morality of Practical Life
Eagleton makes it clear that we are not involved in a nostalgic project of recovery, harking back to the pre-modern world, but critically recovering ancient virtues on the modern terrain. Instrumental ideas of morality should not simply be ditched in favour of the virtues:





Marx doesn’t simply go ‘back to Aristotle,’ rejecting capitalist modernity and involving himself in controversies as just how to constitute the virtues in a society that has lost the practices and communities that give them substance. The world that gave birth to the ancient virtues is beyond recall. Instead, Marx analyses the society we are in with a view to breaking the impasse of liberalism by bringing the individual and social dimensions of life back together. Marx thus looks to engender the socially and historically specific communities and practices through which non-antagonistic, solidaristic forms of human relationships could emerge. 

Marx gained this insight into resolving the problem from Hegel and his historical conception of human nature as in some way a self-creation through different societies in time. Here, Marx’s critique of naturalism reveals its worth. Despite being formulated in different social contexts, both ancient and modern ethical theories demonstrate a tendency to present their key propositions as natural, timeless and unchanging. (MacIntyre 1985: 159). To assert the naturalness of one’s position is an effective way of insulating it from criticism, challenge and change. Marx demonstrated at length the extent to which political economists sought to present capitalism as an eternal natural order. They are still at it. 

Marx – The moral standpoint within practical life
There is an important difference between natural and historical change. Natural facts are independent of human agency, and exist whether or not there are people around to experience them; social ‘facts,’ however, in the form of institutions, structures, systems etc., are reproduced by way of human practices, and so are dependent upon conscious human action. Physical laws are natural facts that operate regardless of what human beings think or do; social laws, however, are dependent upon human thought and action for their operation. When Marx writes of capital’s ‘law of motion,’ he is plainly referring to a social law dependent upon human agency. When he writes of these social laws coming to impact upon human beings with the force of a law of nature, however, he is indicating the extent to which human relations, powers and institutions have come, through alienation, to acquire the force of a natural fact:

As much, then, as the whole of this movement appears as a social process, and as much as the individual moments of this movement arise from the conscious will and particular purposes of individuals, so much does the totality of the process appear as an objective interrelation, which arises spontaneously from nature; arising, it is true, from the mutual influence of conscious individuals on one another, but neither located in their consciousness, nor subsumed under them as a whole. Their own collisions with one another produce an alien social power standing above them, produce their mutual interaction as a process and power independent of them. Circulation, because a totality of the social process, is also the first form in which the social relation appears as something independent of the individuals, but not only as, say, in a coin or in exchange value, but extending to the whole of the social movement itself.

Marx Gr 1973: 197

Marx highlights the paradox of ‘free’ individuals within capitalist relations who are autonomous yet subject to the ‘objective dependency’ of capital (Marx Gr 1973: 162-164). To these individuals, confined within reified social relations, social laws impact with all the external force of physical laws. The capitalist economy proceeds according to its own laws of motion, with social laws imposed upon all in the form of systemic imperatives over which no-one, neither capitalist nor proletarian, has any control. The process of accumulation is the sine qua non of capitalist production, a non-negotiable, Moses and all the Prophets, as Marx says. Any political movement or government that impinges upon the mechanisms of investment, accumulation and valorisation is soon confronted by the limits of the system, and either has to push on to revolutionary transformation, compromise, or retreat and abandon its radicalism upon suffering political defeat. The capital system carries on regardless of the fire and fury of political controversies, let alone our personal thoughts and actions. Whilst the ‘free’ individual of liberalism is free to choose as he or she pleases, that subjective freedom within objectified social relations has little impact beyond personal relations. The ‘free’ individual is free do anything he or she likes, as a matter of personal choice. Changing the world, however, is a supra-individual project and, without the means and mechanisms of collective action, each individual is isolated and powerless, with the result that all are subject to the naturalized collective force of capital.

In analysing the capital system in this way, Marx was engaged in the critique of the fetish systems of production, power and politics, not establishing a methodological principle. An analytical or structural marxism that takes Marx’s critical concepts and erects a ‘scientific’ doctrine on their basis effectively serves only to reproduce the reification of forces and relations of production through the fetish categories of capital. It was against such notions that Harry Cleaver wrote of reading Capital politically (Cleaver 1979). 

Marx, accordingly, spent a lifetime encouraging workers to join together and engage in collective struggles against exploitation and oppression. In such struggle, social facts start to lose the objective, natural force they have acquired through alien relations and come to appear as they are: malleable, changeable, and subject to conscious human agency. The power of external force diminishes in inverse proportion as people start to express their own social power in an internal self-constraint. In collective struggle and action, individuals come together and in the process start to see that the objective facts of society are, in Gramsci’s apposite phrase, ‘humanly objective,’ and hence subject to democratic challenge, intervention and alteration. As isolated individuals, people had experienced social facts as fixed and unchangeable natural facts; through collective struggle, association and organisation, these individuals now see social facts as alterable through their conscious agency. Through collective organisation, the members of hitherto subordinate classes, start to throw off the feelings of powerlessness fostered by the experience subjection to economic compulsion in their everyday life and come to see and develop their power to change the world. In the process, they come to understand that social facts are indeed social, and not natural, and are therefore pliable and subject to alteration. Through such association, organisation and action, workers nurture and sustain virtues of solidarity, overcome a condition of atomism, passivity and powerlessness, and develop the intellectual, moral, political and organisational capacity to see through and break through the fetish systems which serve to ossify power, action and subjectivity in the alienated world. In the process, individuals come to see that capital, which has hitherto appeared as a natural power that stands over them objectively, is in truth their own social product; and they see, therefore, that it is within their power to reclaim that oppresses objective power as their own social power. Where once, through its reified relations, the social world had appeared to isolated individuals as a natural fact beyond their intervention and alteration, through collective struggle, organisation and action it comes to be seen as it truly is: as the social product of human labour, an alien power that lives only through the exploitation of labour, and which can be reclaimed and reorganised as a social power. 

Marx himself wrote that it was the rising of the Silesian weavers in 1844 that was instrumental in his becoming a ‘Marxist.’ (Marx 1975b 415; Blackburn 1977: 27-30). Modern political philosophy and moral theory fails to recognise the transformative significance of this kind of practice, in terms of both a self- and a social transformation, and their coincidence, because it assumes the isolated, discrete individual of bourgeois society as its premise – it considers capitalist society and its competitive individualism as the state of nature and the discrete autonomous individual as a natural fact. Hence Marx’s concern to expose through critique the ideologues who naturalize what ought to be historicized. 

Marx takes the opportunity with respect to the Silesian weavers’ uprising to elaborate his principles of political practice with respect to working class self-organisation and self-emancipation. Here, he challenges those who look to lead, organise and educate the working class from a position outside of the practical struggle. His particular target here is Arnold Ruge, the ‘Prussian’:

Thus the 'Prussian's' attempt to discuss the workers' unrest in Silesia in formal antitheses has led him into the greatest antitheses to the truth. Confronted with the initial outbreak of the Silesian revolt no man who thinks and who loves the truth could regard the duty to play schoolmaster to the event as his primary task. On the contrary, his duty would rather be to study it to discover its specific character. Of course, this requires scientific understanding and a certain love of mankind, while the other procedure needs only a ready-made phraseology saturated in an overweening love of oneself.
Why does the 'Prussian' treat the German workers with such disdain? Because he believes the 'whole problem' - namely the problem of the plight of the workers - 'to have been as yet untouched by the all-pervading spirit of politics'. He dilates on his platonic love for the spirit of politics as follows: All rebellions that are sparked off by the disastrous isolation of men from the community and of their thoughts from social principles are bound to be suppressed amid a welter of blood and incomprehension. But once need produces understanding and once the political understanding of the Germans discovers the roots of social need then even in Germany these events will be felt to be the symptoms of a great upheaval.

Marx EW CN 1975: 416-417

Let us grant that Ruge has a point here, to the effect that a spontaneous revolt on the part of isolated individuals, without the common force of a community, an organisation, or a strategy, is certain to be beaten by the collective force marshalled by defenders of an existing order. Hegel had dismissed these atomised individuals in revolt as a ‘rabble of paupers’ standing in need of organisation. And Marx, too, rather than advocating spontaneity, argues for working class organisation. Marx, later in his career, points to the working class as needing to convert its economic struggle, movement and organisation into political struggle, organisation and action, so as to unite the political and the economic wings and present a holistic challenge to the global power of capital. What Marx objects to here with Ruge, however, as he did with Hegel, is the idea that this centralising, cohering force of politics is something that is extraneous to the working class, something that comes from outside the sphere of struggle. Marx held that since it is labour that creates capital and not vice versa, then it is labour that is the active, creative, immanent principle of revolutionary transformation. Labour can autonomize itself from capital, but capital can never autonomize itself from labour. The immanence of Marx’s ethical position allied to labour is clear. Marx’s emphasizes the inner capacity of labour to subvert the alien force of capital:

Rather, the objective conditions of labour now appear as labour's product - both to the extent that they are value in general, and as use values for production. But while capital thus appears as the product of labour, so does the/product of labour likewise appear as capital - no longer as a simple product, nor as an exchangeable commodity, but as capital; objectified labour as mastery, command over living labour. The product of labour appears as alien property, as a mode of existence confronting living labour as independent, as value in its being for itself; the product of labour, objectified labour, has been endowed by living labour with a soul of its own, and establishes itself opposite living labour as an alien power: both these situations are themselves the product of labour. Living labour therefore now appears from its own standpoint as acting within the production process in such a way that, as it realizes itself in the objective conditions, it simultaneously repulses this realization from itself as an alien reality, and hence posits itself as insubstantial, as mere penurious labour capacity in face of this reality alienated [entfremdet] from it, belonging not to it but to others; that it posits its own reality not as a being for it, but merely as a being for others, and hence also as mere other-being [Anderssein], or being of another opposite itself. This realization process is at the same time the de-realization process of labour. It posits itself objectively, but it posits this, its objectivity, as its own not-being or as the being of its not-being - of capital. It returns back into itself as the mere possibility of value-creation or realization [Verwertung]; because the whole of real wealth, the world of real value and likewise the real conditions of its own realization [Verwirklichung] are posited opposite it as independent existences. As a consequence of the production process, the possibilities resting in living labour's own womb exist outside it as realities - but as realities alien to it, which form wealth in opposition to it. 

Marx Gr N4 1973: 453-55

It is the position of the working class within capital’s exploitative system that gives workers the epistemological and structural capacity to see through and break through capitalist relations. That capacity is not available to any politics, philosophy and ethics that comes from the outside, hence the impasse of passive and theoretical approaches within the bourgeois academy and conventional political sphere, and hence Marx’s call to break with these approaches. Against Ruge’s call for political education and leadership, Marx writes:

We have shown that in the Silesian uprising there was no separation of thoughts from social principles. That leaves 'the disastrous isolation of men from the community'. By community is meant here the political community, the state. It is the old song about unpolitical Germany. 

Marx EW CN 1975: 417-418

Marx notes the loss of community, the atomization of society into isolated individuals, and what real community and real community building entails:

But do not all rebellions without exception have their roots in the disastrous isolation of man from the community? Does not every rebellion necessarily presuppose isolation? Would the revolution of 1789 have taken place if French citizens had not felt disastrously isolated from the community? The abolition of this isolation was its very purpose. 
But the community from which the worker is isolated is a community of quite different reality and scope than the political community. The community from which his own labour separates him is life itself, physical and spiritual life, human morality, human activity, human enjoyment, human nature. Human nature is the true community of men. Just as the disastrous isolation from this nature is disproportionately more far-reaching, unbearable, terrible and contradictory than the isolation from the political community, so too the transcending of this isolation and even a partial reaction, a rebellion against it, is so much greater, just as the man is greater than the citizen and human life than political life. Hence, however limited an industrial revolt may be, it contains within itself a universal soul: and however universal a political revolt may be, its colossal form conceals a narrow spirit.

Marx EW CN 1975: 

Human nature, and its varied expression in human life and activity, is the ‘true community of men,’ separation from which is disastrous. All rebellions are rebellions against such separation, and attempts to recover connection. Marx cites Ruge’s argument that ‘A social revolution without a political soul (i.e. without a central insight organizing it from the point of view of the totality) is impossible.’ That argument has been a familiar refrain in socialist politics over the years, and is surely correct. Marx himself can be shown to argue this very thing in order to overcome a fragmentation that confines workers’ struggles to certain defeat on capital’s own economistic terrain. So why does Marx object so vehemently to Ruge? It’s not so much the principle he objects to here, but its separation from actual social struggle, thought and action, meaning that its ‘political soul’ remains abstract and focused on the abstraction of the political community from the community of life, whereas Marx is concerned to restore their connection. Marx thus declares himself against elitist educational dictatorships seeking to reorganise society from above in accordance with a priori principles of political rationality:

We have seen: a social revolution possesses a total point of view because - even if it is confined to only one factory district - it represents a protest by man against a dehumanized life, because it proceeds from the point of view of the particular, real individual, because the community against whose separation from himself the individual is reacting, is the true community of man, human nature. In contrast, the political soul of revolution consists in the tendency of the classes with no political power to put an end to their isolation from the state and from power. Its point of view is that of the state, of an abstract totality which exists only through its separation from real life and which is unthinkable in the absence of an organized antithesis between the universal idea and the individual existence of man. In accordance with the limited and contradictory nature of the political soul a revolution inspired by it organizes a dominant group within society at the cost of society.

Marx EW CN 1975: 419

Marx proceeds to reveal the secret of the nature of a social revolution with a political soul: it is ‘nothing but a paraphrase of what is usually called a “political revolution” or a “revolution pure and simple.” Every revolution dissolves the old order of society; to that extent it is social. Every revolution brings down the old ruling power; to that extent it is political. (Marx EW CN 1975). There is no doubt about the rationality of a political revolution with a social soul, Marx makes clear: ‘All revolution - the overthrow of the existing ruling power and the dissolution of the old order - is a political act. But without revolution socialism cannot be made possible. It stands in need of this political act just as it stands in need of destruction and dissolution. But as soon as its organizing functions begin and its goal, its soul emerges, socialism throws its political mask aside.’ (Marx EW CN 1975). 

Marx, then, is not arguing against politics and the need for a central organising insight cohering struggle toward the totality; he is arguing against the separation and abstraction of the political community from the true community of men. Marx’s argument is therefore an argument for the unity of the political and the social on the material terrain of practice, struggle, organisation and movement. It is an argument for the overcoming of the ‘disastrous isolation’ of individuals from the ‘true community of men,’ including the isolation of the abstract political community. Marx repeatedly exposes the abstract state as an illusory community, the surrogate community to which isolated individuals have recourse in their pursuit of real community. The universality and commonality that is denied in real society, Marx writes, is projected upwards and outwards to the heavenly abstract sphere of the state. This, Marx argues in The German Ideology, is not the ‘true community,’ it is the ‘illusory community.’ In Ruge’s arguments for the political soul, Marx identifies this tendency to the projection and realienation of power, and checks it vehemently. Marx is concerned to restore the connection of thought, action and politics to the real community, as revealed in the collective struggles of the working class.

This, in part, lies behind the aggressive tone of Marx’s objections to Ruge over the issue of the Silesian weavers’ rising. Ruge may seem to have made a reasonable point in calling for social movement to be given a ‘political soul,’ a central organising principle, an orienting point, so that sporadic struggles cohere toward the total understanding that substantial and enduring transformation requires. Had the point been stated thus, and grounded in practical struggle, so that the political principle emerges from within the social movement, Marx would certainly have agreed. Marx’s anger was drawn by the way that Ruge had diminished the importance of the Silesian weavers' rising in order to demand the creation of a political party capable of leading and educating the workers from above and from without through the existing, and untransformed, state system. 

As early as July 1844, then, Marx was warning against the dangers of an abstractly political socialism canalising social struggle and movement through the abstract forms of party and state. Whether we refer to the reformism of social democracy or the revolution of ‘the party,’ Marx was against them, to the extent that they were abstracted from the actual social forms of working class self-activity and self-organisation:





19 Libertarian Freedom and Common Purpose
Marx’s commitment to the ‘true community’ overcoming the atomization of individuals comes out clearly in his critique of Max Stirner’s individualism. Marx’s engagement with Stirner throws the differences between Marx’s and liberal notions of freedom into sharp relief. In The Ego and His Own (1844), Stirner was concerned to defend an individualist conception of freedom against all collective entities such as nation, state, humanity, God etc. These, to Stirner, are all collective fictions which rule over individuals through the authoritarian mechanism of moral ideology, thereby denying the freedom of individuals to govern their own lives. Marx made similar criticisms of the alien powers of the capital system, revealing the state to be an ideological project claiming to rule in the common interest, but governing individuals in the absence of true community. Marx located the problem in the alienated social forms of the capital system, demanding their uprooting in order to realize real community. Stirner, in contrast, repudiated such socialism or communism as merely the old authoritarian moralism in new form. (Thomas 1985: ch 3; Arthur 1970: 25 28-29. See also McLellan 1969: 119). 

Marx’s critical analysis identified the flaws in Stirner’s argument as originating in its methodological individualism. In asserting egoism as a universal and unchangeable fact of human nature, Stirner was incapable of conceiving community and collective purpose in any form other than as an authoritarian moral imposition upon individuals. (Marx and Engels 1987b: 211). Instead, he turns private property into an ‘eternal truth,’ asserting the impossibility of abolishing private property (Marx GI 1999: 102-103). Again, Marx is concerned to expose the way that ideologists naturalize what should be historicised. Given my emphasis on transcendent standards as a condition of a rational freedom stated against conventionalism and sophism, there is a need to emphasize that Marx’s consistent assault on ‘eternal’ truths and principles is always in the context of the ideological conflation of such truths and principles with specific social forms, thereby rendering historical products natural and permanent. Institutions such as private property are not eternal principles, and Marx’s critical assault is aimed precisely against those who cite eternal truths and principles to rationalize particular social and historical institutions.

This comes out clearly in Marx’s critical analysis of egoism and altruism. Marx explains that those who set the debate up in terms of a false antithesis between egoism and altruism do so out of their own false view of human nature, a view that is abstracted from the social forms through which that nature is expressed in history:

Communism is simply incomprehensible to our saint because the communists do not put egoism against self-sacrifice or self-sacrifice against egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically either in its sentimental or in its highflown ideological form; on the contrary, they demonstrate the material basis engendering it, with which it disappears of itself. The communists do not preach morality at all, such as Stirner preaches so extensively. They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much as self-sacrifice, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals. Hence, the communists by no means want to do away with the "private individual" for the sake of the "general", self-sacrificing man.

Marx GI 1999: 105

In other words, whilst the likes of left utilitarians like Peter Singer charge Marx and Marxists with holding an ideological conception of human nature as cooperative and gregarious, the truth is that it is those who seek to oppose egoism and altruism against each other who are the real abstractors here, arguing from their own particular conception of human nature, and concealing the socially determined nature of this conception in order to naturalize specific social forms. Singer argues that those who would transform society must recognize the ‘inherent’ tendencies of human beings and ‘modify their abstract ideals in order to suit them.’ (Singer 1999: 40). Singer targets Marx in this respect. Yet it can be plainly seen that Marx consistently argues against changing society – and people – in accordance with ‘abstract ideals,’ arguing instead for the coincidence of self- and social transformation in the realization of the human essence. Here, with respect to Stirner, Marx criticizes those who set up their own particular version of what Singer calls the ‘relatively ﬁxed’ attributes of human nature as the true version, biologically and scientifically based, not only ignoring its social determinations, but proceeding to justify specific social forms and relations as natural when they are plainly social and historical. Of course, it is how the attributes of the human essence are related to the means of social and institutional expression in time and place that is the key question.

Communism, as Marx writes, is incomprehensible to those who, holding the individual and society apart, premise their arguments on the single, discrete individual. To such an individual, each, any and every community and common purpose is experienced as an oppressive and authoritarian infringement on liberty. That such an individual is a fiction and exists nowhere is a minor flaw in consideration of its tremendous ideological use in concealing social forms and relations inimical to individual liberty, but profitable to the class of free-riders and exploiters. And Marx was certainly against that kind of liberty. 

As for the idea that Marx sets out to transform society and people from above in accordance with ‘abstract ideals,’ the opposite is the case. Marx explicitly rejects this moralizing approach. Marx could see clearly the liberal incomprehension here, and could see why liberal critics would come continually and consistently to charge his views with being authoritarian. He rejected the charge emphatically, and threw it back at his critics with interest: ‘The communists do not preach morality at all, such as Stirner preaches so extensively.’ As, indeed, do liberals, repeatedly asserting the moral and ontological ultimacy of the individual, oblivious to the extent to which capitalist social forms are the practical denial of that ultimacy. To them, as to Stirner, as indeed to the professional philosophers and moralists and theorists in the academy, Marx’s insistence that collective struggles generate virtues of solidarity is ‘simply incomprehensible.’ Against such incomprehension, Marx related assertions of egoism as natural to the social forms of individualism that had emerged historically in the capital system. It is this, Marx tells Stirner, that explains why morality and community can only be understood by liberals and libertarians as authoritarian and oppressive. The problem is not one of morality and community as such but of their unavailability in anything but abstract form within an atomistic bourgeois society. The authoritarian and oppressive character of morality and community, in other words, is a product of bourgeois separation and abstraction, the way that capitalist social relations divides what belongs together in a ‘greater whole.’ Authoritarianism and oppression are therefore the product of capitalist relations and the way that capital generates abstract community. (Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration ch 9). 

Eagleton comments that ‘pessimistic or shamefaced libertarians like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault see that norms are inescapable as soon as we open our mouths.’ Language levels things down and it is ‘normative all the way down.’ To say ‘leaf’ implies that two incomparably different bits of vegetable matter are one and the same. To say 'here' homogenizes all sorts of richly diverse places. (Eagleton 2003 ch 1). This is basic Plato and the Forms, the distinction between the table and a particular, actual table. But, Eagleton notes, thinkers like Foucault and Derrida chafe against these equivalences, even if they accept them as unavoidable. Their preference is for a world made entirely out of differences. ‘Indeed, like their great mentor Nietzsche, they think the world is made entirely out of differences, but that we need to fashion identities in order to get by.’ The result is a subjectivist delusion in which no meaningful communication or interaction is possible, a world of pure, pointless, egoistic assertion, a world of a splendid isolation enjoyed by god-like beings: 

It is true that nobody in a world of pure differences would be able to say anything intelligible - that there could be no poetry, road signs, love letters or log sheets, as well as no statements that everything is uniquely different from everything else. But this is simply the price one would have to pay for not being constrained by the behaviour of others, like paying that little bit extra for a first-class rail ticket.

Eagleton 2003 ch 1

The grave mistake made by such libertarians is to believe that norms are always and necessarily restrictive. It is, Eagleton remarks, a ‘crass Romantic delusion.’ Quite so. And it is a delusion that has its origins in the liberal ontology that separates individual and society, with the result that all morality, community, and common purpose cannot but be conceived abstractly and hence experienced by discrete individuals as inimical to liberty. This is the point that Marx established in his critique of Stirner. The identification of morality and norms as inherently inimical to liberty, rather than liberating for human beings in establishing clear and acceptable terms on which common life can proceed, is evidence of a libertarian freedom descending into self-defeating delusion:

It is normative in our kind of society that people do not throw themselves with a hoarse cry on total strangers and amputate their legs. It is conventional that child murderers are punished, that working men and women may withdraw their labour, and that ambulances speeding to a traffic accident should not be impeded just for the hell of it. Anyone who feels oppressed by all this must be seriously oversensitive. Only an intellectual who has overdosed on abstraction could be dim enough to imagine that whatever bends a norm is politically radical.

Eagleton 2003 ch 1

It’s that overdosing on abstraction that lies behind much that ails modern ethics and politics, severing our connections from the forms of the common life. A truly radical act in these conditions would be to establish a norm in such a way as to facilitate the recovery of the ethical and political commons. That view is of a piece with the argument for the legitimate democratic constitution of authority on the part of individuals as citizens in a public community. Here, again, libertarians who believe that normativity is always negative are also likely to believe that authority is always repressive, for the very same reason – in conditions in which individuality and sociality are held apart, all forms of common control and purpose will be experienced as external and abstract. In this, Eagleton points out, they differ from radicals, who respect those who have earned authority through a long experience of fighting injustice, or respect the authority of laws which safeguard people’s physical integrity and their working conditions, or protect individuals against racism, sexism and homophobia, or protect the environment against pollution. In these instances, the state and law are not authoritarian shackles upon the individual, but educative and liberatory in precisely the way Rousseau argued. Eagleton points out the blind spots of those modern-day cultural thinkers who seem to believe that minorities are always more vibrant than majorities. ‘It is not the most popular of beliefs among the disfigured victims of Basque separatism. Some fascist groups, however, may be flattered to hear it, along with UFO buffs and Seventh Day Adventists.’ Eagleton’s apparent flippancy or disdain here has a deadly serious point to make with respect to the effectiveness of radical politics: ‘it was majorities, not minorities, which confounded imperial power in India and brought down apartheid.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 1). The transformative action required in mounting an effective holistic challenge to the capital system to bring about the alternative socialist society requires a mass constituency and the formation of a mass movement. A libertarian doesn’t have to commit to such a thing at all, and may well be very happy pursuing self-interest within atomised society as a congeries of possessors and pursuers. That’s fine, so long as these supposedly leftist intellectuals are identified for being the liberals and anti-socialists they are. To cultivate minorities whilst ignoring the need to build majorities ensures that a political or social movement will remain minority and marginal, remaining firmly within existing relations, a politics of permanent protest at best. That may be the intention, as an expression of liberalism in its decadence. In which case, we are entitled to repeat Marx’s criticism of the liberal ontology as utterly incapable of comprehending any authentic basis for common purpose and action. The view is also self-contradictory. In rejecting morality, authority and community as such as repressive of individual liberty and difference, libertarians are guilty of the very abstract universalism they oppose: ‘Those who oppose norms, authority and majorities as such are abstract universalists, even though most of them oppose abstract universalism as well.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 1). 

Against this, Marx argues that since fellowship had emerged as a real need in working class struggle and association, there was no need for abstract morality and community to be imposed on them. There could be no conception of morality and community as abstractions and impositions, once workers come to generate the bonds of society and solidarity from within:

When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time they acquire a new need - the need for society - and what appears as a means has become an end. This practical development can be most strikingly observed in the gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking, eating and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating links between people. Company, association, conversation, which in its turn has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 365-366

Marx exposes the ideological character of arguments that reduce modern forms of individualism to the egoistic type based on some notion of an eternal or fixed nature. Collective struggles on the part of workers against capital, such as the Silesian weavers’ rising in 1844, expose the limitations of the liberal concept of individual freedom, and show the way out of the impasse of modern political philosophy and ethics. Working class association and organisation reveal how individuality and sociality can be restored in their unity, expressing the deep, shared need that human beings have for solidarity and showing in a practical sense how this need grows in association. It is through such collective activity that the working class come to establish the concrete material content that makes a new form of social individuality available, without the need for recourse to abstract, authoritarian imposition:

The human essence of nature exists only for social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with other men, as his existence for others and their existence for him, as the vital element of human reality; only here does it exist as the basis of his own human existence. Only here has his natural existence become his human existence and nature become man for him. Society is therefore the perfected unity in essence of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature.
Social activity and social consumption by no means exist solely in the form of a directly communal activity and a directly communal consumption, even though communal activity and communal consumption, i.e. activity and consumption that express and confirm themselves directly in real association with other men, occur wherever that direct expression of sociality [Gesellschaftlichkeit} springs from the essential nature of the content of the activity and is appropriate to the nature of the consumption.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 351

In this way, Marx socializes and concretises the abstract idea of ‘rational freedom’ by asking radical questions that relate abstract and eternal principles – transcendent truths, norms and values - to specific social institutions and systems: 

To sum up, what is free trade under the present condition of society? It is freedom of capital. 
He [the worker] will see that capital become free will make him no less a slave than capital trammeled by customs duties. 
Gentlemen! Do not allow yourselves to be deluded by the abstract word freedom. Whose freedom? It is not the freedom of one individual in relation to another, but the freedom of capital to crush the worker.

Marx 1848, quoted in Draper, 1977: 273 

‘Whose freedom?’ It’s a simple enough question:

The dialogues of Plato provide the first sustained demonstration both of the depth and difficulty of philosophy, and of the fact that the beginnings of the most profound philosophical investigations lie in seeming shallows. What is truth? What is justice? What is beauty? are as brief as questions can be, but in attempting to answer them, one realizes that they float on a narrow ledge beyond which run treacherous waters full of deep-rooted and tangled weeds.

John Haldane, MacIntyre against Morality May 2017 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/05/macintyre-against-morality (​https:​/​​/​www.firstthings.com​/​article​/​2017​/​05​/​macintyre-against-morality​)) 

In consequence, John Haldane concludes, ‘philosophical inquiry is hard and exhausting work.’ And, divorced from practice and issues of real life, it can become endless and scholastic too. Academic philosophy and moral theory cannot answer MacIntyre’s questions ‘Whose justice? Which rationality?’ for the reasons MacIntyre gives. In answering the question, ‘whose freedom?’ Marx breaks the impasse in modern philosophy and politics, taking us to the specific social forms of these abstract principles. Far from denying the concept of freedom, Marx radicalized, socialized and concretized it. He took Aristotle’s notion of human beings as social beings who can individuate themselves only in public life and allied it to Hegel’s awareness of freedom as unfolding in history to expose the ideological character of a liberalism that saw capitalist social forms and institutions as rational and ordained by nature. Marx shows such naturalization and rationalization to be a false fixity. Human freedom as a societal self-determination is a central thread connecting Marx’s early and later writings. (Gould 1978: 101-128; Gilbert 1981: 98; Sayers 1998: 36-59; Marx and Engels 1987b: 218 225; Marx 1976: 283; Wood 1981: 17). In the Grundrisse, Marx thus defines freedom as a process through which ‘social individuals’ come to realise themselves through their labours. He argues that ‘the development of the social individual’ is ‘the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth.’ Marx does not hypostatize the concepts of forces and relations of production as something independent of individuals – instead, he criticizes the capital system for doing this very thing:

Forces of production and social relations - two different sides of the development of the social individual - appear to capital as mere means, and are merely means for it to produce on its limited foundation. In fact, however, they are the material conditions to blow this foundation sky-high.

Marx Gr 1973: 705-706

Indeed, Marx goes further than this in the Grundrisse, arguing for the ‘free social individual’ as a premise of his standpoint, and not merely as the future achievement of communism. Here, Marx goes beyond the Aristotelian notion of the social individual to posit the free individual, employing this premise to challenge the alienation of power and control from real individuals within capitalist relations:

The social relation of individuals to one another as a power over the individuals which has become autonomous, whether conceived as a natural force, as chance or in whatever other form, is a necessary result of the fact that the point of departure is not the free social individual.

Marx Gr 1973: 197

Such passages explain the meaning of Marx’s statement in Capital III that freedom entails ‘socialised man, the associated producers,’ coming to ‘govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their common control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power.’ (Marx 1981: 959). István Mészáros is thus quite right to argue that ‘the central theme of Marx’s moral theory is how to realise human freedom.’ (Mészáros 1975: 162), (except to point out that Marx did not write ‘moral theory.’) Mészáros is very good on drawing out the implications here:





Mészáros thus indicates how Marx set about unravelling the endless, ‘scholastic’ debates of philosophers and theorists as they carry on interpreting the world in their various ways. And he underlines how Marx’s critique brings us to the realities of freedom and its unfolding in history, as against those who postulate an abstract essence and nature:





Mészáros points out the implications of Marx’s immanent standpoint, which locates the principle of change within: ‘Transcendental ideals—in the sense in which transcendental means the supersession of inherently human limitations—have no place in Marx's system.’ Marx explains the appearance of such abstract ideals in the philosophical systems of others as a result of a ‘socially motivated unhistorical assumption of certain absolutes.’ Mészáros gives an example which has a direct bearing on the issues covered above with respect to the assertion of a natural and eternal egoism on the part of individuals:





No wonder, then, that Kant, for all of his postulation of a universal rationality in a society of co-legislators, cannot transcend the competitive individualism of capitalist society, realizing only a regulative morality in which reason seeks to educate natural desire from the outside. Kant’s morality of reason can only constrain egoism, it cannot overcome it and establish freedom as self-determination, with the result that Hobbes’ ‘war of all against all’ prevails over Kant’s hopes for ‘perpetual peace.’ Marx explains why all such hopes of idealists, rationalists and liberals are doomed to fail. Marx doesn’t simply reject transcendentalism, he is concerned to expose, criticize and reject the picture on which the transcendental ideal is superimposed, i.e. the conception of man who is by nature egoistic:





In the manner of Hegel, but more concretely in terms of a critical social analysis, Marx emphasizes the way that freedom and its understanding evolve over time and place through a process of social struggle taking place around the development of humanity’s productive forces. (Marx and Engels 1987b: 74ff). That this is not the same thing as the expansion of economic power or economic growth is evident once we appreciate Marx’s expansive conception of conscious practical activity in defining the human essence. (ch 3 Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration).

20 Marx’s Implicit Practical Morality
There is an implicit morality to Marx’s position. Marx is not against morality, he is against abstraction and idealism, against the presentation of transcendent ideals that serve to render specific social and historical forms natural and eternal, thereby preserving often very immoral and inhuman institutions and practices from inherently moral movements for change. (Note that that does not necessarily mean that Marx is against transcendent truths, norms and values as such). Any moral judgements that Marx makes are never abstract, as in demands for ‘fairness’ issued apart from the struggles against exploitation. Marx always relates any moral terms to actual practical struggles for freedom on the part of real individuals, not the fictional liberal character which possesses a moral and ontological ultimacy. The collective struggles of actual individuals enable Marx to criticize existing society from a real standpoint, expose the limitations of freedom within that society, and point the way forwards to a concretized freedom in a true community. (Sayers 1998: 124. See also Husami, 1980: 49). 

Marx addresses the relation between law and morality in order to unravel the irresolvable nature of settling the eternal question of what is fair within capitalist relations. From the ‘legal standpoint,’ commodity exchange refers to no more than ‘the worker’s power to dispose freely of his own capacities, and the money owner or commodity owner’s power to dispose freely of the values that belong to him.’ There is nothing unfair about this arrangement within the capital system itself. Marx doesn’t set his argument out in terms of fairness. He points out that, despite their formal freedoms at the level of the state and law, workers lack control over the means of production, their means of material life. Thus, ‘the conditions of labour are concentrated at one pole of society in the shape of capital, while at the other pole are grouped masses of men who have nothing to sell but their labour-power.’ (Marx CI 1976: 899). The result is that workers are ‘compelled to sell themselves voluntarily.’ 

The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws. The organization of the capitalist process of production, once it is fully developed, breaks down all resistance. The constant generation of a relative surplus population keeps the law of the supply and demand of labour, and therefore wages, within narrow limits which correspond to capital's valorization requirements. The silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker.

Marx C1 1976: 899

As for the formal freedom of the individual at the abstract level of the state and law, Marx underlines the reality of state power and its use as integral within the capital system’s second order mediations: ‘The rising bourgeoisie needs the power of the state, and uses it to 'regulate' wages, i.e. to force them into the limits suitable for making a profit, to lengthen the working day, and to keep the worker himself at his normal level of dependence. This is an essential aspect of so-called primitive accumulation.’ (Marx CI 1976: 899). The lesson is plain: no state, no capital, both state and capital together enforcing the ‘silent compulsion’ that destroys individual liberty even as it is asserted at the formal level. And it is not just an abstract freedom that capital destroys. The moral and ontological ultimacy of the individual that liberal critics assert against Marx ends at the factory gates: 

Factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost; at the same time, it does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and in intellectual activity. Even the lightening of the labour becomes an instrument of torture, since the machine does not free the worker from the work, but rather deprives the work itself of all content. Every kind of capitalist production, in so far as it is not only a labour process but also capital's process of valorization, has this in common, but it is not the worker who employs the conditions of his work, but rather the reverse, the conditions of work employ the worker.

Marx CI 1976: 548

Liberalism’s moral and ontological ultimacy of the individual counts for nothing in the collision with the imperatives of accumulation. This contradictory character of freedom within modern society arises from within the structure of capitalist production, where an ‘organised despotism of the factory system’ prevails (Marx, 1994, p29). Marx establishes an inextricable connection between the anarchic relations which characterise the competition between units of capital and the despotic relationship that capitalists exercise over workers within the factory. (Barker, Colin, 1991: 207). Marx thus writes that, in the capitalist mode of production, ‘anarchy in the social division of labour and despotism in the manufacturing division of labour mutually condition each other.’ (Marx CI 1976: 477). 

Marx proceeds to point out the hypocrisy of the bourgeois liberal position that cloaks such ‘despotism’ in the name of freedom, whilst denouncing those who call for a rational social control as enemies of freedom:

The division of labour within society brings into contact independent producers of commodities, who acknowledge no authority other than that of competition, of the coercion exerted by the pressure of their reciprocal interests, just as in the animal kingdom the 'war of all against all' more or less preserves the conditions of existence of every species. The same bourgeois consciousness which celebrates the division of labour in the workshop, the lifelong annexation of the worker to a partial operation, and his complete subjection to capital, as an organization of labour that increases its productive power, denounces with equal vigour every conscious attempt to control and regulate the process of production socially, as an inroad upon such sacred things as the rights of property, freedom and the self-determining 'genius' of the individual capitalist.

Marx CI 1976: 477

With a biting sarcasm, Marx turns liberal accusations aimed at communism back at their accusers:

It is very characteristic that the enthusiastic apologists of the factory system have nothing more damning to urge against a general organization of labour in society than that it would turn the whole of society into a factory.

Marx CI 1976: 477

It is within this structure of production that a ‘dialectical inversion’ takes place between the equal exchange of commodities and the appropriation of value from the worker by the capitalist. (Marx CI 1976: 532). Marx examines at length the process by which capitalists come to ‘consume’ the labour power of workers. (Marx, 1976: 291, chapters 7-17). ‘This antagonistic movement,’ Marx states, ‘has its origin in the twofold character of labour.’ (Marx in Freedman ed. 1961: 37). Marx thus emphasizes ‘the twofold character of labour, according to whether it is expressed in use value or exchange value.’ (Marx 1987a: 407). The capitalist class therefore attempts to profit from the labour power that workers are compelled to sell through the extraction of absolute and relative surplus value from the working class, forcing workers to work harder and longer wherever they can. The result is a ‘protracted more or less concealed civil war between capitalist class and the working class,’ which forms the practical, real life, material terrain on which Marx’s politics and ethics proceeds. (Marx 1976: 412). 

Rather than assert the moral and ontological ultimacy of the individual in abstraction, at the formal level of the state and law, or in academic debate and theorising, Marx presses the case for individual freedom in concrete terms. Marx’s position is directly contrary to an abstract politics and ethics. The claims that the theoretical debates of academia are interminable would have not come as news to Marx, hence his reference in Thesis XI on Feuerbach to philosophers who have interpreted the world in various ways. Alasdair MacIntyre has argued the point at length as to why these debates are endless. I agree. But that leaves us with the problem of what to do about the predicament. (If it is a predicament: professional philosophers would say such is philosophy, liberals would say conflict pluralism is a healthy fact of life). Here, it is not clear how MacIntyre can avoid virtue ethics simply becoming another competing theory in the moral marketplace. How to reconstitute practice, community and identity within the fractured, diremptive modern terrain of capital is the key question. As Marx added in Thesis XI: ‘the point, however, is to change it’ [the world]. It is not theory that stands in need of changing, but the world that generates such incommensurable theories and endless debates, a world that denies us a common language and morality, because it denies us common control over the means of life.

Marx makes this point with respect to the attempts to determine fairness and justice within the capital system. Who determines what is fair and just? Apologists for capital ask that question of socialists who seek to intervene in the capital economy and rebalance its iniquitous operation. The question cannot be answered by moral theory. 

Marx criticizes the wages system as a form of slavery, but his argument is institutional and not abstractly moral. Marx sees no extraneous political or moral imposition serving any useful purpose here. Any authoritarian raising of wages through the legal force of the state would merely mean better rations for the slaves, the capital relation ensuring slavery would remain in place:

Even the equality of wages, which Proudhon demands, would merely transform the relation of the present-day worker to his work into the relation of all men to work. Society would then be conceived as an abstract capitalist.

Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, section on “Estranged Labour,” 1844

Intervening morally into the capitalist economy, whilst leaving the capital relation unaltered, merely reproduces the capital system in generalized form, precisely the criticism that critics such as Max Weber made of socialism. 

God can’t resolve the issue either, merely reassure us that it is a meaningful question to ask and elicit a moral response on our part to the injustices of the world. Marx knew it. Capitalist apologists may attempt to stump their socialist opponents with that question, but the question is full of radical implications which defenders of the capital system will not like. Marx is concerned to expose the inherent systemic bias of the capitalist mode of production. Marx is clear that these abstract debates are pointless, insofar as they lack connection with practical struggles. For there is no standpoint outside of these struggles from which all parties might rationally agree on what constitutes the ‘fair distribution of the proceeds of labour.’ You demand fairness and justice. The question is returned, who determines such things? What, Marx asks of the socialists who had formed the SPD in Germany, is this 'just' distribution they demand?

Does not the bourgeoisie claim that the present-day distribution is “just?” And given the present mode of production is it not, in fact, the only “just” system of distribution? Are economic relations regulated by legal concepts of right or is the opposite not the case, that legal relations spring from economic ones? Do not the socialist sectarians themselves have the most varied notions of 'just' distribution?

Marx FI CGP 1974: 344

Marx proceeds to unravel the implications of these questions. The attempt to persuade capitalists of the inherent injustice and unfairness of the capitalist system and its operation is idle, ineffectual and beside the point. What seems just and fair within the capital relation depends upon which side of that relation one stands, and there is no Archimedean point transcending that relation to decide, regardless of how much the law is presented as impartial. Hence we enter a world of power struggle, a world in which right collides with right, with only might being able to decide:

We see then that, leaving aside certain extremely elastic restrictions, the nature of commodity exchange itself imposes no limit to the working day, no limit to surplus labour. The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the working day as long as possible, and, where possible, to make two working days out of one. On the other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity sold implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the worker maintains his right as a seller when he wishes to reduce the working day to a particular normal length. There is here therefore an antinomy, of right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchange. Between equal rights, force decides. Hence, in the history of capitalist production, the establishment of a norm for the working day presents itself as a struggle over the limits of that day, a struggle between collective capital, i.e. the class of capitalists, and collective labour, i.e. the working class.

Marx CI 1976: 344-345

That’s the sophist world of Hobbes and his ‘war of all against all,’ with the law, pressured by social struggles and movements, attempting to temper might by reason. Society, under the control of the capitalist system, is thus engaged in a civil war, a war of right against right, might against might. But Marx is against such sophism, hence his criticism of capitalist society as a congeries of interests engaged in a struggle over power and resources, with the result that each and all become ‘playthings of alien power’ (Marx OJQ EW 1975: 220-221) their individuality confined within ‘objective dependency relations,’ (Marx Gr 1973: 164). Marx is keenly concerned to uproot that external alien force as inimical to human freedom. He is doing more than argue that the force of the workers come to prevail over against the force of the capitalists. Going back to his original identification of the proletariat as the ‘universal class,’ Marx clearly wants an end to such social war through the realization of a genuine universality. ‘It’s a bit Biblical, that,’ I was once told, being advised to strike out the word ‘redemption’ in my sentence ‘redemption comes from below.’ Alienation as loss and recovery seems to possess clear Judaeo-Christian roots to me. And Marx does write of redemption when answering the question as to where the positive possibility of emancipation in general is to be found:

In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class [Stand] which is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere which has a universal character because of its universal suffering and which lays claim to no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular wrong but wrong in general', a sphere of society which can no longer lay claim to a historical title, but merely to a human one, which does not stand in one-sided opposition to the consequences but in all-sided opposition to the premises of the German political system; and finally a sphere which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from - and thereby emancipating - all the other spheres of society, which is, in a word, the total loss of humanity and which can therefore redeem itself only through the total redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society as a particular class is the proletariat. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 256

Here, we go beyond questions of right against right, the power struggle of might against might, to achieve a universal right that unites each and all in freedom. Marx’s point is that the attainment of this social peace and concrete freedom cannot be determined through ethical and legal positions claiming some transcendent position outside of the struggle to realize this peace and freedom.

Significantly, Marx draws attention to the way that the reality of exploitation behind the injustice and unfairness protested at the political level is obscured when seen only from the perspective of atomised individuals, becoming clear only when these individuals join together and engage in the practical struggle to remedy the situation.

Affirming that the working class, whose exploitation within the system of production generates the power of capital, has the epistemological and structural capacity to see through and break through capitalist relations, Marx argues that the workers through struggle are capable of grasping the totality of the capital system:





Marx first subjected political economy to critique in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Here, Marx noted that Adam Smith and David Ricardo had not proven that the modern capital economy is natural at all. On the contrary, in highlighting the social and historical origins of political economy, they had revealed political economy to be ideological in its naturalizing concerns. Indeed, far from showing the capitalist economy to be natural, the founding fathers of modern political economy had shown it to be unnatural with respect to its dehumanising effects. (Marx EW EPM 1975: 373-75).

The political economist tells us that everything is bought with labour and that capital is nothing but accumulated labour, but then goes on to say that the worker, far from being in a position to buy everything, must sell himself and his humanity.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 286-88

Smith tells us that a society of which the greater part suffers is not happy. But since even the most prosperous state of society leads to suffering for the majority and since the economic system [Nationalokonomie], which is a society based on private interests, brings about such a state of prosperity, it follows that society's distress is the goal of the economic system.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 287

Marx praises Smith for recognizing that the principle of political economy is labour, calling Smith the ‘the Luther of political economy’ for recognizing that labour is the origin of private property (Marx EW EPM 1975: 342-343). But that insight was one to be developed only by practical critique. Political economy remained on the side of capital and its inversions:

Not only does political economy become increasingly cynical from Smith through Say to Ricardo, Mill, etc., inasmuch as the consequences of industry appeared more developed and more contradictory to the latter; the latter also become more, estranged - consciously estranged - from man than their predecessors. But this is only because their science develops more logically and more truly. Since they make private property in its active form the subject, thereby making man as a non-being [Unwesen] the essence [Wesen], the contradiction in reality corresponds entirely to the contradictory essence which they have accepted as their principle. The discordant reality of industry, far from refuting their internally discordant principle, actually confirms it. Their principle is in fact the principle of this discordance.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 343-344

There is no third force, no transcendent standpoint, that is independent of this social reality, Marx argues. And capital itself is not a neutral arbiter capable of mediating the exchange of commodities in the marketplace. Capital and labour exist in a socially structured class relationship through which labour is exploited, dominated and controlled, and capital expands its values: 

Capital is, therefore, the power to command labour, and its products. The capitalist possesses this power not on account of his personal or human properties but insofar as he is an owner of capital. His power is the purchasing power of his capital, which nothing can withstand.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 295

Marx goes on to show not only how the capitalist exercises this power to command labour through capital, but ‘how capital, in its turn, is able to rule the capitalist himself.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 295). The systemic force of the capital relation embraces both proletarians and capitalists, even if the working class are subject to a double determination, bearing the costs of this alienative and exploitative system most directly. Capital imposes its logic upon the capitalists too. The accumulative power of capital encompasses all within the capital, which returns us to Marx’s critique of the capital system as an alienated system of production in which what we produce comes to confront us ‘as something alien, as a power independent of the producer.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 324). 

Marx’s concern in his class-based morality is not, therefore, merely the victory of the working class over the capitalist class, but to uproot the systemic force of the capital relation itself and, in the process, put an end to class society and relations of exploitation and domination. Marx, in other words, is not simply for the workers and against the capitalists, but goes deeper into the capital system in order to uproot the capital relation at source so as to achieve an emancipation for all humankind. The point is important to establish, lest socialism come merely focus on a political abolition/expropriation that does nothing to transform production relations. It also gives us a future that is much rosier than Max Weber’s gloomy prognosis that:

Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now. Where there is nothing, not only the Kaiser but the proletarian has lost his rights.

Weber Politics as a Vocation 1970: 128

Marx is all about overcoming the nothingness of capitalist society, its in-built sophism of imposed (monetary) values and power struggles, and shows what we need to do to bring the world back to its senses.

Marx analyses Smith’s assertion that capital is ‘a certain quantity of labour stocked and stored up,’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 295), from which it follows that as the store of labour expands so does the power of the capitalist over the worker. Marx thus turns political economy against itself:

We have started out from the premises of political economy. We have accepted its language and its laws. We presupposed private property; the separation of labour, capital and land, and likewise of wages, profit and capital; the division of labour; competition; the concept of exchange value, etc. From political economy itself, using its own words, we have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity, and moreover the most wretched commodity of all; that the misery of the worker is in inverse proportion to the power and volume of his production; that the necessary consequence of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands and hence the restoration of monopoly in a more terrible form; and that finally the distinction between capitalist and landlord, between agricultural worker and industrial worker, disappears and the whole of society must split into the two classes of property owners and propertyless workers.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 323

Political economy, however inadvertently, thus reveals the paradoxical truth about the capital system as an inverted system of production, a system which, far from being natural, brings about ‘the inversion and confusion of all human and natural qualities,’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 377), revealing ‘an inverted world’ characterised by ‘the confusion and exchange of all natural and human qualities.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 379). There is, therefore, the paradoxical situation of an expanding social wealth accompanied by the decreasing freedom of individuals. Capital is ‘indifferent to real individual activity’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 284). ‘The devaluation of the human world grows in direct proportion to the increase in value of the world of things.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 323).

Socialism – Uniting the ‘Is’ and the ‘Ought’
For Marx, affirming the unity of the ‘ought’ and the ‘is,’ there is no separation between the realms of fact and value, science and ethics. The neo-Kantian position many urge as furnishing the ethical foundation of socialism presupposes the very split that Marx, following Hegel, sought to close. Marx’s unified science would thus contain an inherently moral dimension. This is why Marx’s critique of the capital system could be both scientific and normative, not merely explaining the contradictory dynamics of the capitalist mode of production but doing so with an implicit standard of good and bad, right and wrong. As against the separation of the realms of fact and value, characteristic of modern capitalist society, Marx understands the unity of these things in one and the same reality. Against endless theorization interpreting the world in ‘various ways’ (Thesis XI on Feuerbach), Marx emphasizes practical struggle to ‘change the world,’ through which the truth about that world becomes apparent, revealing the reality of exploitation, injustice and unfairness as well as pointing the way to the alternative that already exists as unfolding potential within the prevailing mode of production. The unity of fact and value is contained in Marx’s immanent standpoint, locating the ‘ought to be’ in its process of emergence from within the ‘is.’ As Terry Eagleton puts the point: ‘In the critical consciousness of any oppressed group or class, the understanding and the transforming of reality, “fact” and “value,” are not separable processes but aspects of the same phenomenon.’ (Eagleton 1990: 225).

These observations reveal the true nature of Marx’s apparent repudiation of morality, in both his refusal to launch an explicitly moral condemnation of capital and in the scathing comments he directs against those who employ overtly moral arguments. Marx criticizes those who advance moral claims from a transcendent standpoint. Given that I argue for transcendent truths, norms and values as against sophism and conventionalism, and given that I also argue that Marx himself holds some such notion with respect to the concept of ‘rational freedom’ that runs throughout his work, there is a need for clarity here. 

Marx takes a position against those proposing transcendent ideals in the sense of ideals that lie outside of the reality being analysed in its process of movement and development. He is concerned to expose and reflect the conflation of those ideals as eternal truths and principles with specific social forms, relations and institutions, serving to render historically created social arrangements natural and permanent. That defines the key character of ideology as a critical concept in Marx, the way that ideals serve to rationalize asymmetrical relations of power as eternal. He rejects those within the socialist movement who propose a political principle that comes from the outside just as he opposes those bourgeois reformers who argue for an independent third force or mechanism through which it would be possible to advance a common good or universal interest in a world of socially structured divisions. Marx is not against harmony, but he is aware that to assert a unity of interests whilst doing nothing to uproot the reality of class division is a plainly ideological project. To achieve the desired unity and harmony, Marx contends, requires not an appeal to an independent third force that stands for a transcendent ideal, but exists nowhere in a class-divided society, but a practical commitment to transform that society from within. It requires, in short, a ‘redemptive’ commitment to the emancipation of the working class. But in designating the working class as the ‘universal class,’ Marx makes it clear that this commitment is not to the victory of one side over another in a power struggle, something which implies a world of endless power struggles decided by force, but to the attainment of a genuinely universal social order that realizes the principles of freedom and justice beyond force. In other words, Marx’s class based morality is aimed at transforming society beyond class division to realize universality, and hence incarnate transcendent truths, norms and values in time and place. (Engels 1947: 118; Marx 1975c: 255). Marx’s view does, therefore, and must, affirm truths and principles that lie outside of class divisions and power relations, seeking to order social relations to a common end.

With this nuanced understanding of Marx’s class-based morality, as something oriented to the realization of universal principles, we can readily appreciate why Marx criticises, often in savage terms, those who advance transcendent ideals or moral principles. It’s not that Marx is against morality, it is just that, with his emancipatory project being inherently normative, he bitterly resents those whose morality is not only verbal, but also serves to obscure what needs to be done in order to make moral principles actual. This becomes clear in the way that Marx turns upon Proudhon and the way he speaks of ‘eternal justice’:





Marx’s words here apply to all those who justify their political demands through assertions of freedom, fairness and justice, without either explaining what those terms mean with respect to an analysis of the forces that work against them and an explanation of the process by which they are to be attained through practical struggle and transformation. On their own, these principles are neither an argument nor an effective politics. Again, Marx’s repudiation of Proudhon’s concept of ‘eternal justice’ is not a rejection of justice but a rejection of an abstract moralism that does nothing to realize moral principles. (Bear in mind, too, that Marx’s critical points against transcendent truths applies against all assertions of natural order that skate over, or naturalize, specific forms of mediation).

The pathos of means and ends which characterise Max Weber’s social philosophy originates in capital’s alienated system of production. Alienation is ‘the obverse of self-realisation,’ a denial of freedom. (Norman 1983: 174. See also Miller 1989: 178; Miller 1984: 76ff; Wood 1981: 126). The capital economy separates the ends of production from both capitalists and workers and imposes them systemically in the form of accumulative imperatives. The human essence, expressed in terms of creative productive activity, is reduced to being a mere means for the expansion of capital. Thus Weber’s gloomy analysis of a meaningless world in which means have expanded to displace true ends has its social roots in an alienated system of production. The separation between fact and value, ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ has its origins in this estrangement, with the result that what was once lived together within a ‘greater whole’ now came to be separated and differentiated into various spheres of existence now set in antagonistic relation to each other, each with its own standards, and with there being no cohering principle to unify them in relation to the totality. Such was the condition of modernity in Max Weber’s rationalization thesis, a world which Weber considered meaningless, requiring an ethics of responsibility and existential choice leaving each to find their own meaning. No wonder, then, that Weber was pessimistic about the future.

In locating the problem in an alienated system of production rather than some general ahistorical reason, Marx could do better than Weber, or Kant and Hegel, and all who rationalize specific, alien, social forms as natural and permanent features of human existence. Marx was clear that it was the inhumanity and unnaturalness of the capital system that incited workers to rebel, and it was in this insurgency against prevailing conditions that new forms of association emerged to make concrete and real what in the hands of political philosophers and moral theorists can remain merely abstract principles. 

We come to appreciate, then, that the issue of Marx’s morality is not as crude or as simple as tracing how Marx could go from being for Kant to being against Kant (as Kain argues it 1988), but of understanding how Marx is both for and against Kant at the same time. Marx took Kant’s ethic of ends and sought its realization as a democratic community of ends, creating a society which treated others not merely as means to their ends, but respected them always as ends in themselves. (Goldmann 1971: 199 211). That’s the point made by neo-Kantians who urge socialists to mount an effective ethical defence of socialism on the basis of Kant rather than Hegel. However, Marx came to this position of realizing Kant’s categorical imperative not by theoretical deduction but by locating its means of realization in the process of becoming within existing society – Hegel’s ‘ought’ within the ‘is,’ in other words. The implication of the neo-Kantian critique is that such immanentism is not a moral position, just a form of historicism. I say it is a moral position, one that sees morality as something embedded in communities, practices, struggles, in which ends are attached to their means of realization. The emphasis is upon ensuring the provision of these means, something which places the accent on human association as virtuous communities of practice. The neo-Kantian position finds this incomprehensible, precisely because it – like the capitalist order it fits – separates those things that belong together (science and ethics, fact and value, means and ends).

Marx shows that the reason of liberal thought and politics is far from being disembodied and disinterested, the reflection of some natural order outside of time and place, but serves an ideological purpose in rationalizing, naturalizing and legitimizing capitalist social relations. As a result, historically changeable social facts come to be treated as unalterable natural facts. (Reiman 1991: 147). Marx was clear on the connection between the rise of liberalism and the emergence of eighteenth century atomistic society: ‘What Adam Smith, in the true eighteenth-century manner, puts in the prehistoric period, the period preceding history, is rather a product of history.’ (Marx Gr N1 1973: 150). In the section of the Grundrisse on ‘Independent Individuals. Eighteenth-century Ideas,’ Marx describes the isolated, autonomous, natural individual as ‘among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century Robinsonades’ (Marx Gr 1973: 84). This ‘naturally independent, autonomous subject,’ Marx points out, is not natural at all but is, ‘rather, the anticipation of “civil society,” in preparation since the sixteenth century and making giant strides towards maturity in the eighteenth’:

In this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-century individual - the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century - appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the past. Not as a historic result but as history's point of departure. As the Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of human nature, not arising historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has been common to each new epoch to this day.

Marx Gr 1973: 84 

The illusion is still common. Liberalism emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries not, as its own self-image would have it, as the rational expression of the natural order but, as the class-bound reflection of the ‘interests of the new commercial middle classes. (Ramsay 1997: 7). To the extent that modern social relations continue to be naturalized and rationalized in this way, liberalism continues to function in this ideological way. Marx praises Steuart for avoiding this ‘simple-mindedness’ since, in being an aristocrat, and in antithesis to the eighteenth century, ‘he had in some respects a more historical footing.’ The autonomous individual of liberal thought and politics is not a natural or ahistorical being at all, but the product of a particular social formation: ‘The more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole’ (Marx Gr 1973: 84). 

Citing Aristotle’s definition of human beings as social beings, and noting the existence of the individual within a welter of social ties and connections, Marx doesn’t so much reject the ultimacy of each individual as seek the ultimacy of all individuals through the wealth of their social connection within the greater whole of socialism. Marx does not present socialism as an ethical doctrine in the same way that liberals present liberalism as ethical. Marx makes no claim that socialism entails a disinterested and disembodied reason but openly acknowledges that human beings, as social beings, are interested beings given their place within social structures and relations. A belief in a disinterested reason, asserting no necessary relation between social position and political viewpoint, makes it reasonable for a revolutionary socialist to attempt to persuade a merchant banker as to the cause of revolutionary socialism. Marx considers such rational appeal to be idle. He also considers positions of neutrality in non-neutral social conditions to be ideological.

Marx doesn’t present socialism as a moral project in the manner of liberalism for another reason. It is telling that liberal critics of Marx and Marxist socialism consistently refer to Marx’s ‘thickly-textured communitarianism’ as abstract and authoritarian, a view which sees morality and community as abstract impositions upon autonomous individuals. With this autonomous individual as premise, each, any and every collective form in ethics and politics will have oppressive and repressive connotations, hence the emphasis in liberal thought upon sharply circumscribing the limits of power to stake it down. Such a view is based upon a series of separations that sees individuals separated from each other, from the community, from their own powers. In such a situation, power, control and community become abstract, remote from and inimical to the individual. Hence the liberal concern with ‘limited’ government, seeing government not as the pooling of the sovereign power of individuals to yield a conscious and democratic common control over collective forces, but as a neutral arbiter of individual choice, action and competition in civil society. Marx’s communism overcomes these separations at source, giving us a self-mediated form of social control. In rejecting the premise of egoistic, autonomous, competitive individuals, Marx does not see power, control and community as necessarily external to individuals, but as more intimate, immanent phenomena integral to the development of the human being as social being. As a result, collective purpose for Marx, whether in the form of morality, community or control, is not an authoritarian imposition which seeks to constrain the behaviour of egoistic individuals from above. Rather, it is a common force which social individuals constitute for themselves from below. And it is integral to human self-actualization.

Thus, whilst Marx openly acknowledges that socialism is a class-based morality grounded in the particular interests of the working class, its orientation is beyond class struggle and class division and oriented to the universal interest. In opposition to a liberalism that proceeds from a disinterested, transcendent ideal of reason to come to rationalize a class-divided social order in favour of the dominant social interests, Marx takes sides with the interests of the subordinate classes and commits to the struggle to end asymmetrical power relations and realize the genuinely universal society embodying transcendent truths, values and norms. The bias of Marx’s ethics, in other words, is a bias in favour of those social interests whose realization possess the potential to actually realize the universal interest in actual society. The bias of liberal moral doctrine is, in contrast, a hidden bias in which a disinterested, disembodied reason serves to conceal, preserve and naturalize asymmetrical relations of class power under the cover of the universal interest. Marx subjects the liberal conflation of individual rights with property rights to devastating critique, declaring individual rights egoistic assertions of a right of separation and criticising bourgeois civil society as ‘the sphere of egoism’ and ‘the bellum omnium contra omnes’ (Marx EW OJQ 1975: 221). Significantly, Marx distinguishes the rights of man from the rights of the citizen, criticizing the egoism of the former in order to reinstate the social, shared, interactive qualities of the latter:

The first point we should note is that the so-called rights of man, as distinct from the rights of the citizen, are quite simply the rights of the member of civil society, i.e. of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community.

Rejecting the conception of the independent, isolated, autonomous naturally egoistic individual, by showing its socially created roots in a bourgeois civil society founded on private property, Marx seeks to overcome ‘the separation of man from his community, from himself and from other men,’ bringing all these things into unity. 

The rights of man, Marx states, are rights of separation, rights which rationalize the series of separations upon which bourgeois civil society is constituted, separating individuals from their physical, political and ethical commons, alienating them from the forms of the common life.

the right of man to freedom is not based on the association of man with man but rather on the separation of man from man. It is the right of this separation, the right of the restricted individual, restricted to himself.

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 229

With the restoration of the wealth of social connections, social individuals become capable of generating community and common purpose from within their relations. No longer isolated, egoistic beings, individuals become truly social individuals, meaning that common force and control loses the abstract character it must have in atomistic bourgeois society. And they become truly free individuals, too. Marx emphasizes that since the alien control of capitalist relations of production entail ‘the domination of material relations over individuals and the suppression of individuality,’ which capital raises to its ‘sharpest and most universal form,’ ‘existing individuals’ are charged with the ‘very definite task’ of overthrowing this mode of production and replacing it with one that realizes the human ontology. (Marx and Engels GI Selections from parts 2 and 3, The Free Development of Individuals 1999). 

For all that Kain argues that Marx ‘rejects the very possibility of ethics altogether’ in The German Ideology, this ‘definite task’ is fundamentally and inherently moral. It is not, to be sure, an abstract morality which enjoins individuals to act and obligates them from the outside, as in the manner of modern ethical theory. But it is all the more moral for that. ‘The communists do not preach morality at all, such as Stirner preaches so extensively.’ (Marx GI ch 2 Selections 1999). The communists practice what others only preach. The difference is that this moral practice, for Marx, is immanent in society at a specific stage of development. The capital system ‘has set them the task of replacing the domination of circumstances and of chance over individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances.’

It has not, as Sancho [Stirner] imagines, put forward the demand that "I should develop myself", which up to now every individual has done without Sancho’s good advice; it has instead called for liberation from one quite definite mode of development. This task, dictated by present-day conditions, coincides with the task of the communist organisation of society.

Marx GI ch 2 Selections 1999

And this communist reorganisation of society entails a holistic transformation of the capital system, not merely the overthrow of this or that institution within capitalism, but the uprooting of the entire capital relation:

We have already shown above that the abolition of a state of things in which relationships become independent of individuals, in which individuality is subservient to chance and the personal relationships of individuals are subordinated to general class relationships, etc.— the abolition of this state of things is determined in the final analysis by the abolition of division of labour. We have also shown that the abolition of division of labour is determined by the development of intercourse and productive forces to such a degree of universality that private property and division of labour become fetters on them. We have further shown that private property can be abolished only on condition of an all-round development of individuals, because the existing character of intercourse and productive forces is an all-round one, and only individuals that are developing in an all-round fashion can appropriate them, i.e. can turn them into free manifestations of their lives. We have shown that at the present time individuals must abolish private property, because the productive forces and forms of intercourse have developed so far that, under the domination of private property, they have become destructive forces, and because the contradiction between the classes has reached its extreme limit. Finally, we have shown that the abolition of private property and of the division of labour is itself the union of individuals on the basis created by modern productive forces and world intercourse.

Marx GI ch 2 Selections 1999

Marx transcends the alienating separations and false dualisms of bourgeois thought and society, thereby resolving the seemingly intractable problems of the bourgeois academy and parliaments. There is no need to choose between individuality and sociality, egoism and altruism, self-interest and general interest. With their true reconciliation, these things lose the abstract and antagonistic character they possess within bourgeois society, and the very things that give liberalism its raison d’etre disappear, along with liberalism itself. 

Note well that Marx is not repudiating morality, but realizing it, describing communist society as ‘the only society in which the original and free development of individuals ceases to be a mere phrase.’ Those who deny that Marx possessed an ethical position would deny that this is a moral statement, more a statement of a developmental anthropology. There is no antithesis here, Marx’s essentialist anthropology, deriving from Aristotle, possesses a core normative dimension and exhibits a moral concern with the flourishing of human beings. It’s just that Marx thought that this free and full development was not an arbitrary process outside of time and place but something which proceeds through history and its various social formations:

Within communist society, the only society in which the original and free development of individuals ceases to be a mere phrase, this development is determined precisely by the connection of individuals, a connection which consists partly in the economic prerequisites and partly in the necessary solidarity of the free development of all, and, finally, in the universal character of the activity of individuals on the basis of the existing productive forces. Here, therefore, the matter concerns individuals at a definite historical stage of development and by no means merely individuals chosen at random, even disregarding the indispensable communist revolution which itself is a general condition of their free development. The individuals' consciousness of their mutual relations will, of course, likewise become something quite different, and, therefore, will no more be the "principle of love" or devoument, than it will be egoism.

Marx and Engels GI ch 2 Selections 1999

Virtues, working class struggle and the party
Marx thus saw the potential for integration and universalisation from the standpoint of the collective struggles of the working class, showing the way to overcoming the dualism of fact and value characterising modern capitalist society. Marx thus challenged the abstract conception of individual rights from the standpoint of workers’ collective struggles, affirming a class-based morality that possessed universal ends. (Marx 1975: 231). 

Through their position within the capitalist mode of production, workers experience their alienation and exploitation as a dehumanisation. Their collective struggle against dehumanisation is thus a struggle for a self-realisation that is universal. Further, through association and struggle, individuals cease to be isolated and atomized, inert before external alien force, but nurture and sustain a solidarity that, in time, fosters socialistic modes of existence that enable them to challenge and overturn the forces arranged against them. Marx thus argues that 

the continual conflicts between masters and men are…the indispensable means of holding up the spirit of the labouring classes, of combining them into one great association against the encroachment of the ruling class, and of preventing them from becoming apathetic, thoughtless, more or less well-fed instruments of production.

Draper 1978: 24 

Thus, whereas political economy – and the point applies to modern political philosophy and moral theory – is only able to conceive human nature and human life in terms of a competitive, egoistic and atomised individualism (something which generates intractable theoretical problems, as well as political problems that are without resolution within the capital system), Marx, in his aptly titled Poverty of Philosophy, emphasized the ways in which working class activity and organisation generated a new social rationality and solidarity. (Marx, “The Poverty of Philosophy”, quoted in Lapides, 1987: 34). Marx, as Feenberg argues, ‘was actually the first to develop a powerful critique of social rationality.’ (Feenberg 2009).

Marx’s point is not merely that the workers are compelled, through some kind of auto-response, to resist their exploitation by capital, but that in joining together to struggle against their exploitation their collective action takes more positive, pro-active form in generating modes of thought, action and organisation that develop virtuous practices, communities and characters, giving us a viable alternative to the egoism so prevalent and dominant within capitalist society that theorists of all disciplines and persuasions come to see it as natural and eternal. 

Having agreed earlier with MacIntyre’s analysis of the intractable nature of philosophical and ethical debates within modernity, I asked just how MacIntyre could constitute virtue ethics as a viable alternative, given that such an ethics presumes communities of character and practice, a habitus in which the virtues are developed, acquired, transmitted and exercised. Here above is Marx’s answer to that question, and here is another passage in that vein:

When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time, they acquire a new need—the need for society—and what appears as a means has become an end. This practical development can be most strikingly observed in the gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking, eating, and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating links between people. Company, association, conversation, which in turn has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work worn figures.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 365-366

In joining together to struggle against exploitation, the working class create associations, organisations and networks that expand connection and convert expansively into a struggle for a viable alternative society. In acting to change the world, they come to change themselves, developing their powers of insight and control with respect to capitalist forces that once appeared to be natural, unalterable and beyond control and comprehension. Joining with others in common struggles, workers come to create and sustain solidaristic ties and bonds through an everyday practice that presupposes a common cause and which continues to develop the material capacity to pursue it. That points to the self-development of the working class in terms of their intellectual, moral, organisational and political capacities. That underlines the development of the subjective factor in tandem with the objective factor, an actively democratic self-socialisation from below that gives subjective force to capital’s objective socialisation. The virtues as character traits, dispositions and capacities are thus developed within working class associations as communities of practice aimed directly against the competitive individualism of capitalist society. In piecing together what capital has torn asunder, tapping into the deep, shared and growing need for sociality, the working class recover not just the physical commons from capitalist enclosure, but the political and ethical commons too. In the process, we come to leave the intractable debates and irresolvable struggles of capital’s political and moral marketplace behind.

This awareness lay behind Marx’s involvement in the ‘creation of an independent organisation of the workers’ party.’ (Marx 1973b: 324). Insisting upon the principle of proletarian self-emancipation, Marx understood that socialism could only emerge out of sectional and fragmented struggles. Without a cohering principle, such struggles could neither achieve unity nor attain the perspective of totality required for an effective and enduring transformation putting an end to the capital relation. Marx anticipated the rise of what he called ‘workers’ dictators’ to lead socialism and give it the necessary central principle that, in their fragmented condition, workers’ sectionalism could not supply. (Lih 2006: 556). Marx rejected these views. He nevertheless argued for the workers to convert their sectional economic struggle and movement into a general political struggle and movement, thereby integrating the below of spontaneity with the above of organisation. He thus emphasized ‘the concept of leadership won on the basis of performance in the class struggle.’ (Molyneux 1986: 17). In contrast to the sectarians who sought to prescribe action and movement in accordance with abstract principle, Marx looked ‘among the genuine elements of the class movement for the real basis of his agitation.’ (Marx 1987c: 111-112). 

Marx’s political practice, both in the 1840s leading up to 1848 and the year of revolutions, and in the period of the First International, demonstrate his concern with aiding working class struggle, self-activity and self-organisation. He continued to insist on the principle of proletarian self-emancipation to the end of his life, emphasizing it in the criticisms he made of the newly formed SPD in the Circular Letter to Bebel, Liebknecht, Bracke, et al.

For almost forty years we have stressed the class struggle as the most immediate driving power in history and, in particular, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as the great lever of the modern social upheaval; therefore it is impossible for us to ally ourselves with people who want to eliminate this class struggle from the movement. When the International was formed, we expressly formulated the battle-cry: the emancipation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself. We cannot ally ourselves, therefore, with people who openly declare that the workers are too uneducated to free themselves and must first be liberated from above by philanthropic big bourgeois and petty bourgeois. If the new party organ assumes a position which corresponds to the opinions of those gentlemen, which is bourgeois and not proletarian, then nothing remains, much though we should regret it, but to declare publicly our opposition to it and to abandon the solidarity with which we have hitherto represented the German party abroad. We hope, however, that it will not come to this.

Marx CL 1974: 375

I developed Marx’s emphasis upon proletarian self-emancipation in my book The Proletarian Public: The Practice of Proletarian Self-Emancipation (1996). Here, I examined the practice, the experience and the ideas of Industrial Unionism, Tom Mann, James Connolly, French Revolutionary Syndicalism (Pelloutier, Lagardelle), Rosa Luxemburg, Anton Pannekoek, Council Communism, ending with a large chapter on Gramsci’s words and deeds with respect to the factory council movement. In various forms, these movements and figures gave a practical demonstration of how the socialist society of the future could be constituted as a proletarian public order concerned to contest structures and institutions of power within capitalist society. I wrote the book years before I immersed myself in Greek and German philosophy. My first degree is in history and I had intended to turn these notes into a thesis on the proletarian transformation of the political. Instead, I got deeper into the philosophical origins of Marx’s socialism. And having philosophized at length for years, I return to my starting point – socialism and the working class in struggle. Here was Marx’s bridge between contemplation and action.

Georg Lukács grasps this dimension of Marx when he points to the creation of workers’ councils or soviets in class struggle as ‘already essentially the weapons of the proletariat organising itself as a class’ in the process of overcoming the old state and the bourgeoisie. (Lukács 1970: 63). Such proletarian self-activity and self-organisation amounts to what Lukács argues in The Process of Democratisation as the political investment of civil society (1991). Such conciliar activity serves to bridge the gap between existing and future society, developing the socialist ‘ought’ within the ‘is’ of capitalist society by creating alternate, solidaristic, modes of political expression, socialisation and representation to counter prevailing bourgeois modes which reduce workers and citizens to ‘abstract individuals,’ consumers and voters with individual interests only. In contrast to bourgeois parliaments, which tend towards ‘disorganising’ the working class, the council form organises workers as ‘concrete human beings who occupy specific positions within social production,’ and thus represent an organic attempt emerging from within the working class to ‘counteract this [atomizing] process.’ (Lukács 1970: 65-66). Lukács thus presents such conciliar modes of organisation as working class associations and institutions which establish a political and ethical basis from which to criticise, resist and overthrow the alienated systems of politics, production and power within capitalist society. Thus, whilst Lukács argues that ‘class consciousness is the “ethics” of the proletariat’ and is politically expressed through ‘the party’ (Lukács 1971: 41-42), this party and ethics are both firmly grounded in working class self-activity and self-organisation.

That’s a view confirmed by Antonio Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks, where he writes that ‘the scientific base for a morality of historical materialism is to be looked for .. in the affirmation that “society does not pose for itself tasks the conditions for whose resolution do not already exist.” Where these conditions exist ‘the solution of the tasks becomes “duty”, “will” becomes free’”. (Gramsci 1971: 409-410).

Here my argument comes full circle. I began with Marx’s taking of the idea of ‘rational freedom’ from Hegel and have traced this theme throughout. Gramsci took up Hegelian philosopher Benedetto Croce’s idea of ‘ethico-political history,’ where Croce, as a liberal, sought to place individual agency at the centre of the historical process. That is what Marx did with Hegel, not rejecting the principle of individual freedom but radicalizing it, concretizing it and socializing it. Marx showed how rational freedom took fullest form in the socialist society. Arguing that a genuine Marxism ‘does not exclude ethico-political history,’ Gramsci addressed the practical question of how to convert ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ from being an abstract principle to being the concrete end of action and, from there, the organising principle of a viable socialist order. (Gramsci 1995: 329 345-346 357 360; Gramsci 1977: 68). There is no abstract assertions of Platonic philosopher-rulers here, but a hard-headed concern with the realities of political practice. Gramsci asks: ‘How are the immense social forces unleashed by the war to be harnessed?’ This is a variant in context of Marx’s old questions of how social relations escape human control and comprehension, and how we can bring them within democratic reach. Gramsci answers that ‘the socialist state exists potentially in the institutions of social life characteristic of the exploited working class.’ (Gramsci, 1977, p65). These associations of the working class are thus the socialist ‘ought to be’ in the process of becoming within the capitalist ‘is.’ 

In grounding social transformation within the practical struggle, social movement and collective action of the working class, Marx achieved the intertwining of politics and ethics that overcomes the abstraction – and in their abstraction, the contradictions – of both within capitalist society and the bourgeois academy and parliament. In the process, the normative dimension of ‘rational’ politics is recovered at the same time as the practical political dimension of ethics is recovered, morality becoming practical and worldly at the same time that politics comes to be remoralised. 

If liberals are horrified at the prospect, Marx’s key point is that such sensitive, but uncomprehending, souls, concerned with an authoritarian political imposition on individual freedom, are utterly insensitive when it comes to the real encroachment upon freedom on the part of the external constraint of the capital system. Liberals, Marx shows, find real morality and real community ‘simply incomprehensible,’ for the very reason that, presuming the atomized individualism of modern society as natural, they can only see such common codes, purposes and constraints, as authoritarian. They are curiously blind to the external constraint upon individuals as a result of capital’s systemic force. The problem, Marx explains, is that bourgeois social relations have made morality and community unavailable in anything but abstract forms, hence they cannot but appear to ‘free’ individuals, outside of collective struggle, to be authoritarian and artificial impositions of unity. Marx overcomes such abstraction to make morality and community available in real social forms. Those forms are not liberal. But they are not on that account illiberal. Read how Marx converts political emancipation into human emancipation in general (Marx EW OJQ 1975), and one comes to appreciate his communism as post-liberal. 

Under communism, the normative dimension of politics is neither an abstract nor authoritarian imperative imposed from above upon individuals in accordance with a priori principles of a disembodied reason. That’s a liberal view of morality and politics that sounds much more like Kant or, even more, like John Rawls and his Archimedean point and veil of ignorance. Marx sees a socialist morality as an embedded, practical morality emerging from the process of working class consciousness. The socialist ethic proceeds hand in hand with the scientific critique of capitalist political economy As Michael Löwy argues: 





A real infused with the ideal, a practice that is principled. Collective action, practical struggle and social movement on the part of the working class reveal the truth about capitalist freedom, establish the material and moral basis for the condemnation of capitalist exploitation and alienation, and engender the organisational forms to contest capitalist relations. In creating the concrete forms of resistance and converting them into the forms of conscious democratic socialisation, the working class give material embodiment to the old Hegelian idea of future society as the means in the process of becoming the end, the end here being the socialist society. In contrast, the sad state of modern political economy, political philosophy and moral theory, with their interminable debates, endless claim and counter-claim, degenerating into despair and pointlessness, is an all too true reflection of our disinherited, demoralized, and alienated existence within capitalist relations. Not for no reason did Marx write a book called The Poverty of Philosophy. Marx was not content to write books about the disenchanted world of capital, bemoaning meaninglessness, issuing a general invitation into despair; he was against such idle intellectualizing and lamentation. The solution to the problems of philosophy do not lie in the academy. Instead, Marx developed a critique of the contradictory dynamics of the capital system that was simultaneously scientific and ethical. Which is to say, locating the problem in the alienated system of production, and finding the solution in the collective struggles of workers against such alienation, Marx overcame abstraction, rejected the endless interpreting of the world, and put politics and ethics together within working class communities of practice. You can all join in, worldchanging is a team-sport, and there’s a place on the team for everyone.
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